If you do not want to go that route, you either adopt other 'realist' interpretations or you adopt an epistemic one, where the 'collapse' is simply a way to describe the change of knowlege/degree of belief of an agent after a measurement. These views do not say that mind creates reality but they recognize that we have a limitation in our ability to know the physical world. 'How the workd is' independent of any observation is not knowable. — boundless

Keep in mind that the quantum system is in isolation. The measuring device, as I understand it, breaks that isolation at the moment of measurement. Then the classical properties appear. What I am saying is that epistemic interpretation has no place here, since it is the measuring device that breaks that isolation, not the calculations we make. This is where the problem arises: the measurement interferes with the system and takes it out of its isolation. But it is the apparatus, not our calculations, since they do not interact with the isolated system.

The measuring device, as I understand it, breaks that isolation at the moment of measurement. — JuanZu

In your determination to avoid attributing agency to the observer you assign it to the device, as if it were itself autonomous. But it’s just a projection, and one I think that is mistaken for the reasons I’ve already given.

I do not deny that the interaction ends the isolation of the system. But such loss of isolation doesn't remove superposition. So, my question is: in your view, what about the other outcomes?

I believe that d'Espagnat brillantly explains how we can understand an epistemic interpretation of QM (and how such an interpretation is compatible, in principle, with a 'realist' philosophical view)

Even within a classical, mechanicistic, approach a rainbow, obviously, may not be considered an object-per-se. For, indeed, if we move, it moves. Two different located persons do not see having its bases at the same places. It is therefore manifest that it depends, in part, on us.
...
But still, even though the rainbow depends on us, it does not depend exclusively on us. For it to appear it is necessary that the Sun should shine and that the raindrops should be there. Now similar features also characterize quantum mechanically described object, that is, after all - assuming quantum mechanics to be universal - any object whatsoever. For they also are not 'objects-per-se'. The attributes, or 'dynamical aproperties,' we see them to posses depend in fact on our 'look' at them (on the instruments we make use of and on how we arrange them).
...
And lastly, at least according to the veiled reality conception, even though these micro and macro objects depend on us they (just as rainbows) do not depend exclusively un us. Their existence (as ours) proceeds from that of 'the Real.' — Bernard d'Espagnat, On Physics and Philosophy, p. 348

Soon later:

When N observers are scattered in the fields, each one of them sees the rainbow at a specific place, different from the ones where the others see it. In fact, under these conditions speaking of one and the same rainbow seems improper. It is quite definitely more correct to state that there are N of them, and that each observer sees his own 'private' rainbow. But then, if N=0 there is no rainbow. ... If nobody were there, there would simply be no rainbow. — ibid., p. 349

As d'Espagnat himself says, of course, all analogies are limited and we know the physical causes that are necessary for a rainbow to appear. But suppose we didn't have any possibility to know about the sunlight and the raindrops. What we would know would only be the rainbows, not what is 'beyond' them.
In a similar way, in an epistemic interpretation of QM, the mathematics of QM isn't descriptive. It is more like an alogirthm that allows us to make probabilistic predictions of what we would observer once we assumed certain things. But, according to epistemic interpretations of QM, we have no description of of what is beyond the 'observed phenomena'. Does this mean that 'what is beyond' is impossible, in principle, to describe? No but we are not in the position to know.

D'Espagnat himself, in any case, in his book makes it quite clear that he thinks that there is some reality beyond phenomena but such a reality is 'veiled' and we can't know 'how is it'. It is reasonable, however, to suppose, considering the regularities of phenomena, that such a reality has some structural affinity to the 'empirical reality' that we observe. But of course, we can't 'prove' it. So, in a sense, this is speculative.

I believe that ontologically there is a continuity between measurement and what is measured. — JuanZu

I don't think there is any truth to such a proposition of continuity. Measurement is always based in principles, and carried out as an intentional act. Therefore there is always a medium between what is measured and the measurement. This medium, of intentional acts carried out according to principles, necessitates that we understand a discontinuity between measurement and the thing measured.

There is a common realist assumption, which is false, which persistently interferes with the way that people interpret "measurement". We discussed this assumption in another thread, under the subject of marbles in a jar. The realist assumption is that there is a specific number of marbles in the jar, regardless of whether they have been counted. there is always a number (measurement) associated with those marbles regardless of whether they have been counted. This seems extremely intuitive as the basis for "truth" in the realist world view. The marbles are there, and they have a number, (a measurement) whether or not they have been counted.

However, this realist world view propagates a misunderstanding of what "measurement" really is. Measurement is the act by which a number is assigned to the marbles in the bottle. When we assume, in the realist way, that the marbles in the bottle already have a number assigned to them, without actually having to been counted, then we avoid the need for an act of measurement, to produce a measurement, by assuming that the thing has already been measured without an act of measurement. That is a false assumption.

Even if the entire experiment is artificial, there is still an ontological continuity that allows us to interact and 'create' the experiment. In that sense, the experiment is like a work of art, which may be artificial and created, but does not break with our natural world. — JuanZu

I do not see how you can truthfully portray this interaction as a continuity. The application of principles, through intentional activity (final cause) breaks any continuity assumed by Newton's laws. The continuity granted by Newton's laws does not accommodation for freely willed intentional causation.

In that sense, a work of art does break with the natural world, and the division between natural and artificial is warranted. The work of art cannot be explained by the laws of physics (Newton's deterministic laws of motion), because the will of the artist as cause cannot be thus accounted for.

I don't think there is any truth to such a proposition of continuity. Measurement is always based in principles, and carried out as an intentional act. Therefore there is always a medium between what is measured and the measurement. This medium, of intentional acts carried out according to principles, necessitates that we understand a discontinuity between measurement and the thing measured. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am referring to measurement as the phenomenon that takes place in the measuring device. For example, interference, detection, etc. I am not referring to the intentional acts by which the scientist interprets what happens there.

In your determination to avoid attributing agency to the observer you assign it to the device, as if it were itself autonomous. But it’s just a projection, and one I think that is mistaken for the reasons I’ve already given. — Wayfarer

Not at all. I am simply describing what is actually happening. Since we do not interact with the isolated quantum system, the measuring device does so. Causally, what happens is as follows:

The scientist activates the device —> the device interacts with the quantum system —> the quantum system is affected by the device —> the scientist interprets.

I am referring to measurement as the phenomenon that takes place in the measuring device. For example, interference, detection, etc. I am not referring to the intentional acts by which the scientist interprets what happens there. — JuanZu

All forms of measurement are intentional acts. What happens in a measuring device is only a small part of the measuring process, and is not itself an act of measurement without an interpretation. The rain gauge is filled when it rains, but this is not an act of measurement unless the someone reads it. To claim that the rain gauge measures without the act which reads the amount is to misunderstand what measurement is.

Furthermore, the act which creates the rain gauge is also an essential part of the measuring process. If the rain gauge is not properly calibrated, that will contribute to a mistaken measurement. Therefore design and construction of the device, as well as interpretation of the reading, are both essential aspects of the measurement act. An interpretation which is inconsistent with the intent of the design for example, will produce a false measurement. And, fault within either one or the other, the design and construction, or the interpretation, will also produce a mistaken measurement.

Therefore your talk of "measurement as the phenomenon that takes place in the measuring device", simply demonstrates a misunderstanding of what "measurement" actually is. Things occurring within measuring devices are meaningless without the principles described above.

Therefore design and construction of the device, as well as interpretation of the reading, are both essential aspects of the measurement act — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. I should not have said measurement excluding the scientist's intentional acts. What I should have said to avoid this misunderstanding that you point out is the following:

"I believe that ontologically there is continuity between the device and what is measured. The same applies to the phenomena that occur in the device, like detections and interferences."

But what you correctly point out does not change my argument, it only changes the words. The argument is that of the necessary ontological continuity between the device and what is measured. That is why the scientist's interpretation does not affect the phenomenon of detection and brakeup of isolation that ultimately causes the quantum system to acquire classical properties.

This rules out the idealistic interpretation of quantum physics that gave scientists powers they do not actually possess. Interpreting data, although an essential part of measurement, does not interact with the isolated quantum system. That is the job of the measuring device, which does interact with the quantum system.

This seems to be the central issue―what is a fact, and does the qualifier "objective" add anything? — Janus

One helpful way of using the terms might be: an objective fact is one which others can verify, whereas "I'm having thought X at the moment" is a fact, but not objective.

Facts are usually taken to be determinable by either observation or logic. — Janus

As above, the question is, Whose observation? I'm assuming you don't think we need objective confirmation of observations about what goes on in our minds (as a rule).

how will you know, any more than you would in this life, that an experience that you felt was of God is really a confirmation of said entity? — Janus

Yeah, the more I think about Hick's idea, the less I like it. I suppose what he meant was, If you had an experience after death that checked all the boxes of what mystics claim God (and the afterlife) is like, and you in fact found yourself surviving death, as promised, you'd probably be convinced! But we're guessing about how reliable afterlife experiences are . . .

I continue to think that a lot of this comes down to the level of confirmation required before one is willing to claim knowledge of something. We know that different experiences and facts have different criteria. Do I know my head hurts in the same way I know the solution of an equation? No, but surely both are types of knowledge. With a mystical experience, what criteria do we need (using "mystical experience" to mean a genuine one, one that really is of a god or cosmic consciousness)? As long as we agree that some criteria must apply, then the door is open for reasonable dialogue. What we want to avoid is either a) "My experience is self-verifying; I couldn't be wrong" or b) "Since we know there are no gods, your experience can't be genuine; no conceivable criteria could suffice."

One helpful way of using the terms might be: an objective fact is one which others can verify, whereas "I'm having thought X at the moment" is a fact, but not objective. — J

It's like "I'm reading sentence X at the moment". I don't see the words 'objective' and 'subjective' as unambiguous. If I can only determine some fact on my own can I talk about it being objective? Looking out the window behind my laptop I saw a bird just now alighting for a moment in a tree near the creek and a leaf fall into the creek simultaneously. If you had been here you might have witnessed those two events, but they were so brief that chances are you would not have. Can we talk about those events as facts regardless, just on the basis that in principle it is possible you could have witnessed them?

The ambiguity here is the reason I prefer 'intersubjective' to 'objective'. The witnessing of the alighting bird and the falling leaf could in principle be shared. An experience of God, or the thought I am having right now cannot be, even in principle.

As above, the question is, Whose observation? I'm assuming you don't think we need objective confirmation of observations about what goes on in our minds (as a rule). — J

I don't count introspection as all that reliable. That said personally I tend to think in language...I can hear a 'silent' voice speaking my thoughts. so I am fairly confident that I know what I am thinking if I pay attention in the moment of thought.

Yeah, the more I think about Hick's idea, the less I like it. I suppose what he meant was, If you had an experience after death that checked all the boxes of what mystics claim God (and the afterlife) is like, and you in fact found yourself surviving death, as promised, you'd probably be convinced! But we're guessing about how reliable afterlife experiences are . . . — J

I agree and I think this points to the importance of faith in our lives. We all take many things on faith, and it pays to see ourselves doing that, and then from a critical mindset, deciding what to provisionally accept and what reject.

Many folk seem to be uncomfortable with uncertainty...but for me understanding uncertainty and the challenge of living with it is a major part of doing philosophy. So I don't have much time for the dogmatists who want to claim things like, for example, that we know, thanks to Kant, that space and time and all the categories are purely subjective or that intellectual intuition could be a reliable guide to the way things really are.

John Hick points out that, at the very least, claims about God may be "eschatologically verifiable" -- that is, we may find out when we die (or, of course, we'll cease to exist). — J

I hadn't noticed this passage previously, but there is something that comes to mind from philosophy of religion. This is that a spiritual conversion or awakening is oftentimes called a kind of death, in that the 'old man' dies and the aspirant is 'born again' (a motif not limited to Christianity). It is even found in Krishnamurti's entirely non-denominational idiom, in his sayings such as 'the old must cease for the new to be' and in his 'dying to the known'. These might sound like vague poetic gestures but in reality they're often vivid and life-changing realisations - apodictic, even, to those who undergo them.

The usefulness of John Hick's pluralistic approach (not highly regarded on this forum) is that he at least recognises that these kinds of awakenings or events can occur in the context of wildly different cultural registers. For example Buddhists would never describe such an experience in terms of union with God. But as Hick says"

The basic principle that we are aware of anything, not as it is in itself unobserved, but always and necessarily as it appears to beings with our particular cognitive equipment, was brilliantly stated by Aquinas when he said that ‘Things known are in the knower according to the mode of the knower’ (S.T., II/II, Q. 1, art. 2). And in the case of religious awareness, the mode of the knower differs significantly from religion to religion. And so my hypothesis is that the ultimate reality of which the religions speak, and which we [i.e. Christians] refer to as God, is being differently conceived, and therefore differently experienced, and therefore differently responded to in historical forms of life within the different religious traditions. — John Hick, Who or What is God?

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we know, thanks to Kant, that space and time and all the categories are purely subjective or that intellectual intuition could be a reliable guide to the way things really are. — Janus

Correction: Kant does indeed call space and time forms of intuition — i.e. a priori conditions of sensibility that belong to the subject. In that sense they are “subjective” because they are not properties of things-in-themselves, but the way in which objects can appear to us.

But — and this is crucial — he also insists they are empirically real. Everything that can be given in experience must conform to these forms, and within experience space and time are objectively valid. That’s why he repeatedly says his position is transcendental idealism + empirical realism.

So: they are not “merely subjective” fictions or illusions. Rather, they are subjectively grounded, but objectively binding for any possible experience.

An idea which is enjoying a resurgence in much current philosophy of physics.

"I believe that ontologically there is continuity between the device and what is measured. The same applies to the phenomena that occur in the device, like detections and interferences." — JuanZu

But this is clearly not the case. What is measured is a designated quantity, and this is an idea, concept, which is separate from the tool, and whatever interaction the tool is engaged in.

For example, you take a tape measure to measure the length of an object. "Length" is an idea, and any quantity determined, 1.3 metres for example, is purely conceptual, and separate from the tool, and the interaction which the tool is engaged in. The "thing measured" is always conceptual, a quantity which is attributed.

I believe it's the realist misunderstanding of measurement that I referred to with the marbles in the jar example which is misleading you. You seem to think that there is some sort of independent number, attached to the marbles in the jar, and this is what gets measured. But the quantity, which is what is measured, is purely ideal, it does not exist as part of the marbles in the jar. The "thing measured", is purely ideal, a quantity with specific parameters. The realist misconception, and common language leads us to believe that the marbles in the jar are being measured. In reality, "the quantity" of marbles in the jar is what is measured. And quantity is ideal.

This is the same principle as my rain gauge example. The tool engages the rain. However, the tool has been previously designed and calibrated prior to the interaction, then it is interpreted post interaction, and the measurement, or "what is measured" (amount of rain), is an idea, concept, a quantity, in the mind of the interpreter. The "amount of rain" is purely conceptual, and that is what is measured. One might say "the rain has been measured", but that is misleading because what has really been determined is a quantity.

It is necessary to uphold this discontinuity between device with interaction, and the quantity measured, in order to account for the real possibility of mistake. Those possible mistakes which I mentioned last post. If there was ontological continuity between the tool with its interaction, and the measurement, or quantity being measured, there would be no room for error in the measurement.

This rules out the idealistic interpretation of quantum physics that gave scientists powers they do not actually possess. Interpreting data, although an essential part of measurement, does not interact with the isolated quantum system. That is the job of the measuring device, which does interact with the quantum system. — JuanZu

Of course the device interacts with the system, it must be a part of the system in order for the operator to make the measurement. But what is measured is not the quantum system, just like the marbles are not measured, nor is the rain measured, despite the fact that we speak as if it is. What is measured is a quantity of energy, and that is purely conceptual, just like 1.3 metres is purely conceptual in the example above. And 20 marbles is purely conceptual, as is 35 millimetres of rain.

If I can only determine some fact on my own can I talk about it being objective? — Janus

I think so. The key phrasing is "can be verified," not has been. The bird in the tree was in principle verifiable by anyone looking; your thought of X isn't. That, at any rate, is the difference I'm suggesting is useful. It may not correspond to exactly how you, or everyone, thinks about the terms "objective" and "fact." For instance, you may prefer to reserve "objective" for something that not only can be, but has been affirmed by others.

The ambiguity here is the reason I prefer 'intersubjective' to 'objective'. The witnessing of the alighting bird and the falling leaf could in principle be shared. An experience of God, or the thought I am having right now cannot be, even in principle. — Janus

Yes. "Intersubjective" works perfectly well to express the difference. As you probably know by now, I'm not a fan of arguing overmuch about which terms to use, as long as the users understand each other. What counts is the difference, not the labels for it.

I don't count introspection as all that reliable. — Janus

Really? We know the familiar puzzles and loopholes about introspection -- but by and large? I rarely find myself wondering if I am indeed having the mental experience I take myself to be having. Is that too trusting, do you think? It seems to have proved reliable. Now, if you bring in unconscious or subconscious mental influences -- yes, that's different. But here, we're not questioning an experience per se ("I am thinking of X") so much as the motives or meanings that may lie behind the experience ("Yes, but why am I thinking of X? Does my thought of X really mean what I believe it means?"). The thought of X remains a given.

Many folk seem to be uncomfortable with uncertainty...but for me understanding uncertainty and the challenge of living with it is a major part of doing philosophy. — Janus

Agreed, and we could expand that to say, "Doing philosophy helps us understand what we even mean by words like 'knowledge' or 'certainty', words which seem to promise a great deal when used loosely, but which under scrutiny often don't cash out." Provisionally accepting and rejecting is how we get our beliefs to fit with our lives, it seems to me. To ask for more may be unreasonable, except on a few core issues.

These might sound like vague poetic gestures but in reality they're often vivid and life-changing realisations — Wayfarer

Absolutely. The "birth and death" imagery is constant across cultures, for good reason.

. . . apodictic, even, to those who undergo them. — Wayfarer

I know it seems that way. But we have to beware of such claims. There are too many instances of people who've been visited by powerful realizations of one sort or another, and then draw mad conclusions about the meaning of it. What's apodictic, arguably, is the the power and the reality of the experience. I don't think its source and interpretation can be similarly self-verifying.

There are too many instances of people who've been visited by powerful realizations of one sort or another, and then draw mad conclusions about the meaning of it. — J

:100: There are many dangers.

What is measured is a quantity of energy, and that is purely conceptual, just like 1.3 metres is purely conceptual in the example above. And 20 marbles is purely conceptual, as is 35 millimetres of rain. — Metaphysician Undercover

If it is purely conceptual, then it is impossible to explain how, operationally, there is a correspondence between our concepts (language) and the world. Operationally means that we work with the world, and ideas and concepts help us to deal with things. And it works! There are also restrictions that limit us in our language and concepts. That is what allows us to differentiate between science and pure imagination.

Thus, your idealistic and anti-realist position fails to account for the usefulness of concepts and ideas, and above all, it cannot justify why, when we deal with the world through ideas and concepts, we are even able to predict future events. Your position is anti-realist, while mine is pragmatic and operational. So when we deal with the quantum system, we are not simply inventing concepts and ideas that happen to be adequate by pure chance, but there is an operational continuity that allows us to deal accurately with different phenomena in the quantum world.

Of course the device interacts with the system — Metaphysician Undercover

System is a concept just like apparatus. You should flatly deny this, since there is no continuity or operability between our concepts and ideas and the world.

Your position is anti-realist, while mine is pragmatic and operational. — JuanZu

These are not mutually exclusive. See scientific instrumentalism, which argues against scientific realism, claiming that scientific theories are neither true nor false but only useful/successful or not.

Also related to this is Stephen Hawkings’ model-dependent realism, which despite the name is a brand of instrumentalism.

If it is purely conceptual, then it is impossible to explain how, operationally, there is a correspondence between our concepts (language) and the world. — JuanZu

Isn't this the point which Kant tries to make, that such is reality? But I don't believe "impossible" is the necessary conclusion here. I believe that the relation can be understood through purpose, or the good. Plato investigated this route, but Kant did not. The proposed "correspondence" between our concepts and the world is a relation of usefulness, and this implies that we are intentional beings acting with purpose.

Your use of "operationally" indicates that we have a common ground here. However, it seems that I recognize intention as a discontinuity, whereas you attempt to sweep it under the rug, and claim "continuity" regardless of the break which intention produces between concepts and the world.

Thus, your idealistic and anti-realist position fails to account for the usefulness of concepts and ideas, and above all, it cannot justify why, when we deal with the world through ideas and concepts, we are even able to predict future events. Your position is anti-realist, while mine is pragmatic and operational. — JuanZu

"Usefulness" is relative to the end, what is desired, "the good", and your employment of this necessitates that we account for the reality of intention. Concepts are deemed to be useful if they facilitate in getting what we want. And if what we want is the capacity to predict the future, then the ability to predict the future determines the prevailing relation between concept and the world.

In the case of quantum physics, statistics and probability are employed toward predicting the future. However, the use of such does not provide an understanding of the events which are predicted. For example, from watching the sunrise every day, one could predict exactly when and where it will rise tomorrow. But this predictive capacity provides no real understanding of this event. The same person who makes this prediction, might also claim that a dragon carries the sun in its mouth, every night, around from sunset to sunrise, in an habitual way. That would be a case of misunderstanding enabled by prediction.

So "ability to predict" is just one of many possible goals which could be desired. It may be many ways consistent with, and productive toward, the goal of understanding, but it doesn't necessarily produce understanding because understanding requires more than just the ability to predict.

So when we deal with the quantum system, we are not simply inventing concepts and ideas that happen to be adequate by pure chance, but there is an operational continuity that allows us to deal accurately with different phenomena in the quantum world. — JuanZu

Clearly you have made an invalid conclusion. The fact that "we are not simply inventing concepts", and that we are also trying them, testing them for usefulness, does not lead to the conclusion of "an operational continuity". There is still the matter of the goal, or end by which they are tested for usefulness, and this end presents a discontinuity. It is a discontinuity because of the lack of necessity in relation to ends. There are many possible goals and not one can be said to provide the necessary relation required for continuity.

A very significant insight. Recall the gospel teaching 'he who saves his own life will lose it, he who loses it for My sake will be saved'. The 'eastern' interpretation of that is precisely the overcoming (actually the death) of one's sense of egoic consciousness. Again a distant ideal, although in the religious context is is at least recognised. But in practice, the way it manifests is in self-giving. — Wayfarer

Distant, yet "nearest" of all, prior to bringing up the themes of inquiry. And it is IN, if you will, the fabric of the universe, not discovered in the discursive work that attempts to generate meaning apart from it. Philosophy needs to rediscover its own essence and ground. I am reading Derrida's White Mythology, an essay that uses Anatola France's Gardens of Epicurus brief dialog between Polyphilos and Ariste (sp?) to discuss this "distance". Polyphilos argues that metaphysics is like a coin, worn and torn through the ages, no longer bearing the distinctive images it once had, and so the "original" markings are lost, and this is like what the language of metaphysics is: having lost all sense of the original language that once was unconditionally clear, it becomes a blurr of abstractions. There is something here close to what analytic philosophy thinks, that there is a reality in the naturalism of science which is clear in its attempt to discover what is really there in the clarity of its quantifications. Something original and true that ancient thinking has blurred in its theo-metaphysics. Derrida thinks this idea of some original language is only going to be conceived in the very "corrupt" current body of language use that is supposed to have risen out of it. In other words, the wear and tear of the coin in this metaphor could only be meaningful if one could observe from this lost perspectiv, which makes the entire metaphor collapse upon itself, that is, language and its metaphysical "distinctions" cannot be compared to anything original, for this latter would lie outside of this current distinctive totality.

So on distance: one way to look at this is as a critique of scientfic metaphysics in which it is thought that science has as its ground of inquiry in some independent reality, something there that has always been there discoverable in the rigorous attempts to "recover" it details. But language does not have this relation with the world, no matter how rigorous it is. Words do not stand for a world, but "stand in" for a world, and the distance between language and the world is altogether indeterminate.

Or is it? Another look at Poyphilos' position: It is language that brings the world into view, but also keeps it at a distance, for in language we conceive of distance itself. The actuality, what lies before one's very eyes, is that there really never was any such distance (almost affirming Polyphilos' claim, though in a different way). The infant opens her eyes and learns language out of an original unity. It took centuries of thoughtful alienation to create distance. Not that the infant's insights are original and profound; she has no insights. But the original singularity of our existence is there in the "original" infantility, lost in the societal and scientific (them same thing really) evolvement, and in this way Polyphilos is right; only, and I suppose this is my point, it is through language and the construction of agency (which you gave affirmation to) that insight is possible.

And just to follow through, This original unity refers to the proximity of the world: meditative discovery, "panna", the wisdom that issues forth after all that hard meditative work, is a coming home to something original, something that has always been there, but forgotten post-infancy, however now it is WITH insight and agency. We are "thrown" into a a forgetfulness; this is our existence.

So I don't have much time for the dogmatists who want to claim things like, for example, that we know, thanks to Kant, that space and time and all the categories are purely subjective or that intellectual intuition could be a reliable guide to the way things really are. — Janus

“…..For there are so many groundless pretensions to the enlargement of our knowledge by pure reason that we must take it as a general rule to be mistrustful of all such, and without a thoroughgoing and radical deduction, to believe nothing of the sort even on the clearest dogmatical evidence.…” (A210/B255)

Just to say the typical claims of knowledge presented herein, presumably under the auspices of “clearest dogmatic evidence”, re: knowledge of the purely subjective, and, knowledge of the applicability of intellectual intuition, thanks to Kant, do not meet the criteria for the possibility of knowledge in general, thus these claims do not, nor could they ever, afford to us any knowledge at all, which a “thoroughgoing and radical deduction” would prove.

Still, you might agree, while having no time for them is no less a legitimate prerogative, it’s more often the case, that they who make these types of dogmatic claims may be under-informed, or perhaps even fully informed by an entirely separate set of presuppositions, especially with respect to reliable guides for the way things really are, thereby not so much unrepentant dogmatist(s), which is merely he who claims….thanks to Kant…..knowledge of that for which no empirical demonstration is possible.

Idle comment; of no particular import. Idealism in context?

Right, I'm not claiming that Kant necessarily believed he knew that space and time and the categories are purely subjective (subjective in the sense of being entirely due to the constitution of subjects) but that there are those who proffer dogma using Kant as purported support for their contentions.

I think Kant can be read as claiming that we cannot apply our sense of time and space to a mind-independent reality, not that reality in itself cannot be in any way spatiotemporal. As I've said many times it seems implausible that an undifferentiated in itself could produce our experienced world of unimaginable diversity.

Also the very idea of differentiation, diversity is incomprehensible without time and space. Of course we have no cognitive access (by definition) to the in itself, but we may infer its nature in accordance with what seems most plausible given the nature of our cognitive experience.

We are "thrown" into a a forgetfulness; this is our existence. — Constance

:clap: :pray:

Your use of "operationally" indicates that we have a common ground here. However, it seems that I recognize intention as a discontinuity, whereas you attempt to sweep it under the rug, and claim "continuity" regardless of the break which intention produces between concepts and the world. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is a discontinuity because of the lack of necessity in relation to ends. — Metaphysician Undercover

I speak of continuity because our intentions are thrown into the world. That is, there is a determining exteriority in our intentional acts (It is no coincidence that the world has historically been understood as exteriority). Our intentions have purposes in the world. Hence, it is necessary to speak of intentions extended in our operations (the body, for example, building and manipulating a machine to measure something). The fact that there are many possible ends does not change this continuity at all as long as it remains on the horizon of the world. A world that demands that we and our intentions be operational, whatever the purpose we are talking about.

There is a hidden dualism in your position. You think of a kind of purpose and intentional acts that have nothing to do with the world and its operational demands. It is the division between mind and body that makes the mind something totally detached from the world and the body, as if walking and having a different horizon. And I cannot agree with that. As I have said, our intentional acts (including madness) have the world as their horizon.

So when we deal with the quantum system, we are not simply inventing concepts and ideas that happen to be adequate by pure chance, but there is an operational continuity that allows us to deal accurately with different phenomena in the quantum world.

The fact that there are many possible ends does not change this continuity at all as long as it remains on the horizon of the world. — JuanZu

I have no idea how you are using "continuity" here. The possible ends, or goals are clearly not on the horizon of the world, as they are distinctly possible, and the horizon is the boundary of the actual world. Therefore the possible ends are outside the boundary or horizon of the world, and that is why there is a discontinuity.

There is a hidden dualism in your position. — JuanZu

Why do you say that the dualism is hidden? I don't think that free will and intention can be understood without dualism so the dualism is blatant. Those compatibilists who think that free will can be real within a reality which is defined by a monist determinism practise self-deception.

You think of a kind of purpose and intentional acts that have nothing to do with the world and its operational demands. — JuanZu

That's right, we commonly come up with goals, intentions which are completely unrealistic, fantastic and imaginary, having nothing to do with the world, and totally beyond the operational demands of the world.

As I have said, our intentional acts (including madness) have the world as their horizon. — JuanZu

How could you possibly justify this claim? Since the goals of intentional acts are always simply possible, and never something actual in the world, until the goal is realized, how could a goal have the actual world as it's horizon?

It appears to me that the exact opposite of what you say, is what is the case. It is impossible that an intentional act could have the world as its horizon, because "the world" refers to what actually is, and the intentional act is directed toward something apprehended which is lacking from the world. It is directed toward what is desired, the thing which the act is intended to brings about. Therefore the intentional act never has the world as its horizon.

If you look closely, its possibility is determined by the horizon of the world. How can something be possible if it does not mean possible IN THE WORLD? This shows that its nature of possibility has the world as its horizon.

Why do you say that the dualism is hidden? I don't think that free will and intention can be understood without dualism so the dualism is blatant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok. Then si no hidden.

If you look closely, its possibility is determined by the horizon of the world. How can something be possible if it does not mean possible IN THE WORLD? This shows that its nature of possibility has the world as its horizon. — JuanZu

Possibilities are determined by minds, and it is commonly recognized that possibilities are distinctly determinations which are NOT IN THE WORLD. The world consists exclusively of what is actual, or else we'd have all sorts of imaginary things existing IN THE WORLD. Minds determine what is possible, and these same minds recognize that these possibilities are NOT IN THE WORLD, they are simply determinations of the mind.

Whether the minds are correct or not in their determinations is another issue. Even if they are mistaken in there determinations of "possible", this does not mean that there is some other form of "possible" which is not determined by a mind and is IN THE WORLD. It just means that the mind which makes the mistaken determination of what is possible, misunderstands what is actual. A mistaken determination of what is possible simply reflects a mistaken understanding of what is actual.

This very break between what is actual and what is possible is the reason why we must assume discontinuity.

Possibilities are determined by minds, and it is commonly recognized that possibilities are distinctly determinations which are NOT IN THE WORLD. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not in the world just like that, but in a possible world. But it is still a world as telos and exteriority. That is why possibility has a horizon of realisation, and the world is realisation, possible, actual or not. It does not matter if our purposes do not fit into the actual world, but what matters is that they have the world and realisation as their telos. The world is inscribed in the concept of possibility, which is why I say that it is its inherent horizon. In this sense, minds are also thrown into the world; our intentional acts, being possibilities, are inscribed in this telos. Thus, there is a continuity between mind and world, but the world is no longer that thing that is determined once and for all, but rather possesses two shadows, which we call past and future as possibilities and as contingencies. What is actual is at once possible but neither necessary nor impossible. The world thus, a world of pure possibility, is in continuity with the consciousness of possibility.

Not in the world just like that, but in a possible world. — JuanZu

The horizon of the world does not include possible worlds. The opposite could be true, that possible worlds could include the world. But inversion is not permissible because this would allow that the contradictions of the different possible worlds would co-exist within the world.

And even if we assume the premise that the world is one of the multitude of possible worlds, then we need a completely distinct principle by which the actual world is distinguished. It is because of this that discontinuity must be assumed.

That is why possibility has a horizon of realisation, and the world is realisation, possible, actual or not. — JuanZu

See, even you have turned things around now, inverted your claims. You have now assigned the horizon to possibility, instead of to the world. You now refer to "the horizon of realization", which possibility has, and the world is the realization, instead of your former claim that possibility was within the horizon of the world.

So, as I explain above, we need a completely distinct principle which forms the "horizon of realisation" which possibility has. This principle must be distinct, forming a sort of boundary to possibility, and not being a possibility itself, and that's why we must conclude discontinuity. "The world" is on the other side of this boundary, as something completely distinct from possibility formed by the reality of the boundary. This is what allows for the reality of "truth".

The world is inscribed in the concept of possibility, which is why I say that it is its inherent horizon. — JuanZu

No, this is explicitly false. Within the concept of possibility there is nothing which distinguishes "the world". This is why possibility is often understood as possible worlds, plural. And to allow that all the possible worlds are truly possible, there cannot be one which is "the world", or else that would deny the possibility of those which contradict "the world". So the principles which determine "the world" must be external to the concept of possibility, as those principles which designate truth, usually according to correspondence with empirical fact.

What is actual is at once possible but neither necessary nor impossible. The world thus, a world of pure possibility, is in continuity with the consciousness of possibility. — JuanZu

This is the incoherency which results from your insistence that 'the world" is a continuous aspect of possibility. You have denied any meaning from "actual", by stating that its meaning is neither derived from "necessary", nor "impossible". Therefore you have no principle whereby you might propose an reality of "the world". Accordingly you propose that "the world" is pure possibility, and this implies that it is an infinity of possible worlds. So you have no principle whereby "pure possibility" is one united entity as "the world". It can only be conceived as an infinity of possible worlds. Therefore you have no such thing as "the world" and you have not closed the gap between the world and possibility.

You should accept the premise of the possible world, since in our relationship with the world, it is shown as something that is not given once and for all (the future is not given). That is why the horizon I am talking about is presented as a possibility, because, for example, we do not know what will happen in the future, and the future is the future of the world where our actions will take place. So there is a continuity between the state of the world "not given once and for all" and our horizon of possibility of the world. For it is obvious that when we look at the world, it is not given once and for all, that is, the future has not yet happened.

I have not changed things, I have simply expressed a series of implications that are in the notion of the horizon of the world. As I said, there is a non-given world, and this is closely related to the concept of possibility. How is it related? Well, it is very simple: if the world is not given once and for all and we project ourselves into the future, these projections are possibilities that have the non-given world as their horizon, that is, the future, that is, the possible.

The possible world that is our horizon of action and intentional acts cannot, however, be necessary, as this contradicts our experience of the world, since it is not always given once and for all. Nor can it be impossible, because impossibility negates possibility. And our intentional acts are expressed as possibility and something that can happen, as something not given but that can happen. So there is a continuity between the non-given world and our horizon of the world, which is the horizon of the possible world.