What I'm trying to point out is that, whatever mental object you posit in my head, the actual work is done by my mind, interpreting, applying and so forth. Those activities - skills - are what matters. The mental object doesn't actually do anything. — Ludwig V

Yes, to express a complete idea, a sentence needs both a verb (an activity) and generally a noun (object).

There is no complete idea in "apple", but there is in "the apple is on the table".

As Wittgenstein wrote in Tractatus "the world is the totality of facts, not of things", where "the apple is on the table" is a fact because it encompasses relations between things.

In a sense, we know nothing, because we do not have a complete knowledge of anything. But of course, this doesn't mean that we are completely ignorant. — boundless

In a sense, yes. An empirical sense, a posteriori. In a rational sense a priori, that which is known by us with apodeictic certainty, the negation of which is impossible, is complete knowledge of that certainty, re: no geometric figure can be constructed with two straight lines. Or, all bodies are extended. There aren’t many, but there are some.

Hey M! Hope this are well with you. On to fun matters:

Is "all bodies are extended" an assertion or is it a fact?

Hey you!!! Returning hopes, I am.

Stronger than an assertion, methinks, but not necessarily a fact? In the text, it’s simply an analytical logical judgement, true given the relations of the conceptions contained therein.

If there ever is a body encountered that isn’t extended, the judgement would need a revision, along with our entire logical system. I mean, blow one certainty out of the water is sufficient probability for blowing them all.

Yes, to express a complete idea, a sentence needs both a verb (an activity) and generally a noun (object).

There is no complete idea in "apple", but there is in "the apple is on the table".

As Wittgenstein wrote in Tractatus "the world is the totality of facts, not of things", where "the apple is on the table" is a fact because it encompasses relations between things. — RussellA

Are you saying "is on the table" is an activity? In predication the verb "is" does not express an activity.

Stronger than an assertion, methinks, but not necessarily a fact? In the text, it’s simply an analytical logical judgement, true given the relations of the conceptions contained therein.

If there ever is a body encountered that isn’t extended, the judgement would need a revision, along with our entire logical system. I mean, blow one certainty out of the water is sufficient probability for blowing them all. — Mww

So, a kind of "intuitive concept" (taking "intuition" in the ordinary usage of the term, not the technical one).

If that's more or less it, then that's fine.

But as something more definitive, I think we don't know what bodies are. That is, when a body stops and becomes something non-body.

That's the issue with carrying commonsense intuition beyond what they're meant to be dealing with: common sense issues.

I suppose I am rambling a bit.

I think we don't know what bodies are. That is, when a body stops and becomes something non-body. — Manuel

Agreed, in principle. Best we can do is know what we say bodies are.

Are you saying "is on the table" is an activity? In predication the verb "is" does not express an activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Even though the verb "is" expresses a state of existence, the phrase "is on" suggests a temporary situation, as in the apple is on the table, the apple is under the table or the apple is on the floor.

The apple currently being on the table is part of an active situation.

In a sense, yes. An empirical sense, a posteriori. In a rational sense a priori, that which is known by us with apodeictic certainty, the negation of which is impossible, is complete knowledge of that certainty, re: no geometric figure can be constructed with two straight lines. Or, all bodies are extended. There aren’t many, but there are some. — Mww

Ok, yes, I agree with that. Logical and mathematical knowledge are of a different kind of, say, empirical knowledge. But even in mathematics, we can have partial knowledge. For instance, one might know something about natural numbers while not knowing that the primes are infinite. But once you know something in that field, you can have certainty, yes.

On the other hand, I am not sure we can even know completely any phenomena. For instance, when you consider one natural phenomenon, it seems that in order to understand it you have to understand it in its own context. But the 'context' seems limitless (or 'boundless' :lol: ). So, in a sense, every phenomenon, even the simplest ones, seems to be of infinite 'depth' so to speak.

Even though the verb "is" expresses a state of existence, the phrase "is on" suggests a temporary situation, as in the apple is on the table, the apple is under the table or the apple is on the floor.

The apple currently being on the table is part of an active situation. — RussellA

A static state of existence, even if temporary, is very distinct from an activity. In no way is a static state a part of an activity, as there is a causal relation which separates the two. A cause is required to bring the static thing into an active situation.

A static state of existence, even if temporary, is very distinct from an activity. In no way is a static state a part of an activity, as there is a causal relation which separates the two. A cause is required to bring the static thing into an active situation. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are assuming that instants of time, static states of existence, are metaphysically possible.

Henri Bergson is one philosopher who argued that time is not a series of discrete, measurable instants but is a flow of durations. (Wikipedia - Duration (philosophy))

Alfred North Whitehead believed that if we denied the possibility of instants of time, this would solve many philosophical puzzles. (https://whiteheadresearch.org/)

For example, if there are instants of time, and if the apple is on the table at one instant in time, where is the cause that ensures the apple is still on the table an instant of time later. In the absence of any cause, this would mean that time will stop.

It is more likely that there are not instants in time but rather durations of time. It would follow that the apple being on the table is part of an active situation.

Logical and mathematical knowledge are of a different kind of, say, empirical knowledge. — boundless

Yeah, the argument is, empirical knowledge is required to prove logical or mathematical knowledge. But that doesn’t mean empirical and mathematical knowledge are the same. One must be an epistemological dualist to grant that distinction.
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I am not sure we can even know completely any phenomena. — boundless

I suspect that’s true no matter which philosophical regimen one favors. Whether phenomena represent that which is external to us, or phenomena represent constructs of our intellect within us, we cannot say they are unconditioned, which relies on endless…..you know, like….boundless…..cause and effect prohibiting complete knowledge of them.

Where is this reality? — RussellA

This is not a proper question, because there is insufficient context to define a correct answer. It's like asking where space is.

Our five sense are between our minds and a reality the other side. — RussellA

That presupposes that our minds and reality exist in the same space. Since our minds are not physical objects, that cannot be the case.

As you say, we accept that our concept of the sun is not identical with its object, in that our mind, contained within our brain, being of the order 30cm diameter, is less than the 1.39 million km diameter of the sun. — RussellA

Mental objects such as appearances, experiences, concepts are not physical objects, so do not occupy space.

As you also say, our concept of the sun is existentially dependent on its object. — RussellA

I don't see how that can be true. There are many concepts of things that do not exist.

The question is, where is this object? Where is this sun? — RussellA

You need to explain this question. In a normal context, the answer would be 93 million miles from the earth. No doubt there is an astronomical location within a wider context.

As an Indirect Realist, from appearances and experiences in my senses I can infer that their cause was the fact of there being a sun in reality. But this can only be an inference. — RussellA

With reservations, OK.

But how can we know without doubt the cause of the appearances and experiences in our senses? — RussellA

It depends what you mean by doubt. There is not a shred of evidence - apart from these philosophical arguments - that would make such a doubt less than idle speculation.

As an Indirect Realist, this is not a problem. I simply name the unknown cause of my appearances and experiences after the appearances and experiences themselves, such that I name the set {appearance of a circular shape, experience of seeing the colour yellow, experience of hotness} as "sun". — RussellA

So you form a collection of all the evidence that the sun exists, etc. and call that set the sun? That's like holding all the evidence that P implies Q and refusing to assert Q. That's not an inference of any kind. And how can you assert that this set is 1.39 million miles in diameter? Appearances and experience do not occupy space, so no collection of them can have a diameter.

Backwards in time, how can anyone know that the cause of a broken window was a stone or a bird when the observer was not present when the window broke? — RussellA

You must be using the words in unusual ways. From the fact that I am here, I can reliably infer that I was born. I can also infer reliably that I will die.

How can you know the cause of an appearance or experience in the senses when no one cause is necessary but many possible causes are contingent? — RussellA

You must be using the words in unusual ways. It is precisely experience in the senses that enable us to infer causation. If you think those inferences are wrong, I would be glad to see the evidence.

But for the Indirect Realist, they only have the map. They cannot directly look at the actual world to compare it to the map. — RussellA

What earthly use is a map if you cannot relate it to what it is a map of? Is it perhaps possible to look at the world indirectly?

Yeah, the argument is, empirical knowledge is required to prove logical or mathematical knowledge. But that doesn’t mean empirical and mathematical knowledge are the same. One must be an epistemological dualist to grant that distinction. — Mww

Well, I agree with Kant that knowledge in mathematics and logic is 'a priori'. In fact, I would even say that some knowledge of those domains is a precondition for any kind of rational knowledge. To make an example, we could not be able to know that there are 'three apples' on the table if we didn't have a concept of 'three'.
Regarding mathematics and logic I believe that my view falls in between Kant's and Plato's, if the 'Neoplatonic' interpretation about the latter is wrong, i.e. mathematics and logic study of the structure of thought but, unlike Kant, I believe that, ultimately, their timeless truths are grounded in an 'infinite Mind'. So, I am closer to the Neoplatonic or 'Theistic' view about mathematics and logic.

I suspect that’s true no matter which philosophical regimen one favors. Whether phenomena represent that which is external to us, or phenomena represent constructs of our intellect within us, we cannot say they are unconditioned, which relies on endless…..you know, like….boundless…..cause and effect prohibiting complete knowledge of them. — Mww

Agreed. I also believe this kind of thinking also perhaps inspired mystical experiences. In a certain way, seeing that anything finite seem in some way to have an 'infinite depth' seems something like a 'perennial truth', so to speak. It is compatible basically with any metaphysical position.

You are assuming that instants of time, static states of existence, are metaphysically possible. — RussellA

Why do you say that? It was your claim, not mine. You said that the verb "is" expresses a "state of existence". There is no need to assume any "instants of time", because the state of existence, such as the example the apple on the table, may last for a duration of time. My claim is that for this so-called state to become a part of an activity, causation is required.

It is more likely that there are not instants in time but rather durations of time. It would follow that the apple being on the table is part of an active situation. — RussellA

That does not follow. The apple is in a static condition, the state of being on the table, for a duration of time. By what premise do you conclude that it also takes part in activity?

That presupposes that our minds and reality exist in the same space. Since our minds are not physical objects, that cannot be the case. — Ludwig V

Does the mind, as an activity say rather than an object, not reside within the brain/body?

Uh oh :smirk:

Does the mind, as an activity say rather than an object, not reside within the brain/body? — Janus

Well, there are good grounds for saying that the mind is existentially dependent on the brain etc.. The nature of this dependence is not yet clarified, but I doubt if it will qualify as "resident". On the other hand, if you open up a normal head, you do not find the mind. Worse than that, we cannot even imagine what it might be like to accidentally tread on an experience or trip over a concept.

The other requisite for any such theory is a belief that there are such things as brains.

reside within the brain/body? — Janus

'within' is an interesting concept in this context. It's a spatial metaphor in which brain/body is a container and the mind is something inside it. But from another perspective, the body exists 'within awareness'.

The apple is in a static condition, the state of being on the table, for a duration of time. By what premise do you conclude that it also takes part in activity? — Metaphysician Undercover

According to general relativity, an apple on a table is subject to a force and because subject to a force is therefore accelerating, actively accelerating. (Wikipedia - g force)

From the fact that I am here, I can reliably infer that I was born. I can also infer reliably that I will die.................. In a normal context, the answer would be 93 million miles from the earth...................................What earthly use is a map if you cannot relate it to what it is a map of? Is it perhaps possible to look at the world indirectly? — Ludwig V

As an Indirect Realist, I agree with your inferring. I can infer a cause for my sensations, indirect rather than direct knowledge.

I see a broken window and can infer what broke it.

From the appearance of something bright and yellow and the experience of something hot in my senses I can infer the existence of the sun. From other appearances and experiences, I can infer the existence of an Earth and a Sun that is 93 million distance from this Earth.
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Mental objects such as appearances, experiences, concepts are not physical objects, so do not occupy space. — Ludwig V

It depends on one's position regarding the mind-body problem.

My position is more Physicalism than Dualism.

As Peter Lloyd writes in his article Is the Mind Physical?: Dissecting Conscious Brain Tissue

The mind-body problem has remained essentially unchanged since Descartes put it forward in 1641. The problem is: what is the nature of the conscious mind, and how does it relate to the body?

Today, the prevailing view is that the mind is really a physical phenomenon going on inside the brain. I shall call this view physicalism. It contrasts with two other broad views: dualism – which says the mind is irreducibly different from the brain; and mentalism – which denies the existence of the brain altogether.

From the appearance of something bright and yellow and the experience of something hot in my senses I can infer the existence of the sun. — RussellA

But

I simply name the unknown cause of my appearances and experiences after the appearances and experiences themselves, such that I name the set {appearance of a circular shape, experience of seeing the colour yellow, experience of hotness} as "sun". — RussellA

I see a broken window and can infer what broke it. — RussellA

But

How can you know the cause of an appearance or experience in the senses when no one cause is necessary but many possible causes are contingent? — RussellA

Today, the prevailing view is that the mind is really a physical phenomenon going on inside the brain.

It may prevail in the circles that Peter Lloyd moves in. But it is very rash to generalize from that to the world-wide community of philosophers, never mind to the entire population of the world, - unless one has a solid backing from properly organized surveys.
I did say earlier that there are good grounds for saying that the mind is existentially dependent on the brain etc., but that nature of this dependence is not yet clarified.

It's a spatial metaphor in which brain/body is a container and the mind is something inside it. But from another perspective, the body exists 'within awareness'. — Wayfarer

I did say earlier that there are good grounds for saying that the mind is existentially dependent on the brain etc., but that nature of this dependence is not yet clarified. — Ludwig V

My belief is also that the existence of the mind depends on the existence of the brain, and the nature of this dependency is still in doubt, as you say.

My working hypothesis at the moment is panprotopsychism, the view that fundamental physical entities are protoconscious.

'within' is an interesting concept in this context. It's a spatial metaphor in which brain/body is a container and the mind is something inside it. But from another perspective, the body exists 'within awareness'.

It's also interesting because, while the body is a locus of activity, it is not sufficient to generate a mind. Place a healthy human body in most of the environments that prevail in the universe—the bottom of the sea, the surface of a star, within the Earth's core, in the void of space, etc.—and you don't get consciousness but virtually instant death. You can abstract the context away, but only by holding the environment within narrow parameters. Even a normal room, if filled with CO2 or NO2, will make consciousness impossible.

'within' is an interesting concept in this context. It's a spatial metaphor in which brain/body is a container and the mind is something inside it. But from another perspective, the body exists 'within awareness'. — Wayfarer

I get that; it is possible to reverse perspectives. That said from a phenomenological perspective, it does seem to me that my thoughts are going on inside my head, not in my torso, arms or legs or even neck. I mean it just feels that way. So while we cannot be directly aware of neuronal activity, that activity seems to generate sensations that make it seem like thought is in the head (to me anyway).

It's also interesting because, while the body is a locus of activity, it is not sufficient to generate a mind. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, what you go on to say about the body being unable to survive in unsuitable environments just indicates that a healthy living body is usually sufficient to generate consciousness. I say "usually" because there are phases of deep sleep wherein consciousness doesn't seem to be present.

Have you encountered Alva Noë ‘Out of Our Heads’? ‘Noë’s contention is that you are not your brain – rather, that “consciousness is an achievement of the whole animal in its environmental context”.

Noë supports this contention with references to many fascinating experiments in neuroscience. But he claims that neuroscience isn’t getting anywhere in explaining consciousness because it views consciousness of reality as a representation of the world created and manipulated by the brain. Noë attacks brain-body dualism in part by attacking this representationalism.

Process is an important way of thinking for Noë. Thus, consciousness isn’t just what happens in the brain: brain activity is just part of an extended process that starts with the environment, involves the whole body and includes the brain. In this, the environment isn’t merely a source of stimulation, nor is it a model or representation built by and viewed by the brain. In Noë’s words, “the world is its own model.” To put it another way, the real object of perception is the physical environment, not some artifact of the brain/mind.

According to Noë, the brain facilitates the dynamic interactions between the brain, body, and world. Surfers apprehend the world through their familiarity and skills of surfing. Certain surprises that arise while riding a wave cause the surfer to intuitively act and stay on the board. The brain is responsible for this skill, but without the world, such an interaction between the world would not be possible.‘ (He says on these grounds that the thought-experiment of a brain-in-a-vat could never be possible.)

While I’m not completely persuaded by his book, the broader point attacking ‘mind inside head’ is compelling to me. It’s that sense of the separated ego confronting the world of objects and forces that needs to be relaxed. Noë’s approach is more in line with enactive or participatory epistemology and the merging of knowing with being.

I've heard of Noe and that book, but never looked into it. I agree that “consciousness is an achievement of the whole animal in its environmental context”. As Timothy pointed out, the environment must be such as to be able to support life, and the brain body must be, to a sufficient degree, a healthily functioning one.

On the other hand it does seem as though the brain generates consciousness, given that it is injuries to that organ, and not to other parts of the body (barring death of course) that are sufficient to curtail consciousness.

According to general relativity, an apple on a table is subject to a force and because subject to a force is therefore accelerating, actively accelerating. (Wikipedia - g force) — RussellA

I think we had this discussion before. In general relativity, gravity is not a force.

My belief is also that the existence of the mind depends on the existence of the brain, and the nature of this dependency is still in doubt, as you say. — RussellA

This seems to me to contradict what you were telling me about the nature of the sun..


I'm completely bewildered.

Have you encountered Alva Noë ‘Out of Our Heads’? ‘Noë’s contention is that you are not your brain – rather, that “consciousness is an achievement of the whole animal in its environmental context”. — Wayfarer

That is an idea that makes complete sense to me. I've even wondered how to make a case for it.

I'll have to work out a way of getting hold of it.

Thank very much for that.