Systems are coherencies of (self-recreating, in the case of autopoietic systems) differences between themselves and an environment — Baden

Please explain then, in terms of your definition, how to determine what is part of the system, and what is part of the environment?

[In general, if posters want non-academic, dumbed-down answers to their questions, why not just ask AI, why ask on a philosophy forum?] — Baden

To my understanding, AI has not achieved the capability of abstract thought (yet) thus asking AI will have no utility - it will only regurgitate. As a really clever guy once said: "Anyone who conducts an argument by appealing to authority is not using his intelligence; he is just using memory." - Leonardo da Vinci (1452 - 1519).

This definition looks very similar to one that has been published in 1923 by Lewis, C.I. Facts, Systems and the Unity of the World. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 20, No. 6, pp 141 - 151. Apparently without much success.

Yes. The modern notion of Systems*1 sometimes gets mired in details. — Gnomon

You answer thus, then, seemingly, concede to my point:

The word is bandied about ad nauseam and I am not convinced that it is always correctly used! — Pieter R van Wyk

A system is a cognitive construct consisting of individual elements that interact dynamically, forming new properties in relation to the individual elements and maintaining stability over time. — Astorre

Thank you for your frank and honest input - this is a good description, one that is generally accepted by the 'systems-thinkers'. But it has a few problems, specifically one that is really a bother to the systems-scientists: How, in general does one determine what is part of a system and what is not. Or in other words, how does one, in general, determine the boundary of a system?

A system is formed of its interactions rather than constructed from its components. So a general systems theory is successful to the degree it takes that idea to its metaphysical extreme. — apokrisis

In my opinion: interactions without components makes no sense at all. Neither does components without interactions. Please, what would entail a "metaphysical extreme"?

to establish what the "bare bones" definition or criteria for such are, which I believe I have done for you quite nicely. — Outlander

Please, in terms of your "bare bones", is it possible for

entities or "points" — Outlander

to be a system?

So a system is all about stabilising instability. — apokrisis

Please, if a system is all about stabilising instability, where does instability come from? Also, is it not true that "instability" is the root cause of innovation, emergence or evolution?

In its most general sense, a system can be understood as an organized interconnected set of at least two or more components that collectively constitute a unified whole. The behavior of the whole is conditioned by the interactions of its parts, while the parts, in turn, derive their functions and significance from their relation to the whole. In this respect, a system is indivisible, as the whole cannot exist independently of its parts, nor can the parts operate meaningfully apart from the whole. A genuine system necessarily gives rise to emergent properties, thereby becoming more than merely the sum of its parts. — punos

In my opinion, a spot-on description. Thank you

In my opinion, a spot-on description. Thank you — Pieter R van Wyk

That is an excellent opinion. Thank you.
:smile: :up:

No, it really doesn’t. The information that the rock contains bears no resemblance to a system of belief.

You can present your evidence to the contrary if you wish of course. — apokrisis

Again, you're interpreting "belief" in a way that is more elaborate than the minimalist version used in the theory which is not much more than Bayesian probability. Bayesian probability is often linked clisely by people to a kind of subjectivist view of probabilities but Bayes' rule holds regardless of interpretation - its just probability theory. If you read the papers I linked you will see it explicitly expressed that even a rock comes under this formulation. If you like you can think of the word "belief" as just a metaphor. Its just saying that the internal system has information about the external system. The internal system is predictive of the external system (predictive define purely in terms of conditional probabilities) - as if the internal system could be said to have beliefs.

A quick point is that the kind of dynamics that could even be coupled would have to be in a state of criticality. — apokrisis

Well it depends on how complicated the system is, what it does. But again, the free energy principle applies in principle even to just a description of a normal rock that doesn't overtly display behavior like that.

A balance of geological and chemical forces over many scales of being. In some sense its own model as at some particular distance or horizon, the landscape’s smallest fluctuations become a lower bound blur, and its largest fluctuations become so large the system now appears to live inside a fixed background, captured by its laws. — apokrisis

Not really clear to me what is being said here.

But then you can see how the humble rock lacks that kind of dynamics which brings this systems perspective into things. — apokrisis

Again, you are misinterpreting the theory somewhat. If you look at the paper, they say a rock can be described under the theory and its more or less mathematically proven that the principle can apply to something like a rock. What you are talking about is a special case of system that is highly complicated.

But on a skim, I would say he is trying too hard to explain everything by the self-organising dynamics and being too glib about the self-information or measurement aspect of a hierarchical system. — apokrisis

Can you specify what exactly you mean? Its a mathematical principle that applies generically and is not restricted to self-organizing dynamics.

But you had to invent your own term to turn information back into informing. So you clearly can see there is an issue to be sorted. — apokrisis

I did coin a novel term, EnFormAction, for my thesis, to indicate the equation of Information & Energy*1. But I didn't "invent" the physical interrelationship*2. Shannon defined information in terms of Entropy, but didn't pursue its reciprocal relation to Energy*3. Other scientists and philosophers in recent years have been exploring that connection between Causation & Life & Mind*4. So no, the equation of Causal Energy and Mental Information is not a figment of my imagination. Is that the "issue" you feel needs to be sorted? :cool:


*1. Information is Energy :
Just as the principle of conservation of energy is essential to understanding energy, the principle of conservation of information leads to a deeper understanding of information.
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-658-40862-6

*2. The statement "information is energy" reflects a physical interpretation where information requires energy to be stored or transmitted, and conversely, information can be used to extract energy from a system, as seen in Maxwell's demon experiments, though information and energy are distinct concepts. While not identical, they are deeply connected, with some theories proposing an information-energy equivalence where information acts as a fundamental component of reality, much like matter and energy.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=information+is+energy

*3. Information-energy equivalence suggests that information has mass, which is supported by Landauer's principle stating that information is physical and has an associated energy cost when erased, and by the emerging Mass-Energy-Information (MEI) equivalence principle. The MEI principle claims that stored information has mass and can be converted to energy, leading to a full hard drive being marginally heavier than an empty one. While information is not a new state of matter, this principle allows for the physical storage and energetic manipulation of information, with potentially transformative implications for quantum computing and our understanding of the universe.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=information+energy+equivalence

*4. From Matter to Life: Information and Causality :
Recent advances suggest that the concept of information might hold the key to unravelling the mystery of life's nature and origin.
https://www.amazon.com/Matter-Life-Information-Causality/dp/1107150531

As epistemology, his point is mundane. As an ontological commitment, it makes the usual idealist mistake. . . .
But idealism fails to replace reductionism with anything better. — apokrisis

That assessment misses the point of Hoffman's thesis, and my own Information-centered worldview : not to "replace" pragmatic Reductionism, but to supplement it with philosophical Holism. Narrowly-focused Reductionism takes an Either/Or (true/false, black/white) stance, while the broader Enformationism worldview is BothAnd (Holistic, Complementary, YinYang).

Likewise, Hoffman's Idealism (Conscious Realism) is a moderate stance, between pure Platonic Idealism and modern absolute Materialism. Extreme forms of Idealism assert that we have no access to true or ultimate Reality. In that case, we would be completely in the dark. But, Hoffman describes a Veiled Reality, in which we do have some contact with Fundamental Essences, by means of the embodied Information that he calls "icons" (signs, symbols, semiology).

It's still true that we humans have no direct access to Kant's "ding an sich", or what d'Espagnat labeled "reality per se". So, Hoffman's Ontology describes Matter as a "useful fiction". In which case, we are not completely cut-off from ultimate Reality, because we can interface by means of ideas & information. :smile:

PS___ What is a System? : Semiotics is the systematic study of interpretation, meaning-making, semiosis and the communication of meaning. In semiotics, a sign is defined as anything that communicates intentional and unintentional meaning or feelings to the sign's interpreter. ___ Wiki


Donald Hoffman's "idealism," more formally known as his Conscious Realism, posits that consciousness is fundamental, not matter, and that what we perceive as physical objects are "icons" or user interfaces designed by interacting conscious agents. He argues that spacetime and physical objects emerge from the dynamics of these agents, not the other way around. While sharing similarities with philosophical idealism, Hoffman's approach is distinct due to its emphasis on integrating mathematical structures beyond spacetime and its foundation in what he calls a "deeper theory of conscious agents"
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=donald+hoffman+idealism

Donald Hoffman's ontology, outlined in his theory of Conscious Realism, posits that consciousness and conscious agents are fundamental, and that the physical world, including spacetime, matter, and neurons, are not foundational but rather are emergent, useful fictions or a "user interface" to a deeper reality.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=donald+hoffman+ontology

Again, you are misinterpreting the theory somewhat. If you look at the paper, they say a rock can be described under the theory and its more or less mathematically proven that the principle can apply to something like a rock. What you are talking about is a special case of system that is highly complicated. — Apustimelogist

I come back to the point that to claim belief for a rock is to collapse your epistemology into ontological confusion.

Sure, one might have the intellectual purpose of modelling the continuity of all systems and Bayesian probability might be your candidate theory of everything. But my view is that this plainly is a wrong move as Bayesian reasoning is great as a general theory of the organism in its semiotic relation with the world, and so then loses its way when it goes beyond what it was meant to be and is bandied about as a theory of literally anything.

If we can no longer distinguish a rock from a mind under the Bayesian approach, then now the theory is a failure. It becomes the new panpyschism.

The best theory of absolutely everything in my book is dissipate structure theory. And that as a general systems theory does apply as happily to the Big Bang as neoliberal economics.

So no, the equation of Causal Energy and Mental Information is not a figment of my imagination. Is that the "issue" you feel needs to be sorted? :cool: — Gnomon

I plainly said that information and entropy are just mathematical systems of measurement. They don’t tell us about informing or entropifying as real world processes. So the issue is about the how. You coined a term that suggest some general systems theory arises to cover this. But then the hand-waving begins. You speak as if information and energy are substantial things - like forces of nature - and so they just “do it”. Nuff said.

But, Hoffman describes a Veiled Reality, in which we do have some contact with Fundamental Essences, by means of the embodied Information that he calls "icons" (signs, symbols, semiology). — Gnomon

As I say, this part is epistemology 101 so far as it goes. What cognitive scientist doesn’t say this sort of thing? Of course our notions of matter are useful fictions. Even physics says that.

But “consciousness” is likewise a useful epistemic fiction. It is easier to think in terms of powers and substances than to move on to a properly laid out and mathematical systems view of what reality “really is”.

So Hoffman states the obvious about cognition and then gets silly by saying this means the material world is our collective fiction and therefore consciousness is what is fundamental.

The mind and the world are both owed proper scientific accounts. Hoffman’s idealism doesn’t have anything help here.

I come back to the point that to claim belief for a rock is to collapse your epistemology into ontological confusion. — apokrisis

This is just a strawman if you refuse to engage with the way "belief" is intended by the authors of the theory.

Bayesian reasoning is great as a general theory of the organism in its semiotic relation with the world, and so then loses its way when it goes beyond what it was meant to be and is bandied about as a theory of literally anything — apokrisis

Bayesianism is just probability theory. There is absolutely no reason that this should be organism-centric, and the authors have literally constructed mathematical proofs describing its domain of applicability. Whether you like the theory or not, its just a mathematical fact that it can describe a rock. I don't actually see any constructive criticism in your comments other than an unexplained intuition that there is something about it you don't like. The theory fully accomodates characterizations of complicated life; and even so, the topic of the thread is "systems", a concept far more general than ypur favorite topic. The generality of Bayesian mechanics then fits it perfectly.

The best theory of absolutely everything in my book is dissipate structure theory. — apokrisis

Which is more or less just the free energy principle that has been talked about, or at least a corollary with regard to persistent, complicated structures.

This is just a strawman if you refuse to engage with the way "belief" is intended by the authors of the theory. — Apustimelogist

Which authors? I was discussing these things with Friston back in the 1990s when it was all about dynamical systems theory and generative neural networks. I'd be surprised if he now disagrees with what would be my position on this.

My point is that it is just dumb to confuse equilibrium systems with far from equilibrium systems. A hot rock has its internal state. Drop it in a bucket of cold water and it then shares the collective internal state of the thermal system that is the much colder rock and the now slightly warmer bucket of water.

Bringing Bayesian belief into this discussion is a publicity stunt and not serious science or philosophy.

But using the maths of Bayesian probability to model the hierarchical structure of dissipative systems that have the "purpose" of degrading entropy gradients could be a different matter. The question becomes whether anything new is being said that isn't already being said by regular approaches to dissipative structure theory.

So your strawman is a strawman. This is an area I have been busy in for a long time.

Bayesianism is just probability theory. — Apustimelogist

But with a point of view inserted. That is why it is so good for modelling life and mind, but becomes tenditiously hand-waving if you find yourself using the words rocks and beliefs in the same sentence.

Perhaps it might be done in an academic setting for the shock value. And as I say, it is really shocking if the difference between equilibrium systems and far from equilibrium systems doesn't make it immediately a bad analogy, even if it is only meant as an analogy.

Which authors? — apokrisis

Of the papers I linked, including Friston! Friston has even talked about examples like the rock in zoom discussions.

My point is that it is just dumb to confuse equilibrium systems with far from equilibrium systems. A hot rock has its internal state. Drop it in a bucket of cold water and it then shares the collective internal state of the thermal system that is the much colder rock and the now slightly warmer bucket of water. — apokrisis

Yes, a point which refuses to engage with what I am talking about. Its very simple. Read the papers and they will tell you precisely what I have been saying. Nothing is being confused apart from yourself.

So your strawman is a strawman. — apokrisis

How? The thread is about systems in the most generic sense. You're the one who started unnecessarily complicating things with your misunderstandings.

Bringing Bayesian belief into this discussion is a publicity stunt and not serious science or philosophy. — apokrisis

This is an area I have been busy in for a long time. — apokrisis

For someone who has apparently had discussions with Friston himself, its bewildering your inability to just engage with what is being said in these papers and the thread itself.

But with a point of view inserted. — apokrisis

Bayes' rule is just as valid for objective probabilities. Thats why its just generic probability. Bayes' rule describes frequencies for things that have nothing to do with beliefs or minds or living systems. Its just generic probability theory.

The properties of living systems doesn't strictly come from Bayes but their complicated nature in the sense that if you characterize a system as performing Bayesian inference, but its state space is simple, its not going to look like a living thing. An often used example is a thermostat, sensing the temperature and regulating it. That can obviously be seen as active Bayesian inference, and aligns with your dissipative topic. But it doesn't look very much like a living creature does it.

You are just blustering rather than addressing my criticisms.

They aren't criticisms, and if you just read the papers and try to understand what is being said then you will see that. Your best criticism was "belief is a silly word".

I see nothing in Friston’s monograph supporting the claim that rocks have beliefs in any normal sense. A note on p84 explicitly says that by Bayesian belief he does not mean a propositional belief but merely a “belief” in the mathematical and technical sense of “belief” updating and “belief” propagation.

So the use of the Bayesian maths is properly qualified in terms of what its jargon means and doesn’t mean. We can move on from such silliness to the more interesting question of whether his Bayesian formalism is a better way of doing hierarchy theory. And I am perfectly open to that being the case.

It is a problem accounting for the topological phase transitions in complex systems as there is the question of whether emergent properties reflect simply the rearrangement of lower level complications or are indeed the top-down imposition of higher level novelty.

Hierarchy theory says top-down constraints do shape the emergent degrees of freedom that form any new level of topological order. A material particle like an electron is shaped by its Platonic-strength encounter with the constraints of U(1) symmetry, for example. As the simplest final organising structure, quantum field excitations had to eventually arrive at that fundamental state of being.

Friston shows that this is his own central question in his conclusion. But he comes down on the other side of this issue. He claims his Bayesian mechanics does away with the need for downward causation when talking about emergence.

So to me, the issues involved in Friston’s monograph are clear enough. And I still side with the “more is different” camp. For reasons I have already mentioned.

I plainly said that information and entropy are just mathematical systems of measurement. They don’t tell us about informing or entropifying as real world processes. So the issue is about the how. You coined a term that suggest some general systems theory arises to cover this. But then the hand-waving begins. You speak as if information and energy are substantial things - like forces of nature - and so they just “do it”. Nuff said. — apokrisis

Information & Energy are the processes that make the Culture & Nature systems do what they do. If you don't think that is "substantial", then you won't understand the point of the Enformationism thesis. :smile:


Substantial : of considerable importance, size, or worth. ___ Oxford Dictionary

The mind and the world are both owed proper scientific accounts. Hoffman’s idealism doesn’t have anything help here. — apokrisis

Hoffman is a cognitive scientist, and Systems such as Mind are cognitive concepts (ideas). Do you also consider Nobel-winning quantum theorists, such as Planck & Heisenberg, to be unhelpful, when they make non-empirical philosophical conjectures? :smile:


Donald Hoffman's theories, such as the Interface Theory of Perception and Conscious Realism, are not considered mainstream science, though he holds an established academic position and has conducted empirical research on visual perception. While his work incorporates scientific concepts and mathematical models to support philosophical claims about reality and consciousness, critics argue that much of his philosophy is metaphysical and unverifiable, lacking the falsifiability required for a scientific theory.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=is+donald+hoffman%27s+theory+scientific


Donald Hoffman's work represents a contemporary take on idealism, known as Conscious Realism, which posits that consciousness is the fundamental reality, and the physical world is an emergent property of interacting conscious agents, not the other way around. His theory centers on his Interface Theory of Perception (ITP), which, supported by the Fitness Beats Truth (FBT) Theorem, suggests our perceptions are "icons" that don't resemble objective reality but are rather adapted for evolutionary fitness, with reality being a deeper network of conscious agents. Hoffman uses mathematical models to explore how spacetime and physical laws can emerge from these dynamics of conscious agents.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=donald+hoffman+idealism

I don't really like these quantum examples because you are getting to a point where people don't really know what these things mean in a metaphysical sense. In other parts of science, I don't see arguments over downward causation being anything other than semantic, because it is clear that what is not necessarily reducible is an explanatory framework in an epistemic sense, rather than any genuinely novel strongly emergent metaphysics. You obviously get novel behavior, but again, my intuition is that arguments over the significance of this would largely be semantic. There is something like a downward causation in Friston's description, but it is does not invoke anything more than the same genre of mechanisms that you would talk about to explain natural selection in evolution which are "blind".

You said nothing that adds anything. There is a world of difference between belief and “belief” in this debate.

If you don't think that is "substantial", — Gnomon

This is metaphysics we are talking about. Substance is a claim about what “stands under”. And ontologically that is usually regarded as a stuff. A passive and stable material that can be worked up into an unlimited variety of forms.

Of course, Aristotle came up with a better story. Which is where systems science got going.

Hoffman uses mathematical models to explore how spacetime and physical laws can emerge from these dynamics of conscious agents. — Gnomon

Thanks for reminding me just how much of a crackpot he is.

:chin: :chin:

This is metaphysics we are talking about. Substance is a claim about what “stands under”. And ontologically that is usually regarded as a stuff. A passive and stable material that can be worked up into an unlimited variety of forms.
. — apokrisis

That "passive & stable" stuff is indeed the fundamental substance of Ontological Materialism. But Aristotle defined his "Ousia" in terms of two elements : real Matter & ideal Form*1. Modern quantum physics concludes that active & dynamic Information (power to enform) is the essence of Matter*2. Shannon's "passive & stable" Information (data) has been found to also be active & causal (form giving), hence equated with Energy : E = MC^2.

My previous post linked to a book : Information is Energy. And. that creative-power-to-change-Form is the opposite of deforming Entropy*3. So, it seems that Aristotle was ahead of his time, to combine Matter (passive & stable) with Energy (power to transform). So, Matter (marble) is inert until it is given Form (sculpture) by its enforming Essence*4 (idea , concept), in the mind of the sculptor. Working together, inert Matter & causal Information (EnFormAction) are the System we call Evolution. Unfortunately, the metaphysics of Materialism ignores the active, causal half of the equation of Substance. :smile:

Note--- " be ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh you . . ."
Greek Apokrisis = answer

*1. Fundamental Substance :
In Aristotle's philosophy, substance (ousia) refers to the fundamental, individual entities that exist independently and are the subjects of predication. It's a central concept in his metaphysics, distinguishing between primary substances (individual things) and secondary substances (species and genera). Furthermore, Aristotle connects substance with matter and form, suggesting that all physical things are composed of these two elements
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=aristotle+substance

*2. Information is Fundamental :
Information is more than just a description of our universe and the stuff in it: it is the most basic currency of existence.
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/is-information-fundamental/

*3. Information is a Process :
When spelled with an “I”, Information is a noun, referring to data & things. When spelled with an “E”, Enformation is a verb, referring to energy and processes.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page11.html

*4. Marble is the raw material, but the sculptor's concept of Form gives it meaning