I think we had this discussion before. In general relativity, gravity is not a force. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not say that in general relativity gravity is a force.

I wrote: "According to general relativity, an apple on a table is subject to a force and because subject to a force is therefore accelerating, actively accelerating."

I am saying that the apple remains on the table because the table is exerting an upward force that stops the apple from falling

Even in general relativity there are forces.

That said from a phenomenological perspective, it does seem to me that my thoughts are going on inside my head, not in my torso, arms or legs or even neck. I mean it just feels that way. So while we cannot be directly aware of neuronal activity, that activity seems to generate sensations that make it seem like thought is in the head (to me anyway). — Janus

I'm pretty sure that our phenomenological perspective on mental phenomena is heavily conditioned by our culture. For example, it is very difficult to answer the question where (in the body) the mind is to be found in ancient greek (or roman) culture. There are good grounds for answering that it is a distinct entity - a ghost - that survives death. There are also grounds for saying that it is the breath - an interesting choice, since it isn't quite clear where the breath is. I think the best answer is that the question where the mind is was not even formulated in that culture. It requires, I would say, a culture that has already problematized mental/physical relations, as happened in Western Europe in the 17th century or so.

I am saying that the apple remains on the table because the table is exerting an upward force that stops the apple from falling — RussellA

Now you are assuming a force without acceleration, a force which is counteracting gravity to create an equilibrium. That negates the point of your argument, that the apple is accelerating.

Now you are assuming a force without acceleration, a force which is counteracting gravity to create an equilibrium. — Metaphysician Undercover

Within general relativity, Einstein's Equivalence Principle shows that being at rest in a gravitational field is equivalent to being accelerated. (Wikipedia - Equivalence Principle)

One of the many reasons why relativity theory ought to be rejected as false and misleading, it assumes there is no difference between being at rest, and being active.

I'm pretty sure that our phenomenological perspective on mental phenomena is heavily conditioned by our culture. For example, it is very difficult to answer the question where (in the body) the mind is to be found in ancient greek (or roman) culture. There are good grounds for answering that it is a distinct entity - a ghost - that survives death. There are also grounds for saying that it is the breath - an interesting choice, since it isn't quite clear where the breath is. I think the best answer is that the question where the mind is was not even formulated in that culture. It requires, I would say, a culture that has already problematized mental/physical relations, as happened in Western Europe in the 17th century or so. — Ludwig V

You make a good point. I was addressing just the 'thinking' aspect of mind. When I think, whether in language or images, the activity seems to be located in my head. Of course when it comes to emotions, they seem more closely located around the heart, and if sensations are thought to be activities of the mind they extend throughout the body. When it comes to seeing the awareness seems to be "out there' in the surrounding environment. Hearing mostly, but also to a lesser extent smelling and tasting seem to be a bit more ambiguous, for me at least.

Our organs of sight, hearing, smelling and tasting are all located in the head, and that may contribute to making it seem as though the mind is located there.

Perhaps the ancients were not as much "in their heads" and language oriented as we are today.

Perhaps the ancients were not as much "in their heads" and language oriented as we are today. — Janus

I think that's very likely.

Our organs of sight, hearing, smelling and tasting are all located in the head, and that may contribute to making it seems as thought the mind is located there. — Janus

That's true. Though I think the most influential point is that we see from a definite point of view, which just happens to be where our eyes are. Since we can locate the source of sounds, we can become aware of where our ears are, so there's that.

The more I think about this, the more complicated it gets. I just wanted to draw attention to that. The results of introspection are not necessarily correct. But it is a bit of a rabbit-hole. I'm not sure how much hangs on it, though it would obviously suit some forms of materialism quite well.

Perhaps the ancients were not as much "in their heads" and language oriented as we are today.
— Janus
I think that's very likely. — Ludwig V

Good comments. The key point is ‘participatory’ - not being a bystander.

Didn't Aristotle say that the mind resided in the heart?

I don't remember that, but it is quite possible. I seem to remember that there was also a theory that the mind resided in the stomach.

Aristotle believed that the heart was the seat of sensation, thought, and intelligence. In De Anima (On the Soul) and other biological works, he describes the heart as the central organ of life, the source of motion and sensation, and the place where the “soul” (in the sense of the animating principle) most directly resides. The brain, in his view, was a cooling device for the blood. Galen later corrected this view saying that the brain was the seat of thought.

Interestingly in Thai and other Eastern cultures, 'citta' can be translated as either 'heart' or 'mind' depending on the context. That is nearer the colloquial usage of 'knowing in your heart' or 'heartfelt'. I do wonder if there's a somatic element to knowing which those saying reflect.

@Janus @Ludwig V I find that fascinating because, as y'all have pointed out, it seems irresistible to me to locate my self or "I" within my head. Or perhaps a better way to say it is: I can't help locating the part of consciousness which thinks, perceives, and imagines as being within my head; but that leaves open the possibility that spirit or soul should be identified with breath, heart, or guts. So a deeper or more cosmic "I" is not necessarily conceived as mental.

But then there's the Third Eye, which opens in . . . the head.

There is an expression in esoteric philosophy 'the eye of the heart'.

And I feel that sense we have of being 'in the head' is very much associated with a certain kind of mentality.

Ever run across Douglas Harding 'On Having no Head'? He hasn't been mentioned much on this forum, but he was quite a popular spiritual teacher a generation ago. https://amzn.asia/d/9kFTHpb

Ever run across Douglas Harding 'On Having no Head'? — Wayfarer

Yes! Haven't thought about it in years. And I'm sure you're right that "being in the head" is learned (with some help from the proximity of the sense organs of sight, sound, and smell).

And here's a 60s blast: remember "Douglas Traherne Harding," by the Incredible String Band?

It is the 'egological' outlook. Not egocentric, in an obvious way, but the sense of being a separate subject/self in an object world primarily oriented around the visual senses. That term 'egological' I found in an academic paper on the logic of the Diamond Sutra (A is not A, therefore it is A)

That song, I don't remember, but then I never had any of their albums.

Ever run across Douglas Harding 'On Having no Head'? He hasn't been mentioned much on this forum, but he was quite a popular spiritual teacher a generation ago. — Wayfarer

I came across that about a year ago on another forum. I could see how he got there but was not sure how seriously to take it. It just goes to show that phenomenology can take you to some unexpected places.

He’s not a mainstream philosopher, more an alternative type. But, I think, perfectly authentic. Probably overshadowed by more recent figures like Eckhart Tolle,

He’s not a mainstream philosopher, — Wayfarer

Yes. That's part of his appeal.

The equation, in philosophy, of the self with the ego is a specialized locution. It doesn't reflect how the word is used in general discourse. For example, here's what Merriam-Webster says:-

(1): an individual's typical character or behavior (e.g. her true self was revealed)
(2): an individual's temporary behavior or character (e.g. his better self)
(3) a person in prime condition (e.g. I feel like my old self today)
(4) the union of elements (such as body, emotions, thoughts, and sensations) that constitute the individuality and identity of a person)
(5) personal interest or advantage
(6) the entire person of an individual
(7) the realization or embodiment of an abstraction
(8) material that is part of an individual organism (e.g.ability of the immune system to distinguish self from nonself)

I like the equation with both one's typical character and some temporary behaviour.
Think too, about "losing oneself" in philosophy or music, not to mention identifying oneself with the car one is driving.
Anyway, I have to confess that I think that the attempt to identify the self with the ego, or with anything else, never mind the attempt to locate it (self/ego) somewhere, are chasing the end of the rainbow.

Good comments. The key point is ‘participatory’ - not being a bystander. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure what you mean by "bystander". By "participatory" perhaps you mean something like "present"―that is, not "off in your head" all consumed by the "internal dialogue"? The alternative to being in the head would seem to be inhabiting the body, as aware as possible of all the sensory inputs and the spontaneous feelings they generate. Philosophy, on the other hand, is a cerebral activity.

↪Wayfarer ↪Ludwig V ↪Janus Didn't Aristotle say that the mind resided in the heart? — J

I seem to dimly remember reading something like that. Julian Jaynes has an interesting theory that Greek people in Homerian times did not identify thoughts as being their own, but as being the voices of the gods. (This is a simple characterization―I read his book decades ago). Presumably they would have assumed their sensations and emotions belonged to them.

I find that fascinating because, as y'all have pointed out, it seems irresistible to me to locate my self or "I" within my head. Or perhaps a better way to say it is: I can't help locating the part of consciousness which thinks, perceives, and imagines as being within my head; but that leaves open the possibility that spirit or soul should be identified with breath, heart, or guts. So a deeper or more cosmic "I" is not necessarily conceived as mental.

But then there's the Third Eye, which opens in . . . the head. — J

As I said earlier, I share your affliction. Jesper Hoffmeyer in Biosemiotics makes a case for locating the self in the skin, as it is by far the body's largest and most sensitive organ and is our primary interface with the world.

I don't know about "spirit" and "soul"―it seems very difficult to think in terms of those without carrying all the unacceptable cultural baggage that comes with them.

A speculative "cosmic" "self" such as Brahma or God is not necessarily thought as either mental or physical. In fact a universal cosmic being is not necessairly thought of even as a "self"―for example Spinoza conceives God as being synonymous with Nature, and the mental and the physical as being just two of its infinite attributes.

I don't know about "spirit" and "soul"―it seems very difficult to think in terms of those without carrying all the unacceptable cultural baggage that comes with them — Janus

Well, I think both @Wayfarer and myself, in our different ways, are positing a non-mental self, a self that not only thinks but animates and, perhaps, connects with something larger. You're right about the cultural baggage, but as philosophers we can try to see beyond that. @Wayfarer is good at reminding us of the deeper, more thoughtful traditions of spirituality that were there long before some religions tried to codify and moralize spiritual experience. The words "spirit" or "soul" may not be helpful for a particular individual, but let's not rule out this aspect of being alive and human.

Well, I think both Wayfarer and myself, in our different ways, are positing a non-mental self, a self that not only thinks but animates and, perhaps, connects with something larger. You're right about the cultural baggage, but as philosophers we can try to see beyond that. @Wayfarer is good at reminding us of the deeper, more thoughtful traditions of spirituality that were there long before some religions tried to codify and moralize spiritual experience. The words "spirit" or "soul" may not be helpful for a particular individual, but let's not rule out this aspect of being alive and human. — J

I have no argument with spiritual practices and faiths―I just don't like to see people interpreting such beliefs as objective knowledge, for that way lies dogma and fundamentalism. At their best, I see them as techniques for attaining altered states, even transforming the way of life.

If life were in truth "about something" which given its apparent nature seems highly unlikely, it remains that none of us know what that "something" could be.

We can believe or speculate that there have been sages who enjoyed such knowledge, but we don't know that. Those we think of as sages might have been deluding themselves for all we know, just as we might delude ourselves if we think that what might seem like profound insights are telling us anything real about anything real.

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Positivism, pure and simple.

Unargued dismissal by labelling, pure and simple.

If you attained a radically altered state and felt absolutely convinced that you had insight into the true nature and meaning of "life, the universe and everything", you would no doubt think that was objective knowledge.

But when you tried to put it into words it would become just another culturally conditioned interpretation, an interpretation which could never capture, or be adequately true to, the wordless feeling of your insight.

I just don't like to see people interpreting such beliefs as objective knowledge, for that way lies dogma and fundamentalism. — Janus

A lot depends on how much certainty you want to pack into "knowledge." Suppose I said I was pretty sure that I'd had a genuine mystical experience, but wasn't certain. Not "absolutely convinced," but on the whole persuaded. That's a soft "know," and hopefully doesn't start me down the road of dogma, but I think it's fairly characteristic of the attitude many of us take toward these puzzling, powerful experiences. Kind of IBE, really (inference to the best explanation). And taken as a single person's experience, it demands virtually nothing in the way of acceptance by others. It's only when thousands of people over vastly different cultures report similar things that it becomes food for thought. But as always, the intelligent thing to do is to find out for yourself.

I would say you could be fairly certain you had a mystical experience or not by comparing it to the quite substantial literature documenting reports of experiences which are classed as such. What I don't think anyone can be at all certain about is as to what could be the metaphysical implications of such experiences.

I've had quite a few such experiences, some of them under the influence of psychedelics, and some while meditating and some while listening to or playing music, painting or writing, and some while in wild surroundings. I don't interpret them to mean anything beyond themselves―of course for me they hold a great deal of emotional force and meaning in themselves, but that meaning is not discursive. If those experiences can be given voice at all, it would be via the allusive language of poetry.

A lot depends on how much certainty you want to pack into "knowledge'. — J

Note the qualifier, 'objective knowledge'. Let's recall the point of the original post. It was that Bishop Berkeley's idealism was a reaction against the emerging scientific worldview which sought objectivity as the sole criterion of truth.

This was connected with the influence of the empirical philosophers, who said that all knowledge comes from (sensory) experience. It was also due to the decline of the 'participatory ontology' of scholastic philosophy, in which 'to know something is not simply to construct a mental representation of it, but to participate in its form — to take into oneself, immaterially, the essence of what the thing is.'

And finally, with Galileo and Locke's division of primary and secondary attributes, whereby the 'primary attributes' were the province of objective knowledge, and the secondary, how things appear or feel to us, relegated to the interior realm of subjectivity.

This is the origin of that distinctly modern form of consciousness, the Cartesian ego seeking to subordinate nature through science and technology. It permeates all of our awareness in today's world.

A tendentious "just-so" story if there ever was one! What you outline is merely one perspective of what happened historically among many others. Of course the dogmatist thinks their version is the one true account. :roll:

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