So, you like that all these materials are discussed in a single thread?

An objection to Trinity: God/mind to me is defined as an irreducible substance with the ability to experience, freely decide, and create. Such a God experiences His Knowledge. He can create the universe as well. Therefore, the tree substance/Trinity is unnecessary.

The difficulty here is that "salvation" is often understood as a Christian term, and in that context it is not something we can achieve on our own power.

Under this view, we cannot achieve repayment of our sins on our own; but God has to freely choose to save us by sacrificing Himself. Salvation here is referring to the restoration of the sinner into the proper order of creation.

I think the most fruitful things to pursue would be those things where you disagree with traditional Christians, in particular over whether some doctrine is accessible through natural reason (i.e. apart from revelation).

Sounds good. Here’s some differences and you can choose what you want us to discuss.

Stereotypical Christianity vs. “Bobism”

1. One must accept Christ in order to be saved; whereas one must sufficiently act in accord with God to be saved.

2. Justice is retributive; whereas justice is restorative.

3. The Great Sacrifice is freely chosen in a way where it could have been otherwise; The Great Sacrifice is a necessity of God’s freedom.

3. The Trinity, the good life, the path to salvation, etc. is revealed; all of those are naturally determinable.

4. Humans are the most loved by God; Persons of pure form are the most loved by God.

5. Unrepentant sinners go to eternal hell (viz., the lake of fire where there will be gnashing of teeth and great weeping); unrepentant sinners go to an indefinite hell that punishes them appropriately to get them to realize that their sins are bad until they repent.

6. The animal kingdom largely is ordered towards what is perfectly good (e.g., the lion eating the zebra is not bad); the animal kingdom is largely polluted with evil due to the Great Fall.

7. Humans caused the Great Fall; a person which existed prior to most if not all of evolution caused the Great Fall.

8. God can and has committed (retributively) just punishments without giving mercy; whereas God has to synthesize (Restorative) Justice and Mercy.

Etc.

 if we have a non-Deistic God who interacts with creation, then it is very intuitive to move into the idea that God has spoken and men have listened (i.e. faith)

Yes, but it isn’t necessary in order to understand everything that is vital to living a good life is my point. God does have to intervene in my view (such as to save us), but I am not sure exactly how often He would intervene. It seems to me that God doesn’t intervene much…

Anyway, I hope to have a closer look at your document in the near future.

I look forward to hearing your thoughts.

It is true that many different beliefs agreed to the First Amendment establishment of religion clause. The toleration of differences was a rejection of the wars of religion that had consumed the English Civil War and its resolution. That spirit of Liberal rights was broader than just what was expressed by the self-declared Deists of that time.

As a Constitutional matter, the adjudication of States who required their citizens to comply with the taxation and practices of a particular religion were overturned through the use of the 14nth Amendment that restricted the scope of what States could do in view of the individual rights given in the First:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. — Constitution, 14nth Amendment, Section 1

A good summary of this process is given in the Supreme Court decision, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), where the State was permitted to reimburse some costs separate from any advocacy for a particular church.

Under this view, we cannot achieve repayment of our sins on our own; but God has to freely choose to save us by sacrificing Himself. Salvation here is referring to the restoration of the sinner into the proper order of creation. — Bob Ross

Okay, understood. :up:

Sounds good. Here’s some differences and you can choose what you want us to discuss.

Stereotypical Christianity vs. “Bobism”

1. One must accept Christ in order to be saved; whereas one must sufficiently act in accord with God to be saved.

2. Justice is retributive; whereas justice is restorative.

3. The Great Sacrifice is freely chosen in a way where it could have been otherwise; The Great Sacrifice is a necessity of God’s freedom.

3. The Trinity, the good life, the path to salvation, etc. is revealed; all of those are naturally determinable.

4. Humans are the most loved by God; Persons of pure form are the most loved by God.

5. Unrepentant sinners go to eternal hell (viz., the lake of fire where there will be gnashing of teeth and great weeping); unrepentant sinners go to an indefinite hell that punishes them appropriately to get them to realize that their sins are bad until they repent.

6. The animal kingdom largely is ordered towards what is perfectly good (e.g., the lion eating the zebra is not bad); the animal kingdom is largely polluted with evil due to the Great Fall.

7. Humans caused the Great Fall; a person which existed prior to most if not all of evolution caused the Great Fall.

8. God can and has committed (retributively) just punishments without giving mercy; whereas God has to synthesize (Restorative) Justice and Mercy.

Etc. — Bob Ross

Okay, interesting. It looks like there are misunderstandings at various places. We can come back to these topics, but rather than getting into those I think a good starting point might be analogy. This is something that is more fundamental and might be more interesting to others.

In your document you say things like this:

When we say God is all-powerful, all-knowing, all-present, etc. we are speaking analogically and not univocally. — Strong Natural Theism, by Bob Ross

What do you mean by this, and why do you hold that we are (or should be) speaking analogically and not univocally when we say such things?

-

Let's also take up your 3:

3. The Trinity, the good life, the path to salvation, etc. is revealed; all of those are naturally determinable. — Bob Ross

Here are two quotes from Aquinas:

Objection 2. Further, the Divine Law should have come to man's assistance where human reason fails him: as is evident in regard to things that are of faith, which are above reason. But man's reason seems to suffice for the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts do not belong to the Old Law, which is a Divine law.

Reply to Objection 2. It was fitting that the Divine law should come to man's assistance not only in those things for which reason is insufficient, but also in those things in which human reason may happen to be impeded. Now human reason could not go astray in the abstract, as to the universal principles of the natural law; but through being habituated to sin, it became obscured in the point of things to be done in detail. But with regard to the other moral precepts, which are like conclusions drawn from the universal principles of the natural law, the reason of many men went astray, to the extend of judging to be lawful, things that are evil in themselves. Hence there was need for the authority of the Divine law to rescue man from both these defects. Thus among the articles of faith not only are those things set forth to which reason cannot reach, such as the Trinity of the Godhead; but also those to which right reason can attain, such as the Unity of the Godhead; in order to remove the manifold errors to which reason is liable. — Aquinas, ST I-II.99.2 - Whether the Old Law contains moral precepts?

For some matters connected with human actions are so evident, that after very little consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of them by means of these general first principles: while some matters cannot be the subject of judgment without much consideration of the various circumstances, which all are not competent to do carefully, but only those who are wise: just as it is not possible for all to consider the particular conclusions of sciences, but only for those who are versed in philosophy... — Aquinas ST I-II.100.1 - Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?

Aquinas' idea here is that God will give moral instruction via divine revelation even in some cases where the moral instruction could be known without the divine revelation. This is because the instruction is helpful both on account of our sinful and ignorant state, and because only the few have the time or intelligence to understand the proper moral road. Or in other words, even though the moral life is accessible to natural reason, only a tiny percentage of people would ever be capable of such knowledge. The absence of revelation on this score would seem to result in a kind of elitism, where only the select few are able to know the moral way forward.

I have no idea what self-subsistent being would be like. I also cannot see how anything in our investigations of nature could inform us about what self-existent being is like or that it gives us any reason to believe in self-existent being

That’s what the four proofs of God’s existence are setting after: reasons for believing in self-subsisting being and what it would be like (analogically).

You say we can know through natural theology that God is omnipotent, but you don't explain how natural theology enables us to know that

It’s in the link I shared in the OP. Did you read it?

Is natural theology different than revelation for you?

Yes. The field of study denoted as ‘natural theology’ is distinct from ‘revealed theology’: it is what we can know about God through reason applied to the natural world around us (devoid of divine revelation).

The proofs of God are of course well-known by now, and not convincing at all IMO

Why are they unconvincing to you?

Then the proof of the trinity...it always makes me a bit sad to read these, because it's always obviously arbitrary post-hoc rationalizing

That’s a completely unjustified ad hominem and straw man. These arguments convinced me of Trinitarianism: I was not a Trinitarian before coming up with them.

The point on divine freedom: freedom of indifference versus freedom of excellence, is an important one.

Yes, @MoK appears to be overlooking this distinction I have made and collapsing the discussion into ‘free will’.

On the demonstration of the Trinity, one issue I thought of is that the distinction between God's will and God's intellect is generally considered to be merely conceptual. It is a distinction that appears for us, but it isn't a real distinction (else God would not be simple). It's the same way "good" and "true" apply to being generally, but don't add anything to being; they are being as considered from some perspective. But then it would seem that the distinction would have to be real if it is generating subsistent relations, no?

Keen point. My response would be that you are absolutely right that His thinking and willing are the same; so when He wills the good of Himself it is identical to thinking of Himself as good. However, I would say that, as noted in my makeshift document in the OP, there are two and only two objects of God’s thought about Himself: His self-unity and Himself as that unified faculty. His faculties collapse ontologically into each other; and so it is one and the same faculty which God is; but this oneness, for God to know Himself perfectly, is distinct from knowledge of Himself in terms of that faculty. This thusly produces two objects of His thought, one the Holy Spirit and the other the Son.

Got it: thank you for the elaboration. So Spinoza is an atheist IMHO: I remember now. God refers to a Divine Person historically: this Substance is not a person. He would be right to classify it not as God, like Schopenhauer does with his universal will.

So, you like that all these materials are discussed in a single thread?

Well, it’s one view: mine. I want people to discuss the ‘strong natural theism’ I came up with. Naturally, worldviews contain many underlying materials to discuss.

An objection to Trinity: God/mind to me is defined as an irreducible substance with the ability to experience, freely decide, and create

The Trinity argument I gave presupposes a classical theistic sense of God, which most notably does not experience: God is not conscious in the same sense we are. He does not have subjective experience. Consequently:

Such a God experiences His Knowledge

He knows Himself: He does not ‘experience’ Himself.

Also, this idea of Him knowing/experiencing His knowledge/experience leads to an infinite regression.

He can create the universe as well. Therefore, the tree substance/Trinity is unnecessary

Nothing about what you said demonstrated that the Trinity is unnecessary. In fact, the OP’s argument for the Trinity claims that God’s self-knowledge is what causes the Trinity.

As a Constitutional matter, the adjudication of States who required their citizens to comply with the taxation and practices of a particular religion were overturned through the use of the 14nth 

:up:

It’s in the link I shared in the OP. Did you read it? — Bob Ross

Can't you just tell me?

So Spinoza is an atheist IMHO: I remember now. — Bob Ross

Novalis' "god-intoxicated man" is an acosmist (as I've pointed out ), not "an atheist".

The Trinity argument I gave presupposes a classical theistic sense of God, which most notably does not experience: God is not conscious in the same sense we are. He does not have subjective experience. — Bob Ross

My model is simpler since it requires only one substance. To be honest, I cannot comprehend your God. Is your God unconscious?

He knows Himself: He does not ‘experience’ Himself. — Bob Ross

How could he know if He is unconscious? You are unconscious when you don't experience anything.

Also, this idea of Him knowing/experiencing His knowledge/experience leads to an infinite regression. — Bob Ross

How? I even have certain knowledge. I cannot experience all my knowledge at once, but only a small part of it at any given moment. I think that is because I am a conscious mind with a limited memory. The subconscious mind, however, has a huge memory. Therefore, I can conceive a God whose Knowledge is present to Him through experience.

Yes, MoK appears to be overlooking this distinction I have made and collapsing the discussion into ‘free will’. — Bob Ross

I am a free agent Bob, so I have freedom of indifference and freedom of excellence. Are you saying that God does not have freedom of indifference and therefore cannot sin? If yes, why did God create creatures with the ability to sin?

What do you mean by this

By analogical predication, I mean when one predicates a property of a thing by way of an analogy that is in no way meant to be taken as one and the same (viz., univocally) or completely different (viz., equivocally):

First, the predication can be univocal, meaning that the words are used in exactly the same manner. In our previous example, this would mean that God is good in exactly the same way that ice cream is good. A second form of predication is equivocal, meaning that although the words used to describe the two things are the same, they have completely unrelated meanings. To return again to our example, this would mean that when we call God good we are not using the word good to mean anything like the same thing as when we say ice cream is good.

The third form of predication is titled analogical. Here God is not good in exactly the same way that ice cream is good, but there is some kind of analogy between the way God is related to the word good and ice cream is related to the same word. That is to say, the meanings are not completely opposed or unrelated, but neither should we conclude that God’s goodness is just like the goodness of ice cream.

-- (https://amymantravadi.com/2020/03/26/the-analogy-of-being-in-the-works-of-thomas-aquinas/)

, and why do you hold that we are (or should be) speaking analogically and not univocally when we say such things?

I think it is important when specifically speaking of God to use analogical predication; because God's nature is not known to us as He is in Himself but, rather, is known to us by way of analogy to His effects. He is known from what He is not that He produces and not what He is.

God’s true nature is not apparent to us, as it is in-itself, exactly because He is never afforded to our senses (nor could He be) and is always the necessary precondition, as Being itself, for all things sensed.

Aquinas' idea here is that God will give moral instruction via divine revelation even in some cases where the moral instruction could be known without the divine revelation.

I think it is reasonable to conclude that many people may not, in practicality, reach knowledge through philosophy of God; so Divine Revelation may be fitting. I will say that I don’t think the arguments I give are highly technical nor something that a laymen is not smart enough to comprehend: I am making ordinary arguments from ordinary things in the natural world (e.g., change, contingency/necessity, etc.). However, this is not incompatible with the ‘strong natural theism’ I expounded: the central thesis merely claims that we can know through reason applied to the natural world around us about God’s nature—it could be equally true that God could expedite the process by just telling us.

I will say that knowing God through reason applied to the ordinary world is stronger and richer than if God were to reveal it to us; because epistemically it would be much less certain with Divine Revelation and it comes with many other disadvantages (such as requiring faith, tradition, etc.) unless we are talking about God supernaturally infusing us with immanent knowledge.

Sure, this is the portion of the argument that addresses omnipotence:

E: Proof of God as Pure Act and Divine Simplicity
1. An purely actual and absolutely simple being exists (see previous arguments).
2. Two absolutely simple beings cannot coexist because they would be ontologically
indistinguishable from each other.
3. Only one purely actual being can exist.
4. There must be at least one purely actual being because change (or composition or
essences/essen or contingency/necessity) is real.
5. There exists one, and only one, purely actual being and it is the first cause of all change.
6. This being is uniquely, absolutely simple since no other absolutely simple being can exist
and it is changeless: this is called Divine Simplicity.
7. Goodness, as a property, refers to the equality of a thing’s essence and existence.
8. This purely actual being must have an essence that is absolutely identical to its existence
because it has no parts (being that it is absolutely simple).
9. This being must be perfectly good thing (and it is the only perfectly good being because no
other absolutely simple being can exist and absolute simplicity is required for an essence
and existence to perfectly overlap).
10. To be actual only because something else actualized the potential for it to exist implies that
that thing exists contingently upon what actualized it.
11. To be actual only because something else actualized the potential for it to exist, therefore,
implies that a being which can change lacks the ability to exist in-itself (or of its own
accord).
12. All things subject to change, which are all beings with parts, are, then, contingent beings
that lack the ability to exist in-themselves.
13. A being, then, that is not subject to change exists in-itself (as pure act).
14. This purely actual being is uniquely a being that is changeless.
15. Therefore, this purely actual being is uniquely a being that subsistently exists.
16. A being that has being in and of itself is just Being itself.
17. Therefore, this purely actual and Divinely Simple being is identical to Being itself.
18. Pure act and being, then, are convertible.
19. Being in-itself is to be a necessary being.
20. Therefore, this being is necessary and uniquely necessary.

21. Power is the ability to actualize potentials.
22. Omnipotence is just the ability to have power in-itself and not derivatively from another.
23. This purely actual being, then, is uniquely omnipotent because it is the sole, true source of
actuality. It is unlimited by act outside of itself.
24. Omnipresence is just to be present in all things.
25. This purely actual being is Being itself and of which all other things get their actuality
derivatively from as its first cause of act; so this purely actual being is omnipresent.
26. This purely actual being cannot be affected by anything else and to be in space, time, or
subjected to natural laws is to be affected by them; therefore, this purely actual being is
outside of time, non-corporeal, and outside of natural laws.
27. Since this purely is not only outside of time but also incapable of any change whatsoever, it
must be eternal proper (as opposed to something like aeviternal).
28. Since this purely actual being is uniquely the only one that can exist and its nature entails
uniquely that its essence and existence are identical (making it partless); it follows that all
other caused things (by this being)—the totality of its creation—is comprised of parts
because every contingent being—every being which is caused by this necessary being—is at
least comprised of two parts: being and essence. No other essence entails its existence, so
not other essence and being can be identical and, so, no other being can be composed of no
parts.
29. Space, time, and natural laws, if they are real, are made of parts; for, at a minimum, their
essences do not entail their existences (that is, there very existence is comprised of essence
and being—thusly two parts at a minimum).
30. Therefore, space, time, and natural laws are contingent on their parts to exist.
31. Therefore, space, time, and natural laws—as contingent beings—have the potential to
continue to exist and had the potential to begin to exist (at some point).
32. This purely actual being would have to be the first cause of act for the beginning of space,
time, and natural laws and their continued existence; as both an actualized potential to
continue and begin to exist are change and this purely actual being is the first cause of
change. This is true for all other beings with parts, which is the totality of real things besides
this purely actual being.
33. All contingent beings are comprised of essence and being.
34. This purely actual being, being the first cause of the existence of contingent beings, must, in
order to cause them, apprehend the essences of those beings in order to infuse them with
being in a pure act.
35. Apprehension of essences is what it means to be an intelligence (intellect).
36. Therefore, this purely actual being must be an intelligence.
37. However, this purely actual being is absolutely simple; so its pure act of thought (intellect)
is identical to Being itself and pure act.

38. An intellect entails a will.
39. Therefore, this purely actual being must be a will.
40. However, this purely actual being is absolutely simple; so its pure act of thought, Being, act,
and will must be identical.
41. Omniscience is just to know the essences of all things that are real and could be real.
42. This purely actual being, as the first cause of anything that possibly could exist and with
knowledge of the essence of anything that possibly could exist, must be omniscient.
43. Love is to will the good of another for its own sake.
44. This purely actual being wills the existence of a thing in correspondence with its essence,
which is to will the good of that thing insofar as to will its existence.
45. Therefore, this purely actual being is all-loving (although not equally or necessarily
supremely loving).
46. A being that is all-good (perfect), divinely simple, purely actual, changeless, properly
eternal, non-corporeal, active cause of all things, the only necessary being, omnipresent,
omnipotent, omniscient, a will, an intelligence, and all-loving is what is called God.
47. Therefore, God exists.

(Strong Natural Theism, 1:E)

Novalis' "god-intoxicated man" is an acosmist (as I've pointed out ↪180 Proof), not "an atheist".

So, for Spinoza, God is all that exists and God is not a person? Is that the idea?

My model is simpler since it requires only one substance.

Yes, but the goal is to explain the relevant data without multiplying entities without necessity; not come up with the simplest answer.

Is your God unconscious?

A conscious being, as I understand it, has a qualitative experience—qualia--such that there is something to be them experiencing the world. In a literal sense, this would require a being with complexity: with parts to facilitate a mediated interpretation of reality.

If God is conscious, it would be in a far weirder and incomprehensible way of knowing things immanently with no mediation. God, then, would not be conscious like we are: we are conscious because our brains facilitate the mediation of sense-data and our understanding of the world around us. There is something it is like to be us experiencing because we have mediated knowledge: we have faculties that cognize what is in reality. God, on the other hand, just knows reality and is intimately interrelated with it.

How? I even have certain knowledge

Because His experience of His experience is an experience. So if He has to experience His experiences, then He would also have to experience His experience of His experience and so on.

I am a free agent Bob, so I have freedom of indifference and freedom of excellence.

You would be a free agent in the sense of freedom for excellence if you cultivated the virtues, you have sufficient knowledge of what is good, and your environment is conducive to your flourishing as a human.

Are you saying that God does not have freedom of indifference and therefore cannot sin?

Freedom of indifference and freedom for excellence are incompatible theories. The former holds that freedom fundamentally consists in being able to choose from contraries; whereas the latter holds that freedom fundamentally consists in having a state of being that is conducive to flourishing.

If one accepts freedom for excellence, then God is and is the only possibly perfectly free being because He is has perfect knowledge of what is good, is unimpeded by anything external to Him, and has the power to actualize what He wills; whereas if one accepts freedom of indifference, then God is and is the only possibly perfectly unfree being because He cannot will what is bad (or, depending on the view, He may not be able to do otherwise whatsoever).

Yes.

Yes, but the goal is to explain the relevant data without multiplying entities without necessity; not come up with the simplest answer. — Bob Ross

You are introducing unnecessary substances.

A conscious being, as I understand it, has a qualitative experience—qualia--such that there is something to be them experiencing the world. In a literal sense, this would require a being with complexity: with parts to facilitate a mediated interpretation of reality. — Bob Ross

No, God can be simple and yet experience everything. He just needs to be omnipresent.
.

Because His experience of His experience is an experience. So if He has to experience His experiences, then He would also have to experience His experience of His experience and so on. — Bob Ross

We perceive a substance when we experience something. The same applies to God, so no regress is involved.

Freedom of indifference and freedom for excellence are incompatible theories. — Bob Ross

I don't understand why they are incompatible. I can choose to always do right, given the fact that there are at least two right options available to choose from; otherwise, no decision is involved, since I have only one choice. At the same time, I can choose to do wrong. I am a free agent in the end.

whereas if one accepts freedom of indifference, then God is and is the only possibly perfectly unfree being because He cannot will what is bad (or, depending on the view, He may not be able to do otherwise whatsoever). — Bob Ross

That is a very odd position, but granting it, then why did God create creatures with the ability to do contrary?

How is the idea of a non-person deity consistent with the historical use of the term God?

Doesn't it seem to radically redefine what one means by God to refer to a being that is not a person? What kind of definition is Spinoza using (to decipher if his Substance is meaningfully identifiable as God or a god)?

How is the idea of a non-personal deity consistent with the historical use of the term God? — Bob Ross

It's consistent with historical usages of Hindus (e.g. Vedanta), philosophers (e.g. the absolute, the infinite), Scholastics & Thomists (e.g. necessary being), JCI 'mystics' (e.g. ground of being), ... deists.

Doesn't it seem to radically redefine what one means by God to refer to a being that is not a person?

Spinoza does not conceive of God as "a person" (just as those mentioned above don't either).

What kind of definition is Spinoza using (to decipher if his Substance is meaningfully identifiable as God or a god)?

Spinoza uses "God" as the folk name/title for Nature (i.e. natura naturans), what human beings have always called reality (i.e. substance), or the fundamental power that causes all things to exist.

Again, for Spinoza's "definition of God" ...

Read his Ethics - Part 1 "Of God" pp. 1-31 (iirc) — 180 Proof

I am perplexed the modern personalist idea of God. I've read some discussion of this by Edward Feser and David Bentley Hart (Thomist and Orthodox respectively, ) Theistic personalism, common in much modern philosophy of religion, conceives of God really as a “person” in the ordinary sense: a supremely powerful and intelligent agent who shares our basic categories of mind and will, only infinitely perfected. For critics like Edward Feser and David Bentley Hart, this picture risks reducing God to a kind of “super-creature,” a being among other beings, which makes Him vulnerable to anthropomorphic misunderstanding and to the criticisms of modern atheism. I see that depiction as being upheld by many evangelical Christians and disputed by scientifically-inclined atheists.

Classical theism, by contrast, sees God not as a being but as Being (ipsum esse subsistens), the source and ground of all. God is not less than personal but more than personal: the transcendent fullness of intellect and will, whose knowing and willing are identical with His essence, not discursive or contingent as ours are. This avoids the opposite error of treating God as an impersonal force or abstract energy, since God is the very ground of personality, consciousness, and agapē. In short, where theistic personalism projects human categories “upwards” into God, classical theism emphasizes God’s radical transcendence as the living source of all being, without collapsing Him into either a cosmic individual or a faceless principle.

But a more generaous hermeneutic could see theistic personalism as amenable to certain personality types or stages of spiritual development (somewhat analogous to the concept of 'dharma doors' in Buddhism, which are different kinds of teachings suited to beings on various levels of development.)

In short, where theistic personalism projects human categories “upwards” into God, classical theism emphasizes God’s radical transcendence as the living source of all being, without collapsing Him into either a cosmic individual or a faceless principle. — Wayfarer

Afaik, the vast majority of religious believers are not "classical" theists in practice and instead worship a personal God (or gods). As Pascal says

God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God
of Jacob, not of the philosophers and scholars

... which makes Him vulnerable to anthropomorphic misunderstanding ...

Read the most ancient religious scriptures; they all refer to God as "Him".

... and to the criticisms of modern atheism.

Pre-modern atheism was also well represented by e.g. the Cārvāka & Ājīvika schools of Hinduism, Confucianism, classical atomism (e.g. "The Epicurean Paradox"), Sextus Empiricus, etc ...

The inhabitants of the earth are of two sorts: those with brains, but no religion, and those with religion, but no brains. — al-Ma'arri, 10-11th CE

:smirk:

Afaik, the vast majority of religious believers are not "classical" theists in practice and instead worship a personal God (or gods). — 180 Proof

More easy targets for you, 180 ;-)

Is the personalist god really a modern idea? Obviously, polytheistic religions are much more prone to this viewpoint (it's hard to justify multiple ontologically necessary gods). But among monotheistic religions, the philosophical god conceived by scholars of the church were much later additions to a traditionally personalist god. Ever since then, the god of the scholars and the god of the parish have remained two very different conceptions.

:up: :up: