There's no doubt that "God wanted it to happen" is empty, as it stands. But if our framework is that God controls everything, we can produce different explanations according to what happens. If the coin lands tails and I lose the bet, I can say "God is punishing me for my sins". If the coin lands heads and I win the bet, I can say "God is rewarding me for my virtues". My reason for rejecting these explanations as empty is that neither explanation will stand up to standard scientific experimental scrutiny.That the coin we flip comes up heads is supposedly explained as "the will of God"; but that explanation will work equally well if the coin had come up tails. Regardless of what happens, the explanation is "God caused it to happen that way", and so we never learn why this happened and not that; this is no explanation at all. — Banno
I don't think it is as bad as that. Surely "every event has a cause" is not really an assertion. It is a methodological decision. It is not that we can always identify the cause of an event, but that we will approach every event on the basis that there is a cause to be found. It is a presupposition that the world is not disorderly. If we do not find one, we attribute that to our failure, not the failure of the principle. We would file such a case in the "pending" tray.If presenting a cause is to function as an explanation, it must say why this even happened and not some other event. Saying that "Things/events have causes" is trivial, indeed frivolous. — Banno
See the summary I provided above for Moliere. — Count Timothy von Icarus
It seems to me that "neither provable nor disprovable" is the beginning of the story, rather than the end. I mean that proof of the kind we require for specific causal explanations is inapplicable. The proposition is not in the business of asserting truths, but of articulating the conceptual structure in which specific causal connections are discovered and asserted. If you are looking for some sort of justification, that lies in the success of our attempts to find causes - and more than that, our determination to find what order we can in the world, so that when full causal explanations are not available, we wring from the data whatever order we can. So we switch models and go for statistical explanations."Every event has a cause" is one of Watkins' "haunted universes" doctrines, neither provable nor disprovable. — Banno
There is a reservation here, because statistical laws don't really predict anything about individual cases. I've never quite worked out what probability statements say about them. It certainly isn't what I would call a prediction. However, they do come in very handy when it is a case of making decisions in a risk/reward context. Betting may be a bit iffy, but insurance is perfectly rational.Science doesn't look to causes so much as to predictability. — Banno
I hadn't thought that the move to equations amounted to actually abandoning causal explanations. But I can see that it is a very different model from the Aristotelian model.It's not about event A causing event B but about the relation between a's and B's, especially when that relation is expressed in an equation. — Banno
@Ludwig V It could be the case that the CONCEPT of Causation is still useful and practical to actually figure out what those relations are or how important/significant they are. In the modern age we've seemingly, as has been made clear too many times with recent posts, made the case that realism/anti-realism distinction has sort of killed itself. Becoming too speculative or un-interesting (forms of instrumentalism or philosophical quietism). HOWEVER, the new era and REINCARNATION of this debate is upon us. . . if we no longer feel its necessary for science to make clear or obvious what its realist about and we feel its irrelevant then it becomes a competition of METHODOLOGIES.Science doesn't look to causes so much as to predictability. It's not about event A causing event B but about the relation between a's and B's, especially when that relation is expressed in an equation. — Banno
I wasn't so much thinking of statistical laws as the basic equations of physics....statistical laws... — Ludwig V
Yep.But I can see that it is a very different model from the Aristotelian model. — Ludwig V
Yes, I get that point. Are you saying that we should stop talking about causes altogether, or that we need to re-think the concept of causation?Some folk tend to think of F=ma as setting out how the force causes the acceleration. — Banno
Setting aside the local issue about God, I understand you to be saying that underdetermination is the space for research and discovery, rather than a prison of doubt and uncertainty. Is that fair?That underdetermination stuff is a feature, not a problem. It's about being unhappy with a determinate causal answer such as "God willed it" and looking for more, doing the experiments, using your imagination, seeing what happens when you do this or that... — Banno
I would be inclined to agree with you. But then I find that it is still alive and kicking.we've seemingly, as has been made clear too many times with recent posts, made the case that realism/anti-realism distinction has sort of killed itself. — substantivalism
If you want to argue with someone, it is best to start from where they are at.You can still play a make-believe game of REALISM if it. . . to you. . . feels more intellectually useful in deriving the results you desire for whatever means. — substantivalism
Too right. That creates an interesting, and difficult, field of understanding what's really going on.BECAUSE THESE DEBATES DO NOT DIE and they probably just transfer themselves to the new popular domain of philosophical discussion — substantivalism
I'd favour the more humble point, that cause is overrated if it is considered to be the only, or even the most important, explanation. When causation is master, non- causal explanations are forced into casual form, as when ethics is seen as mere biology, or maths aw psychology; Non-causal structures and patterns are missed; or worst case, folk mistake the absence of a causal explanation for the absence of any explanation at all.Are you saying that we should stop talking about causes altogether, or that we need to re-think the concept of causation? — Ludwig V
Yep. That willingness to live with and investigate the precariousness inherent in the absence of deductive certainty is more than just science; it's the human condition" "I don't know, buy I'll take a look"...underdetermination is the space for research and discovery — Ludwig V
OK. It's just that causal explanation, along with the metaphor of the machine, has been such an icon of what science is about that I find it hard to grasp the alternatives (apart from statistical explanations).I'd favour the more humble point, that cause is overrated if it is considered to be the only, or even the most important, explanation. — Banno
That sounds good. Actually, there are reasons for thinking that deductive certainty is not all that it is cracked up to be.That willingness to live with and investigate the precariousness inherent in the absence of deductive certainty is more than just science; it's the human condition — Banno
Oh, yes. But when one looks closely, it turns out to be difficult to say what sort of thing a cause is, and to describe actual science in causal terms. Like the scientific method, we know what it is until we try to say how it works.an icon of what science is about — Ludwig V
Yep. TheOP's framework assumes that genuine explanation must bottom out in metaphysical causes. But this misses how much successful science operates at other explanatory levels entirely.there are reasons for thinking that deductive certainty is not all that it is cracked up to be. — Ludwig V
OK. It's just that causal explanation, along with the metaphor of the machine, has been such an icon of what science is about that I find it hard to grasp the alternatives (apart from statistical explanations). — Ludwig V
That seems right. — Janus
Added: links and citations are conducive to clarity. It might be helpful if you did not remove them
That underdetermination stuff is a feature, not a problem. It's about being unhappy with a determinate causal answer such as "God willed it" and looking for more, doing the experiments, using your imagination, seeing what happens when you do this or that..
OK. It's just that causal explanation, along with the metaphor of the machine, has been such an icon of what science is about that I find it hard to grasp the alternatives (apart from statistical explanations).
I'm not sure whether you mean the Aristotelian solution or the Neoplatonist one. Either way, I don't think we can assume that we can lift one part of a coherent system of thought and make it work in our context. More than that, there are, in my book, two versions of empiricism. One of them has been popular in philosophy and leads to the empiricism of appearances, ideas or sense-data. The other is mostly unspoken but is the foundation of science; this version understands experience in a common-sense way and doesn't posit theoretical objects that boast of being irrefutable and turn out to prevent us from understanding the stars or anything else.I do think that solution is better, but the point isn't to highlight that specific solution, but rather the genealogy of the "problem" and how it arises as a means of elucidating ways it might be resolved or else simply understanding it better." — Count Timothy von Icarus
A fair point. It looks as if we need to be a bit careful what we take from those times if we want to avoid the same sceptical conclusions.Thus, we should not be surprised that borrowing their epistemology leads to skeptical conclusions. — Count Timothy von Icarus
More than that, there are, in my book, two versions of empiricism. One of them has been popular in philosophy and leads to the empiricism of appearances, ideas or sense-data. The other is mostly unspoken but is the foundation of science; this version understands experience in a common-sense way and doesn't posit theoretical objects that boast of being irrefutable and turn out to prevent us from understanding the stars or anything else.
Yes. It is odd that those theories are often classified as idealist.But I think this leads to an unfortunate and common conflation where the second sort of "empiricism" is appealed to in order to justify the first sort, such that all scientific progress is called on as evidence for the superiority of the first sort of empiricism, and a rejection of empiricism is said to be a rejection of science. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I can see your point. But it's only an over-view. It needs a slightly more detailed argument.Yet to my point in the OP, if our epistemology leads us to this—to dismiss claims as seemingly obvious as "it is bad to have my arm broken," or "it is bad for children to be poisoned at school" as lacking any epistemic grounding (i.e., not possibly being facts)—then I'd say this is an indication that we simply have a bad epistemology. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Oh, I think that Hume's argument is a bit better than that. There is some value to recognizing that statements of value (evaluations) are not in the same logical category as statements of fact.I think this is especially actue in metaethics, where empiricsts epistemic presuppositions essentially amount to metaphysical presuppositions. "Examine the sense data; there are no values (or universals, or facts about meaning, etc.) to be found." — Count Timothy von Icarus
The problem is that if one gives up using all those terms, and tries to concentrate on the issues rather than the labels, other people will pin them on us according to their needs.The same sort of thing that happens with "empiricism" happens with "naturalism." Both have been equated with accepting or rejecting science to such a degree that virtually no one says that they aren't an naturalist. Yet this just leads to a huge amount of equivocation, where "naturalism" can be either extremely expensive, or "only reductive, mechanistic materialism." I think it is, in general, an increasingly useless term. — Count Timothy von Icarus
You said, "I know X is not a statement of belief". Well, it IS a statement of belief in standard philosophical discourse. — Relativist
We're still dealing with beliefs — Relativist
Our colloquial way of speaking is vague, and implies distinctions that are not real. An opinion is a belief. — Relativist
A TRUTH is a statement that corresponds to some aspect of reality. Of course there are truths. Truth is what we all want to have in our possession. The issue is: how do we assess whether of not some statement is true? A justification is a reason to believe the statement is true. Some justifications are better than others. If it's derived from deductive reasoning, you're on very solid ground (although you're still dependent on the premises being true). The point I've been making is that we rarely use deduction; more often we use abduction - it's an imperfect guide to truth, but it's usually the best we can do. — Relativist
There is some value to recognizing that statements of value (evaluations) are not in the same logical category as statements of fact. — Ludwig V
Descriptive Claims: How the World Is
Descriptive claims make statements about how the world is. They describe the facts of something, what you observe to be the case without any form of evaluation or judgment. For example, “the weather today is sunny” is a descriptive claim because it simply describes what someone observes.
Evaluative Claims: How the World Ought to Be
Evaluative claims make statements about how the world ought to be. They express judgments of value: what is good, just, fair, beautiful, healthy, important, etc. Instead of simply describing, evaluative claims interpret facts or assert what should be the case.
https://openstax.org/books/introduction-philosophy/pages/8-1-the-fact-value-distinction#:~:text=Instead%20of%20simply%20describing%2C%20evaluative,sunshine%E2%80%9D%20is%20an%20evaluative%20claim.
It's easy to see how the two often become mixed together though. I think this is especially actue in metaethics, where empiricsts epistemic presuppositions essentially amount to metaphysical presuppositions. "Examine the sense data; there are no values (or universals, or facts about meaning, etc.) to be found." — Count Timothy von Icarus
When we are talking about knowledge we are not really dealing with beliefs. — Leontiskos
You're wrong - in terms of standard philosophical discourse. I provided the definition from the Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy that categorically states that knowledge is belief (belief that is adequately justified and true). Here's another source:I don't think so, because it is a statement of knowledge, and knowledge is not belief. — Leontiskos
I'll give two examples:If you think there are truths then can you give an example of a truth? — Leontiskos
I provided the definition from the Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy that categorically states that knowledge is belief — Relativist
(belief that is adequately justified and true) — Relativist
I'll give two examples:
I. :My name is Fred.
I believe this to be true, and I have strong justification to believe it (it's the name on my birth certificate, the name my friends and family have always called me, and the first name on a variety of legal documents). — Relativist
Yes, it did. Let me be clear: the sources did not say (nor did I claim) that all beliefs are knowledge. Rather, both sources are saying that knowledge constitutes a a subset of ones beliefs. I'll also clarify that we're discussing propositional beliefs/knowledge.No, your source did not say that knowledge is belief. Go back and have another look. — Leontiskos
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