In the pre-modern vision of things, the cosmos had been seen as an inherently purposive structure of diverse but integrally inseparable rational relations — for instance, the Aristotelian aitia, which are conventionally translated as “causes,” but which are nothing like the uniform material “causes” of the mechanistic philosophy. And so the natural order was seen as a reality already akin to intellect. Hence the mind, rather than an anomalous tenant of an alien universe, was instead the most concentrated and luminous expression of nature’s deepest essence. This is why it could pass with such wanton liberty through the “veil of Isis” and ever deeper into nature’s inner mysteries.
All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. But... the connection between cause and effect is not a product of reasoning, but of custom. — An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
the Aristotelian sense of logos as both reason and structure — Wayfarer
IMO, the Law Realists improved upon this by proposing that laws of nature entail a necessitation. They define a law of nature as a causal relation between types of things (AKA "universals"). Hume would notice the empirical evidence that every observed pair of electrons repelled each other, and label this a "constant conjunction", while law realists would say that electrons (a type of thing) repel each other - and this is constitutes a law. If A and B are electrons, then they it is physically necessary that they will repel, given that that this law exists.David Hume broke this supposed relationship. He argued that causation is not something we can deduce from reason alone — it's only ever inferred from constant conjunctions: "We see A followed by B, and infer causation." Hence, causation is not logically necessary but contingent and habitual. — Wayfarer
What's wrong with that? It's a metaphysical hypothesis with broad explanatory scope, and consistent with the success of science.the only way we ever know about universals or laws is through the activity of reason, the mind’s ability to discern likeness within diversity and to infer necessity where the senses show only succession — Wayfarer
You're conflating law realism with physicalism. One could accept the reality of laws, while choosing to believe "the mind" is not the product of natural law - whether by faith (as religious scientists do), or by hypothesis - including whatever hypothesis of mind you are drawn to.The difficulty is that law realists won’t acknowledge it, because it thinks mind itself is simply the product of those same physical processes which it situates ‘in things’. — Wayfarer
You're conflating law realism with physicalism — Relativist
I am open to alternatives to a physicalist metaphysics, but I haven't seen any viable proposals from you or anyone else. You've merely pointed to the hard problem of consciousness as a reason to be skeptical of a physicalist theory of mind. The alternatives are as speculative as they are numerous, so they do no more than raise possibilities. You seem interested in exploring these possibilities, but I am not. I'd be interested if you (or someone) felt he had a persuasive argument to support one of them, but my impression is that each theory gets embraced purely on subjective grounds.Many of the contributors I will talk to here - Apustimologist, Relativist, Philosophim, to name a few - assume that, as the brain is physical, and the brain is the source of throught, then thought too has a physical basis. In fact they can't even conceive of there being an alternative to that, it is so firmly a tenet of modern culture. — Wayfarer
You seem interested in exploring these possibilities, but I am not. — Relativist
And yet, physicalism does comprise a comprehensive metaphysics. My eyes are wide open: I recognize that it's imperfect; I want to understand it's weaknesses, because that comprises an area where it can't be applied. But it can be applied to most everything I'm interested in.I understand that you’re looking for a comprehensive alternative metaphysics. That’s a high bar — one that most philosophers don’t clear. — Wayfarer
The meaning of "Metaphysics" has broadened:Remember that “metaphysics” as a term originates with Aristotle... — Wayfarer
My statements were not a judgement of anyone else's rationality. But it would be irrational for me to drop physicalist metaphysics in total just because of the negative fact you repeatedly discuss: the mind is not entirely physical. I do not insist the mind is necessarily 100% physical (I'm not dogmatic), but whatever else it might be seems unknowable - and therefore the possibilities I've seen discussed simply seem like speculative guesses. You certainly don't have to agree with me, but if you believe my judgement (rooted in my backrgound beliefs) is misguided (irrational), then please identify my errors. If you don't wish to, then just agree to disagree and stop reacting negatively when I describe my point of view.When you lump everything else under “enormous speculative guesses,” you’re effectively classifying any framework that doesn’t begin from physicalist premises as irrational — Wayfarer
I do not insist the mind is necessarily 100% physical (I'm not dogmatic), but whatever else it might be seems unknowable - and therefore the possibilities I've seen discussed simply seem like speculative guesses. — Relativist
we can experiment on the physical world and come up with causal explanations in a way that we can't do with the "non physical mental world" you suppose exists. — flannel jesus
So...you make the unwarranted assumption that I won't. What I would need would be reasoning to support an alternative. A couple months ago, you said:I haven't seen any indication that you will consider any alternatives. — Wayfarer
As for the 'unknown immaterial ground' - what if that 'unknown immaterial ground' is simply thought itself? — Wayfarer
Why should I believe that? Why do you believe this to be more than a bare possibility? Thinking is a process - a process that humans engage in. Referring to a "thought" as an object seems like treating a "run" (the process of running) as an object. There's no run unless there's a runner, and there's no thought unless there's a thinker. This is what seems to be the case, so explain how your alternative makes sense. — Relativist
I've been forthcoming with what I believe and why I believe it. This affords you the opportunity to identify a flaw in my reasoning, or undercut something I believe. — Relativist
In addition to pointing out the so-called 'hard problem of consciousness' (which is the irreducibility of first-person experience) I've also argued along other lines, such as that information is not reducible to matter or energy (Norbert Wiener); that what exists and what is known to be real are not coterminous (C S Peirce); that the placebo effect and neuroplasticity as cases of top-down causation are inconsistent with neuro-physicalism; that constraints, forms, and intelligible structures (laws) play a real role, which physicalism as substance-ontology fails to recognise. — Wayfarer
How, for example, do you explain syllogistic logic, or for that matter general semantics, in terms of neural processing? Syllogistic logic and general semantics operate in a normative, rule-governed space ('the space of reasons'). To reduce that to neural processing is a category mistake. Neural firings may underlie thought, but they don’t explain validity, reference, or meaning. — Wayfarer
how it can be the case that there is a N-teenth prime even if no one knows what it is, or has ever had the thought of it. — J
But the same can be said of the real numbers, generally. Do they exist prior to being discovered? — Wayfarer
it is not referring to a domain in the sense of a place. — Wayfarer
It is the domain of ideas that can only be grasped by a rational intelligence. But at least some of these are not generated or created but discovered by the mind. I think that's what Popper was driving at. — Wayfarer
I don't see why a N-teenth prime is a problem. We know how mathematics works, whether we discovered it or invented it. — Patterner
it is not referring to a domain in the sense of a place.
— Wayfarer
Do some people think it is? A "place" without space and time? Hmm . . . — J
Scientists tend to be empiricists; they imagine the universe to be made up of things we can touch and taste and so on; things we can learn about through observation and experiment. The idea of something existing “outside of space and time” makes empiricists nervous: It sounds embarrassingly like the way religious believers talk about God, and God was banished from respectable scientific discourse a long time ago.
Platonism, as mathematician Brian Davies has put it, “has more in common with mystical religions than it does with modern science.” — What is Math? Smithsonian Magazine
Platonism, as mathematician Brian Davies has put it, “has more in common with mystical religions than it does with modern science.” — What is Math? Smithsonian Magazine
Is the problem that humans might have invented mathematics? If that's it, I don't see it as a problem. It seems to me physical things we've invented are as real as physical things we did not invent, and non-physical things we've invented are as real as non-physical things we did not invent.Sure. It's only a problem if you're philosophically bothered by the question "discovered or invented?" — J
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