I have tried a variety of practices and understandings from schools and took only what fitted my path and kept the remainder at arms length. So don’t adhere to a belief system. — Punshhh

Au contraire my friend. Is this not a belief system in and of itself? "Momentary (or perhaps rather conditional) utilitarianism"? Sure this might be watered down or reduced to mere "common sense" and "logic" itself. But it remains a system, whether ingrained to all intelligent, thinking beings or naturally adopted by such out of necessity, it remains a system in its own right and of its own merit.

I did say;
‘ I don’t hold beliefs other than what beliefs are necessary to live a life.’

So here is my belief system. Also beliefs are intellectually defined and held positions, or loyalties. I am relegating such things to the chitta chatta of my mind while continuing to go about living my life.

I did say;
‘ I don’t hold beliefs other than what beliefs are necessary to live a life.’ — Punshhh

That much should have been unmistakable. For that I apologize. You must understand, I rarely have the gall to interject myself into such established arguments (60 pages and counting!) unless, shall we say, the wine glass has been broken out. :smile:

That said, however. That said. This sentence of yours is interesting. One might consider such a sentence to be superfluous considering, surely, there are people alive, perhaps even living quite well, who don't hold the beliefs you do. Are there not? It's just interesting, is all. Not to deviate, but only an interesting short thought experiment in the context that it relates to the overarching theme of the discussion, of course.

So, I suppose, not to nitpick, but for debate for debate sake, one might ask, what are these beliefs "necessary to live a life" you hold, specifically and in detail? Are you certain all people living life hold them as well? Could they not have different interpretations that fundamentally change the idea of such concepts from your own? :chin:

Also beliefs are intellectually defined and held positions, or loyalties. — Punshhh

Loyalty, eh. Heh. Sorry. such terms distract me due to the complex history of my own life experience. I might say, for some, loyalty exists only in the form of distraction from willfully and intentionally placed fear, often from the same person who claims to relieve such. Ah, no matter. Ignore that. For now.

I am relegating such things to the chitta chatta of my mind while continuing to go about living my life. — Punshhh

Aren't we all, more or less? :grin:

chitta chatta — Punshhh

This is a 'yogic pun', of course. In Eastern philosophy 'citta' is variously translated as 'mind', 'heart', or 'being'. According to the classical texts of yoga, the citta (mind-stream) is continuously disturbed or polluted by sense-impressions, cravings, longings, memories of past traumas and so on, which manifest as 'vritti', thought-forms or disturbances. The yogic aspirant aims for the stilling of these vritti, hence the long and arduous periods of 'dhyana' (meditation) and entering states of inner stillness (samadhi). A higher state of samadhi is called 'nirvikalpa', where 'nir-' means ' negation of' and 'vikalpa' are 'discriminative ideas'. So, the negation of thought-forms and inner stillness. Very far from my normal busy mind.

So are we not forced to admit, insofar as Kant offers no definition of what a noumenon is, offers no descriptions of what a noumenon would be like, but authorizes (B115) its validity as a mere possible, non-contradictory, conception, there can be no talk of noumena as such, but only the conception itself, represented by that word, which is actually nothing other than talk of the modus operandi of the faculty of understanding in opposition to its own rules? — Mww

I think this is a very important point. "Noumena" for Kant is analogous to "matter" for Aristotle. They are strictly conceptual, not referring to any independent thing as people are inclined to believe. But "matter" is more like the limit of conception, the closest we can come to contradiction without crossing that boundary. Then many people assume these concepts to be a description of some independent feature of reality. But they are not descriptions at all, just concepts which somehow represent what cannot be described.

One might consider such a sentence to be superfluous considering, surely, there are people alive, perhaps even living quite well, who don't hold the beliefs you do. — Outlander

Surely you understand that each individual is a unique person in a unique position. The majority of the beliefs which are necessary for me to live my life are probably not even similar to the beliefs necessary for you to live your life. That's how varied life actually is, because we adapt ourselves to our environment, which itself is extremely varied.

I think this is a very important point. "Noumena" for Kant is analogous to "matter" for Aristotle. They are strictly conceptual, not referring to any independent thing as people are inclined to believe. But "matter" is more like the limit of conception, the closest we can come to contradiction without crossing that boundary. Then many people assume these concepts to be a description of some independent feature of reality. But they are not descriptions at all, just concepts which somehow represent what cannot be described. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is a stretch too far. We can -- and do -- measure matter. For Noumena there is nothing to say anything about. The very idea of noumena (negative only) is an adumbration of a null concept.

It is fully understandable why people repeatedly misconstrue what Kant meant as it is fairly obvious and fairly obtuse at the same time.

You must understand, I rarely have the gall to interject myself into such established arguments (60 pages and counting!) unless, shall we say, the wine glass has been broken out. :smile:

No worries, I enjoy what you write.

One might consider such a sentence to be superfluous considering, surely, there are people alive, perhaps even living quite well, who don't hold the beliefs you do.

I was using the phrase to say that I hold as few beliefs as I can get away with. I would rather do away with the word completely, but I accept it is used a lot, with various meanings. So I try to keep it to precise definitions where it is used. Janus was asking about my beliefs, which is why I wrote that post and explained how I arrive at intellectual and other positions without having beliefs about them.

Loyalty, eh. Heh. Sorry. such terms distract me due to the complex history of my own life experience.

I seem to have lived a charmed life and often realise that others have had more complex and, or traumatic, conflicted lives. I realise how fortunate I am in this regard and yet still have all the usual emotional, anxiety, confidence hang ups that most people have. Even after many years of defusing and attending to them.

I know a person who always has something to worry about, sometimes he does actuality have a problem, even though often I can see that he caused it himself. Made a rod for his own back, so to speak. Now he has retired and shouldn’t have a care in the world. But is still just as worried, seems to have the weight of the world on his shoulders at times. But it is all of his own making and it doesn’t matter what you say to him, he never reaches the point where it is sorted out and he can just sit back and enjoy life.

This is a 'yogic pun', of course.

Pun is in my name (;-)

Yes. That's the pun-ch line :rofl:

"Noumena" for Kant is analogous to "matter" for Aristotle. They are strictly conceptual, not referring to any independent thing as people are inclined to believe. — Metaphysician Undercover

A20/B34 (in the Transcendental Aesthetic): Kant says that in appearances there is “that which corresponds to sensation (the matter)” and “that which allows the manifold of appearance to be ordered in certain relations (the form).”

Here he is explicit: sensation provides the matter of appearances, while space and time are the form in which that matter is ordered.

This is Kant’s way of transposing the Aristotelian hylē–morphē distinction into the transcendental register: not about substances in the world, but about the conditions under which appearances are given to us. Konstantin Pollok has even described Kant’s position as “transcendental hylomorphism,” where the form/matter schema of Aristotelian philosophy is reworked at the transcendental level (ref).

"Noumena" for Kant is analogous to "matter" for Aristotle. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps; you’re more qualified to say than I. If I were to guess, though, I’d probably go with “substance” in Kant relates to “matter” in Aristotle.

If it is true in Aristotle matter acquires form to become particular substance, and because it is true in Kant matter acquires form to become particular phenomena, then original to both is matter, which leaves Kantian noumena, as it relates to matter, out in the cold…...right where it’s supposed to be.

But I don’t know how Aristotle treats matter at its inception, so….
————-

Then many people assume these concepts to be a description of some independent feature of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

If only those many people would just study the damn book. One does not have to accept what he’s saying, but should comprehend the point he’s making, the major premise in the “ground of the division of all objects”.

That is a stretch too far. We can -- and do -- measure matter. — I like sushi

There is a large variety of things which we measure, and each has a name. There is also a variety of different types of measurements. I've never heard anyone claim to be measuring matter. What type of measurement do you think that would be?

Here he is explicit: sensation provides the matter of appearances, while space and time are the form in which that matter is ordered. — Wayfarer

I wouldn't say that this is explicit. "Form" and "matter" are terms you apply in your interpretation. Aristotelian terms do not correlate very well to Kantian terms, because Kant did not stay true to the Aristotelian structure. Aristotle was explicit in defining "form" with actuality, and "matter" with potential. But Kant blurs the boundary of separation with concepts like "forms of sensibility". Notice that "sensibility" is a potential, so his structure has 'forms of potential'. In this way Kant allows potential (matter perhaps) into the mind, as the a priori intuitions. But Kant is proposing a new way of dealing with the age old active-passive intellect dilemma. The need for "noumena" demonstrates that Kant's proposal, though novel, is not conclusive.

Looking at your statement now, you say "space and time are the form". And, yes, they are the "form", by Kant's words, but they are the form of sensibility, which makes this supposed "form" a potential, inconsistent with Aristotle. And, as potential, these forms of sensibility, space and time, do not possess the principle of activity which is required to order matter. So Kant's proposed system lacks this required principle of activity.

Notice it is "that which corresponds to sensation" which you give the name "matter" to, but in the Aristotelian hylomorphism, it is the form of the particular, not the matter, which is supposed to correspond. Because the form is received in abstraction, it is necessary that there is something passive, potential, within the intellect. That is the passive intellect, which gave the scholastics all the problems, because they wanted the intellect to be purely actual, an independent form, to support absolute knowledge, the afterlife etc.. The passive aspect for Kant is the a priori intuitions, space and time.

If it is true in Aristotle matter acquires form to become particular substance, and because it is true in Kant matter acquires form to become particular phenomena, then originally to both is matter, which leaves Kantian noumena, as it relates to matter, out in the cold…...right where it’s supposed to be. — Mww

I'd agree with this. The difference between Kant and Aristotle then, seems to be that "particular phenomena", for Kant is occurring within the mind, whereas Aristotle has instances of "particular substance" independent from the mind, things with an identity. The reality of the "particular substance" is supported by the concept of matter for Aristotle. Since Kant places the potential, which Aristotle assigned to matter, into the mind, as the conditions for the possibility of phenomena, there is no need for the concept of matter. The a priori intuitions take the place of matter. Therefore that entire Aristotelian world view, this assumption about 'the external', that it consists of particular instances of substance, things with an Aristotelian identity by the law of identity, supported by "matter", is thrown aside, to be replaced with "noumena".

If only those many people would just study the damn book. One does not have to accept what he’s saying, but should comprehend the point he’s making, the major premise in the “ground of the division of all objects”. — Mww

Philosophy, metaphysics and ontology especially, is extremely complex and difficult. A great philosopher is very difficult to understand, requiring much study, and usually subject to an array of different interpretations. However, what generally happens is that a very simple interpretation starts to develop, which clings to specific terms, and since it is simple and easy to understand it rapidly gains in popularity, becoming the conventional understanding of that philosophy. Of course "simple" is the converse of "complex" so the conventional understanding is never very adequate, or properly representative.

A good example is Plato, and Platonism. The simple, conventional interpretation, known as Platonism, holds that Plato promoted the philosophy of independent ideas like mathematical objects, derived from Pythagorean idealism. However, a thorough reading of Plato will reveal that he actually rejected this Pythagorean idealism, and provided refutation of it in his later writings. But even in those ancient days there was divisiveness as to what principles constituted "Platonism". Aristotle, whom many argue was a true Platonist continued with the refutation of Pythagorean idealism, while the Neo-Platonists, who maintained the "Platonist" name, persisted in promoting Pythagorean idealism.

There is a large variety of things which we measure, and each has a name. There is also a variety of different types of measurements. I've never heard anyone claim to be measuring matter. What type of measurement do you think that would be? — Metaphysician Undercover

Kilograms. That is how we do physics.

Kilograms. That is how we do physics. — I like sushi

Telegram from the future. He will reply something along the lines of "weight is not mass, neither is size, necessarily". And likely how mass is merely a phenomenon of gravity or some business like that.

How do you measure a 6 inch solid stone and a 6' empty box? There are dimensions and weight. And the two computed together do offer more or less the mass of such, but there's no reliable measurement because it wouldn't mean anything effectual or useful but for physical beings in a physical world of elements that only care about size and weight.

It's like stepping off into the void into a world where everything is different. It's just not something many people do because, by all observable information, would be a waste of time.

For example, antimatter is a thing that exists, mostly in space. It basically defies all definition of matter, while at the same time technically obeying all the rules, just, per se, it's own special version of said rules.

Still, antimatter is a thing that exists so it's not "nothing" as in lack of something, per se, therefore, in some usages of the word, is still matter that cannot be measured by traditional means.

Aristotle has instances of "particular substance" independent from the mind, things with an identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is this to say, in Aristotle things come with identity?

Identity being what a thing is, in Kant, identity is assigned to things, not for what it is, but for as what it is to be known. The so-called, and mistakenly labeled “Copernican Revolution”, although he would probably cringe at hearing it called out as such.

….usually subject to an array of different interpretations… — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely. Hopefully, in such case, there’s a common ground, an unarguable starting point, from which the divergences can be reconciled.
————-

A good example is Plato, and Platonism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Good synopsis. Thanks for that.

Kilograms. That is how we do physics. — I like sushi

Sure, i see a lot of things weighed in kilograms, but never matter. As I said, I've never heard of anyone trying to measure something called matter. I've seen people measuring and weighing all sorts of different things, but I've never heard of someone measuring something they call matter. Tell me where you think you might find matter being weighed in kilograms. I know a number of physicists, and never heard them talk about weighing matter.

Is this to say, in Aristotle things come with identity? — Mww

That's right one of the things Aristotle is famous for, is the law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself". This law puts the identity of a thing within the thing itself, rather than something which we say about the thing. Hegel was very critical of that law.

Identity being what a thing is, in Kant, identity is assigned to things, not for what it is, but for as what it is to be known. — Mww

This is how "identity" is commonly understood today, as what we assign to a thing in knowing it. But Plato showed how sophists abused this principle, because it annihilates the separation between what we say about things, and how things truly are. Truth gets dissolved into justification when we have no principles which stipulate that there is such a thing as the way something really is. So when a thing's identity is simply what we say about the thing, then as long as it is accepted conventionally (justified), then it is the truth, because there is no such thing as an independent "the way that the thing is".

That is why Aristotle insisted on the law of identity, which tells us that even though we don't necessarily know the way that a thing really is independently of us, there is such a thing. It sort of puts truth out of our grasp, but recognizes that there is such a thing. The ontological ramification is that this divides the assumed independent reality into a multiplicity of particular things, each with its own identity. Then those who hold "the One" as first principle would need to support this proposed unity. Kant's use of "noumena" and "noumenon", indicates that he supports this multiplicity of things. However, his principles sort of disallow us from even having that knowledge, of whether the assumed independent reality is simply one, or a multiplicity.

What happened with Whitehead, and process philosophy in general, is that when the supposed independent reality is understood to consist of process (consistent with "energy" as the basic foundation), then principles are required to explain and understand divisions and separations, individuation in general, because it\s all one big process. Then it becomes very difficult for process philosophy to explain why we perceive separations, and divisions which constitute individual things. However, substance philosophy really does not have any advantage in this matter, because they still have no principle to account for why we perceive individual things. Substance philosophy just takes the existence of individuals for granted, by the law of identity. But until we question this, what we take for granted, we won't figure out why we perceive individuals. Maybe, since things are supposed to have a 'centre of gravity', it has something to do with gravity, whatever that is.

This is a gross misunderstanding if you are referring to Kant. There is no bifurcation at all. — I like sushi

This is a gross, unargued bare assertion. Do an internet search on 'two worlds theory vs two aspects theory in Kant scholarship'. You might learn something.

I would like to offer, for your consideration, the idea, the interpretation, that Kant isn’t talking about noumena at all. He is talking about the faculty of understanding, and its proclivity for exceeding its warrant, such warrants having already been specified in preceding sections of his critical theory. — Mww

It is a tautology that we cannot know things in themselves if 'thing in itself' is defined as what we cannot know, which is the same as to say that all we can cognize are phenomena, and the idea of noumena represents the 'ultimate or true nature of things', which we cannot perceive, but can only speculate about.

So, no one in their right mind would claim that we can know what is defined as that which we cannot know. The thing is though that we can speculate, makes inferences, about the nature of things in themselves or noumena from what we know of phenomena.

So, Kant says that things in themselves cannot exist in space and time. It is true, again by definition, that things in themselves cannot exist in our perceptual space and time, if things in themselves are defined as whatever lies beyond the possibility of human cognition. On the other hand, we can think and speak in a different register and say that things in themselves (things which have their own mind-independent existence) just are what appear to us as phenomena. Interpreted the situation thus we can be said to know things in themselves but only as they appear to us, not as they are in themselves.

Then we are not struggling with an explicitly dualist view, because the things that appears to us are the same things that have their own existence apart from our perceptions of them, it is just that all we can know of them are their perceptible qualities.

Then we can speculate that things in themselves may exist in their own space and time, which cannot be proven but which seems most plausible since an undifferentiated thing in itself that purportedly gives rise to our experience of a spatiotemporal world seems far less plausible than things which have their own existence as different from all other things. For a start "giving rise" implies causation or at least "providing the conditions". How could something completely undifferentiated cause to exist, or provide the conditions for, anything differentiated. To me that idea makes no sense at all.

When it comes down to speculating about noumena or things in themselves there can be no discernible fact of the matter which could confirm or disconfirm any conjectures, so it comes down to what each of us might find to be the most useful and/or plausible way of thinking and talking about them.

My beef is with the dogmatic "thought police" prescriptions about what we can and cannot coherently think and talk about. For me it makes no sense to say "of course things have their own existence independent of any mind in the empirical sense, but not in the transcendental sense'. I see this prescription as dogmatic because there can be no strictly determinable transcendental sense.

If Kant is not positing that there is something which gives rise to phenomena then his position is no different than Phenomenalism.

. I don’t hold beliefs other than what beliefs are necessary to live a life. However I lead a life informed by what I have discovered or adopted as a practice for a period of time. — Punshhh

Without some criteria to determine what belongs in that category I could say that anything I believe is necessary to live a life. Strictly speaking, to live a life all I need to believe are things relating to the "necessities' of life, and spiritual growth is not one of them, certainly not for most people. Of course you can say it is necessary for you―but perhaps that is just because you have come to think it is necessary for you, that is you have come to believe it.

You say you have discovered things and/ or adapted things as a practice, but you wouldn't waste your time if you didn't believe in the truth of those discoveries, or the efficacy of those practices.

Belief is not that hard to define―anything you are committed to holding as being true is a belief.

Noumena are not things-in-themselves. You stated:

I don't hold to a two worlds conception of nature. There is only one world. As I said before I don't accept the bifurcation of nature into phenomena and noumena. — Janus

Maybe you simply mispoke and meant 'phenomena and things-in-themselves'? If so no big deal :)

I am asserting that there are people who misunderstand the difference between 'things-in-themselves' and 'noumena'. I am also asserting -- having read Kant quite thoroughly -- that it makes no sense to talk of a 'bifurcation of nature' between 'phenomena and noumena'. That is very much a gross misunderstanding, but a very common one.

I am asserting that there are people who misunderstand the difference between 'things-in-themselves' and 'noumena'. — I like sushi

What is the difference between noumena and things in themselves according to you?

I am also asserting -- having read Kant quite thoroughly -- that it makes no sense to talk of a 'bifurcation of nature' between 'phenomena and noumena'. That is very much a gross misunderstanding, but a very common one. — I like sushi

A bare assertion is not sufficient. Why does it make no sense to talk of a bifurcation of nature between phenomena and noumena? You say to think that is a common misunderstanding―do you mean among the population of amateur philosophers or do you mean among Kant scholars. Are you a Kant scholar?

If a 'two worlds' reading of Kant in regards to things as experienced and things in themselves is a coherent and consistent interpretation of Kant's philosophy, then as far as I can that would entail a bifurcation of nature.

I don't care so much about the fine points of Kantian terminology, I am more interested in the substance of his arguments. If a world of things in themselves gives rise to a world of things as they appear to us, then that would seem to posit two very different worlds―one we cannot have access to at all, and one we do access. If the world we inhabit (the empirical world) is an "idea" or "representation" as Schopenhauer reckons is the logical conclusion of Kant's system even though Kant may not have explicitly said so, and the world we have no access to is the objectively real world in itself, then which is the real world and which the ideal. I always thought Kant had this backwards, and I have also read a considerable amount of, and about, Kant.

If we want to say that the world of appearances just is nature (for us at least) then we do find a bifurcation even in the 'two aspect' interpretation, or so it seems to me. I say this because, unless we opt for sheer phenomenalism or Hegelian absolute idealism, we are positing that nature is for us divided into what we have access to and what we don't, and this is still a kind of dualism for all intents and purposes.

What is the difference between noumena and things in themselves according to you? — Janus

Phenomena is everything grounded in our sensibility.

Noumena is not Phenomena.

Things-in-themselves are the intuitively inpenetrable 'whereness' of Phenomena. Scare quotes to denote how it makes little sense to talk of something meaningless to space and time.

I think that is as simple as I can express Kant's view.

The subtle difference in meaning between things-in-themselves is the approach. Noumena is conceptually useful as a limitation whereas things-in-themselves helps to appreciate the aboutness of phenomena as our means of knowing the nature of existence.

A lot of this makes more sense form a phenomenological perspective (which is how I originally approached academic philosophy). Consciousness is 'of something' (the intentional), so if you follow that line of thinking further down the track you presume a grounding function.

If you have literally no interest in phenomenology then I can see how none of the above would serve any purpose nor inspire you to look further. I draw the line at people like Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida myself. If you draw it at Kant so be it. It would be a pretty boring world if we all looked at things in the same way :)

and this is still a kind of dualism for all intents and purposes. — Janus

Someone may perhaps say the same as to your position and say for all intents and purposes it is just a kind of solipsism. I would not say this -- or what you say above -- are at all charitable in terms of interpretation.

If you refuse to believe he meant noumena as a negative concept, and that things-in-themselves was used as a means of distinguishing the subtle difference between 'unknown,' unknownable' and 'nothing' that is your choice I guess.

It is absolutely skirting on the fringes of useful language and is only likley to serve you if you hold a certain view. Much like those who study Heidegger, Derrida, Deleuze and Foucault are happy to frolic in their obtuse verbosity I am not. Regardless, I find them of negative interest and can take something away from reading them.

I’m freeing myself from belief. Yes beliefs in their barest form as you define them are used and required in carrying out the necessities of life.
But why taint the rest of one’s interests with it. It ties one to a rigidity of thought and confines one to a hierarchy of sorts of what is true, or not true. One is then tied to these conclusions and loyalties.

In the practice I describe, such rigidity is stifling. In order to develop a sensitivity to nature and a wisdom regarding reality. It is important to free the mind(not just the intellectual parts), from this and become receptive to more subtle activity in one’s life and surroundings. Yes there is thinking, analysis and the development of philosophies, ideologies, after the fact. But this is as I say secondary and only provides a helpful feedback where appropriate to the sense of communion I describe.
To insist that belief plays a role in this is to imply a role played by the ego and thinking processes and their conclusions. But, it is primary to remove this aspect of being from the practice prior to and in order to carry it out.

It is an act of being, akin to the act of being, with presence, practiced all the time by our cousins, the plants and animals. Who don’t have the intellectual mind, to confuse the issue.

Of course you can say it is necessary for you―but perhaps that is just because you have come to think it is necessary for you, that is you have come to believe it.

It is not necessary to live a life, so does not come under the purview of necessary beliefs. It is an interest, a leisure, pursuit, an interest.

There is a guiding process going on, but it is intuitive, not rational. Is there a necessity for intuitive activity in the mind to require beliefs? In order to carry out its intuiting?

Then we are not struggling with an explicitly dualist view, because the things that appears to us are the same things that have their own existence apart from our perceptions of them — Janus

Agreed; no struggle.

Then we can speculate that things in themselves may exist in their own space and time, which cannot be proven but which seems most plausible… — Janus

Agreed, given the conditions which make that speculation plausible. It just isn’t a Kantian speculation and to which I only object because I think it is being made to look like it. In this particular speculation, while Kant also cannot prove things-in-themselves may exist in their own space and time, he only has to prove they cannot, in order for his entire metaphysical thesis with respect to human knowledge, to have an empirical limit. And he does exactly that, by proving….transcendentally….that space and time belong to the cognizing subject himself, which makes the existence of things in them, impossible.
————-

For me it makes no sense to say "of course things have their own existence independent of any mind in the empirical sense, but not in the transcendental sense'. — Janus

Agreed, in principle, for the transcendental sense has nothing whatsoever to do with the empirical domain of things, that belonging to understanding alone as reference to causality. It follows it is just as true things have their own existence independent of any mind in a transcendental sense, as it does in an empirical sense. All of which is quite beside the point, insofar as all which concerns us as knowing subjects, is any of that which is entirely dependent on the mind.
—————-

If Kant is not positing that there is something which gives rise to phenomena then his position is no different than Phenomenalism. — Janus

Dunno about all that, but it’s moot anyway, for he most certainly does posit something which gives rise to….makes possible the representation of…..phenomena. The whole 700-odd page critical treatise begins with it.
—————-

I would like to offer, for your consideration…. — Mww

I recognize nothing that hints you have considered, so I shall assume you’re not so inclined. Or you have and kept it to yourself. Which is fine; just thought you’d be interested.

Then we can speculate that things in themselves may exist in their own space and time... — Janus

The problem, is that science demonstrates to us, that at the very small scale, quantum particles, and at the very large scale, spatial expansion, our intuitions of space and time are highly inadequate for understanding the presumed things in themselves. So we ought to think of these intuitions, space and time, as useful and purposeful, and highly evolved, but most likely not representative of the supposed things in themselves, because they didn't evolve for that purpose. Then to "speculate that things in themselves may exist in their own space and time" is really misguided speculation, because the way that these supposed things in themselves actual exist is probably not at all similar to how we understand them, through the intuitions of space and time. Intuition is known to mislead.

When it comes down to speculating about noumena or things in themselves there can be no discernible fact of the matter which could confirm or disconfirm any conjectures, so it comes down to what each of us might find to be the most useful and/or plausible way of thinking and talking about them.

My beef is with the dogmatic "thought police" prescriptions about what we can and cannot coherently think and talk about. For me it makes no sense to say "of course things have their own existence independent of any mind in the empirical sense, but not in the transcendental sense'. I see this prescription as dogmatic because there can be no strictly determinable transcendental sense. — Janus

But the distinction isn’t a matter of “thought-police prescriptions.” It’s a matter of recognizing limits. The “transcendental sense” isn’t an extra layer of metaphysical speculation—it’s the recognition that our very categories of existence, objectivity, and independence only make sense within the framework of possible experience.

When you say “of course things exist independently of any mind,” you’re already employing the categories of existence and independence. The transcendental point is simply: those categories have meaning only in relation to a subject. It’s not dogma, but an analysis of how thought works.

So you’re right that there’s no empirical way to confirm or disconfirm claims about noumena—that’s precisely why Kant warns against treating them as if they were positive objects. The “transcendental sense” is not something determinable in the way empirical claims are; it’s the limit-condition that makes empirical determination possible at all.

You keep calling it “dogma,” but it seems to me the real issue is that you’re not willing to admit that our knowledge has limits. The transcendental distinction isn’t a prescription about what we’re allowed to think so much a recognition that our categories of thought don’t reach beyond the conditions of possible experience.

And I suspect the reason you push back so strongly is that you have an instinctive aversion to the very word transcendental—for you it smacks of “God talk,” which is why you keep insisting it must be dogmatic. But that’s really just your pre-existing conception of the question, not what’s actually at stake.

Besides, calling Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason “dogmatic” is wildly unjust. Dogma is the very last thing Kant wanted to propagate. His whole project was precisely the opposite: to dismantle dogmatism by showing that speculative claims about the world-in-itself go beyond what reason can justify. What you keep dismissing as “dogma” is in fact Kant’s attempt to set clear limits, so that reason doesn’t mistake its own constructions for knowledge of things as they are in themselves.

I don't see myself as one of the thought police on this forum. That honour goes to all of those who squeal every time the word 'transcendent' is so much as mentioned.

A lot of this makes more sense form a phenomenological perspective (which is how I originally approached academic philosophy). Consciousness is 'of something' (the intentional), so if you follow that line of thinking further down the track you presume a grounding function.

If you have literally no interest in phenomenology then I can see how none of the above would serve any purpose nor inspire you to look further. — I like sushi

Phenomenology intentionally brackets the question of the existence of an external world, and concerns itself with understanding the nature of human experience. Phenomenology can tell us nothing about metaphysics, as it is not in the business of speculation. As Husserl declared: "to the things themselves"( the "things" here being 'things as we experience them'. It is the accumulation of scientific knowledge that places us in a better position to make plausible metaphysical inferences to the best explanation.

When Kant says we cannot know noumena or how things exist in themselves as opposed to how they exist for us, he is basing that on a consideration of only what we can via reflection on perceptual experience, establish that we can have direct cognitive access to. And yet he acknowledges, in order to escape Berkelyan idealism or Humean phenomenalism, that in order for there to be appearances there must be "something" that appears. It is the nature of that "something" which concerned traditional speculative metaphysics, which relied on the idea that intellectual intuition as to the nature of things is possible. Kant debunked this idea, and yet still wished to say what could not be the case with things in themselves or noumena.

If we have no cognitive access to that "something" are we nonetheless able to coherently speculate as to the nature of its existence? Of course we are. But what will be the best guide to such speculation? Intuition? Imagination? Common sense? Everyday experience? Science? I would say common sense, everyday experience and science are the best guides as to what metaphysical speculations are most plausible. It remains, though, that metaphysical questions are not strictly decidable, since any proposed thesis is neither logically provable or empirically demonstrable.

Then we can speculate that things in themselves may exist in their own space and time, which cannot be proven but which seems most plausible…
— Janus

Agreed, given the conditions which make that speculation plausible. It just isn’t a Kantian speculation and to which I only object because I think it is being made to look like it. In this particular speculation, while Kant also cannot prove things-in-themselves may exist in their own space and time, he only has to prove they cannot, in order for his entire metaphysical thesis with respect to human knowledge, to have an empirical limit. And he does exactly that, by proving….transcendentally….that space and time belong to the cognizing subject himself, which makes the existence of things in them, impossible. — Mww

I wasn't attempting to make it look like a Kantian speculation. On the other hand, I think there are inconsistencies in Kant. "Things in themselves" is the idea that there is more than just one thing that appears to us as the stupendous diversity of phenomena. Schopenhauer took him to task on this very point ( not saying I agree with Schopenhauer's "solution"). The point is that we cannot make sense of a single something appearing to us as a diversity of commonly perceived phenomena.

You say that Kant "proves" that things-in-themselves cannot exist in space and time, when all he can prove if anything is that they don't exist (and that proof by mere definition) in our perceptual space and time.

All of which is quite beside the point, insofar as all which concerns us as knowing subjects, is any of that which is entirely dependent on the mind. — Mww

I agree that as knowing subjects that is all that concerns us. But we can also know what seems most plausible to us when it comes to questions concerning speculative matters which are strictly both logically and empirically undecidable, since such speculating and weighing of what seems most plausible is also entirely a function of the mind. I say "function of the mind" rather than "entirely dependent on the mind", because the latter formulation may mislead into forgetting of experience.

See above.

I recognize nothing that hints you have considered, so I shall assume you’re not so inclined. Or you have and kept it to yourself. Which is fine; just thought you’d be interested. — Mww

Remember? “…I can think what I please, provided only that I do not contradict myself…”, which is precisely what understanding is doing, when empirical conceptions of possible objects arise from it alone, the empirical representation of which, from intuition, is entirely lacking. — Mww

I did not have the time to address that at the time. I say that speculative conceptions of the kind of bare bones in-themselves nature of the objects that appear to us as phenomena is not at all contradictory. That is just an interpretation-dependent stipulative judgement that I don't accept. It's all about what can make sense to talk about. Juts as I can sensibly talk about the things I perceive having an existence of their own, I can sensibly speculate about what the idea of such things seems to logically entail. "Things" implies differentiation and form, and differentiation implies space and time. If we are going to talk about things at all, then we should be consistent with what logic is implicit in thinking in terms of things. Of course thinking about things is based on concepts formed on account of the actual cognition of things. Then if we posit things beyond cognition we are in speculative territory. But if all such speculation is incoherent, or worse, contradictory, then forget about things in themselves altogether and go with absolute idealism or phenomenalism.

:up:

But the distinction isn’t a matter of “thought-police prescriptions.” It’s a matter of recognizing limits. — Wayfarer

Whose limits, and justified by appealing to what exactly?

When you say “of course things exist independently of any mind,” you’re already employing the categories of existence and independence. The transcendental point is simply: those categories have meaning only in relation to a subject. It’s not dogma, but an analysis of how thought works. — Wayfarer

No, it's a simple truism being unsupportedly amplified into a purported stricture. You simply have no warrant to pontificate on what may or may not have meaning to others. It's dogma, pure and simple, but I can't make you see that, you have to come to that realization yourself.

You even agree that it makes sense to say that things existed prior to humans. Then you go on to say it makes sense in an empirical context, but not in a transcendental context. I don't accept that bifurcation. "transcendental sense" is an artificial construct, which is neither logically nor empirically supported. So what is it supported by? If you say phenomenology I won't agree, because the whole remit of phenomenology consists in reflection the nature of experience. Science consists in investigation and analysis of the nature of the phenomena we experience. Phenomenology='What is the nature of experience ' and science= 'what is the nature of the things we experience'.

So you’re right that there’s no empirical way to confirm or disconfirm claims about noumena—that’s precisely why Kant warns against treating them as if they were positive objects. — Wayfarer

We need not talk about them at all except that it seems obvious, even to Kant, that if there are appearances there must be something that appears. What is the nature of that something about which we only know how it appears? It's not directly subject to investigation. But if there is something that appears we know how it appears.

And we know that the idea of something completely amorphous appearing as a world of diversity seems mighty implausible, actually makes no sense at all. If we want to speculate then I say that's the place to start. But I acknowledge we cannot say much, even about what seems most plausible. I also acknowledge that it doesn't really matter, it changes nothing about how we live our lives.

You keep calling it “dogma,” but it seems to me the real issue is that you’re not willing to admit that our knowledge has limits. — Wayfarer

If you think that it shows you don't read my posts closely. Of course I admit that our knowledge has limits, but I'm not a fan of pre-determining those limits. Of course we can talk about limits in tautologous way―once we conceive of objects as being "appearances for us" and "things in themselves" it is true by mere definition that if we define 'in itself' as what lies beyond 'how it appears' then we cannot have cognitive access to the in itself. But it doesn't follow logically that speculative talk about what it might be is meaningless.

And I suspect the reason you push back so strongly is that you have an instinctive aversion to the very word transcendental—for you it smacks of “God talk,” which is why you keep insisting it must be dogmatic. But that’s really just your pre-existing conception of the question, not what’s actually at stake. — Wayfarer

Here we go again with the psychological explanations! I don't so much object to the word 'transcendental' because we can only really reflect on what we experience and on what we can imagine. "The idea of transcendence just indicates that we must recognize that we don't know everything, and that we are bound to think that there must be something beyond what we experience and imagine. We inevitably imagine a transcendental world or aspect of the world that exists somehow apart from and independently of our world of cognitively apprehended objects.

The natural attitude, based on the fact of everyday experience that we all experience the same objects at the same times and places, is that those objects exist independently of our perception of them. That's really it. We don't know what that independent exist is like, we don't even know that there really is an independent existence. But phenomenalism explains nothing, so we are bound to think of an independent existence in some form or other.

Anything we think about it is more or less underdetermined. What thoughts are more determined and what less is the salient question. As Kant says, and @Mww quoted recently: "we can think whatever we like provided we don't contradict ourselves'. The thought that there is a god in whose mind all the objects we encounter exist is not logically contradictory, and nor is the idea of a mind-independent spatiotemporal world of real existents. Choose your poison. I know which I find the more plausible. But to repeat―it doesn't really matter, what matters is how well we live the lives we know we have.

I don't see myself as one of the thought police on this forum. That honour goes to all of those who squeal every time the word 'transcendent' is so much as mentioned. — Wayfarer

Of course you wouldn't see yourself as one of the thought-police. I have no argument with the idea of the transcendental per se. It's the way that some use it to push their dogma, and try to impose what I see as bullshit limits on what others can or should think that spurs me to respond.

Whose limits, and justified by appealing to what exactly? — Janus

Ours — the limits of human cognition. And justified by what? By the recognition that our categories of thought (existence, objectivity, causality, etc.) are the very means by which the world is knowable to us. To apply them beyond possible experience - to imagine a world as it would be outside any cognition of it - is to use them outside the domain in which they have sense. That’s the force of the transcendental distinction: not a ban on thinking, but a clarification of what kind of thinking makes sense.

What has never entered your mind is not anything, obviously. And when it has entered your mind, it has done so via the senses, and has been interpreted by your intellect. What is outside that, neither exists nor does not exist. It is not yet anything, but that doesn't mean it's nothing. This is not dogma.

You even agree that it makes sense to say that things existed prior to humans. Then you go on to say it makes sense in an empirical context, but not in a transcendental context. I don't accept that bifurcation. — Janus

It is not a 'bifurcation'. That term is usually associated with A N Whitehead and is a different matter. In fact, the division is between the world as known to us, and what you think it must be, beyond that.

It's dogma, pure and simple, but I can't make you see that, you have to come to that realization yourself. — Janus

I’m not laying down a stricture about what others may or may not think. I’m pointing out that when we use concepts like “existence” or “independence,” we are already relying on the framework of experience that gives those concepts their sense. That isn’t dogma — it’s analysis. To ignore that is not to be “freer” in one’s thinking, but simply to overlook the conditions that make thought coherent in the first place.

I don't so much object to the word 'transcendental' because we can only really reflect on what we experience and on what we can imagine.... — Janus

I don’t disagree except I’d stress that the “natural attitude” you invoke is exactly what phenomenology and Kantian critique are meant to interrogate. Yes, we all tacitly assume that the objects we encounter exist “anyway” and independently of perception. But to take that assumption as foundational is precisely to overlook the constitutive role played by the observer.

You’re right that phenomenalism explains nothing; but the transcendental approach is not phenomenalism. It’s not saying “objects are only in the mind,” but that our very idea of an “independent existence” is already framed by the categories through which we think. That’s why Kant speaks of “the transcendental” not as another realm to imagine, but as the condition that makes imagining and experience possible at all.

So I’d put it like this: you’re right that “it doesn’t really matter” whether we speculate about God or noumena. But it does matter whether we recognize the limits of our categories, because that recognition is the difference between naïve realism (taking the natural attitude as ultimate) and critical philosophy (understanding it as a conditioned and contingent reaiity).

Science consists in investigation and analysis of the nature of the phenomena we experience. Phenomenology='What is the nature of experience ' and science= 'what is the nature of the things we experience'. — Janus

Do you see the difference? Don't you think it's very significant? This is the subject of this quote, which I've posted quite a few times already, about Husserl's criticism of naturalism, from the Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology:

In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in any ontological sense—this would be a subjective idealism, itself a consequence of a certain naturalising tendency whereby consciousness is cause and the world its effect—but rather that the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness. Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role.

Why do you think Husserl says that conscious acta cannot be properly understood from with the natural outlook? Do you agree? Do you think it's significant?

Of course I admit that our knowledge has limits, but I'm not a fan of pre-determining those limits. Of course we can talk about limits in tautologous way―once we conceive of objects as being "appearances for us" and "things in themselves" it is true by mere definition that if we define 'in itself' as what lies beyond 'how it appears' then we cannot have cognitive access to the in itself. But it doesn't follow logically that speculative talk about what it might be is meaningless. — Janus

But it is likely to be dogmatic.

But it doesn't follow logically that speculative talk about what it might be is meaningless.
— Janus

But it is likely to be dogmatic.

This is why in mysticism the intellect, like the ego is held on a leash and is only of secondary importance (while acknowledging that they are necessary in the cogitation of experience).

The primary means is in seeking to develop the whole being. So that rather than to work out truths, one walks into/upon truths, as if to walk into a room, or through a door.

What has never entered your mind is not anything, obviously. And when it has entered your mind, it has done so via the senses, and has been interpreted by your intellect. What is outside that, neither exists nor does not exist. It is not yet anything, but that doesn't mean it's nothing. This is not dogma. — Wayfarer

This is what I see as the greatest difference between Kant and Plato. Unlike Kant, Plato allows that the human intellect can have direct access to what Kant calls noumena, the independent intelligible objects. By Platonic principles, human beings can receive ideas through means other than the senses. This is where "the good" plays its role, and Plato\s "good" is absent from Kant. The good is what is intended, or desired, and as such it does not yet have material existence, and cannot be sensed. Therefore the source of these ideas is not sensation.

The nature of "the good" is not well understood because it avoids the grasp of knowledge, by Plato's description. as prior to knowledge. It illuminates intelligible objects like the sun illuminates sensible objects. Notice that we do not consider ideas to be knowledge until they are justified by empirical principles. So human intention and desire will create all sorts of fanciful ideas which cannot be justified, and will never be knowledge.

We can understand Kant's a priori intuitions of space and time as a replacement for Plato's "the good". Both perspectives realize that it is necessary to assume a principle, or some principles, which are prior to empirical sensation, which enable the mind's capacity to produce ideas and knowledge. For Plato this is the good, for Kant it is the a priori intuitions. We can see how Kant's imposition of space and time limits the scope of knowledge to the sensible world, while the more general, "the good", allows the potential for knowledge to extend beyond the limitations of empirical justification.

You say that Kant "proves" that things-in-themselves cannot exist in space and time, when all he can prove if anything is that they don't exist (…) in our perceptual space and time. — Janus

Our space and time is not perceptual, meaning our senses do not perceive them, for that would be the same as space and time being appearances. Our space and time is intuitive, hence in us as a condition of our intelligence, where the things that exist can never be found, whether or not such things affect the senses.

It follows that Kant’s proof of the non-existence of things-in-themselves in space and time is predicated on the tenets of his theory, which states, insofar as they are strictly transcendental human constructs, space and time cannot be the conditions for existence of things, but only the conditions for the possibility of representing things that exist.
————-

I say that speculative conceptions of the kind of bare bones in-themselves nature of the objects that appear to us as phenomena is not at all contradictory. That is just an interpretation-dependent stipulative judgement that I don't accept. — Janus

Neither do I. I don’t accept it because it is contradictory, the judgement being diametrically opposed to the method under discussion prescribes.

If we are going to talk about things at all, then we should be consistent with what logic is implicit in thinking in terms of things. — Janus

True enough, but isn’t the logic already implicit when the thought is of things? But I see what you mean…to think this is to use this logic, to think that is to use that logic, as long as the conceptions contained in this and that, or at least the origins of them, are sufficiently different from each other….

Then if we posit things beyond cognition we are in speculative territory. — Janus

“….To think an object and to cognize an object are by no means the same thing….”

….just like that.

Maybe this is more toward the restrictive version Wayfarer has made sure I stick to. That meaning, what i've said relates to the fact that for humans the "world" is irrelevant, but our perceptions are. So in "our world" our perception differentiates to create entities.