I've thought about it a lot, for a couple of years now. Kant is talking about noumena as assumed objects. Pretyt clearly.

If that’s what you think, so be it.

its also the general scholarly consensus, best I can tell.

Ours — the limits of human cognition. — Wayfarer

The limits of human cognition does not define or determine the limits of what exists.

What has never entered your mind is not anything, obviously. And when it has entered your mind, it has done so via the senses, and has been interpreted by your intellect. What is outside that, neither exists nor does not exist. It is not yet anything, but that doesn't mean it's nothing. This is not dogma. — Wayfarer

You can talk about the situation that way, but there are of course alternatives ways of framing it. So I would say it is something before it "enters the mind" otherwise there would be nothing there to be perceived.

It is not a 'bifurcation'. That term is usually associated with A N Whitehead and is a different matter. In fact, the division is between the world as known to us, and what you think it must be, beyond that. — Wayfarer

'Bifurcation' is a synonym for 'division'. The bifurcation is yours―between the empirical and the transcendental. If all we know is the empirical world, and everything that has evolved out of that experience, and attempting to understand that experience―maths, geometry, science, music, poetry, literature―then we can say nothing about the transcendental other than that it is an idea of the possibility of something beyond.

You bare the one saying what the transcendental must be like―that it cannot exist in space and time, be differentiated and so on. I am saying that the transcendental is just an idea of the possibility of something beyond the empirical world. It's an idea that's been around for a very long time, and for which there can be, on your very own argument, no evidence. You say all we know, all our concepts, mathematics, geometry, science, music, poetry, literature and so on find their sense in the empirical world, so we cannot coherently speak about anything beyond that. because we have no cognition beyond that to give sense to whatever we say.

You admit that we can coherently say, within the empirical context that the world existed prior to humans. I say that is right, and that is where we stop our saying, and don't pretend that there is another context in which it makes no sense to say that. There is your bifurcation. By the way I didn't have Whitehead's "bifurcation of nature" (although I studied Whitehead's ideas quite extensively quite a few years ago) specifically in mind. He was more concerned with bypassing the division of nature into primary and secondary qualities, and of course that is a related issue, but let's not go down that rabbit hole.

I’m pointing out that when we use concepts like “existence” or “independence,” we are already relying on the framework of experience that gives those concepts their sense. That isn’t dogma — it’s analysis. To ignore that is not to be “freer” in one’s thinking, but simply to overlook the conditions that make thought coherent in the first place. — Wayfarer

The terms "existence" and 'independence" are common coin that get used in various contexts. To repeat, you say yourself that we can perfectly sensibly talk about the existence of the world prior to humans with the caveat that it makes sense only within the empirical context. I say there is no other context―so it looks like we are actually agreeing. I say there is no other context in which we can say anything at all, because we don't know any other context

I wouldn’t know. I would guess “scholarly consensus” for Kantian discourse is an oxymoron.

The limits of human cognition does not define or determine the limits of what exists. — Janus

But the whole point of the essay is what we know of what exists. When I say the world “relies on an implicit perspective,” I mean the world-as-known. To speak of what lies entirely outside that perspective is already speculative. Better to call it “purported” or “imagined” existence.

I would say it is something before it "enters the mind" otherwise there would be nothing there to be perceived. — Janus

To call it “something” already applies a category it doesn’t yet have. That’s why I said: it is not some-thing. But I'm also not saying it is simply non-existent. This is what you keep insisting is 'nonsensical', but when the context is understood, it is really quite straightforward: it is neither a “thing” nor “nothing,” but precisely what lies beyond the scope of those categories.

The bifurcation is yours―between the empirical and the transcendental. If all we know is the empirical world, and everything that has evolved out of that experience, and attempting to understand that experience―maths, geometry, scince, music, poetry, literature―then we can say nothing about the transcendental other than that it is an idea of the possibility of something beyond. — Janus

There is no division between the empirical and the world as it is in itself. The world known by empiricism is simply the universe as it appears to us. To speak of “the world in itself” is not to posit a separate domain, but to point to the condition that makes the empirical world possible in the first place.

The point being that a lot of modern thought tends to forget that empirical knowledge is contingent in this way, which is to accord science an authority it doesn't really have.

But the whole point of the essay is what we know of what exists. When I say the world “relies on an implicit perspective,” I mean the world-as-known. To speak of what lies entirely outside that perspective is already speculative. Better to call it “purported” or “imagined” existence. — Wayfarer

I was editing as you were responding apparently. Anyway I'm sayin that we can sensibly say that the things we perceive have their own existence independently of us, period. You say we cannot sensibly say that except within the empirical context. Then I respond that everything we say is from within the empirical context. So, what are we disagreeing about?

To call it “something” already applies a category it doesn’t yet have. That’s why I said: it is not some-thing. But I'm also not saying it is simply non-existent. This is what you keep insisting is 'nonsensical', but when the context is understood, it is really quite straightforward: it is neither a “thing” nor “nothing,” but precisely what lies beyond the scope of those categories. — Wayfarer

You are again confusing what we say with the things we are talking about. The things we talk about only "have categories" insofar as they are talked about―it doesn't follow that they are such that they cannot be thought to be fit or not to be included whatever category we are thinking of. You are thinking in simplistic terms here. You say it lies beyond the scope of the categories―if we haven't perceived it yet, it may or it may not. Say there is a cat behind a tree―you haven't seen it yet, but you imagine it is a dog. Then you go around behind the tree and find it is a cat. If you had thought it was a cat, then it would have fitted that category before you perceived it, but it didn't fit that category because you mistakenly thought it was a cat.

There is no division between the empirical and the world as it is in itself. The world known by empiricism is simply the universe as it appears to us. To speak of “the world in itself” is not to posit a separate domain, but to point to the condition that makes the empirical world possible in the first place. — Wayfarer

The world known by us is simply the world―there is no other world for us. We know the world, but we do not know it completely, obviously. There is always more to learn. There could not be more to learn if there was not more there, presently unknown, to be experienced and to be learned about via that experience. We think there might be things we could never know about the things we know―we can't know for sure, but one thing we do know is that even if we reached the end of knowledge, if we knew everything it is possible to know, we could have no way of knowing that we had reached that point.

Then I respond that everything we say is from within the empirical context. So, what are we disagreeing about? — Janus

The objection:

‘Surely “the world” is what is there all along, what is there anyway, regardless of whether you perceive it or not! Science has shown that h. sapiens only evolved in the last hundred thousand years or so, and we know Planet Earth is billions of years older than that! So how can you say that the mind ‘‘creates the world”’? — Questioner

The response

As already stated, I am not disputing the scientific account, but attempting to reveal an underlying assumption that gives rise to a distorted view of what this means. What I’m calling attention to is the tendency totake for granted the reality of the world as it appears to us, without taking into account the role the mind plays in its constitution. This oversight imbues the phenomenal world — the world as it appears to us — with a kind of inherent reality that it doesn’t possess. This in turn leads to the over-valuation of objectivity as the sole criterion for truth. — Wayfarer

It's this taken-for-grantedness that is the main target.

I wouldn’t know. I would guess “scholarly consensus” for Kantian discourse is an oxymoron. — Mww

I disagree, but i get the joke ;)

Our space and time is not perceptual, meaning our senses do not perceive them, for that would be the same as space and time being appearances. — Mww

That's one way of describing the situation. On the other hand I can say I perceive the space between objects, albeit usually more or less filled up with other objects. I do perceive space but I don't perceive empty space.

It follows that Kant’s proof of the non-existence of things-in-themselves in space and time is predicated on the tenets of his theory, which states, insofar as they are strictly transcendental human constructs, space and time cannot be the conditions for existence of things, but only the conditions for the possibility of representing things that exist. — Mww

So, to refer to things-in-themselves as "strictly transcendental human constructs" is again a particular way of framing, not an expression of any determinable fact of the matter. If things are human-independent existents that have mass, form and size then space and time would be the condition for their existence, just as they are the conditions, not just for our cognition, but for our very existence. In our material existence we are not different than other things.

“….To think an object and to cognize an object are by no means the same thing….” — Mww

Of course I cannot disagree with that. Since it is true by definition. On the other hand, some might say that for God to think an object and to cognize an object are one and the same.

As already stated, I am not disputing the scientific account, but attempting to reveal an underlying assumption that gives rise to a distorted view of what this means. What I’m calling attention to is the tendency totake for granted the reality of the world as it appears to us, without taking into account the role the mind plays in its constitution. This oversight imbues the phenomenal world — the world as it appears to us — with a kind of inherent reality that it doesn’t possess. This in turn leads to the over-valuation of objectivity as the sole criterion for truth.
— Wayfarer

It's this taken-for-grantedness that is the main target. — Wayfarer

I don't understand why you keep repeating this when I have long acknowledged that the world as perceived is (you might even say by very definition) mediated by the nature of bodily organs and processes. Science can study this and even model what the world might look like to different animals given the different ways the perceptual organs of individual kinds of animals are constituted.

Maybe this is more toward the restrictive version Wayfarer has made sure I stick to. That meaning, what i've said relates to the fact that for humans the "world" is irrelevant, but our perceptions are. So in "our world" our perception differentiates to create entities. — AmadeusD

The issue is as to whether it is more plausible to think that we carve nature "at the joints", so to speak or arbitrarily. If it were arbitrary we would not all perceive the same things. Our bodies with their perceptual organs, or minds if you prefer to frame it that way, cannot be the sole determinants of how we differentiate nature or we would not all see the same things. So differentiation is down to real patterns and regularities that are independent of us in nature or some kind of collective or universal mind. Choose your poison.

On the other hand I can say I perceive the space between objects, albeit usually more or less filled up with other objects. I do perceive space but I don't perceive empty space. — Janus

I don't think so. We don't perceive space between objects, we perceive separation. And knowledge tells us that there is another, invisible object, air, which exists in the medium. And we actually sense that air, feeling the wind and the smells. We don't ever perceive, or apprehend space except as a concept.

So, you say that you perceive space, but not empty space. Imagine the space which you believe that the air occupies, or that some other object occupies. How do you think you are perceiving this space, rather than simply assuming it as a fundamental concept?

Oh, i'm definitely with you. It was just a comment on the version put forward in the OP (i.e the world in which a mind exists - which is not hte external world).

So, to refer to things-in-themselves as "strictly transcendental human constructs" is again a particular way of framing, not an expression of any determinable fact of the matter. — Janus

Basically you're saying that it's subjective, a matter of opinion. 'It's OK if you see it that way, but I see it a different way'. It's not 'determinable' because it can't be validated empirically. Whatever is not determinable by science is a matter of personal preference.

I don't understand why you keep repeating this. — Janus

I keep repeating it, because you keep misrepresenting it. You say 'Science can study this and even model what the world might look like to different animals'. But you're still positing a real world beyond what appears, as if that is the criterion of realness, when it is the very point at issue. That's why I posted this:

In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in any ontological sense—this would be a subjective idealism, itself a consequence of a certain naturalising tendency whereby consciousness is cause and the world its effect—but rather that the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness. Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role. — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology

So in "our world" our perception differentiates to create entities. — AmadeusD

I do agree, but I also think there is a danger in the word 'create' - even though I used it in the OP. I think 'construct' might actually have been a better choice, and besides, there is a school of thought 'radical constructivism' which is very similar in outlook to what I'm arguing for (info). But it is a semantic distinction.

Yes, very meaningful distinction (no sarcasm). Thanks for that.

The truth concerning what is neither empirically nor logically demonstrable is not strictly decidable and so is a matter of what each of us finds most plausible or in other words a matter of opinion...call it what you like. And of course a dogmatist won't want to accept that.

This is going nowhere so I'm going to leave you to it.

Got it...Cheers.

The separation of objects just is the space between them.

The separation of objects just is the space between them. — Janus

But there is not space between objects, only more objects, that's why you said you do not perceive empty space.

Suppose one object here, and another object over there. implying a separation between them. You perceive other objects in between, perhaps the movement of air. By what principle do you replace the objects you perceive between the two objects, with the concept "space", and then claim to perceive this "space".

This is the same issue I had with I like Sushi, only that was with the concept "matter" rather than the concept "space". I like Sushi claimed that we measure, and weigh matter, but we do not. We weigh particular things not matter. Matter is purely conceptual, as is space. The two being very good examples of universals. Now, you and I are going through the same thing with the concept "space". You claim to perceive space, but you don't, you have a concept of space which you apply when you perceive that things are distinct from one another. Application of concepts is not the same as perception.

The truth concerning what is neither empirically nor logically demonstrable is not strictly decidable and so is a matter of what each of us finds most plausible or in other words a matter of opinion...call it what you like. And of course a dogmatist won't want to accept that. — Janus

I'm saying that the argument in the OP is a logical argument. If arguments can only be decided by empirical means, then we're back at verificationism or positivism. You will also need to justify why you think the argument is dogmatic.

Your argument is something like:

We derived our idea of existence from our cognitive experience, therefore nothing can exist apart from its being cognized.

The conclusion does not follow logically from the premise, so it is not a deductively valid argument.

What you are offering is a certain perspective on the situation―a certain way of framing it. There are other ways of thinking about it. There is no determinable truth of the matter; so really comes down what seems most plausible as to what you will believe. In other words it is a matter of opinion, or preference, or taste or whatever you want to call it.

If you think otherwise then explain how you think your view could be established to be correct.

But there is not space between objects, only more objects, that's why you said you do not perceive empty space. — Metaphysician Undercover

We perceive the extendedness of objects; that is what space is. It is not an empty container. If you think we cannot perceive space as an empty container, well of course that is true, but irrelevant.

Basically you're saying that it's subjective, a matter of opinion. 'It's OK if you see it that way, but I see it a different way'. It's not 'determinable' because it can't be validated empirically. Whatever is not determinable by science is a matter of personal preference. — Wayfarer

No, whatever cannot be determined by observation or logic is a matter of opinion. You tell me how it might otherwise be determined.

But you're still positing a real world beyond what appears, as if that is the criterion of realness, when it is the very point at issue. — Wayfarer

Yes, I'm positing a real world beyond what appears, because I think all the evidence points to that. You are positing that there is not a real world beyond what appears because (apparently) you think all the evidence indicates that to be the case. Neither of us can demonstrate that we are right, so it is a matter of opinion. That's plain to see, but you apparently cannot accept that.

BTW, I'd rather just discuss this with you―there is little point quoting entries about Husserl or other philosophers I am well enough familiar with to know that I disagree with them and why. Invoking authority figures just doesn't cut it for me.

Your argument is something like:

We derived our idea of existence from our cognitive experience, therefore nothing can exist apart from its being cognized.

The conclusion does not follow logically from the premise, so it is not a deductively valid argument. — Janus

That’s a very simplified gloss, and not my argument. I’m not claiming that “nothing exists apart from cognition.” I’m saying that any concept of existence only makes sense within the conditions of possible experience. (I'm not bound by Kant's argument, but I am trying to stay in his lane, so to speak.)

The point about the Husserl quote was that:

Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology

That is much nearer what I mean. You're saying, there must be a reality outside any consciousness of it.

whatever cannot be determined by observation or logic is a matter of opinion. You tell me how it might otherwise be determined. — Janus

But that’s precisely the point: your criterion itself — “only what can be determined by observation or logic counts” — is not itself established by observation or logic. It’s a philosophical commitment, not a scientific observation. And that is what I mean by “dogmatism”: a framework that denies legitimacy to what it cannot assimilate, while never acknowledging that its own framework is not supported by its arguments.

I'm positing a real world beyond what appears, because I think all the evidence points to that. — Janus

But this “real world” you posit beyond appearances is itself nothing but conjecture. You say “all the evidence points to it,” but by definition the evidence only ever belongs to the realm of appearances. To project what the “real world” is behind appearances is less defensible than what you’re criticizing, because it claims the authority of evidence precisely where no evidence can reach. And I'm not positing that there is no reality beyond what we can experience: what I said was that 'what its existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible.'

The limits of human cognition does not define or determine the limits of what exists. — Janus

It does if that is all there is we ever have access to. If something exists beyond space and time it is not a 'something'. Get it?

Kant talks about our 'intuitions' being space and time.

I can see why someone would suggest a Two Worlds scenario but this is stretching what Kant is stating too far. The Noumenal World -- so to speak -- is not a World. If we have some as yet unknown facaulty that allows for some other intuition (other than space and time) then, and only then, is talk of another World open to sensibility. That said, it woudl still be a natural and necessarily integrated part of space and time.

So noumena is in itself a phenomena referred to in reference to human existence (the only existence we know of being space and time).

A fuller appreciation of phenomenology can help frame what Kant was talking about because by taking up a phenomenological approach forces us to look at the certain limitations of cognition we are bound by. For instance, we cannot conceive of a polygon with no sides, a colour with no pigment, nor a sound with no pitch. Something similar is held in what Kant means when using the term 'noumena' and is famously framed by saying "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."

That’s a very simplified gloss, and not my argument. I’m not claiming that “nothing exists apart from cognition.” I’m saying that any concept of existence only makes sense within the conditions of possible experience. — Wayfarer

I would argue there is no intrinsic difference between saying one or the other. No one can speak of something outside of space and time if there is faculty of cognition possessed by humans that operates in a completely distinct sense to the faculties we possess.

A shape with no edges is not a shape at all. If there can exist something 'shape-like' beyond sapce and time it does not 'exist' in any sense we can frame and if not soley separate we can appreciate it. This is the difference between being open to discovery by us and not existing, but 'not existing' is a concept that we appreciate not that we do not.

A shape with no edges is not a shape at all. If there can exist something 'shape-like' beyond sapce and time it does not 'exist' in any sense we can frame and if not soley separate we can appreciate it. This is the difference between being open to discovery by us and not existing, but 'not existing' is a concept that we appreciate not that we do not.

So there may be a sqircle somewhere, but because we can’t frame it, we can’t say it exists. Because to say it exists we would have to define (definitively) it. But we can’t define it, so we can’t say it exists, or that it doesn’t exist?

But surely we can talk about the neumenon and conclude that it exists? But we can’t define it, because it has no shape, colour, dimension(as we know them). This is not to say it doesn’t have attributes like this, but that we don’t know what they are.
Also, if we do attempt to define them, we will only be using attributes that we know about from the phenomenal world and by definition neumena are outside of the phenomenal world. So we would be describing things in the phenomenal world and attributing them to something outside that world. Which we can’t do.

So we can say it exists, provided we don’t define it (because that would miss the mark). Because without it, the phenomenal world wouldn’t exist and the phenomenal world exists.

Seems straightforward enough to me, I don’t know what all the fuss is about.

Surely we have just defined a necessary being?

But surely we can talk about the neumenon and conclude that it exists? — Punshhh

No. Because:

'not existing' is a concept that we appreciate not that we do not. — I like sushi

We understand what exists for us is all that can exist for us. We cannot know what we cannot frame within the bounds of our cognitive capacities (time and space) unless we have some other 'intuition' that is yet to be articulated.

When we 'talk about noumena' we are not talking about noumena as our faculties are framed in space and time and the concept of noumena is not -- hence it serves as a means of understanding what we can understand and how we frame the term 'exist'. Nothing is the absence of something, noumena is not even that, no words can capture it as it is not an 'it' and only represented as a limitation of our cognitive capacities. Any sense of 'beyond' is mere word play.

This is not to say it doesn’t have attributes like this, but that we don’t know what they are. — Punshhh

We CANNOT. Therefore it is less than nothing. Nothing we can say about noumena is noumena. It is Negative only. Literally everything we can ever conceive of in existence -- abstract or otherwise -- is phenomenal. Noumena is not phenomena. This is not to say just because we lack a sense, it is to say we have no grounds for talking about non-constituent part of existence because that is nonsensical. Understanding that it is nonsensical is the establishment of noumena as a negative limiting term for what exists and what does not with res[ect to space and time.

So we can say it exists, provided we don’t define it (because that would miss the mark). Because without it, the phenomenal world wouldn’t exist and the phenomenal world exists. — Punshhh

Everything we can talk about and speculate about exists. The point is we have no right to say 'exists' when if any such capacities to recognise such is absent.

Hopefully you get the idea that no matter how long I go on EVERYTHING I can say is noumena negatively ONLY and can NEVER be positively captured.

I think it is a good place to begin when trying to understand the kind of problems that arise in human experience including how we articulate what consciousness is and how it relates to the physical world as well as our metaphysical concepts about the world -- which are necessarily connected in some fashion.

Seems straightforward enough to me, I don’t know what all the fuss is about.

Surely we have just defined a necessary being? — Punshhh

It is so straight forward it bends around everything!

Necessary being? I do not see how. We are not talking about any such thing, although Kant certainly doe scover such ground in his work and states we cannot say anything about any such noumena (see above).

The closest other thing I can think of that covers this kind of concept is probably Dao/Tao (the 'way'). More poetic than Kant but far less precise. If either works for you then that is probably enough.

That’s a very simplified gloss, and not my argument. I’m not claiming that “nothing exists apart from cognition.” I’m saying that any concept of existence only makes sense within the conditions of possible experience. — Wayfarer

So, you're saying that something might exist apart from cognition, but that it makes no sense to say that? In any case the concept of existence outside of cognition makes sense to me. You can say it makes no sense to you, but that is all you are entitled to say. There is no determinable fact of the matter that that can be used to ascertain what makes sense and what doesn't as a universal rule.

You're saying, there must be a reality outside any consciousness of it. — Wayfarer

No I'm not; I'm saying it seems most plausible to me that there is a reality outside any consciousness of it.

But that’s precisely the point: your criterion itself — “only what can be determined by observation or logic counts” — is not itself established by observation or logic. — Wayfarer

It is established by observing that no other way of determining truth is to be found. If there is another way, then tell us what that way is, and how it works.

But this “real world” you posit beyond appearances is itself nothing but conjecture. You say “all the evidence points to it,” but by definition the evidence only ever belongs to the realm of appearances. — Wayfarer

I don't believe that's true. It is an undeniable aspect of experience that people see the same things at the same time and place down to the smallest detail. It's easy to test. That is what is to be explained and I think the inference to a world of mind-independent existence is the best explanation. You don't have to think that―but since it cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed by observation or logic it becomes a matter of what each person finds most plausible. That's the way I see it.

Anything we say about things which cannot be decided by observation or logic is a matter of conjecture―I've never denied that.

There is no determinable fact of the matter that that can be used to ascertain what makes sense and what doesn't as a universal rule. — Janus

"Not determinable” in what sense? If you mean not determinable by science, then of course — but that doesn’t reduce it to mere opinion. If you mean not determinable in principle, then I disagree: there is a fact of the matter about whether categories like “existence” or “mind-independence” are meaningful outside the bounds of cognition. That’s the point of the argument: It’s not about my opinion versus yours. Your implication always seems to be: can't be 'determined scientifically' therefore it's a matter of opinion.

I'm saying it seems most plausible to me that there is a reality outside any consciousness of it. — Janus

As said a number of times already, 'there is no need for me to deny that the Universe is real independently of your mind or mine, or of any specific, individual mind.'

It is an undeniable aspect of experience that people see the same things at the same time and place down to the smallest detail. It's easy to test. — Janus

At the macroscopic level it’s easy to say “we all see the same thing.” But at the quantum scale - which is the smallest detail you can expect - it’s not so clear cut. In the double-slit experiment, whether you get an interference pattern or not depends on whether an observation is made. And the 'Wigner’s friend' experiments show that two observers can have inconsistent but equally valid accounts of the same event. So the claim that everyone just “sees the same thing in the same way” doesn’t hold once you look deeper. On that level, which is the most fundamental level, it's the nature of the physical that is 'not determinable'. So you can't appeal to it.

Furthermore, the fact that “we all see the same thing” is not some metaphysical given — it’s because we are all members of the same species, with the same sensory and cognitive apparatus, and also because we inhabit a shared culture that trains us to interpret the world in broadly the same ways. That’s why we can agree that “this is a table” or “that’s red.” But how a bat, or an octopus, or a machine intelligence “perceives the world” is another matter entirely — and one we simply cannot know from the inside. So even the claim that “we all see the same thing” is already species- and culture-bound.

But, appreciate the questions.

Your argument is something like:

We derived our idea of existence from our cognitive experience, therefore nothing can exist apart from its being cognized. — Janus

I think that's one of the best examples of a straw man that I've ever seen.

We perceive the extendedness of objects; that is what space is. — Janus

The extendedness of objects is just another concept which you've swapped for "space". You started off by saying "I perceive the space between objects", and when I informed you that you do not actually perceive whatever it is that separates objects making them distinct, you changed your proposed meaning of "space", to define it as "the extendedness" of objects.

But the "extendedness" of objects is purely conceptual, just like "space" is. You do not perceive extendedness. To "extend" is to increase something. So to conclude that something has been extended, "stretched out spatially" requires an application of logic. It is not a perception but a logical conclusion.

You are still not distinguishing between perceiving, and applying concepts. I suggest, that once you recognize that this distinction is impossible to make at the foundational level, you'll understand the need for a priori concepts. The application of concepts is inherent within even the most basic acts of perception. This implies that conception is prior to perception, therefore conception is not dependent on perception. That is why Kant proposed the a priori, as intuitional 'concepts'.

It is an undeniable aspect of experience that people see the same things at the same time and place down to the smallest detail. — Janus

You keep saying things like this, but it is so clearly false. In fact, the argument that different people never see the same thing is far more sound then the argument that people see the same things. To begin with, if you point to an area and ask people to describe what is there, they will never use the exact same words. And even if we point to a location, and agree on the words to be used in reference to that location, this does not imply that the people see the same thing. It only means that they are agreeable. Therefore in reality, it is an undeniable aspect of human beings, that they are agreeable, and you falsely present this as "It is an undeniable aspect of experience that people see the same things".

Hopefully you get the idea that no matter how long I go on EVERYTHING I can say is noumena negatively ONLY and can NEVER be positively captured.

YES, I HEAR YOU, I UNDERSTAND. I’ll have take your word for that for now, until I’ve read more about it.

I think it is a good place to begin when trying to understand the kind of problems that arise in human experience including how we articulate what consciousness is and how it relates to the physical world as well as our metaphysical concepts about the world -- which are necessarily connected in some fashion.

Agreed, I have been doing the same from a different school for decades along with using it in my practice.

The closest other thing I can think of that covers this kind of concept is probably Dao/Tao (the 'way'). More poetic than Kant but far less precise. If either works for you then that is probably enough.

A little less wordy though, the gist is the same.

So presumably there are a number of philosophers around who don’t like the idea?

On the other hand I can say I perceive the space between objects, albeit usually more or less filled up with other objects…. — Janus

Hmmm. Sure, I suppose you could say that. Take a dinner table place setting: the space between the dinner fork and the salad fork seemingly filled by the perception of the table they both rest on.

I’ve got a pretty decent telescope, and when I look here, and look there, the space between is full of stuff I don’t perceive without it.

Still, in both of these, the space between is actually space in general; the table isn’t in the space between the forks, and with respect to the ‘scope, the other objects seemingly between here and there could very well be in front or behind and not between them at all.

…..I do perceive space but I don't perceive empty space. — Janus

If you agree all perceptions have a sensation belonging to them…..what sensation does one receive from the perception of space? What is it about your perception which distinguishes the space you perceive from empty space you do not?
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to refer to things-in-themselves as "strictly transcendental human constructs" is again a particular way of framing, not an expression of any determinable fact of the matter. — Janus

Yeah…the bane of speculative theoretics in general, the fact of impossible physical verification. Nevertheless, it’s hard to argue with proper logic.

If things are human-independent existents that have mass, form and size then space and time would be the condition for their existence — Janus

While it may be true, at least for a human or human-like being, that in order for there to even be a thing at all, mass, form and size are the conditions by which it is so. But it still needs to be known the necessary conditions for mass, form and size of a thing, and even more importantly, the necessary conditions by which differences in mass, form and size of different things are related.

All of which reduces to the inevitable conclusion, that the necessary conditions the relations of mass, form and size have nothing whatsoever to say about the existence of the thing to which they belong. Space and time, then, are merely the necessary conditions for the possibility of a thing for which mass, form and size are determinable, the existence of which is given regardless of whatever mass, form or size it may be determined to have.

A reminder that space and time are pure intuitions belonging to sensibility, while existence is a pure conception belonging to understanding. That the representations of one are conjoined with the representations of the other for any human experience reflecting perception of real things, does not make one dependent on, nor the condition for, the other.

The problem here is, of course, I have argued why the conclusion of your opinion represented by the quoted comment cannot hold, but I have nothing by which to judge whether my argument is relevant to the construction of your opinion. In other words, I have no idea what qualifies the truth value, the logical ground or presuppositions, of what you say, which means I may have engaged myself in a dialectical non-starter.

Perish the thought!!!
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In our material existence we are not different than other things. — Janus

There’s one major difference: my material existence can never be in-itself, insofar as it is apodeitically necessary that my body be an appearance for me, whereas that condition is merely contingent for any other material existence.

But I get the point: the material of my existence is no different from the material of any other existence. What do you intend to be gleaned from such analytical truths?

If you mean not determinable in principle, then I disagree: there is a fact of the matter about whether categories like “existence” or “mind-independence” are meaningful outside the bounds of cognition. — Wayfarer

What do you mean by "meaningful outside the bounds of cognition"? Let's say for the sake of argument nothing for human discourse is outside the bounds of cognition, are you saying categories like 'existence' and 'mind-independence' can only apply to the objects we perceive?

If so, then it seems obvious that they don't only apply to the objects we perceive when they are being perceived. In my view all our experience, both ordinary everyday observations and science, informs us that there are human-independent things in the Universe now and that
there were before humans existed.

As said a number of times already, 'there is no need for me to deny that the Universe is real independently of your mind or mine, or of any specific, individual mind.' — Wayfarer

It follows then that it must be real independently of all minds unless you posit a hidden collective mind. Is that what you believe?

In the double-slit experiment, whether you get an interference pattern or not depends on whether an observation is made. — Wayfarer

Regarding any individual experiment, all observers see the same result, though. The fact that the behavior of microphysical particles seems counter-intuitive, even paradoxical, shouldn't surprise us given that we have evolved in a macroworld, and our expectations as to the behavior of entities has been conditioned by our experiences of macro-objects.

There is also no clear consensus among the physics community as to the implications of those observed weird results. In any case why deny what science tells us, and then appeal to it when it suits you?

I don't believe you have any real doubt that the everyday objects we encounter constantly have their own existence, which does not rely on our perceiving them. As Peirce said: "Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts".

I’ve got a pretty decent telescope, and when I look here, and look there, the space between is full of stuff I don’t perceive without it. — Mww

Right, I haven't claimed there are any truly empty spaces. But then when it comes to spaces that look empty that just speaks to the fact that there are things there we cannot see with the naked eye. It's kind of irrelevant anyway, because all I'm saying is that we can perceive extension, distance, and that counts in my view as perceiving space. You are free to frame it differently.

If you agree all perceptions have a sensation belonging to them…..what sensation does one receive from the perception of space? What is it about your perception which distinguishes the space you perceive from empty space you do not? — Mww

The sensation is one of extension, or distance as a said above. I'm not sure what you are driving at here.

But it still needs to be known the necessary conditions for mass, form and size of a thing, and even more importantly, the necessary conditions by which differences in mass, form and size of different things are related. — Mww

I don't know what you mean―the necessary conditions for the perception of mass, form and size are that they are there to be perceived. The overall form of an object is not dependent on perspective, although of course how it looks from any angle will be if it is not a sphere. Size is relative, and if one object is larger than another, that would not seem to be dependent on perspective either. Same with mass.

But I get the point: the material of my existence is no different from the material of any other existence. What do you intend to be gleaned from such analytical truths? — Mww

Clarity?

It follows then that it must be real independently of all minds unless you posit a hidden collective mind. Is that what you believe? — Janus

No. It's that when you imagine or conjecture a universe with no humans in it, that conjecture still requires an implicit perspective. To conjecture a universe, or an object, without already bringing to bear the framework of space and time would be impossible - you would be imagining nothing. All of your statements about the 'already existing objects' and 'previously existing universe' rely on that implied perspective which you're bringing to bear on it, without noticing that you're doing it.

Regarding any individual experiment, all observers see the same result, though. — Janus

But they don't. The claim that “we all see the same thing” doesn’t hold once you move beyond the classical scale. Wigner’s Friend (1961), a thought-experiment, implied how two observers could end up with irreconcilable results — one sees a definite measurement, the other only a superposition. And in 2019, Massimiliano Proietti and colleagues ran this with six entangled photons. The result: Wigner’s “reality” and the friend’s “reality” coexisted but could not be reconciled. That suggests there may be no single set of “objective facts” that all observers must agree on — which is precisely the point at issue here. Also Does Physical Reality Objectively Exist? Ethan Siegel (Medium, may require registration):

For relativity:

Space and time might be real, but they’re not objectively real; only real relative to each individual observer or measurer. — Ethan Siegel

For quantum physics:

To the best that we can tell, the real outcomes that arise in the Universe cannot be divorced from who is measuring them, and how. — Ethan Siegel

In any case why deny what science tells us, and then appeal to it when it suits you? — Janus

Ethan Siegel, for instance, is a well-known popular science communicator and writer. Mostly he just writes on straight-ahead physics, but that essay above is him looking at the philosophical question concerning whether physical reality objectively exists. And he suggests that both relativity theory and quantum theory suggest not.

So - I'm not disputing science. I'm questioning scientific realism, which is philosophical attitude, not a scientific theory. Or if you like, a meta-scientific theory.

I don't believe you have any real doubt that the everyday objects we encounter constantly have their own existence, which does not rely on our perceiving them. — Janus

From the OP: 'It is empirically true that the Universe [and 'the object'] exists independently of any particular mind. But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective. It is not solely constituted by objects and their relations. Reality has an inextricably mental aspect, which itself is never revealed in empirical analysis.' Which is Kant's 'Copernican Revolution in Philosophy'.

This requires an exercise in looking at your spectacles, instead of simply through them.

PS - also I would never want to be accused of science denialism. I accept wholeheartedly the science of climate change, and the science of vaccination, things which are only denied by cranks and weirdos (and the current US administration.)

All of your statements about the 'already existing objects' and 'previously existing universe' rely on that implied perspective which you're bringing to bear on it, without noticing that you're doing it. — Wayfarer

All my statements are expressions of my perspective―so what, that's trivially true. Of course I'm aware of it. I also acknowledge that my perspective is not the reality―you know, "the map (or model) is not the territory".

'It is empirically true that the Universe [and 'the object'] exists independently of any particular mind. But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective. It is not solely constituted by objects and their relations. Reality has an inextricably mental aspect, which itself is never revealed in empirical analysis.' — Wayfarer

If the existence of the Universe is independent of any particular mind, whether human or animal, how does it not follow that it is independent of all individual minds? Of course there is a perspective involved in saying that the Universe is or is not independent of minds, but it doesn't follow that it is impossible that the universe be either independent or dependent on minds―we just don't know and may only speculate about it.

I'm not going to try to address any purported implications of quantum mechanical experiments and results because I don't have the expertise, and I don't believe you do either. It is arguable that even the experts understand only the math, not what metaphysical implications might be suggested by QM. Wasn't it Feynman who said: "I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics"?

This requires an exercise in looking at your spectacles, instead of simply through them. — Wayfarer

You can't look at your spectacles without looking through them.

"Not determinable” in what sense? If you mean not determinable by science, then of course — but that doesn’t reduce it to mere opinion. If you mean not determinable in principle, then I disagree: there is a fact of the matter about whether categories like “existence” or “mind-independence” are meaningful outside the bounds of cognition. That’s the point of the argument: It’s not about my opinion versus yours. Your implication always seems to be: can't be 'determined scientifically' therefore it's a matter of opinion. — Wayfarer

I didn't address this as thoroughly as I meant to. The claim is that truth is determinable only by observation or logic, and otherwise we can have only beliefs about what is true. A radical skeptic would say that we cannot be certain of the truth even of what is observed or logically self-evident. Can you give me an example of any truth which is determinable in any way other than by observation or logic, and also explain just how that truth can be determined?