I address this in another Medium essay, Is there Mind at Large? This essay interogates Kastrup's expression and compares it with Berkeleyian idealism. But then it draws on Yogācāra Buddhism, the school colloquially known as 'mind-only', to argue that it is not necessary to posit any kind of super-mind or cosmic mind.

Although I also concede that if Kastrup simply means 'some mind' or 'mind in general', then I am in complete agreement with him. Why? I think the reification trap is associated with the tendency towards objectification, to try and consider anything real in terms of it being an object or an other. This is where Heidegger's criticism of onto-theology rings true. — Wayfarer

I read your essay, and I thought it was well-constructed and clearly expressed. However I remain unconvinced about the idea of a collective or universal mind being explanatorily unnecessary for an idealist thesis concerning the nature of the world and its relationship with human and animal experience.

You cite as an alternative the Ālaya-Vijñāna or storehouse consciousness of Yogācāra Buddhism, an idea I am fairly well acquainted with from my studies of Eastern philosophies and religions. I always thought of it as a kind of collective karmic storehouse, and it is explicitly doctrinally classed as a form of consciousness. So I'm not seeing how it is not an idea of collective consciousness or mind.

If the thought is that our individual minds are separate then what is posited, in the absence of also positing a collective mind that connects and/or coordinates them, is that, as far as minds go, it is only individual minds that exist. I don't see a "reification trap' in the sense of a 'tendency towards objectification' because neither individual minds nor collective minds are being posited as objects of the senses. I see mind as an activity of the body/brain, not as an object of the senses. It's maybe not the best analogy, but digestion is also an activity of the body, not an object of the senses.

Thank you for those comments on my essay, appreciated. My only comment on the closing analogy is the proximity to that materialist saying that ‘the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile.’ I wpild agree however that being is more a verb than a noun.

I was using the digestion analogy more to point to the idea that activities in general are not strictly objects of the senses, not to address the issue of whether the brain generates thought. And yes, 'being' is explicitly a verb, and seeing it that way instead of as a noun renders it as an activity not as any kind of object (except in the very general sense that thinking of it makes it an object of thought), Being or existing would be thought of the master or umbrella activity under which all other activities find their place.

Regarding the Ālaya-Vijñāna there is also a Theosophical idea designated the "Akashic Records", which I think bears some resemblance to the Buddhist idea. It seems that idealist thinkers have long recognized the explanatory need for some kind of collective consciousness as a substitute for the independent actuality of physical existents.

Do you have anything to say about my contention that the idea of storehouse consciousness is an idea of a collective consciousness or mind?

I sure will but I’m in grand-dad mode today so am besieged with a thousand minor annoyances and it’s a very deep topic. I’ll try and find some time soon.

They said somthing physical could be noumenal. This is flat out wrong. Noumenal cannot relate to physical in any other way than as a negative limiting concept.

:up: Whenever you're ready...

I always thought of [alayavijnana] as a kind of collective karmic storehouse, and it is explicitly doctrinally classed as a form of consciousness. So I'm not seeing how it is not an idea of collective consciousness or mind. — Janus

As I say, a very deep topic, I could easily be mistaken about many aspects. It is not accepted by all Buddhist schools, because it said by some Buddhists to be too close to the idea of an 'underlying self or soul'. Madhyamaka philosophers say that ālaya-vijñāna risks reifying consciousness into a hidden essence or foundational mind. From their standpoint, this contradicts the radical emptiness (śūnyatā) of dharmas.

Early Buddhist schools (e.g. Theravāda and some Sarvāstivādins) didn’t have this concept, and when later confronted with it, some commentators saw it as smuggling in an underlying self.

Even within Yogācāra, the idea had to be very carefully explained: the storehouse consciousness is not a permanent self or universal mind, but a provisional way of accounting for karmic continuity and the latent “seeds” (bīja) that ripen into experience.

But the whole subject is one which hinges on the sense in which such a faculty can be said to exist. Perhaps we could say that it exists as potential - but then in what sense do such potential states exist? They are by definition not yet manifest so not existent. But also not beyond the realm of possibility.

Calling the alaya a collective mind does tend to reify it as some ethereal kind of medium or intelligence, which is really a non-Buddhist view. I remember the well-known W Y Evans-Wentz translation many of us has in the 60's and 70's The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation by Knowing the One Mind. Regrettably, that translation is not at all accurate, and there is no 'one mind' concept in Tibetan Buddhism. Evans - Wentz absorbed those ideas from theosophy which also had many spurious interpretations of Buddhism.

Bernardo Kastrup in the other hand sometimes dialogues with Swami Priyananda, and says that his ‘analytical idealism’ is broadly compatible with Vedanta. And I think his ‘mind at large’ reflects that. So my essay reflects a Buddhist critique.

Buddhists believe in the Universe. The Universe is, according to philosophers who base their beliefs on!idealism, a place of the spirit. Other philosophers whose beliefs are based on a materialistic view, say that the Universe is composed of the matter we see in front of our eyes.

Buddhist philosophy takes a view which is neither idealistic nor materialistic; Buddhists do not believe that the Universe is composed of only matter. They believe that there is something else other than matter. But there is a difficulty here; if we use a concept like spirit to describe that something else other than matter, people are prone to interpret Buddhism as some form of spiritualistic religion and think that Buddhists must therefore believe in the actual existence of spirit. So it becomes very important to understand the Buddhist view of the concept ‘spirit.’

I am careful to refer to spirit as a concept here because in fact Buddhism does not believe in the actual existence of spirit. So what is this ‘something else’ other than matter which exists in this Universe?

If we think that there is a something which actually exists other than matter, our understanding will not be correct; nothing physical exists outside of matter.
Some people explain the Universe as a universe
based on matter. But there also exists something which we call value or meaning. A Universe consisting only of matter leaves no room for value or meaning in civilizations and cultures. Matter alone has no value. We can say that the Universe is constructed with matter, but we must also say that matter works for some purpose.

So in our understanding of the Universe we should recognize the existence of something other than
matter. We can call that something spirit, but if we do we should remember that in Buddhism, the word ‘spirit’ is a figurative expression for value or meaning. We do not say that spirit exists in reality; we use the concept only figuratively. — Nishijima Roshi

They said somthing physical could be noumenal. This is flat out wrong. Noumenal cannot relate to physical in any other way than as a negative limiting concept. — I like sushi

Who did? Kant? Sure. There's no reason to deny that physical objects cause perception of physical objects. I think probably the distinction you want to make is far too close to a non-transcendental idealism for me.

As best I can tell, all Kant was trying to show was that the noumenal world is made up of objects which our bodies interpret through various sense organs and processes. That seems correct, on his explication of the human understanding.

Why do you posit (well, this is a negative inference, but still) that physical objects could not be noumenal? This suggests that everything we perceive is non-physical, other than in perception. To me, that is clearly and almost risibly a non-starter (with respect... It just seems ludicrous to me).

No. Janus. Kant said no such thing -- well technically he is so careful people often misunstand what he meant. He even says there is danger in being too precise as people misunderstand.

We wre talkign about what Kant said. I am sticking to what he said, and the mass concensus, not using weird or outdated interpretations.

As best I can tell, all Kant was trying to show was that the noumenal world is made up of objects which our bodies interpret through various sense organs and processes. That seems correct, on his explication of the human understanding. — AmadeusD

Flat out wrong.

Yeah, I don't thikn you're making too much sense.

Kant, or Janus? I am addressing Kant's positions, not Janus'. If you disagree with my take, take me to task :)

The consensus is that Kant intended a "physical object" and "limiting factor" aspects to the noumenal. They couldn't do the former latter without hte former holding.

It seems there is nothing to be said here, then. But you are incorrect, my friend.

I have explained ad nauseum above. The onus is on you to read not me. I have studied Kant more than enough -- as in read the actual text repeatedly.

I have also checked my interpretation with the modern evaluation of what he meant. Have you?

That's nice dear. So have I. My description of the consensus is correct. I don't have much interesting in pissing on each other's shoes. Let's leave it..

This is a philosophy forum. If someone is saying the emperor is fully clothed when he is naked I will not just sit idle at every time.

Kant is something of a cornerstone in philosophical history so it makes sense to point out mistakes when they occur -- especially when repeated by more than one person.

As best I can tell, all Kant was trying to show was that the noumenal world is made up of objects which our bodies interpret through various sense organs and processes. That seems correct, on his explication of the human understanding. — AmadeusD

This misses the mark because he does not talk of a noumenal world in any physical sense. Anything physical is phenomenonal, not merely known through out limited 'senses' as he uses the terms 'intuitions' and 'sensibility'.

You seem to be confusing the 'noumena' with 'transcendental objects'. That is my guess.

In my opinion, in order to understand the other of consciousness, one must understand how consciousness is constituted at the most fundamental level. And consciousness is constituted at the most fundamental level as present and immediate time. Thanks to Husserl's analyses, we understand that consciousness is constituted at this level by diferences in protensions and retentions. This implies that there is always a non-present side with which consciousness is continuously in contact. This non-present is precisely the form of the world, as something not given in consciousness. In this sense, the existence of the world can be maintained as something distinct with which consciousness relates. But even more, it is consciousness itself that is constituted by the non-present, so it can be said that consciousness is constituted by the very nature of the world as non-present. To deny the world, we must deny the existence of the non-present. But that non-present is fundamental to consciousness and its functioning.

The world is like a note on the refrigerator. It is always pointing to the non-present. The dark side of the moon becomes a paradigmatic example of how experience works: we see it on one side, but within us there is always the hint of a non-present. This non-present is the dark side of the moon, which, if we see it, we stop seeing the other side, and the hint persists. Even to sustain the unity of the object, the hint of the non-present and the non-conscious is necessary. Its non-presence also guarantees its consistency and ultimately its existence. This is the world created by non-consciousness. Perhaps the moon does not have a dark side, but this "perhaps" is persistent and accompanies everything we call experience. It is the perhaps of what is not consciousness.

Regarding the Ālaya-Vijñāna there is also a Theosophical idea designated the "Akashic Records", which I think bears some resemblance to the Buddhist idea. It seems that idealist thinkers have long recognized the explanatory need for some kind of collective consciousness as a substitute for the independent actuality of physical existents.

There are ways around this*, you know how gravity works at a distance, but absent the theory of relativity, there is no known physical mechanism by which the force is exerted. Relativity accounts for it, but is little more than a descriptive, rather hypothetical explanation, a mathematical mapping of the relation between bodies, forces and energy. Perhaps there is the equivalent between minds**. Also there is the idea, which dovetails to an extent with idealism, of all beings/organisms, or more pertinently living entities, as one entity, branched, or budded off into separate organisms in the realm of manifestation/objectification. With the root unseen, or known by us rather like the root of gravity being unseen, or known.


* although I don’t see the need for such aversion to the idea of some connection, or lineage, or mind between beings. I can understand the aversion found amongst Western philosophers and Buddhist scholars. But for me, I see, a kind of apologetics, or fig leaf being used when such ideas come to the surface.

** I use mind in a broader sense than the thinking, or computational intelligence, often referred to. Rather the animating living aspect of being, which incorporates the whole electrical cohesion of the body.

Thank you for that input, it's an aspect of Husserl that I hadn't encountered yet (there are many). I will think that over some more.

‘I tick therefore I am’ :lol:

This misses the mark because he does not talk of a noumenal world in any physical sense. — I like sushi

I said as much here on pg 59. He doesn’t talk about a noumenal world at all.

The chapter on noumena is relatively short, in which is found that noumena are merely the proverbial red-headed stepchild of a wayward human understanding.

After two books consisting of four chapters consisting of eight sections, ~200 pages, telling us all about how the faculty of thought/judgement/cognition works properly, and prior to moving on to the faculty of reason itself, he concludes with a scant 20-page exposè warning, by example, of understanding’s attempts to function beyond its warrant, perfectly demonstrating the major limitive premise, “….I can think whatever I please, provided only that I do not contradict myself….”

To say he talks about that for which even a representation is impossible to conceive, is so far beyond mistaken as to be deemed…..speaking of which…..ignorant.

There's no reason to deny that physical objects cause perception of physical objects. — AmadeusD

This is a very fine example of the faulty deterministic perspective derived from the overextension of Newton's law.

In reality, the activities of the living being are caused by the being itself, not some external forces. Perception is an activity of living beings. Therefore, we have a very strong reason to "deny that physical objects cause perception of physical objects".

That is why your interpretation of Kant is like Sushi says, "flat out wrong". Kant proposes that the a priori intuitions of space and time are put to work by the human being, like tools in its production of the phenomenon you call "perception of physical objects", rather than perception being caused by what you call "physical objects".

Thanks to Husserl's analyses, we understand that consciousness is constituted at this level by diferences in protensions and retentions. — JuanZu

Protension is the way that we relate to the future, and retention is the way that we relate to the past. As being at the present, we recognize a significant, even substantial difference between the two, past and future. Deterministic principles serve to dissolve this difference.

Whitehead, in his process philosophy, uses the concepts of "prehension" and "concrescence" to explain how a being at the present can experience the flow of time.

This implies that there is always a non-present side with which consciousness is continuously in contact. This non-present is precisely the form of the world, as something not given in consciousness. — JuanZu

The non-present, which is "the form of the world", must necessarily be divided into two, to accomodate an adequate understanding of it. This is due to that substantial difference between past and future, and the result is that some form of dualism is necessary in order to derive an appropriate conception of "the world". Again, deterministic principles serve to dissolve this requirement.

But that non-present is fundamental to consciousness and its functioning. — JuanZu

We can understand that within the conscious being, the two distinct substances of past and future, are united into one, as retention and protension, and this constitutes conscious being at the present. This implies that being at the present, consciousness, "is constituted at the most fundamental level", as a combination of these two distinct things, past and future.

Your observation regarding the structure of CPR is interesting. I best not put my trowel away.

What still surprises me about the later sections is where he dismisses the either/or quality that has often been ascribed to him by later thinkers. The attempt to form the last words on an issue is yet not to have the last word. Otherwise, there would only be the silence Cratylus was said to have fallen into.

….dismisses the either/or quality…. — Paine

Are you referring to principles, that in which resides always and only absolute certainty?

Agreed on last words, generally. Thing is, Kant sets a high bar for himself, then claims to have attained to it. Anyone is free to agree whether he did, thereby tacitly giving him the last word, or not, denying the last word and setting the stage for saying something else.

Protension is the way that we relate to the future, and retention is the way that we relate to the past. As being at the present, we recognize a significant, even substantial difference between the two, past and future. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly. But the flow of time implies that the relation with the past and the future is not discontinuous. That is why our present is constantly related to non-presents and non-consciousnesses in the flow of time.

Deterministic principles serve to dissolve this difference. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here you lost me. Can you explain this?

We can understand that within the conscious being, the two distinct substances of past and future, are united into one, as retention and protension, and this constitutes conscious being at the present. This implies that being at the present, consciousness, "is constituted at the most fundamental level", as a combination of these two distinct things, past and future. — Metaphysician Undercover

They cannot be two consciousnesses as two substances. Because we have to guarantee the unity of experience, for example that the past is a past of mine just as the future is a future of mine. In this sense we are body, where non-presents and non-consciousnesses constitute us. This body is the world that constitutes us.

The non-present, which is "the form of the world", must necessarily be divided into two, to accomodate an adequate understanding of it. This is due to that substantial difference between past and future, and the result is that some form of dualism is necessary in order to derive an appropriate conception of "the world" — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not a dualism it is simply two dimensions that relate to the present. But the important thing is that they are constitutive and non-present. In that sense consciousness is constituted by that which is not it. We do not perceive these dimensions in themselves unlike the present. There is something that is not conscious that constitutes consciousness. I call it the form of the world because we normally understand the world as something beyond consciousness and distinct from experience. There is an analogy with the non-present and the non-conscious.

Are you referring to principles, that in which resides always and only absolute certainty? — Mww

I will have to think about it in those terms. I don't want to get too far over my skis.

In the passages I quoted, the view of Descartes and Berkeley as being childish both involve the personal being taken as a fundamental ground that is not only unproven but misses elements of experience. Kant claims his more mature approach looks for a set of conditions for the experience of the 'I think' that it is not self-evident but requires more understanding. How we visualize the boundaries seems connected to this kind of unknown. I will try to express this better in other posts.

Your point about Kant having the last word in many places if left unchallenged is well taken.

I appreciate this translation. I cut my teeth with the Norman Kemp Smith translation fifty years ago. It was like being sent to a different planet.

I’m determined to get through the whole work by year’s end. I talk a lot about it but am well aware of the gaps in my reading.

We have both read much of what the other has not. That is a peculiar feature of this space.

So, we could all benefit from what troubled you while reading this text.

But the flow of time implies that the relation with the past and the future is not discontinuous. — JuanZu

I don't think we can make this conclusion. The flow of time itself appears to be continuous, as a continuous activity, but consider what is happening. Future time becomes past time. August 29 will change from being in the future to being in past. In the meantime, it must traverse the present. What I propose is that the present acts more like a division between past and future, than as a union of the two. Therefore the relation between past and future is discontinuous.

Here you lost me. Can you explain this? — JuanZu

The difference between the deterministic world view, and the free will world view, is that the deterministic perspective assumes a continuity of existence, from past, through the present, to the future. This is what is supposed to be a necessary continuity, stated by Newton's first law. Things will continue to be, in the future, as they have been, in the past, unless forced to change. Any change is caused by another thing continuing to be as it has been, so that any change is already laid out, determined. That support a block type universe.

The free will perspective allows that as time passes, there is real possibility for change, which is not a continuity of the past. This violates Newton's first law. But in order to allow, in principle, for the possibility of this 'real change', we must break the assumed continuity of existence, past through present, into future. We must allow that at any moment of passing time, Newton's first law, the determinist premise, may be violated. This means that the idea of a thing having equal existence on the future and past side of present, would have to be dismissed as wrong. What this implies is that an object's existence is recreated at each moment of passing time. This is the only principle which will allow that a freely willed act can interfere in the continuity of existence, i.e. the continuity of existence is false. Of course, this is not difficult to accept, for those who believe that objects are a creation of the mind, anyway. The mind can only create the object as time passes.

They cannot be two consciousnesses as two substances. Because we have to guarantee the unity of experience, for example that the past is a past of mine just as the future is a future of mine. In this sense we are body, where non-presents and non-consciousnesses constitute us. This body is the world that constitutes us. — JuanZu

Why do we need to guarantee such a unity? From the free will perspective this proposed unity makes no sense. Experience is entirely past. We have no experience of the future. We think of the future in terms of possibilities, but it is irrational for me to think that all possibilities will come to pass, and be a part of my experience. Only those possibilities which are actualized will be experienced. Therefore we cannot say that the future and past are united in experience. Only the past has been experienced, and future possibilities always remain outside of experience.

It is not a dualism it is simply two dimensions that relate to the present. But the important thing is that they are constitutive and non-present. In that sense consciousness is constituted by that which is not it. We do not perceive these dimensions in themselves unlike the present. There is something that is not conscious that constitutes consciousness. I call it the form of the world because we normally understand the world as something beyond consciousness and distinct from experience. There is an analogy with the non-present and the non-conscious. — JuanZu

I agree with this, except there is one big problem. The problem is that we understand the non-present to consist of two parts which are radically different, the past and the future. We know that with respect to the future there is real possibility in relation to what we will do, and what will come to pass. And, we also know that with respect to the past there is an actuality as to what we have done, and what has come to pass. So, if we accept this as a reality, that the past consists of actuality, and the future consists of possibility, dualism is unavoidable.

You call this "something that is not conscious that constitutes consciousness", "the form of the world", and I am pointing out to you, that the form of the world consists of two very different aspects. And because there are two very different aspects which constitute the form of the world, we need a dualism to understand the world.

So, we could all benefit from what troubled you while reading this text. — Paine

It’s not that I find Kant troubling so much as that reading him is very hard work. But I find if I go through it methodically I can understand the arguments. I also want to understand it well enough to understand the criticisms by his successors.