Of course there is a perspective involved in saying that the Universe is or is not independent of minds, but it doesn't follow that it is impossible that the universe be either independent or dependent on minds―we just don't know and may only speculate about it. — Janus

Right - that's what you're doing. You fall back on the 'it can't be determined, therefore a matter of opinion.'

Can you give me an example of any truth which is determinable in any way other than by observation or logic, and also explain just how that truth can be determined? — Janus

I think the logic of the original post is quite sound. Every time you take issue with it, you do so on the basis of an innaccurate paraphrase of it, before reverting to the argument that 'it can't be known, it can't be determined'.

I'm not going to try to address any purported implications of quantum mechanical experiments and results because I don't have the expertise — Janus

Very convenient. Remember that it was you that said:

It is an undeniable aspect of experience that people see the same things at the same time and place down to the smallest detail. — Janus

Regarding any individual experiment, all observers see the same result, though. — Janus

It doesn't require knowledge of mathematical physics to show that the sources I mentioned call this into question: it is not the case that 'people see the same things at the same time and place' and that 'all observers see the same result'. So if you're going to appeal to the facts, how about making sure you understand them first.

This is becoming very repetitive, you keep making the same objections, and I'm giving the same responses. If you honestly can't see the point of the OP, maybe find another one to comment on.

Right - that's what you're doing. You fall back on the 'it can't be determined, therefore a matter of opinion.'

This is becoming very repetitive, you've been making the same objections, and I'm giving the same responses. If you honestly can't see the point of the OP, maybe find another one to comment on. — Wayfarer

It looks to me like you are out of answers. You claim that there are ways, other than by observation or logic, to determine truth, but when pressed by questions such as this:

Can you give me an example of any truth which is determinable in any way other than by observation or logic, and also explain just how that truth can be determined? — Janus

You don't even attempt to back up your claim.

Surely I am free to raise objections to any OP, or am I allowed, according to you, to comment only on those I agree with?

I don't believe you have any real doubt that the everyday objects we encounter constantly have their own existence, which does not rely on our perceiving them. — Janus

Don't say this to me. I firmly believe that an independent reality would be completely different from, and not at all similar, to the representations we have of it as the sense perception of objects. In direct contrast to what you say, I have no real doubt that the supposed independent reality would be in no way similar to the everyday objects we encounter in our perceptions.

For analogy, consider that a word, numeral, or any symbol, may be completely different from, and similar in no way to whatever it represents. Sense perceptions are representations. And in general, representations, like the symbols of language, are produced and maintained trough principles of use and efficiency, not by principles of similarity.

Can you give me an example of any truth which is determinable in any way other than by observation or logic, and also explain just how that truth can be determined? — Janus

Isn’t that exactly what the OP was about? The point of the transcendental argument is that there are truths not determined by observation or logic, but by clarifying the conditions that make either possible. That’s why I began the thread in the first place. Your two-years-worth of criticism don't illustrate any grasp of that.

You don't even attempt to back up your claim. — Janus

I say the OP stands on its own two feet. You can continue to say whatever you like, but unless you can come up with an actual criticism, I will feel no obligation to respond.

Can you give me an example of any truth which is determinable in any way other than by observation or logic, and also explain just how that truth can be determined? — Janus

How I feel is not observable, but the truth of it exist only within myself and cannot be observed, even by me, because I am having the feelings. Direct experience is also a source of truth. It is clear that this is not logical or empirical (in the sense meant by "observation" anyway. Probably is empirical in some other sense).

A general observation on many of the comments being made in this thread:

the assumptions of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect' enter unawares into the way in which the statements of transcendental idealism are understood, so that these statements appear faulty in ways in which, properly understood, they are not. Such realistic assumptions so pervade our normal use of concepts that the claims of transcendental idealism disclose their own non-absurdity only after difficult consideration, whereas criticisms of them at first appear cogent which, on examination, are seen to rest on confusion. We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them. This, of course, is one of the explanations for the almost unfathomably deep counterintuitiveness of transcendental idealism, and also for the general notion of 'depth' with which people associate Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. Something akin to it is the reason for much of the prolonged, self-disciplined meditation involved in a number of Eastern religious practices. — Schopenhauer's Philosophy, Bryan Magee, p106, 'Subjects and Objects'

Isn’t that exactly what the OP was about? The point of the transcendental argument is that there are truths not determined by observation or logic, but by clarifying the conditions that make either possible. — Wayfarer

How do we determine the conditions that make either possible if not by observation and logic? We can reflect on our experience, that is we can do phenomenology, in order to try to determine the essential characteristics of all experiences. Such reflections are not directly testable observations, so there may be disagreement about their findings, but I think that given good will substantial agreement can be reached.

That all perceptions of objects must be spatiotemporal and that embodiment is spatiotemporal are two uncontroversial examples of such phenomenological reflection of the character of experience. I would count phenomenological investigations as a species of observation, and of course logic plays its part in all our judgements.

Other more controversial results such as that consciousness is non-physical because it doesn't seem to us to be depend on the framing. What exactly is meant by "non-ohysical"? Does it mean "not an object of the senses" or "not a function of, and completely independent of, any physical substrate".

Do you have anything to add to that?

I say the OP stands on its own two feet. You can continue to say whatever you like, but unless you can come up with an actual criticism, I will feel no obligation to respond. — Wayfarer

I have asked questions and posed counterpoints which you have no even attempted to address. Here are two:

Your argument is something like:

We derived our idea of existence from our cognitive experience, therefore nothing can exist apart from its being cognized.

The conclusion does not follow logically from the premise, so it is not a deductively valid argument.
— Janus

That’s a very simplified gloss, and not my argument. I’m not claiming that “nothing exists apart from cognition.” I’m saying that any concept of existence only makes sense within the conditions of possible experience. (I'm not bound by Kant's argument, but I am trying to stay in his lane, so to speak.) — Wayfarer

You say that you are not saying that nothing can exist apart from its being cognized, and yet that is what saying that any concept of existence only makes sense within the conditions of possible experience amounts to. If we accept a framing that says we cannot possibly experience things-in-themselves, then it follows that things that cannot possibly be experienced cannot exist. This must follow because if they can exist, then it cannot be incoherent to say that they can exist.

Of course I don't accept that framing because I don't accept the notion of "things-in-themselves" I think there are just things that we perceive, and that there is no logical contradiction in saying that those things might (or might not) exist independently of being perceived, and that there may be some things about them that we cannot perceive, given the limitations of our perceptual organs.

Can you give me an example of any truth which is determinable in any way other than by observation or logic, and also explain just how that truth can be determined?
— Janus — Janus

On reading your response below which apparently occurred while I was editing and adding to my post, I see that you have agreed that phenomenology may be thought of as a species of observation, so I guess we are in agreement there unless you have any further examples of ways of determining truth.

How do we determine the conditions that make either possible if not by observation and logic? — Janus

You're missing the point. We do this, and gain secure inferences which are not part of the logical or empirical assessments at hand. I don't quite see other examples among philosophers than with Kant, and if you reject his positions then you wont accept this argument anyway, as he's put it better than anyone before or since.

The fact (in concept) is when we make "truth" evident in situation A, we often are committed to accepting "truth" in some realm we have not assessed.

If A then B, but we've only assessed A. and A obtains. We haven't assessed B at all. If you see a transitive holding weight, that's fine. I don't.

That’s a more reasonable framing, yes. I’d agree that phenomenological reflection is the method by which we clarify the conditions of experience, and that these conditions are not “observations” in the empirical sense. If you want to call them a “species of observation,” that’s OK — but the crucial point is that they are not observations of objects in the world but of the structural features of experience itself. They are self-reflective in a way that objective observation is not.

So when I say that “existence” or “objectivity” only have sense within experience, I’m not appealing to a particular empirical observation, but to precisely this kind of reflection. And that’s where the transcendental analysis differs from science: it’s not discovering new objects but clarifying the preconditions of there being any objects-for-us at all.

On the “non-physical” question, my point would be that the very category of “the physical” is itself mind-dependent in some basic way. That’s not to deny that there are physical objects — of course there are. But “the physical” as such is already a construct of our observational and conceptual framework: spatiotemporal, measurable, extended, resists our will. To point this out is not to dispute reality, but to draw attention to the inescapable role of the observer in what counts as physical in the first place. As I said in the extended version of the OP:

As for the nature of the physical, Charles Pinter (in Mind and the Cosmic Order) points out that it originates ‘with the sense that it acts in opposition to our will and constrains our actions’ — push it, and it resists, or lift it, and it is heavy. But then, ‘since sensation and thought don’t require overcoming any physical resistance, we consider them to be outside material reality’ — in other words, non-physical. However, contrary to the popular understanding, the so–called ‘immaterial’ acts of cognition are fundamental to any conception we can form of ‘the physical’, as physics itself is inextricably intertwined with mathematical concepts. But again, the primacy of mind has been deprecated because of having been relegated to the so–called ‘immaterial domain’, which does not objectively exist. To put it another way — our cognitive construction of the world is not itself amongst the objects of the natural sciences, and so is deprecated by physicalism, even though, in a fundamental sense, the physical sciences depend on it. This points towards the fundamental contradiction in the physicalist conception of the world. — The Mind Created World

But, overall, very good questions.

Right we make "secure" (or not so secure) inferences. But they are not determinations of truth. For example, I get accused of scientism, and yet I don't believe that scientific theories are strictly determinations of truth. Any theory may be falsified.

:up: I think we've reached some consensus, so I'm happy to leave it there if you are.

Suits me. Kudos for keeping the discussion going.

Hmm. What else is there to truth? I can't see anything particularly special about observing directly something B which is logically required for A to obtain, and we know A obtains.

This seems to be hte method of truth-finding, in any case?

:lol: Which one are you?

I'm not sure what you are saying, and I can't think of an example of what I think you might be saying. Can you give an example for clarification.

Please don't take this personally, but the reason I often don't respond to your posts is that it seems as though your interpretation of what I've said that you're disagreeing with seems to me so far from what I intended that I find it difficult to get enough purchase on what you are saying to respond.

Yeah, reading it back it's confusing. My point is the 'truth' seems to function the way I've described, anyway.
The example to give, which I think is more closely a description of the above, is Kant's noumena.
They are logically required for the system to get moving (and it seems, for us to have any interaction with anything). Consider:

P1 = I can see an apple(1), and I know (through other's observations) that my system of perception works in x way to produce the images I use to 'observe' anything (2).

P2 = due to my knowledge in (2), i can confirm that there is something beyond my scope to observe which must be there to cause (1) to obtain.

C = now that I know (1) and because of (2) B obtains, I have assured knowledge of B, without ever having assessed its possibility. It is inherent in the knowing of (1) and (2), but is not the same thing as either of them.

As best I can tell, this, but across fields we could theoretical observe, is how "truth" functions, particularly in science.

Which one are you? — Janus

I'd like to be Sam, but I won't insist.

OK, that makes sense. The only thing I wonder about is whether Kant's noumena are logically required. To explain the fact that we all see the same things and inhabit a common world it would seem that something beyond mere individual perceptions, something beyond the perceptual in general, is required. So phenomenalism seems highly implausible and it has no explanatory power at all.

I guess strictly speaking, even if what that "something beyond" is is just a world of physical existents, it can be said that they are noumenal to us. On the other hand we perceive objects, so the objects are not unknown to us even though there may be things about them we don't or even cannot, know. For example it seems we could never be certain about the ultimate or most basic constitution of physical things.

In that case it would not be a case of there being noumenal things, but noumenal aspects of things. If things are ideas in the mind of God, we might know all about the things because God makes everything about them to be discoverable, and there is nothing unknowable left over about them at all. But we still
wouldn't know that that was the case.

I'd like to be Sam, but I won't insist. — Wayfarer

I'm happy enough with being Ralph.

I guess strictly speaking, even if what that "something beyond" is is just a world of physical existents, it can be said that they are noumenal to us. — Janus

No.

In that case it would not be a case of there being noumenal things, but noumenal aspects of things. — Janus

No, again.

Totally useless comments.

You do not wish to be corrected? Okay.

Bye

Corrections require cogent argument and explanation. "No" is a useless comment.

But surely we can talk about the neumenon and conclude that it exists?
— Punshhh

No. Because:

'not existing' is a concept that we appreciate not that we do not.
— I like sushi

We understand what exists for us is all that can exist for us. We cannot know what we cannot frame within the bounds of our cognitive capacities (time and space) unless we have some other 'intuition' that is yet to be articulated.

When we 'talk about noumena' we are not talking about noumena as our faculties are framed in space and time and the concept of noumena is not -- hence it serves as a means of understanding what we can understand and how we frame the term 'exist'. Nothing is the absence of something, noumena is not even that, no words can capture it as it is not an 'it' and only represented as a limitation of our cognitive capacities. Any sense of 'beyond' is mere word play.

This is not to say it doesn’t have attributes like this, but that we don’t know what they are.
— Punshhh

We CANNOT. Therefore it is less than nothing. Nothing we can say about noumena is noumena. It is Negative only. Literally everything we can ever conceive of in existence -- abstract or otherwise -- is phenomenal. Noumena is not phenomena. This is not to say just because we lack a sense, it is to say we have no grounds for talking about non-constituent part of existence because that is nonsensical. Understanding that it is nonsensical is the establishment of noumena as a negative limiting term for what exists and what does not with res[ect to space and time.

So we can say it exists, provided we don’t define it (because that would miss the mark). Because without it, the phenomenal world wouldn’t exist and the phenomenal world exists.
— Punshhh

Everything we can talk about and speculate about exists. The point is we have no right to say 'exists' when if any such capacities to recognise such is absent.

Hopefully you get the idea that no matter how long I go on EVERYTHING I can say is noumena negatively ONLY and can NEVER be positively captured.

I think it is a good place to begin when trying to understand the kind of problems that arise in human experience including how we articulate what consciousness is and how it relates to the physical world as well as our metaphysical concepts about the world -- which are necessarily connected in some fashion.

Seems straightforward enough to me, I don’t know what all the fuss is about.

Surely we have just defined a necessary being?
— Punshhh

It is so straight forward it bends around everything!

Necessary being? I do not see how. We are not talking about any such thing, although Kant certainly doe scover such ground in his work and states we cannot say anything about any such noumena (see above).

The closest other thing I can think of that covers this kind of concept is probably Dao/Tao (the 'way'). More poetic than Kant but far less precise. If either works for you then that is probably enough. — I like sushi

There you go.

You haven't said anything I didn't already know. Anything about which we can know nothing is noumenal. "Know" here means 'have cognitive access to'. If the ultimate nature of a physical existent is unknowable, then it is noumenal. If there are unknowable aspects of physical existents then those aspects are noumenal.

It is meaningless to say "noumena are not nothing, they are less than nothing". That's just philosobabble.

If the ultimate nature of a physical existent is unknowable, then it is noumenal. — Janus

No.

You’re both looking down different ends of the telescope. That’s why it looks different.

A general observation on many of the comments being made in this thread:

the assumptions of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect' enter unawares into the way in which the statements of transcendental idealism are understood, so that these statements appear faulty in ways in which, properly understood, they are not. Such realistic assumptions so pervade our normal use of concepts that the claims of transcendental idealism disclose their own non-absurdity only after difficult consideration, whereas criticisms of them at first appear cogent which, on examination, are seen to rest on confusion. We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them. This, of course, is one of the explanations for the almost unfathomably deep counterintuitiveness of transcendental idealism, and also for the general notion of 'depth' with which people associate Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. Something akin to it is the reason for much of the prolonged, self-disciplined meditation involved in a number of Eastern religious practices.
— Schopenhauer's Philosophy, Bryan Magee, p106, 'Subjects and Objects'

Yes, this crisis/initiation is foundational in Eastern religions and spirituality. It’s promising to see that philosophers are making it over this hurdle too.

Let’s see how many other hurdles they have jumped.

Well, Schopenhauer and Kant have been compared with Eastern philosophy. Indeed in Bryan Magee’s excellent Schopenhauer’s Philosophy from which that is quoted, there’s a chapter on Schopenhauer and Buddhism. Schopenhauer, as is well known, read a translation of one of the Upaniṣads all his life. But it can’t be pushed too far as they never really had any contact with authentic practitioners in those traditions. Nevertheless the basic point that Magee makes stands - that insight into transcendental idealism does require a kind of fundamental shift in perspective, akin to a gestalt shift but in a more general way, and it’s not easy to come by.

Please don't take this personally, but the reason I often don't respond to your posts is that it seems as though your interpretation of what I've said that you're disagreeing with seems to me so far from what I intended that I find it difficult to get enough purchase on what you are saying to respond. — Janus

So you say, but as I observed yesterday:

You keep saying things like this, but it is so clearly false. — Metaphysician Undercover

My disagreement is with things you repeat over and over, which are false. Since these are repeated statements of yours, it's highly unlikely that I interpret them incorrectly. What is actually the case, is that you really don't know what you are saying, and this is why my interpretations are not consistent with what you intend. You intend to express your beliefs, but your statements betray the falsity of them. You do not intend to express false beliefs, so the interpretation of what you say is unintelligible to you.

It appears like after I point out to you the meaning of what you stated, and the falsity of it, you decide that it is not what you wanted to say. Then, since you cannot determine in your own mind what you actually wanted to say with those words, other than what you did say, and my interpretation which demonstrates the falsity of what you said is the only interpretation of those words which makes sense, you simply dismiss my reply as unintelligible to you.

In other word, since I demonstrate to you, that the fundamental principles you repeatedly insist on, are very clearly false, instead of addressing the meaning of those words which express those principles you strongly believe in, to understand why your fundamental beliefs are false, you insist that the conventional interpretation of those words which express those strong beliefs, is nonsense

So is it the case that whenever this perspective is proposed, it invariably originated from a study of Eastern religious ideas?

Nevertheless the basic point that Magee makes stands - that insight into transcendental idealism does require a kind of fundamental shift in perspective, akin to a gestalt shift but in a more general way, and it’s not easy to come by.

I would use the word orientation in that it is a question of perspective, or direction. A viewpoint, or gaze which then sees something already known, or commonly seen in a different light.

A development within the self, or being, in which, (by analogy), a lens is cleared (a veil lifted), or brought into clearer focus. Allowing more light through (illuminating further), or a broader, or deeper perspective.

I guess strictly speaking, even if what that "something beyond" is is just a world of physical existents, it can be said that they are noumenal to us. On the other hand we perceive objects, so the objects are not unknown to us even though there may be things about them we don't or even cannot, know. For example it seems we could never be certain about the ultimate or most basic constitution of physical things. — Janus

I think this is well-worded. The noumena aren't necessarily esoteric, just as if they are in a room we can't access, so its not as 'mysterious' as one might think. But we can at least securely infer that they are there, or we'd not perceive anything.