2. Not actually possible. If Kant is so complex, and I can find several notable and respectable writers who take the position I'm putting forward, you can't make this claim. Its exactly the same as I'm objecting to above. It is a standard response which is not actually capable of being made on the writings Kant left. The interpretive process gets us here, fairly squarely. — AmadeusD

Show me in the text where Kant says noumena is physical. You cannot. End of story.

Henry Allison: Takes the dual-aspect argument on and imo compellingly.
P.F Strawson makes similar comments in Bounds of Sense
Lucy Alais doesn't commit, but is heading in this direction, from what I've read (but that could turn out to be embarrassingly unhelpful)
Schulting seems to presuppose the noumena as physical
the SEP on Qualified Phenomenalism seems to also support this, or at least run over why its reasonable. — AmadeusD

I imagine out of all of these SEP might hint at such. I doubt very much any other states noumena is physical. you are jus trawling for secondary commentaries for evidence instead of presenting primary source quotes ... which makes me wonder if you have actually read COPR? Many people pose as if they have when it fact they simply did a course on it and were spoon fed information via a secondary source. Perfectly understandable as not everyone has the tiem or inclination to sift through such a dense volume.

It's not a blindness but a sensible intellectual humility. All we know is this world. We can have no way of knowing if there is more. I think your assertion that most of the population think this world is all there is unsupported by the data: It is estimated that more than 85 percent of the global population identifies with a religious group.

I'd say those who want to believe in something that cannot be known to be true are the ones wearing blinkers. — Janus

You think the Kant's description of the unknowability of the in itself is a religious dogma, because you don't understand it. You think he's projecting an unknowable something. Meanwhile, 'the world', which you so confidently proclaim our knowledge of, is itself not the knowable, familiar and determinate realm which you so casually believe it to be. So you categorise this kind of argument, and that of the original post, as being kind of religious, which is why you think them dogmatic. It's just completely transparent, and it's the opposite of intellectual humility.

What's your point here? — Metaphysician Undercover

Ohfercrissakes. Obviously, my point is your thumb will be just as wounded by a mis-directed “faulty idea” as mine is by a hammer.

And for truth accurate representation is necessary….. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wonderful. Be sure and let me know when, or if, you happen upon an accurate representation. That to which you compare the one you have, to another you don’t, from which the necessarily deficient quality of yours is determinable….well, good luck with that, I say.

Now, you might say the comparison is always just between your own representations, a succession predicated on changes in experience, which, ironically enough, is precisely what every cave-dweller since Day One, has done. But there is never in the manifold of successive changes in your own representations the implication of the unconditioned, that from which no further change is possible and from which the only logical notion of an accurate representation, is given.

Which leaves you with….(sigh)…..only those that don’t contradict each other, and from which it is clear the form of truth, that in a cognition which conforms to is object, already manifests an accurate representation, and justifies logic as the necessary criteria for the form any truth must exhibit.
————-

To find truth we must exceed empirical knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

Given as established the conditio sine qua non form of truth, that in a cognition which conforms to its object, and the impossibility of exceeding empirical knowledge with respect to experience of the objects contained in those cognitions, which is always that to which the form of truth relates, it follows there is no universal criteria for the fact of truth available to the human being.

There may be considered sufficient reason to exceed empirical knowledge insofar as the empirical knowledge we have does not afford us truth as such. But considering sufficient reason for an impossibility, is incomprehensible.

But it’s more complicated than that... — Punshhh

Yes, i think it's very complicated, and the trend for us is to simplify. We even have evolved in a way which has us sensing a very small bit of reality. So it is intuitive for us, as built into the fabric of our very existence, to simplify things. Consider for example, that our eyes are only sensitive to a small portion of the electromagnetic wavelengths, one octave so to speak. We've simply evolved in a way to focus on a very small, but very relevant part of reality.

The simplification helps to keep us focused directly on what is important and purposeful to our little corner of being, but it misleads us into thinking that this is representative of "the universe" as a whole. Ontologies like monism are an extension of this misleading trend toward oversimplification.

As for the “activity of something else”, presumably we are talking of distant, or large objects, acting as poles. As in electrical, or magnetic poles? — Punshhh

Not necessarily distant or large. If for example, we understand electromagnetism as waves, then there must be substance which the waves are active in (common called aether). That is simply the nature of a wave, it is the activity of the particles of an underlying substance. In our trend to simplify things, it seems like we overlook this need for an underlying substance which is active as waves, in our representations of electromagnetism. But then we end up with a wave function, or something like that, which accounts for the energy of the waves in their capacity to interact with assumed particles of matter, without providing any real representation of the waves.

The issue of poles is a further problem which I don't think can even be approached without a true representation of the waves. To look for the poles without first representing the waves would be like looking for a cause without first knowing the effect which you are looking for the cause of.

Ohfercrissakes. Obviously, my point is your thumb will be just as wounded by a mis-directed “faulty idea” as mine is by a hammer. — Mww

Sorry Mww, but I still don't get it. Whether or not a person understands how one received a wound, or even what it means to be wounded, is irrelevant to the feeling of being wounded. It seems like you are trying to say that fi one doesn't know how they got wounded, then they cannot feel the wound. If that is your point, then it's not valid.

well, good luck with that, I say. — Mww

Thank you, as you seem to understand, we need as much luck as we can possibly get, with this endeavour.

Now, you might say the comparison is always just between your own representations, a succession predicated on changes in experience, which, ironically enough, is precisely what every cave-dweller since Day One, has done. But there is never in the manifold of successive changes in your own representations the implication of the unconditioned, that from which no further change is possible and from which the only logical notion of an accurate representation, is given. — Mww

You seem to be saying that the process would go on forever, infinitely. I disagree, I think there would be an end to it. Whether the end comes in a good way or a bad way is another question, but I think the good way would be better than the bad way.

Which leaves you with….(sigh)…..only those that don’t contradict each other, and from which it is clear the form of truth, that in a cognition which conforms to is object, already manifests an accurate representation, and justifies logic as the necessary criteria for the form any truth must exhibit. — Mww

You are completely neglecting the reality of possibilities, and our inclination to judge some possible outcomes as better than others. It is not contradiction, or lack of it, which forms the basis, or grounding of our judgements, it is better and worse, good and bad, which provides that base. And these have a view toward the future, rather than the view toward the past which empirical representation has. Therefore real truth is grounded in the principles by which we judge goodness, as the basic form of all judgement.

Given as established the conditio sine qua non form of truth, that in a cognition which conforms to its object, and the impossibility of exceeding empirical knowledge with respect to experience of the objects contained in those cognitions, which is always that to which the form of truth relates, it follows there is no universal criteria for the fact of truth available to the human being. — Mww

Do you recognize two very distinct meanings of "object"? One is a physical thing, an object of sensation, empirical knowledge. The other is a goal, or end, the good. Since the physical object of empirical knowledge is demonstrably a faulty concept, produced by the deceptive nature of the senses, then we must consider that the true "object" is the goal or end, the good. Therefore "the form of truth" relates to the good, as the true object, the goal for the future, and not to the false "object" which is the object of empirical knowledge. The "object", as the goal, or end, the good, cannot be known by empirical knowledge, and this is why we must exceed empirical knowledge for real truth, to understand the real object, as the good. That is the principle of the is/ought divide.

There may be considered sufficient reason to exceed empirical knowledge insofar as the empirical knowledge we have does not afford us truth as such. But considering sufficient reason for an impossibility, is incomprehensible. — Mww

Do you classify knowing the good as impossible?

I looked through what I could find of Henry Allison's writings, and he promotes a view of 'transcendental idealism' over against the view of 'transcendental realism' that he attributes to P.F. Strawson. I cannot copy and paste from the preview but here a link to Allison's book: Kant's Transcendental Idealism.

The Preface orients the distinction in the context of the CPR. Chapter 1 introduces sharp critics of transcendental idealism on page 4 and introduces P.F. Strawson as the champion of those views on page 5. The two thinkers are diametrically opposed in this debate concerning 'things-in-themselves.'

In the Cambridge edition of CPR, Strawson is cited in an editors' footnote for the following text:

Elucidation.
Against this theory, which concedes empirical reality to time but dis-
putes its absolute and transcendental reality, insightful men have so
unanimously proposed one objection that I conclude that it must natu-
rally occur to every reader who is not accustomed to these considera-
tions.20 It goes thus: Alterations are real (this is proved by the change of
our own representations, even if one would deny all outer appearances
together with their alterations). Now alterations are possible only in
time, therefore time is something real. There is no difficulty in answer-
ing. I admit the entire argument. Time is certainly something real/
namely the real form of inner intuition. It therefore has subjective real-
ity in regard to inner experience, i.e., I really have the representation of
time and of my determinations in it. It is therefore to be regarded re-
ally not as object but as the way of representing myself as object But
if I or another being could intuit myself without this condition of sen-
sibility, then these very determinations, which we now represent to our-
selves as alterations, would yield us a cognition in which the represen-
tation of time and thus also of alteration would not occur at all. Its
empirical reality therefore remains as a condition of all our experiences.
Only absolute reality cannot be granted to it according to what has been
adduced above. It is nothing except the form of our inner intuition. * If
one removes the special condition of our sensibility from it, then the
concept of time also disappears, and it does not adhere to the objects
themselves, rather merely to the subject that intuits them.
The cause, however, on account of which this objection is so unani-
mously made, and indeed by those who nevertheless know of nothing
convincing to object against the doctrine of the ideality of space, is
this. They did not expect to be able to demonstrate the absolute reality
of space apodictically, since they were confronted by idealism, accord-
ing to which the reality of outer objects is not capable of any strict proof;
on the contrary, the reality of the object of our inner sense (of myself
and my state) is immediately clear through consciousness. The former
could have been a mere illusion, but the latter, according to their opin-
ion, is undeniably something real. But they did not consider that both,
without their reality as representations being disputed, nevertheless be
long only to appearance, which always has two sides, one where the ob-
ject is considered in itself (without regard to the way in which it is to be
intuited, the constitution of which however must for that very reason al
ways remain problematic), the other where the form of the intuition of
this object is considered, which must not be sought in the object in it
self but in the subject to which it appears, but which nevertheless really
and necessarily pertains to the representation of this object.

[Kant's footnote at "It is nothing except the form of our inner intuition. * is as follows]

I can, to be sure, say: my representations succeed one another; but that only
means that we are conscious of them as in a temporal sequence, i.e., accord
ing to the form of inner sense. Time is not on that account something in it
self, nor any determination objectively adhering to things.

[Kant's note on the manuscript is as follows]

"Space and time are not merely logical
forms of our sensibility, i.e., they do not consist in the fact that we represent actual re-
lations to ourselves confusedly; for then how could we derive from them a priori syn
thetic and true propositions? We do not intuit space, but in a confused manner; rather
it is the form of our intuition. Sensibility is not confusion of representations, but the
subjective condition of consciousness." — CPR A36/B53

The editors' footnote #20 says (in part):

Kant refers here to objections that had been brought against his inaugural
dissertation by two of the most important philosophers of the period,
Johann Heinrich Lambert and Moses Mendelssohn, as well as by the then
well-known aesthetician and member of the Berlin Academy of Sciences,
Johann Georg Sulzer. Lambert objected that even though Kant was correct
to maintain that "Time is indisputably a conditio sine qua non of all of our
representations of objects, it does not follow from this that time is unreal,
for "If alterations are real then time is also real, whatever it might be" (letter
61 to Kant, of 18 October 1770, 10:103-11, at 106-7). Mendelssohn also
wrote that he could not convince himself that time is "something merely
subjective," for "Succession is at least a necessary condition of the repre-
sentations of finite spirits. Now finite spirits are not only subjects, but also
objects of representations, those of both God and their fellow spirits.
Hence the sequence [of representations] on one another is also to be re-
garded as something objective" (letter 63 to Kant, of 25 December 1770,
10:113-16, at 1I5). (The objection that time cannot be denied to be real
just because it is a necessary property of our representations, since our rep
resentations themselves are real, has continued to be pressed against Kant;
see, for instance, P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense [London: Methuen,
1966], pp. 39 and 54.) — CPR page 721

Strawson appears to hold the criteria of mind-independence as the last word on objectivity. Allison defends Kant's argument that the subjective condition is integral with the real.

The simplification helps to keep us focused directly on what is important and purposeful to our little corner of being, but it misleads us into thinking that this is representative of "the universe" as a whole. Ontologies like monism are an extension of this misleading trend toward oversimplification.

Do you realise that you have just said that we know nothing, in particular. Well apart from what we have evolved to deal with.
I would go further and state that we cannot say anything positive, or negative about anything other than our world (except through revelation), welcome to the ranks of mysticism.

Regarding the poles, I would refer one to the myth of Ishvara (there are differing interpretations within Hinduism). I liken it to a divine being, spinning the world from her fingertips.

Or the first verse of the bible;

In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. 2 Now the earth was formless and empty, darkness was over the surface of the deep, and the Spirit of God was hovering over the waters.

In both cases the deity whispers, blows, or spins the vibrations, or waves of form and diversity onto/into a ground, a field of potentially.

I won't get into the technicalities here - they don't fascinate me, with some exceptions of course. But I think looking at Lucy Allais' Manifest Reality is very comprehensive for Kant. She also analyzes people like Allison and Peter Strawson, many others.

Do you know of a portion of Allais that suggests I have mischaracterized the debate between Allison and Strawson?
I have been checking out secondary sources as they are appealed to by interlocutors. But I also have been trying to respond to them in the context of specific interpretations of the primary text such as those put forward by AmadeusD and Wayfarer.

You think the Kant's description of the unknowability of the in itself is a religious dogma, because you don't understand it. — Wayfarer

What a ridiculous statement―I never claimed it was a religious dogma.. The in itself is unknowable by mere definition/ stipulation―the in itself is also just another human idea. We see things as they appear to us, and we have a natural tendency to want to know of those things what the fundamental nature or existence independent of their appearances to us is, and we recognize that it is impossible to know that―we might even say that since it is impossible the very idea is irrelevant or even a nonsense.

It is also true that we can speculate about what seems to be the possible alternatives, and we can consider whether it seems more plausible to think that our cognition of things gives us some knowledge of them or not.

It is also a ridiculously presumptuous and petulant statement―as usual you claim that anyone who has a different take than you must therefore not understand.

Meanwhile, 'the world', which you so confidently proclaim our knowledge of, is itself not the knowable, familiar and determinate realm which you so casually believe it to be. — Wayfarer

Human knowledge of this world as it appears to be is vast and comprehensive. Can you cite even one piece of knowledge which is not of, about, or dependent upon this world of human experience?

I don't expect you to answer of course, because you apparently don't think it necessary to answer questions that present difficulties your dogma cannot handle.

I never claimed it was a religious dogma — Janus

Your own words:

It's not a blindness but a sensible intellectual humility. All we know is this world. We can have no way of knowing if there is more. I think your assertion that most of the population think this world is all there is unsupported by the data: It is estimated that more than 85 percent of the global population identifies with a religious group.

I'd say those who want to believe in something that cannot be known to be true are the ones wearing blinkers. They see only through their own confirmation bias. I have no problem with people believing whatever they like provided they can be honest that it is all about faith, not knowledge — Janus

Here, you are directly equating the argument in the original post with religious dogma - and now, you're denying you said it. Just as you constantly appeal to positivism, and then deny you're doing so. Doesn't warrant any further response.

You think the Kant's description of the unknowability of the in itself is a religious dogma, because you don't understand it. — Wayfarer

There is nothing in the quoted passage there about Kant's description of the unknowability of the in itself being religious dogma. I haven't even used the words "religious dogma" there at all. What I have implied is that claiming what is accepted on faith is knowledge is to be asserting some religious dogma.

Meanwhile, 'the world', which you so confidently proclaim our knowledge of, is itself not the knowable, familiar and determinate realm which you so casually believe it to be.
— Wayfarer

Human knowledge of this world as it appears to be is vast and comprehensive. Can you cite even one piece of knowledge which is not of, about, or dependent upon this world of human experience? — Janus

Meanwhile, as expected, you make no attempt to address my refutation of your ridiculous and obviously false claim that we don't know much of and about the world. You make a lot of claims, but when they are challenged you deflect and hide behind strawmen.

You know, it's not a matter of "I'm right and you're wrong", but of "I think this" and "Oh, I disagree with that because..." You seem to think that your perspective is unimpeachably correct and that the reason people disagree is because they are mired in a kind of modernist forgetting of truths know to the ancients. Such a claim is unsupported, hopelessly underdetermined, that's why I don't share that view. You cannot even be confident that you really understand what the ancients thought, since you don't read ancient languages and you rely on translators, who each have their own take on ancient thought.

So, I don't say you are so much wrong as you are spinning a story that suits your wishes as to how the world should be. You are basically a dogmatic proselytizer.

I think you did fine. The bit I understand of what you put forth makes sense.

But Kantian scholarship isn't something I'm an expert in; I suggested Allais because she covers almost all of them.

So, no interpretative issue arises that I can see here.

Do you realise that you have just said that we know nothing, in particular. Well apart from what we have evolved to deal with. — Punshhh

This really depends on how you would define "know". Unlike some epistemologists, I don't think that truth is a requirement for "knowledge". Plato, in The Theaetetus, demonstrated that we cannot actually ensure truth, so a determination of truth is not necessary for us to call some information "knowledge". So I'm not saying that we know nothing, I'm saying that truth isn't really part of our knowledge.

I would go further and state that we cannot say anything positive, or negative about anything other than our world (except through revelation), welcome to the ranks of mysticism — Punshhh

I tend to enjoy your mystic perspective.

+1 :up:

Truth is a moveable feast, ;-)

This really depends on how you would define "know". Unlike some epistemologists, I don't think that truth is a requirement for "knowledge". Plato, in The Theaetetus, demonstrated that we cannot actually ensure truth, so a determination of truth is not necessary for us to call some information "knowledge". So I'm not saying that we know nothing, I'm saying that truth isn't really part of our knowledge.

Yes, and there are different kinds of knowledge. Something that interests me is knowledge acquired through the witnessing of events. This doesn’t require learning, or understanding, just observation, or presence. I can remember and visualise clearly, in memory, events that happened 30 years ago. In which I witnessed something unexplainable, something which defies credulity and which has broad ranging implications for how I think about the world and reality. And yet at the time, it was just something I noticed, experienced, for a split second. Something that happened so quickly and was over before I could react. I could have just carried on, walked past and not given it another thought. But my enquiring mind and curiosity latched onto it instantly and it is still with me now as though it happened yesterday.

This experience is logged in me along with many others like a film archive, of curious observation’s and form an important part of my knowledge.

I read an analogy, recently - imagine you’re one of millions of displaced people after a war. You find a large bulletin board in the city you used to live in, with photographs of faces on it. One of them is your mother. You know this with complete certainty - but in the circumstances, with all of the civilian bureaucracies destroyed, no records anywhere - you can’t prove it.

Yes, reminds me of realisations about separateness. If only I could go back to that point in my memory. What I would do, or say differently if I could. If I could only step back those thirty years, what I would do. Or people who I have lost touch with, who I would dearly like to contact and yet I know that they too are present now in this moment. Just somewhere else. These separations are also there for knowledge, experience. In a sense, they define us.

I still don't get it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, my fault, being facetious. I’m just having trouble understanding how anyone could feel physical pain from a “faulty idea”. You said objects were, or might be, just faulty ideas, a hammer, being an object represented by that conception, would fit the bill.

I started out by saying, you hit my thumb with a faulty idea and I’ll hit yours with a hammer, but it got lost in the shuffle somehow.

Anyway….
—————-

You seem to be saying that the process would go on forever — Metaphysician Undercover

In the search for accurate representation, if not for the LNC, what other way is there to judge the relation between the object we perceive and the object we think? If logic doesn’t end the search, insofar as all relations are determinable by it, it stands to reason the search for a relation wouldn’t end. But it always does, either in the affirmation or negation thereof, so the logic would seem to be both necessary and sufficient.

Do you recognize two very distinct meanings of "object"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Doesn’t everyone with even an inkling of philosophical inclination? A thing is always an object but an object is not always a thing.

Since the physical object of empirical knowledge is demonstrably a faulty concept, produced by the deceptive nature of the senses… — Metaphysician Undercover

There’s that faulty idea thing again. Ya know, right, the senses don’t describe? The only “nature” attributable to the senses would be to inform of a real presence, nothing more or less.

Furthermore, empirical knowledge is not of a physical object, but the representation of it, and the senses have nothing to do with representations, being merely the occasion for the possibility of them.
—————-

Do you classify knowing the good as impossible? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. The good isn’t something to know; it is something to feel. That by which one feels anything is reducible to an aesthetic judgement, that by which he knows something is reducible to a discursive judgement. The formal ground of the one is pure practical reason, of the other is pure theoretical reason.

Last but not least, that by which one merely comprehends the possibility of knowledge, is pure speculative reason, upon which is constructed the transcendental philosophy of German Enlightenment idealism.

Something that interests me is knowledge acquired through the witnessing of events. — Punshhh

I believe it is important to the topic of this thread, to understand how intention guides attention, and knowledge is dependent on attention. So 'the created world' is a product of 'what we pay attention to', and 'what we pay attention to' is guided by our intention.

I can remember and visualise clearly, in memory, events that happened 30 years ago. In which I witnessed something unexplainable, something which defies credulity and which has broad ranging implications for how I think about the world and reality. And yet at the time, it was just something I noticed, experienced, for a split second. Something that happened so quickly and was over before I could react. I could have just carried on, walked past and not given it another thought. — Punshhh

I find it very interesting how different people will remember the very same event in completely different ways. So you might say, something incredulous happened, but someone else in the same area might just notice a mundane occurrence.

But my enquiring mind and curiosity latched onto it instantly and it is still with me now as though it happened yesterday. — Punshhh

In Plato's Theatetus, and Meno, Socrates said that curiosity, or wonder, is the source of philosophy. Being amazed is what inspires inquiry. Those who simply take things for granted do not notice all the potential sources of amazement, and do not aspire to philosophy.

Yeah, my fault, being facetious. I’m just having trouble understanding how anyone could feel physical pain from a “faulty idea”. You said objects were, or might be, just faulty ideas, a hammer, being an object represented by that conception, would fit the bill. — Mww

OK, I see what you are saying, and it exposes a misunderstanding of what I said, which I didn't notice before. Let me try again.

The idea of "objects" is a faulty idea. That you pick up a thing called a hammer, and start banging at things called nails, is a misconception, a faulty representation of the reality of the situation. It is just conception and perception which is supported facility and efficiency. It is very easy to understand reality in this way. To have objects which we name and talk about facilitates communication, and easy knowledge. However, sciences like chemistry and physics, prove to us that reality is actually completely different from this conception/perception representation. Activity is not at all as we represent it, as picking up objects called a hammer and nails, and hitting one object with another. That's a vastly oversimplified representation of what is actually going on, and really a faulty representation.

Why your pain reference is irrelevant, is that a person will feel pain after making the mistake which you describe as hitting one's thumb with a hammer, regardless of whether this description, "hitting one's thumb with a hammer", is an accurate description of what really happens, or not.

In the search for accurate representation, if not for the LNC, what other way is there to judge the relation between the object we perceive and the object we think? If logic doesn’t end the search, insofar all relations are determinable by it, it stands to reason the search for a relation wouldn’t end. But it always does, either in the affirmation or negation thereof, so the logic would seem to be working. — Mww

The LNC does not apply to the good of intention. This is why goods are often said to be subjective, different people can have contradicting goals, or goods. Even the same person will sometimes have conflicting goals. That is what makes deliberation necessary.

The "object we think" is created through the guidance of intention. As explained above, intention guides attention, which induces observation. The "object we perceive" as the result of observation, is therefore a product of intention. Since intention is the guiding factor, in the relation between the object we think and the object we perceive, and the LNC does not apply to intention, then LNC based logic is not what is required to end the search for understanding this relation. We must consider the type of logic by which we deliberate, and judge goods. This is a logic of priority and hierarchy, where things exist in a relation of order, rather than a logic of this or that.

There’s that faulty idea thing again. — Mww

Science demonstrates very clearly, that the conceptual structure based in objects of substance, physical objects, moving and interacting in space, is insufficient, and cannot adequately represent the reality of activity. This implies that it is a faulty idea. Please accept this as reality, instead of referring to mundane experiences in an attempt to make fun of the reality of the situation.

Furthermore, empirical knowledge is not of a physical object, but the representation of it, and the senses have nothing to do with representations, being merely the occasion for the possibility of them. — Mww

Right, with this understanding you ought to be in a very good position to be capable of simply rejecting this representation, that of "empirical knowledge". This representation has demonstrated to us that it has reached its limits of efficacy, and at that point it has shown itself, proved to us, that it itself, is based in faulty ideas. Therefore we need to start all over, from the bottom up, with something more reasonable as the foundation.

Yes. The good isn’t something to know; it is something to feel. That by which one feels anything is reducible to an aesthetic judgement, that by which he knows something is reducible to a discursive judgement. The formal ground of the one is pure practical reason, of the other is pure theoretical reason. — Mww

OK, now since the two, practical reason and theoretical reason, may contradict, and this will inevitably call into question the applicability of the LNC, we need to be able to hand priority to one or the other. Would you not agree, that "that by which one feels anything" is necessarily prior to 'that by which he knows something"? This puts practical reason as the higher, more conclusive form of judgement.

Kant supports this as well. The a priori intuitions of space and time, as the conditions of sensibility, are "that by which one feels something". Since these intuitions form the basis for theoretical reason, we must conclude that this type of judgement, practical reason, is a higher form of judgement.

Last but not least, that by which one merely comprehends the possibility of knowledge, is pure speculative reason, upon which is constructed the transcendental philosophy of German Enlightenment idealism. — Mww

The category of "speculative reason" is completely unnecessary, created and referred to, as a distraction. Rather than accepting the reality that practical reason is higher than theoretical reason, and that theoretical reason is subordinate to it, another category, speculative reason, is proposed as higher than the two. However, when we recognize the reality that practical reason is actually higher than theoretical reason, and that practical reason is by its very nature speculative, then there is no need for that further category.

I find it very interesting how different people will remember the very same event in completely different ways. So you might say, something incredulous happened, but someone else in the same area might just notice a mundane occurrence.

Let me describe the event (that happened 30yrs ago), because there we two people who experienced it and it involved an exchange of glances between another person and myself and in some ways the setting was not the main event. It was the meeting of minds.

I was at the New Years Eve rave at Anjuna beach, Goa in 1995/6. There was a dense throng of dancers in a dense area about the size of a tennis court. I had been observing the dancing, the music and how it affected the people and how the crowd would become one. There was a kind of churning of energy following the music, the people would move with the churning as a flock of birds, or shoal of fishes. With the highlight being when someone would blow a whistle. Needless to say, I found this fascinating and was contemplating the spiritual dimension. When all of a sudden the throng parted by chance, a wall of about twenty, or more deep of dancers simultaneously all moved in such a way that a clear passage opened up in the throng. I saw at the other end of this passage, a small chap who was all grey, drained and exhausted, he looked as though he was struggling to stay on his feet and wanted out. I just looked on astonished, like a rabbit caught in headlights. He suddenly noticed me and our gaze met. I could see his desperation and his heartfelt plea for me to release him. He reached out his hand and I failed to respond. Although there was nothing I could do. The wall of people closed in on him again in an instant and I realised there would be no way I would be able to go in there and pull him out. I just carried on my way, contemplating what had just happened.

There was a visceral exchange between us, an acknowledgment and an understanding, the whole thing lasted for about a second, although it felt more like about ten seconds. I often wonder just what happened there in that moment. Although it wasn’t an isolated incident, lots of other interesting things happened around that time.

But going back to my point about being a witness, I am sure that for the other person along with myself, the encounter was burned into our minds and I know I certainly had a profound sense of every detail of it. There was knowledge given to me absent a thinking mind, instantaneous and unforgettable.

However, sciences like chemistry and physics, prove to us that reality is actually completely different from this conception/perception representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Except that the reality demonstrated by the sciences is only demonstrable from the very same system of conception/perception representation, as the common Everydayman reality not the least concerned with the scientific version at all. When was the last time you approached the SOL…..etc, etc.

Activity is not at all as we represent it, as picking up objects called a hammer and nails, and hitting one object with another. That's a vastly oversimplified representation of what is actually going on, and really a faulty representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Activity is exactly as we represent it to ourselves, give appearances in compliance with our particular physiology alone. The fact it is a vastly oversimplified representation doesn’t make it false; it merely makes it incomplete, and that merely from perspective, iff given by a deeper scale of investigation. The point being, the completion of the representation, determined from such deeper scale, wouldn’t be a necessary addendum to our experience, insofar as knowing e.g., the distinct molecular composition of different kinds of forks, does nothing whatsoever for disturbing the already established activity of getting food to the mouth using one. Contingent with respect to future experience, certainly, for deeper-scale investigations make things like penicillin possible. Such is science, not as opposed but in juxtaposition, to metaphysics.

How is all that not exactly congruent to the fact SR/GR doesn’t falsify Newtonian physics, but supplements it, given a different scale of representation?
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The LNC does not apply to the good of intention. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it doesn’t; it applies to the understanding of whether or not the good is judged to be satisfied by the intention.

This is why goods are often said to be subjective…. — Metaphysician Undercover

(I hesitate with the term “goods”, but continue with the subjective)

Of course. On the one hand, good things for me are not necessarily good things for you, hence each good of a thing is a subjective judgement. On the other hand, any of my judgements regarding what is good, insofar as they all arise in me alone, can hardly be termed subjective, in that there is nothing to which they relate except my own determinability. The good in such case, reverts to relative degrees of a necessarily presupposed good, rather than different forms of good itself. Such condition is the same for both of us, granting the commonality of our respective human inclinations and intellectual attitudes.

Even the same person will sometimes have conflicting goals. — Metaphysician Undercover

True enough for Everydayman, but the well-practiced philosopher is the more likely to not.
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Science demonstrates very clearly, that the conceptual structure based in objects of substance, physical objects, moving and interacting in space, is insufficient, and cannot adequately represent the reality of activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Insufficient….for what? It is quite sufficient for us. We’ve conceived space and time, applied them quite adequately to the activity of objects. Is there more? Sure, could be, seems science has said so. Doesn’t make what we’ve already done with our conceptual structure any less adequate.
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we need to start all over, from the bottom up, with something more reasonable as the foundation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fine. You’ve suggested dumping what we have, but haven’t suggested what to replace it with. You are in no position to prove the system we speculate as adequate for us, has a substitute that is better for us, which is really nothing but a greater degree of adequate.

Please accept this as reality, instead of referring to mundane experiences in an attempt to make fun of the reality of the situation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh, I have no problem with accepting the science. As a matter of fact, because science is the best indicator of the LNC available to us, wouldn’t it be great to subject the speculative methodologies by which our mundane experiences manifest in us to the same criteria, in order to discover whether or not we can get something beneficial out of them?

Ever noticed that no science is ever done that wasn’t first thought? Ever heard of a scientist that wasn’t human? You favor the scientific so far beyond the necessary ground for its very possibility, making fun is what one does rather than to disrespectfully scoff outright at the absurdity of the favoritism. Or, fanaticism, perhaps. At any rate, the objects of science proper are irrelevant with respect to how science is done.

That being said, I shall immediately rescind my objections, upon being presented with that rational system which is better than, over that system which is merely not good enough.
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The category of "speculative reason" is completely unnecessary, created and referred to, as a distraction. — Metaphysician Undercover

This, and all that pursuant to your practical reason and theoretical reason may contradict, I leave for future debate, for the subtleties therein are even more obscure than those at present.

Again, I don't think you've misinterpreted anything. I was just pointing out what I think is the more comprehensive account of Kant's epistemology.

It's a suggestion, nothing more.

Thank you for the clarification.

I will take a look at Manifest Reality and see if it pulls me in. I am stingy with my time upon secondary texts and like to keep work on them in balance with engagement with primary texts, even when the secondary ones are very helpful.

My recent interest in Kant comes from realizing that so many philosophers after him have become 'secondary sources' in their own right in regard to him. I am trying to make a separate space from all that to investigate what is said.

She was a student of Galen Strawson and he recommended her book, fyi.

Consider the difference between your representation, of three distinct colours, and my representation of two distinct colours producing the appearance of a third, through mixing. The problem with yours is that it produces the need for two distinct boundaries, one between present and past, and one between present and future. This is what is required to isolate the present as distinct, and the only true "substance". That, I see as an unnecessary complication, actually producing three distinct substances. You class the two, future and past together, as other than being. But this is incorrect, because the difference between future and past disallows them from being classed together. The problem with mine is that it produces the need for skepticism and doubt concerning our "experience of the present". There is an appearance that the present is distinct, and separate from the past and future, as the substance of being, but that appearance is misleading. Which do you think i more logically consistent with your own conscious being, yours or mine? — Metaphysician Undercover

Hi,

The difference I explain between present, past and future is a difference in their constitutive roles. If the past and future are constituents of the present, then the present is not something pure, but something that does not participate in ousia or substance. There would be no need to make the present something totally different from the past and future, since all three do not participate in ousia. The difference between these three must be thought of differently from how we normally think of three different things, since they are not so different and their difference is erased at every moment.

Your position fails, i think, when it demands precision, since you are seeking to differentiate between past, present and future by treating them as substances. In other words, for me there is a complicity between the demand for precision and the idea of a classical difference between three substances. For me, it is necessary that the difference between past, present and future be unclear and constantly erased in order to show that consciousness is more than the present: it is being erased in a difference distinct from presence and ousia. For me, it is necessary that the difference between past, present and future is not clear and is constantly blurred in order to show that consciousness is more than just the present: it is being blurred in a difference distinct from presence and ousia. This implies introducing non-being as part of its essence. This implies that the world is not distinct from consciousness insofar as the world has been classically conceived as the non-being of consciousness. In this sense, the world is something different from consciousness, but it is also something equal to consciousness.

In other words, the conclusion I would reach according to my position is that the world and consciousness differ, but not according to a classical difference as we understand it according to the logic of identity. The difference shows us that there is something of the world in consciousness and there is something of consciousness in the world.

Thanks for that description.

Except that the reality demonstrated by the sciences is only demonstrable from the very same system of conception/perception representation, as the common Everydayman reality not the least concerned with the scientific version at all. — Mww

The point though, is that what is demonstrated is its own faultiness. You know, when a method fails in its capacity to reach the desired end, it demonstrates its own faultiness.

Activity is exactly as we represent it to ourselves, give appearances in compliance with our particular physiology alone. The fact it is a vastly oversimplified representation doesn’t make it false; it merely makes it incomplete, and that merely from perspective, iff given by a deeper scale of investigation. The point being, the completion of the representation, determined from such deeper scale, wouldn’t be a necessary addendum to our experience, insofar as knowing e.g., the distinct molecular composition of different kinds of forks, does nothing whatsoever for disturbing the already established activity of getting food to the mouth using one. Contingent with respect to future experience, certainly, for deeper-scale investigations make things like penicillin possible. Such is science, not as opposed but in juxtaposition, to metaphysics. — Mww

I completely disagree with all this. Perhaps, by the principle of relativity, activity is exactly as we represent it to ourselves, but I thing relativity is a means of avoiding truth. In general, oversimplification is falsity.

Of course. On the one hand, good things for me are not necessarily good things for you, hence each good of a thing is a subjective judgement. On the other hand, any of my judgements regarding what is good, insofar as they all arise in me alone, can hardly be termed subjective, in that there is nothing to which they relate except my own determinability. The good in such case, reverts to relative degrees of a necessarily presupposed good, rather than different forms of good itself. Such condition is the same for both of us, granting the commonality of our respective human inclinations and intellectual attitudes. — Mww

We seem to be losing any common ground for discussion.

Insufficient….for what? — Mww

Insufficient for truth. That is what I was talking about.

If the past and future are constituents of the present, then the present is not something pure, but something that does not participate in ousia or substance. — JuanZu

The point though, is that "substance", just like "the present" may itself be an illusion. So the issue is not whether the present is something pure, but whether the present has any kind of reality at all. And if it is real why would we think that it partakes of substance?

Your position fails, i think, when it demands precision, since you are seeking to differentiate between past, present and future by treating them as substances. — JuanZu

I treat past and future as substance, but I see no reason to assume any substantial existence of the present. The present is purely active, without substance. I disliked your proposal because it required three substances, instead of my two. by making the present something distinct from the past and future.

You know, when a method fails in its capacity to reach the desired end, it demonstrates its own faultiness. — Metaphysician Undercover

A tree produces a seed in order to produce another tree. If you just look at the seed and say "oh that's not a tree, obviously it failed let's destroy this tree" one quickly notices an error in judgement. Belief systems call this arrogance or pride. Society calls this impatience and imprudence. Science calls this just being wrong. Remember that.