Arguments for a more widespread skepticism or relativism I am familiar with tend to instead rely on a more global underdetermination of things like all rules/rule-following, all causal/inductive reasoning, or the underdetermination of any sort of solid concept/meaning that would constitute the possession of knowledge, which is a step up (or down) from simple scientific underdetermination. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think we should keep the underlying logical limitations in the background of our minds, but we shouldn't let this undermine practical critical thinking for making judgements and arguments. As one example: a lot of people embrace some conspiracy theory because it explains some facts, and defend their judgement on the basis that it's not provably false. It's a distortion of inference to best explanation. This is a tangent from the theme of your thread, but it's an issue I consider extremely important.

Good question. We have beliefs that follow necessarily from other beliefs/facts, so they're provable in that sense. It seems inescapable that we depend on some foundational beliefs. So nothing can be proven without some sort of epistemological foundation. What are your thoughts? — Relativist

That seems right to me. In an Aristotelian sense we would speak of demonstrative arguments and non-demonstrative arguments, where demonstrative arguments have premises which are foundational and certain, whereas non-demonstrative arguments have premises which are non-foundational (and therefore also not certain). We could also apply that distinction to the inferences rather than the premises if we are not counting an inference as a premise.

So when you said:

Most of our beliefs are not provably true, so I have labelled them IBEs. — Relativist

...I guessed that this meant that some of our beliefs are provably true, and are not IBEs. If that guess is correct, then apparently you must hold that some foundations are certain. If that guess is wrong, then it would seem that you hold that all beliefs are (unprovable) IBEs. Do you disagree with any of that?

Now for Aristotle one certain foundation that we are capable of having is the principle of non-contradiction, and therefore an example of a provable conclusion would be, "This entity before me is either a tree or it is not a tree."

What's the argument here: "There is no problem with identifying pseudoscience because in these examples scientists came around to calling out the pseudoscience?"

Why exactly will science always tend towards correctly identifying pseudoscience? Will this always happen? What's the mechanism? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Good questions. I gave three characteristics, but they are generalizations which aren't always strictly true in the universal way.

Also, I don't think scientists will always do so -- it could have been the case that, for instance, Jewish Science "won" vs. Nazi Science, at least hypothetically, and my suspicion is that it could uncover true things but it'd be because they waited until a person of the right designation said it rather than because the first person who noticed it said it.

But I'd argue that since reality is wider than these races' thoughts, at least on the philosophical level (which a fascist would not allow), maybe we should listen to the other people who had the thought first rather than wait for one of our "master race" people to pillage the thought and say it?

I don't think there's a mechanism in scientific practice, though -- not like a bike with a chain or a conveyor with a gear etc.

It could be the case that in the future it falls to some stupidity. At times I feel like it's still doing so, given science's marriage to Capitalism, but also -- that's what we have to do now to live, and "pure" knowledge still gets funding sometimes.

The 19th century was rife with pseudoscience, and I think developments in scientific methods and the philosophy of science played a significant role in curbing this. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree here, too!

I'm beginning to wonder if "underdetermination" is wider than I think on it. "Boltzmann Brains" aren't something I'd even associate with "underdetermination" -- I largely think of "underdetermination" with respect to the philosophy of science. So a (scientific) theory is underdetermined by the evidence it references. That doesn't make it false it just means that an observations doesn't determine the theory, not even in a large set of observations.

Eventually the theory determines what you're looking for once it's a good scientific theory. It's starting to point out patterns we can talk about, predict, describe, and agree upon.

But that, in turn, means that one must -- to make scientific progress -- ignore many irrelevant facts.

And sometimes those deemed irrelevant happen to be relevant.

****

So, again, I feel we're agreeing on the basics but disagreeing on the interpretation. I'm still wondering why or where.

And, still -- I also wonder if it's just not "for me" -- I'm an absurdist who accepts causation isn't real. Many people baulk at that and wonder about what you're wondering.

Both can be good philosophies, but it's hard to find a bridge.

This sounds to me a bit like post hoc rationalization, as if one is going to decide on a theory and then allow their theory to be "a selective pressure on which evidence is relevant to consider."

The difficulty here is that you seem to be redefining "theory" to be something that precedes rather than follows after evidence, and such is a very strange redefinition. For example, on this redefinition someone might say, "I have a theory...," and this statement would be indistinguishable from, "I have a prejudice..." The basic problem is that 'theory' and 'prejudice' do not mean the same thing. We distinguish between reasoning and post hoc rationalization, and yet your definition seems to have made such a distinction impossible. It seems to have made impossible a distinction between "following the evidence where it leads," and, "engaging in selection bias in favor of some a priori theory." — Leontiskos

I think this is the scary part of underdetermination.

I was taught that evidence leads to conclusions.

That's still true! They do!

It's just more complicated than that. It's not like I can just gather the evidence and then know the conclusion -- that's because we're limited, we're human, and can only form provisional thoughts which are justifying themselves and present them to others to critique.

I agree that "theory" and "prejudice" are different -- but i'd say that this is the difficulty being presented by the under-determination of a scientific theory by its evidence.

At the point of scientific revolutions empirical justification is what decides things.

But at the secondary education level the theory is what decides things, since it's very likely the student is wrong.

So, for the sake of clarity, the Boltzmann brain comes in because our experiences and memories are consistent with both our living in the world we think we do and with our being Boltzmann brains that might dissolve at any moment. The evidence we have doesn't determine our embracing one theory over the other.

Actually, given some multiverse formulations, it seems that we are vastly more likely to be Boltzmann-like (there are many similar variants) brains than citizens in a lawful universe. Or, even if we are in a seemingly lawful universe, it would be vastly more likely that we are in one that has just randomly happened to behave lawfully by sheer coincidence for a few billion years, and will turn chaotic in the coming moments. In which case, while the case is underdetermined, we might conclude that our being Boltzmann like is vastly more likely.

Now, if we are hardcore Bayesian brainers, what exactly is the wholly predictive mind supposed to do when available data forces it to conclude that prediction is hopeless? It's in a pickle!

(This flaw in multiverse theories that fail to place any real restrictions on the "multiverse production mechanism" (e.g. Max Tegmark's view that all mathematical objects exist) is, IMHO, completely fatal to attempts to offer up the multiverse as a solution to the Fine Tuning Problem, but that's a whole different can of worms.)

So, for the sake of clarity, the Boltzmann brain comes in because our experiences and memories are consistent with both our living in the world we think we do and with our being Boltzmann brains that might dissolve at any moment. The evidence we have doesn't determine our embracing one theory over the other. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is this different from the Cartesian scenario, in your mind?

Actually, given some multiverse formulations, it seems that we are vastly more likely to be Boltzmann-like (there are many similar variants) brains than citizens in a lawful universe. Or, even if we are in a seemingly lawful universe, it would be vastly more likely that we are in one that has just randomly happened to behave lawfully by sheer coincidence for a few billion years, and will turn chaotic in the coming moments. In which case, while the case is underdetermined, we might conclude that our being Boltzmann like is vastly more likely. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Heh.

I'm a "Copenhagen interpretation" dude, but only by habit and because it made more sense than the others.

In my mind, at least, Boltzman brains can be treated the same as Evil Demons.

Now, if we are hardcore Bayesian brainers, what exactly is the wholly predictive mind supposed to do when available data forces it to conclude that prediction is hopeless? It's in a pickle! — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not, and would be surprised to hear you express that I am.

I've not pushed it, but have been against Bayesian epistemologies.

Not Bayesian analysis, tho. Bayes' theorem has many relevant truths and uses.

I just don't think it does much to explain knowledge or inference. It's a bit of a "just so" theory, in which case why not phenomenology?

(This flaw in multiverse theories that fail to place any real restrictions on the "multiverse production mechanism" (e.g. Max Tegmark's view that all mathematical objects exist) is, IMHO, completely fatal to attempts to offer up the multiverse as a solution to the Fine Tuning Problem, but that's a whole different can of worms.) — Count Timothy von Icarus

Given that I've said I'm an absurdist it probably isn't, or shouldn't be, surprising that "The Fine Tuning Problem" is something I'd "pass over" as a bad problem, though would only address it in a thread on that problem because, holy moly, you've been gracious to me (which I appreciate) but that would take us way off track.

"..I guessed that this meant that some of our beliefs are provably true, and are not IBEs. If that guess is correct, then apparently you must hold that some foundations are certain. If that guess is wrong, then it would seem that you hold that all beliefs are (unprovable) IBEs. Do you disagree with any of that?"
I don't think ALL beliefs are IBEs:
-We have some basic, intrinsic beliefs, that aren't inferred. Example: the instinctual belief in a world external to ourselves.
We also accept some things uncritically (no one's perf ect).

Re: certainty- that's an attitude, and it may or may not be justified. Justification doesn't require deductive proof. Consider your example "this entity before me is either a tree or it is not a tree." Solipsism is logically possible, so that there actually isn't something before you. We can justifiably feel certain despite the logical possibility we're wrong.

Broadly speaking, an argument from underdetermination is one that attempts to show that available evidence is insufficient to determine which of several competing theories is true. That is, many different theories might be able to explain the same evidence, hence any move to choose between theories must be “underdetermined,” i.e., not determined by the evidence. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I have some questions about this. I hope it is not too disruptive to raise them.

1. What happened to falsification, which is based on the argument that there can never be enough evidence to establish a theory? Falsification is much easier and can be conclusive when positive proof is not available.

2. There are several criteria, I understand, that are applied in order to choose between two competing theories - Occam's razor, elegance, simplicity etc. Kuhn suggests that the wider context - sociological, technological, practical considerations - all have influence here.

3. If an alternative theory explains more data than the existing theory, it is preferable. If it explains less data, the existing theory is preferable. If both explain exactly the same data, how are they (relevantly) different?

4. Is there really anything special about our making decisions based on less than conclusive data? (We even have a special word for this - "judgement" - admittedly it is not always used in this way.)

I don't think ALL beliefs are IBEs:
-We have some basic, intrinsic beliefs, that aren't inferred. Example: the instinctual belief in a world external to ourselves.
We also accept some things uncritically (no one's perf ect). — Relativist

Okay good, so let's look at this quote of yours:

I've been treating "underdetermined" as any belief that is not provably true (i.e. determined=necessarily true). Under this extreme definition, nearly every belief we have is underdetermined...

Most of our beliefs are not provably true, so I have labelled them IBEs. — Relativist

In that last sentence you seem to equate "not provably true"/undetermined with "IBE." Now you are implying that something that is not provably true might not be an IBE if it is not inferred. Do you stand by your decision to label beliefs that are not provably true IBEs?

The more central question can be restated with your claim, "Under this extreme definition, nearly every belief we have is underdetermined." The "nearly" makes me think that some beliefs are not underdetermined, but I'm not sure if you really hold that.

Re: certainty- that's an attitude, and it may or may not be justified. — Relativist

In English "certitude" connotes subjectivity, whereas "certain" and "certainty" need not. When I said, "premises which are foundational and certain," I was using 'certain' in this objective sense, which is quite common. For example, you that some beliefs follow necessarily from other beliefs/facts. I might ask, "But do they really follow necessarily?" You might answer, "They certainly do." Your answer would not mean, "I have a high degree of certainty or a high degree of certitude that they do follow necessarily." It would mean, "They objectively follow necessarily."

Now if you want to try to find a different word than "certain" to describe the phenomenon in question, you can do that. I think certain is actually the correct word, given that it couples the knower and the known in the proper way needed to speak about first principles.

Justification doesn't require deductive proof. Consider your example "this entity before me is either a tree or it is not a tree." Solipsism is logically possible, so that there actually isn't something before you. We can justifiably feel certain despite the logical possibility we're wrong. — Relativist

Well the same problem crops up here. What is certain and a feeling of certainty are not the same thing, just as justification and a feeling of justification are not the same thing. One's being justified and one's deeming themselves justified are two different things.

Do you stand by your decision to label beliefs that are not provably true IBEs? — Leontiskos

No, not all unproveable truths. I was being careless in my wording. More precisely: most of our rational, acquired beliefs are IBEs. (My objective had only been to contrast this with the notion that our beliefs are somehow proven deductively; in most cases - IBEs are the best we can do, and that's perfectly fine).

The more central question can be restated with your claim, "Under this extreme definition, nearly every belief we have is underdetermined." The "nearly" makes me think that some beliefs are not underdetermined, but I'm not sure if you really hold that. — Leontiskos

I do hold that we have some beliefs that are not underdetermined. The belief that the object before me is a tree or not a tree is not underdetermined. Properly basic beliefs (e.g. there is a world external to ourselves) aren't underdetermined, because they aren't determined through reasoning at all- so the term seems inapplicable (however, arguably- they are determined by the environment that produced us. This aspect is what makes them properly basic - a variation of Alvan Plantinga's reformed epistemology).

In English "certitude" connotes subjectivity, whereas "certain" and "certainty" need not. When I said, "premises which are foundational and certain," I was using 'certain' in this objective sense, which is quite common. For example, you ↪claimed that some beliefs follow necessarily from other beliefs/facts. I might ask, "But do they really follow necessarily?" You might answer, "They certainly do." Your answer would not mean, "I have a high degree of certainty or a high degree of certitude that they do follow necessarily." It would mean, "They objectively follow necessarily." — Leontiskos

I understand the semantic distinction, but are the attitudes actually distinct? (Remember that I suggested certainty is an attitude). Some may insist there is a parallel distinction of attitude, but I'm not convinced.

This is associated with my view toward "Bayesian epistemology": which depends on assigning an epistemic probability to every belief. It is a practical impossibility to do this consistently. We can only apply some subjective coarse grained level of certainty (which may vary from one day to the next). So it seems to me that our epistemic judgements aren't sufficiently fine-grained to truly have an attitude distinction that matches the semantic one. Example: I'm certain the sun will come up tomorrow, despite there being a nonzero probability the sun will go nova.

Well the same problem crops up here. What is certain and a feeling of certainty are not the same thing, just as justification and a feeling of justification are not the same thing. One's being justified and one's deeming themselves justified are two different things. — Leontiskos

This seems similar to someone believing a proposition to be true vs the proposition actually being true. All we can ever do is to make a judgement: there is no oracle to inform us that our judgement is correct. One or more people may examine the reasoning and concur, but this only elevates a subjective judgement to an intersubjective one. Similar with the feeling of certainty: it's subjective, and so is the analysis that leads to the feeling. When we're certain of something, we believe we've arrived at objective truth - that's what it means to be certain.

No, not all unproveable truths. I was being careless in my wording. More precisely: most of our rational, acquired beliefs are IBEs. (My objective had only been to contrast this with the notion that our beliefs are somehow proven deductively; in most cases - IBEs are the best we can do, and that's perfectly fine). — Relativist

Okay thanks, that makes sense (although I may come back to this dichotomy between deduction and abduction).

I do hold that we have some beliefs that are not underdetermined. The belief that the object before me is a tree or not a tree is not underdetermined. Properly basic beliefs (e.g. there is a world external to ourselves) aren't underdetermined, because they aren't determined through reasoning at all- so the term seems inapplicable (however, arguably- they are determined by the environment that produced us. This aspect is what makes them properly basic - a variation of Alvan Plantinga's reformed epistemology). — Relativist

Okay, so you are saying that some beliefs are determined and are therefore not undetermined, such as the belief about the object before you; and that "properly basic" beliefs are neither determined nor undetermined. It seems that by "determined" you mean something like "deduced," and that this is why a "properly basic" belief is not determined. The same would presumably hold for foundational beliefs in general.

I understand the semantic distinction, but are the attitudes actually distinct? (Remember that I suggested certainty is an attitude). Some may insist there is a parallel distinction of attitude, but I'm not convinced. — Relativist

My point here is that certainty need not be an attitude, and is not always an attitude in English. When someone says, "They certainly do," they are not expressing an attitude. See for example <this entry> from Grammarist, where they point to feeling (certitude) vs factuality (certainty).

This seems similar to someone believing a proposition to be true vs the proposition actually being true. All we can ever do is to make a judgement: there is no oracle to inform us that our judgement is correct. One or more people may examine the reasoning and concur, but this only elevates a subjective judgement to an intersubjective one. Similar with the feeling of certainty: it's subjective, and so is the analysis that leads to the feeling. When we're certain of something, we believe we've arrived at objective truth - that's what it means to be certain. — Relativist

I think you are still running roughshod over the difference. There is a difference between believing a proposition to be true vs the proposition actually being true, and this is tracked by the fact that people are saying different things when they say, "I believe it is true," and, "It is true." Similarly, when you say, "That's what it means to be certain," what you are saying is, "That's what it means [for someone] to be certain." But again, "certain" is not always predicated of persons. It is very often predicated of propositions. For example, from the Grammarist entry, "It’s a near certainty that the 17-member nation eurozone won’t survive in its current form." This is not a predication about an attitude or a subjective state.

Now one could stipulate that "certain" or "certainty" is always subjective, or always a matter or attitudes, or always person-indexed, but that's not actually how we use the word in English. Sometimes it pertains to an "attitude" and sometimes it doesn't.

I think you are still running roughshod over the difference. There is a difference between believing a proposition to be true vs the proposition actually being true, and this is tracked by the fact that people are saying different things when they say, "I believe it is true," and, "It is true." Similarly, when you say, "That's what it means to be certain," what you are saying is, "That's what it means [for someone] to be certain." But again, "certain" is not always predicated of persons. It is very often predicated of propositions. — Leontiskos

I think you're discussing the semantics of everyday language - many people say "I believe X" to convey a degree of uncertainty. There could be an implied "but I could be wrong". Some people also say they "know" something to be true, conveying absolute certainty, not the philosophical sense of knowledge. Everyday language is imprecise. In a conversation, one might need to clarify.

I'm using the terms more precisely- using definitions that dovetail epistemology (dealing with beliefs and their justification) and psychology (what a belief IS to a person).

For example, from the Grammarist entry, "It’s a near certainty that the 17-member nation eurozone won’t survive in its current form." This is not a predication about an attitude or a subjective state.

It's a statement of belief* by whoever formulated it and becomes a belief* of any person who reads it and accepts it. If no one had ever formulated it, then it wouldn't be a belief* held by anyone.

* a subjective state of an individual.

Perhaps you're thinking, "it would be true even if no one had formulated it". But what exactly would you be referring to as the "it" that is true? The statement? Does the statement exist independently of human minds? Do all possible statements have some sort of independent existence? In my opinion, statements only exist in minds.

1. What happened to falsification, which is based on the argument that there can never be enough evidence to establish a theory? Falsification is much easier and can be conclusive when positive proof is not available.

Good question. Many thinkers think that falsification's role as the core criterion of science was badly weakened by an argument from Quine (and refined by others)... get this... from underdetermination.

That is, every seeming "falsification" can always be explained away in other terms that do not falsify a theory, and the choice between these explanations will be underdetermined by the evidence.

Plus, historians of science were quick to point out that, pace Popper, theories, and particularly paradigms, are often falsified and rather than being challenged post hoc explanations are offered. For example, Newton's physics was falsified almost immediately when applied to astronomy. But rather than reject it, astronomers posited unobserved, more distant planets to explain the irregular orbits of visible planets. These were eventually identified with improvements in telescope technology, but were originally unobservable ad hoc posits.

To be sure, falsification is still a very useful criteria. Quine's argument doesn't mean there aren't distinctions. Marxist theory, or arguably the anthropology of liberal political-economy, is unfalsifiable in a stronger sense. Literally any observation of human behavior is easily rendered explicable by the theory itself, and challenges to the theory can be explained by the theory (just as challenges to Freudianism was a sign of a "complex"). Falsification is still a useful criteria, but not a particularly strong one in light of the underdetermination problem.

2. There are several criteria, I understand, that are applied in order to choose between two competing theories - Occam's razor, elegance, simplicity etc. Kuhn suggests that the wider context - sociological, technological, practical considerations - all have influence here.

Right, and those "other criteria" are what are often used to suggest a fairly robust anti-realism, i.e., "sociology all the way down (with the world merely offering some "constraints"). Occam's razor is often poorly translated from Ockham into a straight preference for reductionism, but I suppose that's a different sort of problem—except this—implausible reductions and eliminations (e.g. eliminating consciousness or all mental causality) are often justified in terms of "parsimony " paired with the claim that any difference between reduction/elimination and its opponent theories must be "underdetermined by empirical evidence." This is precisely why "parsimony" wins the day.

3. If an alternative theory explains more data than the existing theory, it is preferable. If it explains less data, the existing theory is preferable. If both explain exactly the same data, how are they (relevantly) different?

This is a very tricky question when we get to philosophy of mind and language. I'd question whether many skeptical solutions actually do explain the data equally well. They often succeed by making constricting assumptions about what can count as "data" in the first place.

More broadly, outside the context of scientific models (which is less of an issue), your current experiences are consistent with the world, and all of our memories, having been created 5 seconds ago, no? And they are consistent with all other human beings being clever robots, and your living in an alien or AI "zoo" of sorts. But surely there is a metaphysical and ethically relevant difference.

4. Is there really anything special about our making decisions based on less than conclusive data? (We even have a special word for this - "judgement" - admittedly it is not always used in this way.)

"Special" how? It's certainly a very common experience. My interest though lay more in the use of underdetermination to support radical theses in philosophy, not so much basic model underdetermination. In part, this is because the historical comparison isn't that illuminative here. The ancients and medievals knew about and accepted model underdetermination ("saving appearances"), but the more interesting thing is that they didn't think this general form of argument led to much wider forms of underdetermination as respects rules, causation, induction, word meaning, free will, etc.

I'm using the terms more precisely- using definitions that dovetail epistemology (dealing with beliefs and their justification) and psychology (what a belief IS to a person). — Relativist

But if you are saying that everything is believed and nothing is known, then I don't find that to be epistemologically precise. According to standard epistemology some things are known and some things are merely believed, and belief is a necessary but insufficient condition for knowledge. It feels as if you've created a non-standard semantics where there is only belief and never knowledge; where "certain" and "certainty" always denote subjectivity or an attitude and never knowledge; where there are only opinions and never facts, etc.

It's a statement of belief* by whoever formulated it — Relativist

But it's not. That's the whole point of the article and the distinction. If it were a statement of belief then "certainty" and "certitude" would be identical. But they're not. "X is certain," is not a statement of belief, just as, "I know X," is not a statement of belief. You seem to be making a move where you say, "They only think its certain, or they only think they know it. Really they don't, because certitude is always an attitude and knowledge doesn't really exist." That looks like a tendentious move to me. It also undermines the basic idea that we can know things as simple as, "This object in front of me is either a tree or else it is not a tree."

Perhaps you're thinking, "it would be true even if no one had formulated it". But what exactly would you be referring to as the "it" that is true? The statement? Does the statement exist independently of human minds? Do all possible statements have some sort of independent existence? In my opinion, statements only exist in minds. — Relativist

I think that's fine, but I don't think it follows either that statements are not about anything more than minds (nominalism), or that minds never know truth. At a very simple level, the way we linguistically distinguish facts from opinions highlights the way that facts are not subjective in the way that opinions are subjective, and that they exist all the same. That is: there really are facts (truths), and they really are something different than opinions. If everything returns to attitude, then it seems that there is nothing other than opinion.

I see two interesting questions, here. One is whether the sort of "probabilism" that you are proposing is coherent, given that it eschews knowledge. It may be that probabilism without knowledge is like branches without a trunk.

The other question has to do with the modern move where the subject is cut off from reality by fiat of premise. For example, if we can never get beyond our attitudes and make truth- and knowledge-claims that are not merely belief- or attitude-claims, then of course a kind of Cartesian skepticism will obtain. If every knowledge-claim is rewritten as a matter of the subject's attitude or nominalistic beliefs, then realism has been denied a hearing.

(I will be offline for a number of days, but will return. Thanks for the good conversation. :up:)

Plus, historians of science were quick to point out that, pace Popper, theories, and particularly paradigms, are often falsified and rather than being challenged post hoc explanations are offered. For example, Newton's physics was falsified almost immediately when applied to astronomy. But rather than reject it, astronomers posited unobserved, more distant planets to explain the irregular orbits of visible planets. These were eventually identified with improvements in telescope technology, but were originally unobservable ad hoc posits. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So the system worked, in the end. True, one has to be patient. True also that there is no time limit on such waiting. In the mean time, opinions will differ and arguments will rage. Nothing wrong with that.

Right, and those "other criteria" are what are often used to suggest a fairly robust anti-realism, i.e., "sociology all the way down (with the world merely offering some "constraints"). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. But I don't see that anti-realism is a necessary consequence of the applicability of these criteria.

implausible reductions and eliminations (e.g. eliminating consciousness or all mental causality) are often justified in terms of "parsimony " paired with the claim that any difference between reduction/elimination and its opponent theories must be "underdetermined by empirical evidence." This is precisely why "parsimony" wins the day. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I can't see that the consequence is inevitable. Surely, it will depend on the details of the case.

Literally any observation of human behavior is easily rendered explicable by the theory itself, and challenges to the theory can be explained by the theory (just as challenges to Freudianism was a sign of a "complex"). — Count Timothy von Icarus

This could mean that the theory is underspecified couldn't it? Or not even suitable for assessment as though it were a "scientific" theory?

your current experiences are consistent with the world, and all of our memories, having been created 5 seconds ago, no? And they are consistent with all other human beings being clever robots, and your living in an alien or AI "zoo" of sorts. But surely there is a metaphysical and ethically relevant difference. — Count Timothy von Icarus

One difference is that there is not the slightest reason to take any of those possibilities seriously. They are all fantasies. "Here be dragons".

My interest though lay more in the use of underdetermination to support radical theses in philosophy, not so much basic model underdetermination. In part, this is because the historical comparison isn't that illuminative here. The ancients and medievals knew about and accepted model underdetermination ("saving appearances"), but the more interesting thing is that they didn't think this general form of argument led to much wider forms of underdetermination as respects rules, causation, induction, word meaning, free will, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Speaking of the general form of argument, these arguments look to me very much like re-heated old-fashioned scepticism. What's new about it?

What's new about it?

It's been used in some novel ways. For example:

• David Hume’s argument against causal inferences and explanations, as well as his hugely influential “Problem of Induction;”

• Ludwig Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument, as well as Saul Kripke’s influential reformulation of it;

• W.V.O Quine’s argument for the inscrutability of reference;

• Quine’s holist arguments for the underdetermination of theories by evidence, as well similar arguments for forms of theoretical underdetermination made by J.S. Mill and expounded upon by Pierre Duhem;

• Thomas Kuhn’s arguments about underdetermination at the level of scientific paradigms;

• As well as many others, including Feyerabend’s “epistemological anarchism,” Goodman’s “new riddle of induction,” etc.

Yes. But I don't see that anti-realism is a necessary consequence of the applicability of these criteria.

Sure, arguably it is "underdetermined."

One difference is that there is not the slightest reason to take any of those possibilities seriously.

Maybe, but it's a not unpopular opinion that the existence of the universe and its contents are an inscrutable "brute fact." Now, if inscrutable brute facts can "just happen" without causes, then there is no reason why they should be one way and not any other. So why would it be any more or less likely that a universe just "happens to be" with a first state something that looks something like cosmic inflation rather than a first state full of memories and people?

I will grant that this is only a problem for those asserting the "brute fact" view. But if we assert, to the contrary, that the cosmos had a determining cause, then presumably this is a realist claim. In which case, maybe an inability to dismiss anti-realism will bother us.

I guess something has to be said.

Mashing Hume, Wittgenstein, Kripke, Duhem, Quine, Kuhn, Mill, Feyerabend, and Goodman together and calling them "sceptics" ought ring alarm bells with anyone.

And those two supposed foundations - That things do not happen “for no reason at all" and that everything has an explanation - at least some discussion might be worthwhile, rather than mere assertion.

But the Law of Diminishing Returns applies here. It's harder to critique than to make stuff up.

One difference is that there is not the slightest reason to take any of those possibilities seriously. They are all fantasies. "Here be dragons". — Ludwig V

:up:

Mashing Hume, Wittgenstein, Kripke, Duhem, Quine, Kuhn, Mill, Feyerabend, and Goodman together and calling them "sceptics" ought ring alarm bells with anyone.

Yes, but you are conflating arguments from underdetermination and skepticism. The examples you listed are given as examples of the former, not the latter. These arguments are not necessarily skeptical. Wittgenstein, for example, is often read as offering a purely descriptive account, not a skeptical or metaphysical account. However, historically these arguments have often been extended towards anti-realism and skepticism, or positions that would have been considered skeptical and/or radical up until the 20th century. I do, in fact, point out that there is disagreement as to whether redefinitions of truth itself are mere modifications, or an equivocation that essentially denies truth and knowledge and offers up an alternative "pragmatic equivalent" such as "'true' is just an endorsement of beliefs we feel it is good to hold."

Kripke's skeptical solutions, for instance, are not straightforward skepticism and I do not present them as identical. They are also not strong refutations of skeptical claims however. Arguments to anti-realism from underdetermination are often but not always skeptical (e.g., "there is no fact of the matter we can empirically verify..."). They try to reduce the burden of proof they face, arguing merely for undecidability or skepticism instead of making positive metaphysical claims, but this is not always so, sometimes they make stronger metaphysical claims (often on the assumption the empirically verifiable differences are necessarily equivalent with ontological differences).

Second, just because a philosopher says: "I am not a skeptic," doesn't make it so. Hume accepted the label gladly. Contemporary philosophers tend to run away from it. But by prior norms and standards, many of these claims, or their extensions would be considered skeptical (and are still often considered so by some contemporary thinkers).You are missing this nuance.

And those two supposed foundations - That things do not happen “for no reason at all" and that everything has an explanation - at least some discussion might be worthwhile, rather than mere assertion.

The second one is not "everything has an explanation." It's:

1. Things do not happen “for no reason at all.” Things/events have causes. If something is contingent, if it has only potential existence, then some prior actuality must bring it into being. It will not simply snap into being of itself. Our experiences are contingent, thus they must be caused by something that is prior to them.

2. Being is intelligible, and to be is to be intelligible. Every being is something in particular. That is, it has a form, an actuality, that is determinant of what it is (as well as the potential to change, explained by matter). This actuality determines how a thing interacts with everything else, including our sense organs and our intellects. If this was not the case, interactions would be essentially uncaused, and then there would be no reason for them to be one way and not any other (i.e. random).

...Indeed, if they did not hold, if being were unintelligible and things did happen “for no reason at all,” we might suppose that philosophy and science are a lost cause.

If you want to argue that things/interactions/events are (and are one way and not any other) "for no reason at all," without causes, feel free. Likewise, if you want to object that something can be "nothing in particular (nothing determinant) of "nothing at all."

if you are saying that everything is believed and nothing is known, then I don't find that to be epistemologically precise. — Leontiskos

My semantics is standard in epistemology Here's what the Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy says:

Starting from Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus, knowledge has been thought to consist in three necessary conditions: belief, truth, and justification. Traditionally, the focus is on the nature of justification...In 1963 Gettier showed that these three conditions do not really explain what knowledge is. For I may hold a justified belief which is true but which I believe to be true only as a matter of luck. Such a belief cannot count as knowledge. Epistemology since then has been debating whether the original conditions need to be modified, or whether further conditions must be introduced.

So if you KNOW X, this means you BELIEVE X, X is true, you are justified in believing X, and your justification is not a product of luck.

You said, "I know X is not a statement of belief". Well, it IS a statement of belief in standard philosophical discourse. I realize that in colloquial speech, some people consider belief and knowing to be something distinct, but that actually muddies the water.

You're also drawing a distinction with "certainty" and "certitude" but this also seems colloquial. We're still dealing with beliefs, even if there is no logical possibility that the belief is false.

the way we linguistically distinguish facts from opinions highlights the way that facts are not subjective in the way that opinions are subjective, and that they exist all the same. That is: there really are facts (truths), and they really are something different than opinions. If everything returns to attitude, then it seems that there is nothing other than opinion. — Leontiskos

Our colloquial way of speaking is vague, and implies distinctions that are not real. An opinion is a belief. Colloquially, if we say "that's my opinion" - we may be qualifying the nature of the belief, but it's a vague qualification. A person might say this when he knows the basis for his opinion is weak, but another person might formulate an opinion only after a good deal of analysis. In either case, they're stating a belief.

A TRUTH is a statement that corresponds to some aspect of reality. Of course there are truths. Truth is what we all want to have in our possession. The issue is: how do we assess whether of not some statement is true? A justification is a reason to believe the statement is true. Some justifications are better than others. If it's derived from deductive reasoning, you're on very solid ground (although you're still dependent on the premises being true). The point I've been making is that we rarely use deduction; more often we use abduction - it's an imperfect guide to truth, but it's usually the best we can do. But it's better than choosing beliefs randomly, or jumping to conclusions without considering all the facts.

...you are conflating arguments from underdetermination and skepticism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not so much, although your walking back on scepticism is positive.

Your main argument is that underdetermination only seems feasible because of the rejection of your two metaphysical principles. From this you deduce that "...the skepticism resulting from underdetermination has been seen as a serious threat and challenge". But what you call "underdetermination" here is very different to the use of that term in Duhem and Quine. Where they showed us specific cases in which we could not decide between competing theories, you suppose that we can never decide between any cases, unless we accept your two premises. Doing so lumps together quite disparate approaches, flattening the philosophical landscape, reduces complex positions to caricatures. Your "argument" consists in labelling.

We ought look a those two premises closely.

The first supposes that every event has a cause, inviting your rhetorical ploy 'If you want to argue that things.. are "for no reason at all," without causes, feel free.' The issue here is not that there are uncaused events, so much as that a method that supposes explanation in terms only of ultimate cause is no explanation at all. Consider the extreme case, where god is the cause of all things. That the coin we flip comes up heads is supposedly explained as "the will of God"; but that explanation will work equally well if the coin had come up tails. Regardless of what happens, the explanation is "God caused it to happen that way", and so we never learn why this happened and not that; this is no explanation at all.

If presenting a cause is to function as an explanation, it must say why this even happened and not some other event. Saying that "Things/events have causes" is trivial, indeed frivolous. What makes talk of causes useful is their role in setting out what happens from what might happen.

"God wills it" satisfies your rejection of "underdetermination", but at the cost of providing no explanation at all.

The second supposes that there is always an explanation. Given my argument above, this is again trivially true. "God wills it" will explain everything, and yet is no explanation at all. But more, what you are setting aside here is humility, the capacity of admitting "I don't know". You would prefer an explanation that it complete yet wrong to one that is incomplete yet right; you would prefer a complete lie to a partial truth.

You picture yourself as defending rationality when you are denying it. Underdetermination is a feature rather than a flaw, marking the difference between rationality and dogmatism.

...or, the flip side of "underdetermination" is confirmation bias. — Moliere

My point, in so few words. Nice.

:) Thank you.

At this point I'm wondering if the difference in positions is that I think of "underdetermination" with respect to scientific theories, especially -- rather than applying to the radical skeptical position.

At this point I'm wondering if the difference in positions is that I think of "underdetermination" with respect to scientific theories, especially -- rather than applying to the radical skeptical position. — Moliere

Well, that's how it is used, apart from Tim's modification. Any finite set of observations can be satisfied by innumerable general theories.

Tim argues that scepticism follows from his version of "underdetermination", and so is using that term in an unconventional way. He seems to think that since evidence can't determine which of the competing theories is true, we cannot chose one theory to go on with - as if the only basis for choosing were deductive.

But of course we can choose Einsteinian relativistics over Newtonian relativistics, for all sorts of reasons that are not merely deductive.

Added: But of course Wittgenstein and Quine are not sceptics in the way Tim suggests. Each provides a way to move on without the need for deductive certainty.

Well it's not surprising that we see eye-to-eye, is it? :D

Do you think this a bad interpretation @Count Timothy von Icarus?

David Hume’s argument against causal inferences and explanations, as well as his hugely influential “Problem of Induction;”

For some reason, a little while ago, I re-read Hume's Enquiry, and realized that he is not at all the sceptic that he is painted to be. His rejection of what he calls pyrrhonism is emphatic. (He does not believe that it can be refuted but argues that it is inconsequential, and recommends a stiff dose of everyday life as a remedy.) He distinguishes between pyrrhonism and "judicious" or "mitigated" scepticism, which he thinks is an essential part of dealing with life. See Enquiry XII, esp. part 3.
PS I read the conclusion of this section (book-burning) is a rhetorical trope, designed to show how extreme views can lead one into absurdity. That fits better with his actual analysis.

So why would it be any more or less likely that a universe just "happens to be" with a first state something that looks something like cosmic inflation rather than a first state full of memories and people? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think that a meaningful estimate of that is possible, unless we know the range of other possibilities. In any case, as every lottery winner knows, extremely unlikely or improbable events occur all the time. In the end, though, one has to consider whether it is more plausible (not likely or probable) that all our memories are false, and that no evidence actually points to a real past, or that at least some memories are true and some evidence is good. In any case, what difference would it make if it were true that the first state was full of memories and people? This is a blank space, which can only be filled up with fantasies and dreams.

But if we assert, to the contrary, that the cosmos had a determining cause, then presumably this is a realist claim. In which case, maybe an inability to dismiss anti-realism will bother us. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, yes and no. If we think that we have to dismiss this anti-realism by means of argumentation in the traditional fashion, we have a problem. But if we analyse the terms and context of debate, we may not be so bothered. However, these arguments can have an effect on how we perceive the world. Many people find the vision of the world proposed since the 17th century extremely depressing and can get quite miserable about it. Others find it full of wonders and possibilities and find it extremely exciting. Neither view will be much affected by traditional argumentation.

Your main argument is that underdetermination only seems feasible because of the rejection of your two metaphysical principles. From this you deduce that "...the skepticism resulting from underdetermination has been seen as a serious threat and challenge". But what you call "underdetermination" here is very different to the use of that term in Duhem and Quine. Where they showed us specific cases in which we could not decide between competing theories, you suppose that we can never decide between any cases, unless we accept your two premises. Doing so lumps together quite disparate approaches, flattening the philosophical landscape, reduces complex positions to caricatures. Your "argument" consists in labelling.

This is a misreading. See the summary I provided above for Moliere. That particular response is offered as merelyone example of why the form of the argument, though known from antiquity, was not considered to be widely applicable in the past.

From this you deduce that "...the skepticism resulting from underdetermination has been seen as a serious threat and challenge".

No I don't; that would be a bizarre "deduction." The comments on the difficulties with some of these positions are all in the first half of the paper, before those premises are presented.

A relevant section would instead be:

Again, the difficulty here is that the “solutions” often seem quite skeptical, e.g., “words never refer to things,” “there is never a fact about exactly what rules we are following,” etc. Here, it is worth considering what it is one ought to do if one sees an argument with an absurd conclusion. The first things to do are to check that the argument is valid, and crucially, that the premises are true. I would argue that contemporary thought, particularly analytic thought, has far too often only done the first. Because it holds many empiricist presuppositions beyond repute (indeed, “dogmatically” might not be too strong a word) it has not generally questioned them.

Yet if an epistemology results in our having to affirm conclusions that seem prima facie absurd, and if further, it seems to lead towards radical skepticism and epistemological nihilism, or an ever branching fragmentation of disparate “skeptical solutions” and new “anti-realisms,” that might be a good indication that it is simply a bad epistemology. Indeed, an ability to at least secure our most bedrock beliefs might be considered a sort of minimal benchmark for a set of epistemic premises. Yet, due to the conflation of “empiricism” with “the scientific method,” as well as modern culture’s preference for iconoclasm, novelty, and “creativity,” the starting assumptions that lead to these conclusions are rarely questioned. With that in mind, let us turn to the realist responses that, in prior epochs, made these arguments seem relatively insubstantial.10

(Note: Kripke himself allows that the claim seems absurd.)

I write that the wider application of this form of argument, and that fact that it is thought to be extremely strong, has often led to theses that would have seemed radical for most of history. I also point out that thinkers have thought that these do pose a serious challenge (e.g., Russell's quote on Hume). I do point out that others have been enthusiastic about the ability to support a variety of radical theses, seeing this as liberating, or supporting a move to "pragmatism."

Some of the redefinitions of truth do strike me as dressed up epistemic nihilism with a hand wave to "pragmatism" as a modern panacea. I do think this particular trend is quite problematic. What this generally reduces to in practice is: "those with power decide what is true." Or at least, this is eventuality is not kept out.

Where they showed us specific cases in which we could not decide between competing theories, you suppose that we can never decide between any cases, unless we accept your two premises.

No I don't, I say those are the two core premises related to the example. It's a relevant example because the Neoplatonist response is similar. The Stoics, however, had a different response, etc.

But what you call "underdetermination" here is very different to the use of that term in Duhem and Quine

I define what I mean in the first paragraph. The arguments listed follow that general pattern. The term is associated with the "underdetermination of scientific theory," but that does not mean there are no other arguments from underdetermination. I mention the ancient Empiricist version and (briefly) the even broader Academic ones for instance.

The issue here is not that there are uncaused events,

Good, so you agree with it.

so much as that a method that supposes explanation in terms only of ultimate cause is no explanation at all.

It doesn't mention anything about "ultimate causes." For the purposes of the arguments in question, the relevant causes are the causes of our perceptions, the act of understanding, etc.

"God wills it" satisfies your rejection of "underdetermination", but at the cost of providing no explanation at all.

A dichotomy of:

A. Contingent events just happen; and
B. A sort of occasionalism where God (or a necessary cause) is necessarily the only cause.

For instance, in the example cited, "God wills it," is not the only cause. What is the positive argument that:

" 1. Things do not happen “for no reason at all.” Things/events have causes. If something is contingent, if it has only potential existence, then some prior actuality must bring it into being. It will not simply snap into being of itself. Our experiences are contingent, thus they must be caused by something that is prior to them."

Entails that "God wills it," is the cause of everything?

He seems to think that since evidence can't determine which of the competing theories is true, we cannot chose one theory to go on with - as if the only basis for choosing were deductive.

I suggest nothing of the sort. Obviously, we can have a sort of volanturist approach to theories, or invoke principles such as parsimony, etc. However, the appeal to parsimony is a particularly pernicious principle in the hands of empiricsts precisely because the main data of experience are excluded from consideration, and then phenomena such as consciousness or causes are recommended for elimination on the grounds of parsimony.

For some reason, a little while ago, I re-read Hume's Enquiry, and realized that he is not at all the sceptic that he is painted to be. His rejection of what he calls pyrrhonism is emphatic. (He does not believe that it can be refuted but argues that it is inconsequential, and recommends a stiff dose of everyday life as a remedy.) He distinguishes between pyrrhonism and "judicious" or "mitigated" scepticism, which he thinks is an essential part of dealing with life. See Enquiry XII, esp. part 3.

Funny, this is generally precisely how I've seen his approach to skepticism described. Others have just generally found his conclusions, particularly in ethics, more problematic than he does.

I don't think "skepticism" has historically been used only to describe extreme positions such as: "I can know nothing at all; the sky is falling!" For instance, this hardly describes the paradigmatic ancient skeptics. I would think Hume's approach actually isn't that different from the ancient skeptics however. Their skepticism is also largely pragmatic. What do you think makes them radically different?

In any case, what difference would it make if it were true that the first state was full of memories and people?

Presumably, it would remove some of our warrant for thinking things will continue on as they have in the past, seeing as how there is no past.

Well, yes and no. If we think that we have to dismiss this anti-realism by means of argumentation in the traditional fashion, we have a problem

I am not sure about that. The arguments I have seen for it seem me to use questionable premises. If the premises are (likely) false, there is no good reason to believe the argument is true.


If you think I am calling Wittgenstein himself a skeptic then this is incautious reading. The general pattern of the rule-following argument has been expanded in that direction by later, less cautious thinkers.

I would think Hume's approach actually isn't that different from the ancient skeptics however. Their skepticism is also largely pragmatic. What do you think makes them radically different? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Perhaps I wasn't clear. The distinction I'm focusing on is the one that he himself adopts - between what he calls pyrrhonism, but which is probably actually closer to Cartesianism. (Given the history of philosophy taught in Philosophy 101, it seems very odd that he doesn't mention Descartes.) I think that he is really quite close to the old tradition, without the Stoicism (so far as I can discern). (I owe that understanding to you.)

If you think I am calling Wittgenstein himself a sceptic then this is incautious reading. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That reading is a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein. I do not think you include Wittgenstein among the incautious sceptics.

Presumably, it would remove some of our warrant for thinking things will continue on as they have in the past, seeing as how there is no past. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I classify the expectation that things will continue as they have in past as a default position, in the absence of positive evidence for anything else. We don't need a warrant.

Perhaps I wasn't clear. The distinction I'm focusing on is the one that he himself adopts - between what he calls pyrrhonism, but which is probably actually closer to Cartesianism. (Given the history of philosophy taught in Philosophy 101, it seems very odd that he doesn't mention Descartes.) I think that he is really quite close to the old tradition, without the Stoicism (so far as I can discern). (I owe that understanding to you.)

Ah, gotcha. That makes sense.

That reading is a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein. I do not think you include Wittgenstein among the incautious sceptics.

Sorry, that got shifted out of place. That was a reply to @Banno who thought I had Wittgenstein with the "skeptics." I do not think this is so. But some positions that appeal to Wittgenstein, such as the cognitive relativism thesis, lead to a sort of broad skepticism about our ability to understand others (outside our own time and culture, or even tout court). This is a misreading of Wittgenstein to the extent it is attributed to him I think, but I think most advocates don't say this; rather they claim that if you follow out Wittgenstein's insights, with their own additions, you get cognitive relativism.

some positions that appeal to Wittgenstein, such as the cognitive relativism thesis, lead to a sort of broad skepticism about our ability to understand others (outside our own time and culture, or even tout court). This is a misreading of Wittgenstein to the extent it is attributed to him I think, but I think most advocates don't say this; rather they claim that if you follow out Wittgenstein's insights, with their own additions, you get cognitive relativism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't get this. I think there must be a typo or something here. ?
Broadly speaking, I see a tempting reading of the PI that is relativistic. But I don't think it what he intended. If he had, he would, surely, have not talked about our form of life, but about our forms of life. To put it another way, there are many differences between practices and forms of life which are more or less difficult to understand and communicate between. But, if we are all human beings, it is possible to grasp the other's form of life or practice. If it is really not possible (and how would one prove that?), then the other is not a human being. That's what lies behind his extraordinary remark that "if a lion could talk we could not understand him." The twist in this story is, of course, that there is a good deal of mutual understanding between humans and lions even in the context of an extreme language barrier and I see that as based on a shared form of life.

Funny, this is generally precisely how I've seen his approach to skepticism described. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Perhaps this is more a labelling problem than an actual disagreement. But his position is scepticism de-fanged, if it is scepticism at all. The implication of what he says, to my mind, is a rejection of the doctrine. But I can see that others might not see it that way. Mind you, I'm not even sure that Descartes was really a sceptic.