Democracy hasn't been voting for dictators. It has been voting for influencers.

Liberalism could still be the social structure that works best in the real world. But democracy has become detached from the real world and absorbed into its own reality show version of life. — apokrisis

This is an interesting take.

This realism about what the actual facts are – what people really want and the scale of the surplus that exists to be shared – is basic to liberal democracy working as a coherent system. And it is the realism that has fallen apart in a big way. Voters are now entrained to the various brands of cultural make-believe. — apokrisis

Do you see this as a phase or the beginning of catastrophe?

Sans any strong ordering ends, any vision of what we are defending liberalism to "adapt towards" why don't self-interested utility maximizers (which is what liberalism tells us we are) with power take advantage of their ability to direct the system towards their own ends? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Liberalism is about freedom of association. Democracy is about the wishes of the people. It is all about recognising that a complex society has to be structured as a hierarchy of institutions. Interest groups free to form over all scales. And the "strong ordering end" is what emerges from having forged a robust collection of institutions. The collective view is what emerges in fractal fashion from democratic action over every possible scale.

The system is coherent when no interest is so small that it is ignored, and also every interest is served to the degree that the collective good can afford that cost – in terms of its economic or social capital.

here’s a growing belief that the prosperity of the West has come at the expense of the Global South, and that the status quo must change. — Astorre

What if the dictatorships of the global south are what the inhabitants of the global south want? — Astorre

What does "global south" mean in your usage. Can you define this?

Do you see this as a phase or the beginning of catastrophe? — Tom Storm

Many commentators have said the US has had these kinds of convulsions regularly. The old always has its fossilising tensions. The system must appear to be dissolving itself so as to be reborn in some new more functional alignment.

George Friedman, ex-Stratfor, is a good example of those who think Trump is the useful buffoon fronting for the realists behind the scenes. The Project 2025 manifesto was at least some people's blueprint. And US political realists generally agreed the US ought to let go the larger world and rebuild within its own North American continental fortress. Absorb Canada and Mexico for their resources and cheap manufacturing. Just live within that comfy gated community and dump the whole failed world liberalism project.

So there are real forces at work behind Trump with a perfectly pragmatic socioeconomic vision. The problem was these forces couldn't quite believe just how incompetent Trump would be. And how many other incompetents he would appoint when he got a second term.

Say Vance takes over. Say the geopolitical realities of US self-interest get competently implemented. There is no reason the current mess couldn't crystalise into a new liberal order. The reality show of woke and MAGA concerns would still linger a long time. But the US could become reunited under a socioeconomic compact that is recognisably realist and competently run.

The big problems would still exist. You would have Europe aging out, despot regimes everywhere you looked, climate change ratcheting up the pressures, nukes still poised for launch in a last moment of madness.

But no. We can't actually live life as a reality show. And liberal democracy has proven its robust adaptiveness beyond doubt.

There is every chance of catastrophe. Nukes, climate, pandemics, famine. But also every chance that the US emerges from the current moment to forge a new plan around circling the wagons to create Fortress North America. That is an economic and military objective that makes its own obvious geopolitical sense. And Canada, US and Mexico can be a trio that also makes equal sociocultural sense.

The stability of nations depends on having defensible borders around required resources. Coupled to a national identity that owns that space. North America just happens to have the most of everything as a geopolitical region. Minerals, water, energy, agriculture, population. And its impossible to invade.

Compare that to Russia with its wide open steppes that force it to want to push into even Poland to find a defensible boundary – some natural barrier like a mountain pass.

So I think geopolitical realism will show through. Trump was already meant to be speaking those lines and indeed his first administration started the ball rolling as the realists behind the scenes got their guys into the top jobs. Biden – as another figurehead – then quietly kept the project going. Vance could be the next puppet in line, or some real leader could emerge with a broader sociocultural angle on the same geopolitical agenda.

The part that isn't so clear is what happens to the US dollar and world capital. There is still an internationalist level of superorganismic order that is its own thing. The Davos, drug cartel, petrodollar, tech bro, oligarch, private equity, cryptocurrency level of planetary society that floats above mere geopolitics. It has its own rather undemocratic and illiberal view of what suits its continued existence.

Does that sphere of unplaced power have its own philosophies that go beyond liberal democracy and the wealth of nations? Is a figure like Curtis Yarvin its Adam Smith or Karl Marx? A guy with the plan?

I jest. But most of the actual wealth of the world has been sucked up into this global realm that is its own gated community wherever it sets down foot on real ground. The Davos era version was trying to implement some workable global version of liberal democracy, just as Bretton Woods did in 1944. But who can tell us what political understanding it will come to in its need to organise itself heading into the next 50 years or so.

That seems the much more interesting question of the moment from the political philosophy or history of social structure point of view.

If the elite can't be taxed, seen, regulated – kept within the community of nations level of world organisation – then how is that new world going to regard us ordinary folk? Are we the healthy foundation to its own existence. Or does it even need us as an exploitable resource anymore?

They're similar in that they're both given to apocalypticism. They're both looking for signs of the end of the world. Over-simplified, the Cold War was two cultures seeing each other as the anti-Christ. Is that what you mean? — frank

Former USSR and the USA folks are both more liberal thinking (even individualistic) than average Chinese folk, in wildly broad terms. — Fire Ologist

Since it so happened that I am connected (by personal and family ties) with China and the countries of the former USSR and the USA, I can say for myself with a high degree of confidence that the former USSR and the USA were not so different states in the mentality of their citizens (which may sound like wildness now), which I cannot say about the closeness of the Chinese and American mentalities. It is difficult to prove theoretically, but if you have been to these places, you will immediately understand what I am talking about. — Astorre

Well, the answer to this question is not obvious and it is not so easy to answer it. In this case, we are talking about the mindset of citizens. The idea is that both nations considered their ideology to be a kind of embodiment of truth on earth, because it is their idea that is correct, as opposed to the other. Both states were at some point the most powerful in all respects (military, sports, cultural, ideological) and saw their path as correct, which is probably where this similarity comes from. But both of these states are the embodiment of the ideas of European thinkers who grew up in the Christian society of enlightenment

But I would like to say something else here. Imagine that today you live in a state whose ideology claims to be the universal truth, and tomorrow you suddenly wake up in a state that has completely abandoned this in favor of the opposite ideology. Overnight, your entire internal structure, system of ideals and values, turned out to be a fake. Purely humanly, this is very difficult to experience. Many people lose faith in any idea against this background. Others accept the ideology of the victors (liberalism). Others insist that not everything was so bad, and that politicians are to blame (similar to how everyone now blames Trump, while at that time Gorbachev was blamed). This is not very simple. Almost 35 years have passed since then, but to this day, in my opinion, the countries of the former USSR are searching for themselves, trying to understand their place in the world. What is happening in Ukraine is one of the manifestations of this search and development.

The liberal backsliding since 2008 isn't actually out of line with his core thesis, although it does run against the general optimism of the 1989 article and 1992 book. Illiberal leaders in previously liberal countries do not justify their authoritarianism or interventions in opposition to liberalism. In general, they position themselves as saviors of liberalism. On both the right and the left, the need for norm breaking interventions is justified in terms of the need to secure liberalism against opposing "illiberal forces." That is certainly how Trump positions himself for instance. He is saving liberal democracy from illiberal "woke mobs" and "elites" and his economic interventions aren't positioned against free enterprise and capitalism per se, but against bad state actors who are "ripping us off" by not abiding by true free market principles. He sells his policies in liberal terms. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is exactly what I wrote about:

This is where, in my opinion, today's problem arises: Liberalism has ceased to moderately seek this compromise, has ceased to adapt sensitively, its strengths have taken on some extreme form, and the ideas themselves have become dogmatized, instead of working dynamically. — Astorre

Yet they decidedly do not recommend some sort of alternative ideology the way the Soviet Union did. China occasionally positions itself as a sort of alternative position, but not in any coherent way. They aren't evangelical about their form of state-capitalism, trying to force it on their allies, or trying to boost it internationally as a popular movement — Count Timothy von Icarus

The ideologies of the USSR and the USA functioned like secular religions. They demanded faith, had their "prophets" (the Founding Fathers, Marx/Lenin), "sacred texts" (the Constitution, Capital), and were ready to wage "crusades" for their ideals. China, by contrast, is a state-civilization. Its governance model and philosophy (a mixture of Confucianism, Legalism, and adapted Marxism) do not claim to be universal. Beijing is not trying to make a copy of China out of Nigeria or Brazil. It exports goods and infrastructure projects, not ideological revolution.
They seem to say: we do not claim the truth of our views and do not dispute yours. Believe in whatever you want, but drive our cars, wear our clothes, use our smartphones. It may not be the most advanced yet, but it is cheaper, more practical and simpler.

I'd argue that what we're seeing now though is that liberalism, without these deviations, isn't actually "adaptive." Civilizations require the pursuit of arduous goods. They require heroism and self-sacrifice, and a capacity to resist serious temptations (since liberalism is always prone to slipping towards oligarchy or dictatorship). Sans any strong ordering ends, any vision of what we are defending liberalism to "adapt towards" why don't self-interested utility maximizers (which is what liberalism tells us we are) with power take advantage of their ability to direct the system towards their own ends? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I was talking about the idea growing on the basis of the base (economic, social, cultural) and not the base growing on the basis of the idea:

Many theorists have a certain conviction that first an ideology (a set of ideals) is invented, which is then integrated into society and we all live happily ever after. — Astorre

I consider liberalism not as a set of ideals, striving for which we will certainly build paradise, but as a system for searching for a certain point of compromise of aspirations. — Astorre

Humanity can come up with any construct, any set of slogans, any religion, belief, ideology, ontological approach - but all this is a description of the basis. All this works only insofar as the basis has not changed. The basis changes - any idea crumbles.

In my opinion, the problem with idealism is that in their opinion, an idea is born first, and only then, strictly following it, everything falls into place. Hence this exploitation by politicians "we will bring back liberalism." Maybe they will bring it back for a moment, but this is the creation of a new construct that will lead to decline.

In the 70s in the USSR, everyone measured their own truthfulness of reading Marxism-Leninism, everyone sought the most correct meaning of what was written. In the same way, believing that the idea is primary. Well, we all know what this led to.

I also do not dispute your statement that it is necessary to understand what to start from in order to act. That is true. But the rigidity of prejudices is as evil as their absence.
For harmonious development, constant adaptation, including ideas, is required.

If the idea is not adapted, nothing good will come of it.

One of the questions I asked at the beginning was whether the West will accept illiberal regimes as equals or will another cold war follow?

If it does, that will be great. We will be able to develop by enriching each other. If it does not, another iron curtain and eternal proof of the fidelity of our ideals await us.

a) Is an 'unshakable dollar' a measure of the western ideal?
b) Why wouldn't 'western democracy' remain the highest IDEAL, even if, in reality, it is less than ideal?
c) Are objectively superior consumer goods, nice as they are, a measure of western ideals?
d) The 'broader cultural narrative' isn't accepted by all western academics. — BC

I will try to explain what all this means, as descriptively as possible, without emotions and personal prejudices.

It is no secret that the US uses soft power to export its ideology. Enormous resources of US taxpayers are spent on this. What does this look like in post-Soviet states? Grants are allocated for the media, for strengthening national languages, traditions or cultures, the essence of which is to undermine the confidence of citizens in the course chosen by the Russian Federation and the entire Soviet legacy. For example, you turn on the TV where it is stated: "Look - we live well in the West, our currency is a model of stability, our goods are the best (iPhone, Macrosoft, etc.), our achievements in observing human rights are the best, our courts are the fairest. And the Russians, the Chinese are all villains, authoritarians, their regimes do not observe human rights. And do you know why all this? Because we have liberalism and all these benefits are a consequence of liberalism. Therefore, think like a liberal, reject everything sinister (especially Iranian, Chinese, Russian). Reject the Soviet past in favor of your language, your identity, because the Soviets suppressed all this in you, build liberalism, and even better, allow us to place our military bases in your country so that you can be protected." It looks like a "successful business coach" telling his students: "I am rich, happy and successful because I think differently. If you think like me, you will become rich. Change your thinking right now."

This is the essence of the message that is being broadcast, but in reality the influence is much more subtle and multifaceted. It comes not through a single direct “selling” text, but through a combination of news, films, educational exchange programs (like FLEX), pop culture, and NGO activities.

That's why I pointed out all these things in the original post.

Why did all this look so interesting, and liberalism is attractive? The average person is essentially indifferent to the value of an ideology as such. He looks at the advantages that are possible with this ideology and decides whether to join it or not. If a person sees hunger and decline, then any ideology is seen as wrong (for example, Chu-Chhe in North Korea). Thus, if we assume that the US suddenly becomes poor tomorrow, then liberalism will immediately end. But what if prosperity isn't just about ideology?

At some point, the "benefits" offered by the US turned out to be not such a blessing. And "success through following liberal ideas" was undermined by China. A person from a hypothetical Eastern state turns on the media sponsored by USAID and sees contradictions. And plus, there is also the inclusivity with LGBT, which was cultivated until recently - it is not at all suitable for traditional views in the East. From here, trends began to emerge offering alternative views. This is how all this talk about multipolarity appeared.

The US has had better and worse period of western democratic performance, and is currently in one of its worst-performing periods, with Trump at the helm. The big question for me is how long this dispiriting episode will last. — BC

Trump's election was a testament to this decline I'm talking about. He won by a large margin. That alone is a sign of the fatigue of most voters. But I couldn't believe my eyes when Trump started doing whatever he wanted and neither the Senate nor the court stopped him. The system of checks and balances stopped working? How did it happen that he can do almost whatever he wants? Isn't that a decline?

For me personally, it was a big disappointment: I've always been convinced that the US constitution is very well designed to prevent dictatorships. In general, I'm still convinced that US society will be able to regulate itself and resolve this crisis. But the longer it takes, the harder it will be to do so in the future.

And as the move to a self-conscious pragmatism is made, the question becomes how fast can it be allowed to grow and spread? And are all its parts synchronised to some general idea of this optimal growth rate?

Mistakes are always going to get made in implementing the theory. Or rather, growth itself always produces the unexpected in Nature. Reach a certain point and the system wants to rearrange. It wants to go through a phase transition or some topological shift in structure.

Do we fight these things or discover how to flow with them? What should be our philosophy as we encounter the unpredicted consequences of our own previously effective habits? — apokrisis

These are very good philosophical questions.

It used to be simpler: you had some set of ideas that you could develop throughout your life, moving along a given course. This set of ideas was enough for your life. Today the world is so fast that in one five-year period you have to rethink something several times, so as not to simply fall out of life. Once in the 2000s, my friends and I thought that we were living in boring times: all theories are known, the boundaries are defined, medicine will save us, and what can happen anyway? How wrong we were then...

In my opinion, in today's world, the approach that turns out to be the most adaptive and not dogmatized will be the most effective

It’s pitchforks at dawn again, I’m afraid.

He (Trump) won by a large margin. — Astorre

Not that large:

• 2024: Trump won the popular vote with a lead of about 1.5% over Kamala Harris. This was the first time he won the national popular vote in a presidential election.
• 2020: Joe Biden won the popular vote by 4.5% over Trump.
• 2016: Hillary Clinton won the popular vote by 2.1% over Trump, despite losing the Electoral College.
• 2012: Barack Obama won by 3.9% over Mitt Romney.
• 2008: Barack Obama won by 7.3% over John McCain.

It’s pitchforks at dawn again, I’m afraid. — Punshhh

I feel you vastly — and do I mean, vastly — underestimate the laziness and complacency of the average American voter. No, I take that back. It's not subject, or rather limited, to an invented term that has no real meaning other than socially. It's the human condition. Maybe an off metaphor but, water takes the path of least resistance. Humans are 70% water. We evolved with a natural (many would argue healthy) sense of fear, which if acted upon and in unison can lead to such. But the mind always seeks homeostasis, or a sense of wellness even when there is no rational element to be found. We will learn to love, or at the very least become accepting toward, our bad choices and predicaments, as foolish and blatantly obviously poor as they are. See the hedonic treadmill. With a positive spin, it's the enduring human spirit to endeavor on. Otherwise, it's a sort of healthy delusion with evolutionary benefit. It's why we can never be happy, not for very long, unless we know there is someone or something unhappier or less fortunate than ourselves, we'll invent a system where such is so, often based on real and relevant enough premises. Or, we'll simply declare one outside of the reality of the situation altogether.

I was relying on Donald Trump receiving 312 electoral votes and Kamala Harris receiving 226 electoral votes out of a total of 538 electors. But your point is correct, since in the text I was talking about the "majority" of voters and not electors, the difference between which is really about 1.5 percent. I apologize for this inaccuracy.

Hey no apologies necessary, it’s only that ‘landslide victory’ is yet another Trump exaggeration so should be called out.

For me personally, it was a big disappointment — Astorre

You can imagine, then, how much bigger a disappointment it is for Americans who didn't vote for Trump and altogether disapprove of him and his policies.

Trump did not win the popular vote by a wide margin; it was Trump 49.8% and Harris 48.3%. The large margin was in the electoral college, which I don't want to discuss here.

The Senate and the House are both controlled by Republican majorities--not huge margins, but still a majority. This might change in the 2026 election, or maybe not. We'll see. Trump had the unfortunate opportunity to name 3 justices to the Supreme Court, tipping the balance strongly toward the conservative judicial view. With both legislative houses, the court, and the presidency all controlled by the same party, the republicans can expect to have many policy wins.

The BIG thing about Trump is that he is willing to flout legal precedent and ignore laws (and the constitution) which place limitations on his some of his overt policies and actions, and his party approves -- so far, anyway. From what source would powerful opposition come? Not from the House; not from the Senate; not from the Court. "We the people" won't have a chance to vote for House members and 1/3 of the Senate for 14 more months, and if an overwhelming majority of liberals were elected, they still wouldn't take office until 16 months (roughly) from now. That gives Trump a long time to continue on his rampage, and possibly abort an election where he would lose power.

We are in uncharted territory with a president who doesn't care what the court rules. The courts do not have an army to force him to do anything. The uncomfortable fact is this: You can't do business unless people are honest, and you can't have an effective law-abiding government if people (particularly in government) don't care about the law, facts, and reality.

An American has to be something of a rebel, a dissident, to perceive how propaganda and soft power operate on the home front -- never mind in countries where we don't travel a lot. Most Americans are not dissidents, not given to reading Marx or other socialists (real socialists, not the Democratic Socialists). Certainly the recipients of propaganda, soft power, and sometimes hard power have no difficulty seeing American foreign policy at work.

A previous administration used to conduct "secret wars". The New York Times reported on these "secret wars". Noam Chomsky, in blasting the NYT, asked "To whom are these wars secret? Certainly not the people who are being bombed! It's Americans from whom the wars are kept secret."

I'm a gay man, but I can understand how the western 'gay movement' does not translate well to some other societies. Health workers in Uganda, for instance, don't think that they need to worry about gay transmission of HIV because "there are no homosexuals in Uganda" -- or that was the view 25 years ago. Uganda is apparently virulently homophobic at this time--not a good time to start a gay liberation movement. I'm not sure which countries are open to some of the esoteric gender issues which we have been dealing with. "Gay liberation" can only happen in societies that are ready and willing.

Trump did not win the popular vote by a wide margin; it was Trump 49.8% and Harris 48.3%. The large margin was in the electoral college, which I don't want to discuss here. — BC

I was not clear in my original post and have corrected myself above. I apologize.

An American has to be something of a rebel, a dissident, to perceive how propaganda and soft power operate on the home front -- never mind in countries where we don't travel a lot. — BC

This is a very important remark. I would like to develop this idea a little. When American propaganda declares "In your country, dissent is prohibited, you are authoritarian" it always makes me laugh, because within America itself, dissent is of course allowed, but only within the liberal paradigm. I don't know if you will be patted on the back at home if you express support for Putin or Kim. At the same time, those same "independent" media, sponsored by the American government, tell us "stand up and cry for freedom."

Obviously, from the point of view of local regimes, this will not be okay. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between dissent "within the paradigm" and "outside the paradigm"

couldn't believe my eyes when Trump started doing whatever he wanted and neither the Senate nor the court stopped him. The system of checks and balances stopped working? How did it happen that he can do almost whatever he wants? Isn't that a decline? — Astorre

Indeed. I'm in Australia, and here, most people - a huge majority, in fact - are shocked, frightened and appalled by what's happening in America under Trump. There's some degree of cynicism about the US here, but probably much less than other places - my parents (who lived through WWII, one of my father's brothers died in the Pacific Theatre) never ceased to say that 'MacArthur saved us from invasion from the Japanese'. So in my household, America was always the 'light on the hill'. My mother wept bitter tears when Kennedy was assasinated (I was ten). So I've been extremely dissappointed by the Trump phenomenon, ever since it started - it is the victory (for now), of greed, of hatred and cynicism. Anyway this isn't the Trump thread but as the topic came up....

I believe there has been a significant overestimation of the percentage of the population in the U.S. and Europe who ever supported liberal democracy for philosophical rather than just reasons of economic self-interest, because the ranks of liberal political parties were for a long time inflated with voters who were in fact philosophically anti-liberal, and who have now organized right-wing populist parties like MAGA that more purely reflect their anti-liberalism. Rural people in countries around the world have followed a pattern similar to MAGA , reorganizing their political parties in a rightward direction politically to reflect the traditionalism and conservatism they have always believed in. — Joshs

If I understand correctly, you think we have misinterpreted the fact that liberalism won (which is what Fokuyama's main idea was built on)? Well, your arguments cannot be argued with, in this regard his ideas seem idealistic.

But I do think that liberal democracy has advantages over more authoritarian political systems that can be described in pragmatic rather than in abstract ethical terms. If one thinks of political organization as a complex dynamical system, we may say that such systems tend toward their own evolution. As they become more complex they become more stable. The enlightened self-interest of individuals will steer them towards modes of social
organization which foster communication, commerce and creativity rather than stifle it. — Joshs

In that case, do you agree with these ideas:

This is a very important binary opposition that is often overlooked. Many theorists have a certain conviction that first an ideology (a set of ideals) is invented, which is then integrated into society and we all live happily ever after. In a descriptive sense, the idea of ​​Marx and Engels, expressed by them in "The German Ideology", that it is not consciousness that determines being, but being that determines consciousness, looks very interesting.

In the Marxist perspective, society is divided into a base (production relations, means of production) and a superstructure (ideology, politics, culture). The base is primary: changes in the economy (for example, the transition from feudalism to capitalism) give rise to new ideologies that justify or disguise these relations.

It follows from this that it is impossible to "invent" an ideology and impose it as the "pinnacle of evolution" - it will collide with the reality of the base. — Astorre

Contemporaries often use the term "global south" in the context of alternative associations like BRICS or G77. Although my understanding of the concept of "global south" is broader - it is "Developing countries", "periphery", "Third world"

Funny thing about hijabs is your people forget why it's worn, and it's not for religious reasons. The girl saying "this is how I express myself, was a defense mechanism because she knew no other way, and no other expression. Everyone loses sight of meta over time. Because the ontological is more potent. They realize that the values don't match their expectations, they find more likeness online, or they stick closer to their nationalism. In the past 10-15 internet has exploded in your part of the world. So the complacent "dream" is distorted back into the desolation of the real.

Unfortunately, I don't know why they wear them or why others change their gender. To be honest, I haven't given much thought to these questions. Perhaps there is a rational explanation, or perhaps it's purely emotional. In any case, I am a simple existentialist and am not responsible for the decisions of others.

Contemporaries often use the term "global south" in the context of alternative associations like BRICS or G77. Although my understanding of the concept of "global south" is broader - it is "Developing countries", "periphery", "Third world" — Astorre

I can't understand this form of classification. It classifies a bunch of dissimilar and unrelated things together in the same classification, as not-X. So you start with "Western values and narratives", then produce a category of exclusion, "non-Western", and place all others into that category. But there is no principles by which the "others" ought to be placed in the same category, except that you want to exclude them from being in the category of "Western". How is that an acceptable form of classification? What could be the intent of such a form of classification?

Well, it tends to be hot in your part of the world, which increases pore size, which allows more dirt to get in and cause boils. It is a cheap and effective way to protect health which means it's a cheap and effective way to protect beauty and serves to highlight beauty also. Changing genders is mostly people listening to their instincts (thus may not be a completely intelligible thing) combined with a certain need for autonomy over themselves.

Yes, I use the concept of "everything that is not X" to describe Y, and vice versa. You require clarification, and this is philosophically justified, as we need to understand what we are talking about before we can discuss it. However, in this case, X+Y is not equal to infinity, but rather to around 200. Additionally, I have used the same language to describe Y as is used in state X. Furthermore, I perceive this as "excessive specificity," a rhetorical device that allows us to avoid direct answers (a common tactic used by politicians). However, the dichotomy between "developed countries" and "developing countries" seems quite accurate to me.

I believe there has been a significant overestimation of the percentage of the population in the U.S. and Europe who ever supported liberal democracy for philosophical rather than just reasons of economic self-interest, because the ranks of liberal political parties were for a long time inflated with voters who were in fact philosophically anti-liberal, and who have now organized right-wing populist parties like MAGA that more purely reflect their anti-liberalism. Rural people in countries around the world have followed a pattern similar to MAGA , reorganizing their political parties in a rightward direction politically to reflect the traditionalism and conservatism they have always believed in.
— Joshs

If I understand correctly, you think we have misinterpreted the fact that liberalism won (which is what Fokuyama's main idea was built on)? Well, your arguments cannot be argued with, in this regard his ideas seem idealistic. — Astorre

My point is:
1) Many, including Fukuyama, explain the recent rise of rightwing populism and authoritarianism as a form of ‘backsliding’ away from the ideal of liberalism.
2) My claim is this should not be interpreted as backsliding but rather as an overestimation of the percentage of the world population who embraced liberalism to begin with.
3)This does not mean liberalism ‘lost’. I agree with Fukuyama that the world has been and will continue to be to move in the direction of liberalism, but I find his ethical reasons to be less relevant than his pragmatic reasons (people will eventually find that liberalism works better for them). But this does not mean there cannot and will not at some point in the future be a ‘post-liberalism’ that subsumes and exceeds the best of liberalism.

In that case, do you agree with these ideas:

In the Marxist perspective, society is divided into a base (production relations, means of production) and a superstructure (ideology, politics, culture). The base is primary: changes in the economy (for example, the transition from feudalism to capitalism) give rise to new ideologies that justify or disguise these relations.

It follows from this that it is impossible to "invent" an ideology and impose it as the "pinnacle of evolution" - it will collide with the reality of the base. — Astorre

I would move away from Marx’s narrow definition of the base in terms of economic and class structures, in favor of epistemic and values-based norm-producing social structures which include but arent simply determined by the economic aspects of society. Rather than producing ideologies which justify or disguise the base social normative structures, these structures themselves instantiate and imply a certain constellation of philosophical-metaphysical stances. Every individual participating within a social structure contributes to the invention of these partially shared philosophical
worldviews, which include within themselves attitudes toward political and economic theory. Individuals neither simply march in lockstep with the social norms nor deviate wildly from them, since they are partially shared. A person who offers a new philosophical-economic-political perspective that they believe represents a ‘pinnacle of evolution’ can influence others but not simply ‘impose’ their vantage on the community unless that community is already receptive to such a perspective. There is a philosophical-economic-political evolution but the ground of its becoming is collective rather than strictly individual.

I don't see why we should believe that discourse of the "West" (whatever that means) can no longer be given.

It seems to me that there are quite sensible accounts one can put together about what's happening in the world. It takes a decent amount of searching different people specialize in different domains (foreign policy, economy, domestic policy, international relations, tech, climate change, etc.), but one sees a picture emerging which is frankly very grim.

Now that's one thing, the other is to assume that one is capable of giving a single account of everything that is happening. I don't think any one person can do that, there are too many countries, too many complexities, to expect someone to be able to do this.

But I don't see why that is even necessary.

The problem for proponents and critics of liberalism alike is that there is very little that is liberal about the current order. Nor has there ever been. Despite the claims of its ascendancy it is surprisingly difficult to find liberal policy at work anywhere in the world. (Though socialism gets some love within the constitutions of some republics, liberalism doesn’t.) Liberalism in particular and freedom in general become the scapegoat once again. It takes a rhetorical beating while the true culprits of the current malaise continue achieving power.

Most states are republics, either by name or by form, and whether those in power are liberal, communist, or fascist in their thinking. Heads of state, mixed constitutions, rule of law, representative governments—this enduring structure is largely the legacy of the interbellum establishment, not of any one ideology or political philosopher. And every statist, no matter their ideology, serves as its Praetorian Guard.

These structures and the resulting effects of their control over, and involvement in, the lives of every person ought to be at the forefront of the criticism of modernity. But as usual they miss the mark, end up achieving power, and we come to find that we were worse off than before.

I don't see why we should believe that discourse of the "West" (whatever that means) can no longer be given. — Manuel

I think the conventional wisdom among political scientists is that the US is in decline, so therefore China will continue to grow out of regional power status into super power status.

As for liberalism, everybody is capitalist. Everybody has fairly centralized authority. So the scene will be primitive social dominance, gorillas in the jungle.

Economically yes. Though they do have a looming population decline that is very very serious and that may change the outlook for them. But as of now yes, that is what is happening.

We are in dire need of good leaders in this "West". I see danger all over and escalating. Let's hope it doesn't spiral out of control.

We are in dire need of good leaders in this "West". I see danger all over and escalating. Let's hope it doesn't spiral out of control. — Manuel

It will eventually, but probably not in our lifetime.

So the proper connection between democracy and liberalism is that it speaks to society as a dynamic community of institutions. People are free to collectivise around any common interest that appears to have a useful end. This was always the case for societies. But liberalism puts it on the democratic basis where the resulting institutions can all contest for their fair share of the total social pie. Funding becomes a global capital flow that can be piped into any social function according to political will.

The design is commonsense. Let everyone organise on any scale. But the total of the activity has to produce the surplus that gets parcelled out accordingly. And realism is about being able to tie the two sides of the social bargain together in an empirically determined way.

This realism about what the actual facts are – what people really want and the scale of the surplus that exists to be shared – is basic to liberal democracy working as a coherent system. And it is the realism that has fallen apart in a big way. Voters are now entrained to the various brands of cultural make-believe. — apokrisis

Whether realism has to do with opposition to "social media psychodramas" or the strangeness of intersectionality, either way there is nothing connecting democracy or liberalism to this realism, and therefore deviation from this realism is not a deviation from democracy or liberalism.

Realism is great, but it isn't democracy or liberalism (per se) that gets you there. If one wants to use democracy or liberalism to achieve realism, then they need a particular flavor of democracy or liberalism. The flavor of liberalism has to do with a focus on the individual and inalienable rights. The flavor of democracy has to do with a relatively autonomous demos (which is probably no longer possible in our internet age).

What we see so often today is a population that says, "Democracy is good, my ideas are good, therefore my ideas are democratic," or, "Liberalism is good, my ideas are good, therefore my ideas are liberal." That's why it is so easy for opponents to wield the same terms. A culture with a hyper-specific concept of democracy and freedom has forgotten that their concept is hyper-specific; and they can no longer justify or even properly perceive what has come to be taken for granted.

Liberalism is about freedom of association. — apokrisis

Wouldn't you agree that freedom of association is always a subordinated value within liberalism, subject to various conditions?