among monotheistic religions, the philosophical god conceived by scholars of the church were much later additions to a traditionally personalist god. Ever since then, the god of the scholars and the god of the parish have remained two very different conceptions. — finarfin

Concepts of God(s) are notoriously difficult to define with any precision. What I had in mind with Feser and Hart were these kinds of critiques.

Feser says that theistic personalism tends to reject divine simplicity, a core tenet of the classical tradition. In classical theism, God isn’t composed of parts; rather, God is being. Theistic personalism, by contrast, portrays God as a being with distinct attributes (like intellect, will, power), effectively making God composite in a way classical theists view as metaphysically untenable. Theistic personalists (he's discussing William Lane Craig here) depict God essentially as “a person” with amplified human-like qualities—leading to what Feser sees as anthropomorphism: imagining God as a “super‑creature” rather than as the source of being ref

As for Hart:

Many Anglophone theistic philosophers …, reared as they have been in a post-Fregean intellectual environment, have effectively broken with clas­sical theistic tradition, adopting a style of thinking that the Dominican philoso­pher Brian Davies calls theistic personalism. I prefer to call it monopoly­the­ism myself (or perhaps “mono-poly-theism”), since it seems to me to involve a view of God not conspicuously different from the poly­theis­tic picture of the gods as merely very powerful discrete entities who possess a variety of distinct attributes that lesser entities also possess, if in smaller measure; it differs from polytheism, as far I can tell, solely in that it posits the existence of only one such being. It is a way of thinking that suggests that God, since he is only a particular instantiation of various concepts and properties, is logically dependent on some more comprehen­sive reality embracing both him and other beings. For philosophers who think in this way, practically all the traditional metaphysical attempts to understand God as the source of all reality become impenetrable. — Source

Of course, this may not be at all relevant to the God 'of the pews', but this is a philosophical discussion.

Of course, this may not be at all relevant to the God 'of the pews', but this is a philosophical discussion. — Wayfarer

In other words, "the God of the pews" doesn't hold up under logical or metaphysical scrutiny and therefore is ontologically eliminable; the speculative or supernatural fiat of 'classical theism' is an unparsimonious, ad hoc X-of-the-gaps, apologia – rationalized superstition (à la Spinoza et al).

But among monotheistic religions, the philosophical god conceived by scholars of the church were much later additions to a traditionally personalist god. Ever since then... — finarfin

When do you theorize that the "addition" began?

Looking at abrahamic religions, it seems that the desire for rationalization grows as religious movements turn from their prophetic and/or tribal origins. As religious institutions grow, they require more orthodoxy and more universal justifications for their existence. Scholars of the church and scripture emerge, providing the rigor and intellectual legitimacy that pure spirituality lacks. Sometimes this is a conscious, top-down decision to push for a more centralized orthodoxy; other times, it's a subconscious development.

Early debates were often restricted to matters of scripture and religious practice, rather than philosophical defenses of monotheism in general. After all, having a coherent and unified theology is a much more pressing matter than validating what your followers already believe (monotheism). Scholarly investigations into god's precise metaphysical nature is not something that concerned your average churchgoer; however, they were logical development to this spirit of inquiry.

Most christian churches continue to parade around these two very different ideas of god. In parishes and in the scripture, god is personalist, but in religious scholarship, he is a metaphysical necessity. People don't go to church for metaphysics, but if you dedicate your entire life to one religion, I suppose it's inevitable that you search for more intellectual justifications. Ironically enough, in doing so they create a deity that nobody would really care about, because it is so detached from their parishoners' beliefs and needs.

Most christian churches continue to parade around these two very different ideas of god. In parishes and in the scripture, god is personalist, but in religious scholarship, he is a metaphysical necessity. People don't go to church for metaphysics, but if you dedicate your entire life to one religion, I suppose it's inevitable that you search for more intellectual justifications. Ironically enough, in doing so they create a deity that nobody would really care about, because it is so detached from their parishoners' beliefs and needs. — finarfin

I think you're dealing in a lot of false dichotomies and historical inaccuracies. In every community there will be more and less rigorous presentations of the life, whether intellectual or otherwise. That doesn't mean, for example, that the intellectual who believes that God is immutable suddenly stops believing that God is personal, nor does it mean that the non-intellectual who believes that God is personal is barred from believing that God is immutable.

Does theological precision come "later" as an "addition"? Yes and no. All natural developments come later, but they are always present in what came before. The myth you are espousing always struggles to identify an actual moment when the "addition" occurred, because there is always an antecedent that the neat theory ignored. Heck, Christians were originally deemed atheists in large part because they had more in common with philosophical groups than ancient religious groups.

Does theological precision come "later" as an "addition"? Yes and no. All natural developments come later, but they are always present in what came before. The myth you are espousing always struggles to identify an actual moment when the "addition" occurred, because there is always an antecedent that the neat theory ignored. — Leontiskos

To choose a single moment of initiation would be reductive. The addition of the metaphysical onto the spiritual was gradual, yet that does not mean that no addition occurred. You can see a marked difference between Jesus' humanistic teachings, first century christian apocalyptics, the discussion of christian doctrines and practices among the church fathers, and the scholasticism of the medieval church which explored metaphysics and the fundamental grounds of monotheism. This culminated with the deistic god of the enlightenment. Similarly, Jewish and Islamic theological scholarship were much later additions to tribal and scriptual origins.

All natural developments come later, but they are always present in what came before. — Leontiskos

Sure, the developments are causally linked as all things are, but that does mean that Scholastical metaphysics were secretly upholding Jesus' teachings in the first century? Probably not. More likely, the Scholastics used their religion as a guide to (or made it the ends of) their philosophy, and from it developed a new orthodoxy.

I think you're dealing in a lot of false dichotomies and historical inaccuracies. In every community there will be more and less rigorous presentations of the life, whether intellectual or otherwise. That doesn't mean, for example, that the intellectual who believes that God is immutable suddenly stops believing that God is personal, nor does it mean that the non-intellectual who believes that God is personal is barred from believing that God is immutable. — Leontiskos

Admittedly, you can believe in both (see the catholic church). However, I think that they have different motivations for their belief. The "god of the parish" addresses the human tendency towards religion (fraternity, moral certainty, explanations and relief, etc.) while the philosophical god was a way to justify that tendency and/or the product of metaphysical investigations. That doesn't discount the philosophical god in any factual way, but it is nevertheless important to acknowledge. After all, even if a deistic god is entirely plausible, it does not mean that the god of the parish is (hence my point that conflating the two might be subconsciously beneficial to organized religion). On its own, a philosophical god would very likely seem soulless to most church goers

By analogical predication, I mean when one predicates a property of a thing by way of an analogy that is in no way meant to be taken as one and the same (viz., univocally) or completely different (viz., equivocally): — Bob Ross

Okay. Interesting article. :up:

I think it is important when specifically speaking of God to use analogical predication; because God's nature is not known to us as He is in Himself but, rather, is known to us by way of analogy to His effects. He is known from what He is not that He produces and not what He is.

God’s true nature is not apparent to us, as it is in-itself, exactly because He is never afforded to our senses (nor could He be) and is always the necessary precondition, as Being itself, for all things sensed. — Bob Ross

Fair enough. That seems like a good account.

(Sorry, I sort of forget where I was going with this. :blush:)

However, this is not incompatible with the ‘strong natural theism’ I expounded: the central thesis merely claims that we can know through reason applied to the natural world around us about God’s nature—it could be equally true that God could expedite the process by just telling us. — Bob Ross

Okay.

I will say that knowing God through reason applied to the ordinary world is stronger and richer than if God were to reveal it to us; because epistemically it would be much less certain with Divine Revelation and it comes with many other disadvantages (such as requiring faith, tradition, etc.) unless we are talking about God supernaturally infusing us with immanent knowledge. — Bob Ross

Sure, and Aquinas would agree that knowledge by sight is more satisfying than knowledge by faith.

Admittedly, you can believe in both (see the catholic church). However, I think that they have different motivations for their belief. The "god of the parish" addresses the human tendency towards religion (fraternity, moral certainty, explanations and relief, etc.) while the philosophical god was a way to justify that tendency and/or the product of metaphysical investigations. That doesn't discount the philosophical god in any factual way, but it is nevertheless important to acknowledge. After all, even if a deistic god is entirely plausible, it does not mean that the god of the parish is (hence my point that conflating the two might be subconsciously beneficial to organized religion). On its own, a philosophical god would very likely seem soulless to most church goers — finarfin

I suppose I would argue that there is a continuum between the two, in much the same way that a child will begin to refine its understanding as it grows and matures. There is a difference between the layman's and the theologian's understanding of God, but I don't see them to be in conflict. I don't see that they believe in two different Gods.

This is an interesting video that touches on many of the themes of the OP: Bishop Robert Barron and Rabbi Meir Soloveichik.

Strong Natural Theism’s central thesis is comprised of two claims: (1) God can be known through the application of reason to empirically demonstrable aspects of the ordinary and natural world, and (2) this knowledge is sufficient for understanding and justifying living a proper and good life. — Bob Ross

The problem with this is is that it is your creation, a god of your creation -- and you know it. How do you respect such a god? How do you trust such a god? How do you fear such a god? What use is such a god or belief in such a god?

:up: I'll take a look.

I didn't create God, baker. You are confusing coming to understand something with creating something.