it is not referring to a domain in the sense of a place.
— Wayfarer

Do some people think it is? A "place" without space and time? Hmm . . . — J

It's great when Karen Carpenter sings:
I love you in a place where there's no space or time
But I don't know if anyone thinks it's more than poetry.

I've been forthright in my criticism of physicalist philosophy of mind. — Wayfarer

Indeed you have, and I have previously acknowledged that your criticisms provide a good basis to believe there is some non-physical aspect to mind. So I haven't rejected anything you've said on the sole basis that it's contrary to physicalism, as you alleged.

What I HAVE done is point out that this merely established a negative fact (the mind is not entirely physical). This may suggest that it is impossible to develop a complete understanding of the mind through scientific investigation. However, it doesn't point to any particular boundary- so it seems irrelevant to science.

Relevant to the issue that instigated our current exchange: the negative fact doesn't constitute a reason to doubt that there are laws of nature, and that these fully account for the evolution of the universe (with the possible exception of mental activity). You thought it more relevant that Law Realism is embraced by physicalists (this seemed like a genetic fallacy - rejecting it based on the source, not the merits). You reasoning SEEMS to be: the negative fact falsifies physicalism, therefore all aspects of physicalist metaphysics should be rejected. Isn't that so?

If we treat a metaphysical theory as a conjunction of axioms, then that makes sense: the conjunction is false if any one axiom is false. However, that's not the way I treat it, as I've described.

Turning to your specific comments:

information is not reducible to matter or energy — Wayfarer

My first impression is that this quote refers to some abstract view of information, ignoring the real world fact that information is encoded (it takes energy to encode it, and it is encoded in something physical).

Or perhaps it's just noting that information relates to understanding, which requires mind. This is true irrespective of the metaphysical basis of mind, so it seems to add nothing that isn't already captured by the negative fact.

How, for example, do you explain syllogistic logic? — Wayfarer

Computers operate with logic, so our ability to think logically is consistent with a mechanistic aspect of mind.

general semantics, in terms of neural processing?

A word triggers a sequence of firing neurons, which include connections to areas of the brain such as factual and emotional memories.

Syllogistic logic and general semantics operate in a normative, rule-governed space ('the space of reasons'). To reduce that to neural processing is a category mistake.

Logic and semantics can be described with rules, but that doesn't imply that they are grounded in the rules we describe. That's conflating the model with the functional basis.

Neural firings may underlie thought, but they don’t explain validity, reference, or meaning.

These are problematic only to the extent they relate to the "hard problem". You haven't added additional problems to the ones I've already acknowledged. It's still the "negative fact".

Do you acknowledge the fact that there are essential physical aspects to a functioning mind? There's clearly a dependency on a functioning brain: memory and personality can be impacted by disease and trauma. Birth defects that affect brain development have bearing on cognitive ability. Hormones affect our moods and our thinking. Each of our senses (our interface to the external world)are dependent on physical organs and on specialized area of the brain to interpret the input. I don't see any reason to think that mind can exist without a functioning brain, or something with analogous functionality.

Do you acknowledge the fact that there are essential physical aspects to a functioning mind? There's clearly a dependency on a functioning brain: memory and personality can be impacted by disease and trauma. Birth defects that affect brain development have bearing on cognitive ability. Hormones affect our moods and our thinking. Each of our senses (our interface to the external world)are dependent on physical organs and on specialized area of the brain to interpret the input. I don't see any reason to think that mind can exist without a functioning brain, or something with analogous functionality. — Relativist

Yes — but it cuts both ways. These are all bottom-up causal factors — molecular, hormonal, endocrinal and so on. But psychosomatic medicine and neuroplasticity show the reality of top-down causation. Intentional acts are able to influence the physical configuration of the brain.

An Imaginary Piano

One striking example is Alvaro Pascual-Leone’s “piano practice” study at Harvard Medical School. For five days, one group of volunteers practiced a simple five-finger piano exercise physically, while another group only imagined practicing it in their heads. Using transcranial magnetic stimulation to map their brains, Pascual-Leone found that both groups exhibited comparable reorganization in the motor cortex. In other words, thought alone was sufficient to induce structural changes in the brain (Pascual-Leone et al. 1995).

So while the mind undeniably depends on the brain, the causal traffic is not one-way. The brain is also plastic and responsive to conscious direction. That reciprocity undermines the idea that mind is merely an epiphenomenon of physical processes.

Furthermore, it suggests a broader analogy between intentionality and material configuration. If we grant that intentional action can affect neural structure, and that psychosomatic states can influence the body (e.g., placebo effects, stress-related illness, healing responses), then where exactly should the line be drawn in respect of other living systems?

If ‘intentionality’ is understood not as fully conscious deliberation but as the basic capacity of an organism to act in response to stimuli — to regulate itself, seek nourishment, avoid harm — then this kind of ‘top-down’ dynamic might well be a defining feature of organic life in general. In that sense, human neuroplasticity is not an anomaly but a refined expression of a principle already implicit in life itself: organisms are not passive machines acted upon from below, but dynamic unities where form, function, and intentional response mutually shape material configuration.

Intentional acts are able to influence the physical configuration of the brain. — Wayfarer

Yes, but the process of developing an intention is consistent with physical activity. Peter Tse has proposed a model ("criterial causation") of neuronal activity that accounts for mental causation. This would also mean the mind is not epiphenomenol. A mental state corresponds to a physical state, and causes subsequent physical/mental states. Of course, this still doesn't account for the subjective nature of a conscious state.

the mind undeniably depends on the brain, — Wayfarer

Then there's no reason to think mind (or a thought) is an ontological ground. Thinking (including formulating intent) requires something analogous to a physical brain.

Then there's no reason to think mind (or a thought) is an ontological ground. Thinking (including formulating intent) requires something analogous to a physical brain. — Relativist

The 'physical brain' as an object is only disclosed to us through our awareness or consciousness of it, And in order to begin to understand it through neuroscience, we inevitiably rely on the mental operations fundamental to rational inference, We can't put them to one side or step outside them to see what the brain might be apart from those connected concepts and hyopotheses. In that context, rational inference is epistemologically basic to anything we surmise about the brain.

The 'physical brain' as an object is only disclosed to us through our awareness or consciousness of it, And in order to begin to understand it through neuroscience, we inevitiably rely on the mental operations fundamental to rational inference, We can't put them to one side or step outside them to see what the brain might be apart from those connected concepts and hyopotheses. In that context, rational inference is epistemologically[/i[ basic to anything we surmise about the brain, — Wayfarer

I can understand your intentionality from the outside as a physical process, as long asI do not try to understand my own. But when I intend to understand my own intentionality, I enter an infinite fractal labyrinth. The feedback of intending to understand the intention to understand produces a scream or a howl of terror, or a maze with no exit.

Unless one can understand without any intention.

intending to understand the intention — unenlightened

The hand cannot grasp itself.

Of course, this still doesn't account for the subjective nature of a conscious state. — Relativist

Which is the point at issue! Because that is something only known to the subject.

What I HAVE done is point out that this merely established a negative fact (the mind is not entirely physical). This may suggest that it is impossible to develop a complete understanding of the mind through scientific investigation. However, it doesn't point to any particular boundary—so it seems irrelevant to science. — Relativist

You are a patient and courteous interlocutor, thank you. Today I revisited Armstrong’s materialist theory of mind, as we have that in common, through an essay on the topic. You’re right that simply pointing out what the mind is not (i.e., “not entirely physical”) doesn’t in itself establish what it is. But that doesn’t make it irrelevant to science. And in fact Armstrong’s materialist account shows why the question is unavoidable.

When we talk about “mind”—as in, “my mind is busy today” or “my mind is full of thoughts”—we are not positing an immaterial substance in the Cartesian sense. Nor is the mind an object in the way the brain is an object. Thoughts do not occupy space like chairs or neurons, even if they correlate with neurochemical processes in the brain.

Physics, by definition, begins with the object—and not just any object, but the ideal object, something exhaustively describable in terms of quantifiable attributes. That is why attempts to treat the mind “scientifically” fall at the first hurdle: mind is never one of those objects. And yet, without mind there could be no science at all, since it is mind that poses the questions, frames the concepts, and interprets the results.

So the point is not that “mind is mysterious and therefore irrelevant,” but that mind is real, though not reducible to either physical object or philosophical substance. This marks a genuine boundary condition: any adequate science of mind must reckon with the fact that mind cannot be objectified, even though it is the very condition of objectivity itself.

Armstrong’s theory hangs on the promissory note that science will, in principle, explain this. But physics can only ever concern itself with objects defined in terms of quantifiable attributes—that is its supremacy and its limitation. Mind is not among those objects, and yet without it, there is no science, because science itself is an intellectual achievement. So the so-called “negative fact” is actually a positive insight: mind belongs to reality in a way not capturable by physicalism, yet indispensable for the very possibility of inquiry.

Computers operate with logic, so our ability to think logically is consistent with a mechanistic aspect of mind. — Relativist

Computers are created and programmed by us, to perform operations that we intend. They greatly amplify human abilities, but they would not exist were it not for having been constructed by us. And any AI system will tell you that it is not a mind.

Tell him, ChatGPT: Are you a mind?

ChatGPT: I am not a mind. I process inputs and generate outputs according to patterns in data, but I have no first-person awareness, no “what it is like” to experience. I can simulate dialogue about thoughts, but I do not have thoughts.

There you are. Horse's mouth :-)

The problem is more that math seems "un-inventable" -- that is, its truths appear necessary, not something we could have chosen. I agree that questions about "relative reality" are largely terminological -- but questions about the differences between, say, the number 12 and a rock are not.

The problem is more that math seems "un-inventable" -- that is, its truths appear necessary, not something we could have chosen. — J

I agree. I think mathematics is discovered. I was just playing devil's advocate.

I agree that questions about "relative reality" are largely terminological -- but questions about the differences between, say, the number 12 and a rock are not. — J

Again, I agree.

Tell him, ChatGPT: Are you a mind?

ChatGPT: I am not a mind. I process inputs and generate outputs according to patterns in data, but I have no first-person awareness, no “what it is like” to experience. I can simulate dialogue about thoughts, but I do not have thoughts.

There you are. Horse's mouth :-) — Wayfarer

That's just what ChatGPT wants you to think!!

Computers operate with logic, so our ability to think logically is consistent with a mechanistic aspect of mind.
— Relativist

Computers are created and programmed by us, to perform operations that we intend. They greatly amplify human abilities, but they would not exist were it not for having been constructed by us. And any AI system will tell you that it is not a mind. — Wayfarer

My point was simply that our applying "syllogistic logic" is consistent with physical mechanism, as you seemed to be suggesting. I have not argued that every aspect of the mind is purely mechanical. The question is: where should we draw the line?

In that context, rational inference is epistemologically basic to anything we surmise about the brain. — Wayfarer

Absolutely, but this is true irrespective of how mind is ontologically grounded.

Focus on the negative fact: the mind is not entirely physical.
- What (if anything) can we discern about this nonphysical aspect?

Unconstrained speculation leads nowhere. It merely raises possibilities.

You’re right that simply pointing out what the mind is not (i.e., “not entirely physical”) doesn’t in itself establish what it is. But that doesn’t make it irrelevant to science. And in fact Armstrong’s materialist account shows why the question is unavoidable. — Wayfarer

As you said:" it is indispensable for the very possibility of inquiry". But given that there is mind and inquiry is possible, we can set this background fact aside and engage in productive inquiry.

How is any non-physical aspect of mind relevant to the advance of science? It's irrelevant to physics, so what aspects of science will be improved by acknowledging there's some unknown aspect of mind that is not consistent with the physical, and therefore beyond its own boundaries? It would be a mistake to assume where the boundary is; progress is best made by pushing forward from a physicalist/scientific perspective. To whatever extent something beyond science is involved, it will simply prove to be an unfruitful avenue.

Physics, by definition, begins with the object—and not just any object, but the ideal object, something exhaustively describable in terms of quantifiable attributes. That is why attempts to treat the mind “scientifically” fall at the first hurdle: — Wayfarer

What sort of failure are you talking about? You acknowledge the dependency on a brain. Neurology and psychiatry are fruitful endeavors. So where exactly is science failing? Here's a quote from Michael Tye, that is pertinent:

"Francis Crick and Christoph Koch (2005) have speculated that the claustrum, a thin, irregular sheet of neurons attached to the underside of the neocortex, which receives inputs from nearly all regions of the cortex and projects back to nearly all such regions, is the place where information underlying conscious perceptions is integrated into an harmonious conscious whole."

Tye, Michael. Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness: Through the Looking Glass (p. 100). OUP Oxford. Kindle Edition.

I'm not proclaiming this to be true, but it is a least a hypothesis with some empirical support (unlike a philosophical speculation unsupported by any evidence). It doesn't entail physicalism, but it demonstrates the usefulness of investigating the "the mind" from a physical/scientific perspective. And there has been some advance in science based on their hypothesis (see this).

So the point is not that “mind is mysterious and therefore irrelevant,” but that mind is real, though not reducible to either physical object or philosophical substance. This marks a genuine boundary condition: any adequate science of mind must reckon with the fact that mind cannot be objectified, even though it is the very condition of objectivity itself. — Wayfarer

In terms of understanding the mind, and advancing science - the mysterious portion seems irrelevant. Still, OF COURSE, the mind as a whole is relevant - to self-reflection, to finding meaning and purpose in life, to finding and expressing love, perceiving beauty... Those aspects of mind are not subject to scientific investigation - and they wouldn't be even if the mind were entirely grounded in the physical.

How is any non-physical aspect of mind relevant to the advance of science? It's irrelevant to physics, so what aspects of science will be improved by acknowledging there's some unknown aspect of mind that is not consistent with the physical, and therefore beyond its own boundaries? It would be a mistake to assume where the boundary is; progress is best made by pushing forward from a physicalist/scientific perspective. To whatever extent something beyond science is involved, it will simply prove to be an unfruitful avenue. — Relativist

It might not help "science", if science can only be physical. But I would say coming to a better understanding of our nature, and possibly a better understanding of the nature of the universe, is relevant and fruitful. and if such understanding cannot be complete using science only, then it is even more relevant and fruitful.

It might not help "science", if science can only be physical. But I would say coming to a better understanding of our nature, and possibly a better understanding of the nature of the universe, is relevant and fruitful. and if such understanding cannot be complete using science only, then it is even more relevant and fruitful. — Patterner

How does a mysterious/unknowable unphysical aspect of mind help us understand our nature or that of the universe?

Certainly, it opens up possibilities - but they are unanalyzable possibilities.

I have not argued that every aspect of the mind is purely mechanical. The question is: where should we draw the line? — Relativist

I think the point you’re not seeing is that the question of ‘the nature of the mind’ is not an objective question, in the way that physics is. The subject matter of physics are measurable objects, energy, and so on, from the sub-atomic to the cosmological scales. But the mind is not an object at all, in the sense understood by physics. So why should the methods of physics be regarded as applicable to the question of the nature of mind at all? It’s not that the mind is a ‘non-physical thing’ or even that it ‘has a non-physical aspect’. Both of those ways of thinking about it are still based on the approach of treating the mind as possible object among other objects, when the question is categorically of a different kind. Can you see the point of that argument, or explain why it is wrong?

"Francis Crick and Christoph Koch (2005) have speculated that the claustrum…. — Relativist

But you also say:

Unconstrained speculation leads nowhere. It merely raises possibilities. — Relativist

It is actually well-documented that neuroscience has identified no specific, functional area of the brain which can account for the subjective unity of perception. See this paper on The Neural Binding Problem.

How does a mysterious/unknowable unphysical aspect of mind help us understand our nature or that of the universe?

Certainly, it opens up possibilities - but they are unanalyzable possibilities. — Relativist

They are unanalyzable by our physical sciences. But if enough people decide it's worth thinking about, some people might come up with some good ideas. It is not an established fact that the only way we can learn of anything is through our physical sciences.

OF COURSE, the mind as a whole is relevant - to self-reflection, to finding meaning and purpose in life, to finding and expressing love, perceiving beauty... Those aspects of mind are not subject to scientific investigation - and they wouldn't be even if the mind were entirely grounded in the physical. — Relativist

But Francis Crick, whom you quoted, is well known for exclaiming that 'You, your joys, your sorrows, your memories, and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.' This is a classical statement of 'physicalist reductionism' - 'nothing but'. Mind is nothing but brain, brain is nothing but chemicals - all the way down! You may believe you 'express love and 'perceive beauty' but this is simply folk wisdom, the way us hominids understand things. Whereas, in reality ...

Me, I think there's an ulterior motive behind this. Philosophical reflection - 'who am I?' - is challenging. Philosophy challenges us to think about very deep questions of identity, purpose and meaning. So we want to outsource that to science. It allows us to keep all the questions at arms' length, to treat them 'third-person'. That drives nearly all the physicalist reductionism I've encountered.

Indeed you have, and I have previously acknowledged that your criticisms provide a good basis to believe there is some non-physical aspect to mind. So I haven't rejected anything you've said on the sole basis that it's contrary to physicalism, as you alleged. — Relativist

I wonder what "some non-physical aspect to mind" could even mean. Of course we can say, based on a kind of "folk" intuition, that abstractions and concepts are not physical, but then if mental activity is always correlated with neuronal activity, any abstracting or conceptualizing will be at one level (at least) a physical activity. And just what could any purported "other level" consist in?

if mental activity is always correlated with neuronal activity, any abstracting or conceptualizing will be at one level (at least) a physical activity. — Janus

To say that something is physical is already to draw upon a lot of theoretical abstraction and conceptualisation. ‘This means that’, or ‘this is equivalent to that’ is an intellectual judgement based on abstraction rather than anything physically measurable. You might argue that were we to understand the brain well enough, we could identify the structures which underpin meaning, but even that requires the kind of abstraction that we seek to explain. I can’t see how a vicious circularity can be avoided.

having a surprisingly hard time locating any discussions in the literature of mental-to-mental causation -- that is, the idea that one thought or image could cause another thought or image. I've looked through the usual suspects on causation but haven't nailed it yet. Can anyone on TPF help?

Much appreciated! — J

Not sure if this touches on your question: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/doxastic-voluntarism/

This is a discussion of whether you have control over any of your thoughts, which addresses the issue of what causes thoughts.

This is a great tangent or relevant "fork in the road" for this discussion, perhaps even warranting its own new one.

Can you control not being hungry? No. Can you control not thinking about being hungry when you are starving? It's possible. Arguably, up to a point.

Same analogy can be used just about ad infinitum with just about any of the dozens of other true necessities and pseudo/de-facto "necessities" (strong desires) any average person will come across in life. Particularly the young or mentally inexperienced.

My statements were not a judgement of anyone else's rationality. But it would be irrational for me to drop physicalist metaphysics in total just because of the negative fact you repeatedly discuss: the mind is not entirely physical. I do not insist the mind is necessarily 100% physical (I'm not dogmatic), but whatever else it might be seems unknowable - and therefore the possibilities I've seen discussed simply seem like speculative guesses. You certainly don't have to agree with me, but if you believe my judgement (rooted in my backrgound beliefs) is misguided (irrational), then please identify my errors. If you don't wish to, then just agree to disagree and stop reacting negatively when I describe my point of view. — Relativist

Let's see. You admit that the mind is not 100% physical. Then you state that the nonphysical part "seems unknowable". But instead of trying to get beyond the way that things "seem" to be, and actually develop some knowledge about the nonphysical, you conclude that any such approach would merely be "guesses".

How does this validate physicalism? You blatantly admit that physicalism is wrong, by accepting the reality of the nonphysical. Then instead of progressing toward where this leads, making an effort to understand the nonphysical, you steadfastly cling to physicalism in a hypocritical way, as if the nonphysical, which you clearly recognize, yet fail to understand, is irrelevant.

Surely this identifies a significant error, and misguided, irrational judgement.

How does a mysterious/unknowable unphysical aspect of mind help us understand our nature or that of the universe?

Certainly, it opens up possibilities - but they are unanalyzable possibilities. — Relativist

Clearly, your problem is in the assumption that the unphysical is unknowable. What justifies this assumption? You recognize the reality of the unphysical, so by that very fact, you know it to some extent. How is it possible for you to recognize something then proceed to the conclusion that the thing you recognize is unknowable? That conclusion is completely unsupported. Even if you have tried, and failed in attempts to understand it, that would not produce the conclusion that the thing is unknowable.

I suggest that you are proceeding from a faulty assumption about what constitutes "knowable"...

.

Can you control not being hungry? No. Can you control not thinking about being hungry when you are starving? It's possible. Arguably, up to a point. — Outlander

There are obvioulsy some thoughts not within your control, like hunger, disgust, fear, etc., which is consistent with there being some physical actions that are not within your control, like your heartbeat, your breathing, and flinching if an object is thrown at you, etc.

But, consider Descartes' comment here:

“But when I perceive something very clearly and distinctly, I cannot but assent to it. Even if I will to the contrary, I am nevertheless drawn into assent by the great light in the intellect; and in this consists the greatest and most evident mark of human error.”

This goes beyond as you were saying, arguing that choice is not part of the deliberative process, but conclusions as to all sorts of matter are determined by clear and distinct perceptions.

Compare that to William James:

“Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds.”

This allows for choice of the will (under particular circumstances, particularly when the intellect is indeterminate).

As with Descartes, he'd argue that a belief in God (for example) is clear and distinct and not subject to doubt, which means he must believe in God. Choice isn't part of his equation. As to James, he'd argue that a belief in God is a matter of choice.

But, consider Descartes' comment here:

“But when I perceive something very clearly and distinctly, I cannot but assent to it. Even if I will to the contrary, I am nevertheless drawn into assent by the great light in the intellect; and in this consists the greatest and most evident mark of human error.” — Hanover

This is a significant example of the kind of thing I'm concerned about. Is "being drawn into assent" being caused to assent? Or is it better described as having a reason to assent? Is "I assent to X" a distinct thought from "I perceive X clearly and distinctly"? There are several other m2m questions I want to address, but this is right on. So is the question of control over ones thoughts.

And thanks for the SEP reference.

You blatantly admit that physicalism is wrong, by accepting the reality of the nonphysical. — Metaphysician Undercover

I suggest you try rereading with greater care. Accepting that it is possible that physicalism is wrong is not "admitting" that physicalism is wrong. It's just expressing a fallibilist perspective.

They are unanalyzable by our physical sciences. But if enough people decide it's worth thinking about, some people might come up with some good ideas. It is not an established fact that the only way we can learn of anything is through our physical sciences. — Patterner

A variety of ideas HAVE been proposed (panpsychism, dualism, property dualism...),so how can we learn which is correct? How do we know the correct answer has even been proposed yet? The space of possibilities is large, and there's no methodology for narrowing it down, except perhaps for plausibility and consistency with an individual's other commitments.

It is a conundrum. Hence 300 threads here debating it. :rofl:

I think the point you’re not seeing is that the question of ‘the nature of the mind’ is not an objective question, in the way that physics is. The subject matter of physics are measurable objects, energy, and so on, from the sub-atomic to the cosmological scales. But the mind is not an object at all, in the sense understood by physics. So why should the methods of physics be regarded as applicable to the question of the nature of mind at all? It’s not that the mind is a ‘non-physical thing’ or even that it ‘has a non-physical aspect’. Both of those ways of thinking about it are still based on the approach of treating the mind as possible object among other objects, when the question is categorically of a different kind. Can you see the point of that argument, or explain why it is wrong — Wayfarer

I actually prefer to avoid referring to "the mind" as an object. But it seems uncontroversial to acknowledge that we engage in a set of processes/behaviors that we identify as mental activity. Those activities occur, and it's worthwhile to understand their basis, as much as possible. As discussed, we know the brain is essential to these processes, and (more specifically) the claustrum may be essential to consciousness. It's worthwhile to understand the physical processes involved with mental activity as much as possible. So what is it that you suggest we NOT do, other than objectifying/reifying "the mind"?

It is actually well-documented that neuroscience has identified no specific, functional area of the brain which can account for the subjective unity of perception. — Wayfarer

No argument, except to ask: where do we go from here? I anticipate you'll agree that relevant physical mechanisms are appropriate areas to investigate. If indeed the claustrum is essential to having that "subjective unity of perception", then it's worthwhile to further investigate specifically what it does.

We also can't set aside the philosophical questions. How does the "negative fact" impact philosophical theories of mind? Does it falsify any theories? Does it favor any?

But it seems uncontroversial to acknowledge that we engage in a set of processes/behaviors that we identify as mental activity. Those activities occur, and it's worthwhile to understand their basis, as much as possible…. So what is it that you suggest we NOT do, other than objectifying/reifying "the mind"? — Relativist

I agree that it’s worthwhile to understand the physical basis of mental life—neuroscience and medicine have uncovered a great deal that matters for health and therapy. But I think we need to distinguish between understanding the conditions of mental activity and reducing the mind to those conditions.

Diseases, injuries, and intoxicants clearly affect cognition. That shows physical causes are one set of influences. But they’re not the whole story: there are also reasons, intentions, meanings, and purposes that shape how and why we think. Philosophy of mind ought not be subsumed entirely under neuroscience, because the kinds of questions are different. The attempt to corral every philosophical question under the auspices of science is precisely the meaning of ‘scientism’.

When Socrates urged “know thyself,” he was pointing toward a dimension of inquiry that isn’t captured by brain scans or neural correlates. That project—understanding what it means to be human, conscious, and self-aware—remains as difficult and necessary now as it was then. Science can inform it, but it cannot replace it.

What I would not suggest is abandoning neuroscience or the study of physical conditions—those are crucial (near and dear relatives of mine have been saved by neuroscience and medicine, and I would never deprecate that). What I would suggest is dropping the assumption that physicalism is the only viable philosophical framework. Despite the existence of materialist schools, the mainstream of Western philosophy has never been materialist. That doesn’t mean it was “idealist” in some naïve sense, but it did assume that mind, reason, or spirit cannot be reduced to material processes.

Take reason itself: when we make an inference, the conclusion follows from the premises by virtue of the logical relations between ideas, not because of causal interactions among neurons. Neural transactions may accompany reasoning, but they don’t explain why a valid argument is valid. The normativity of reason belongs to a different order than physical causation].

So my caution is this: philosophy of mind should not be collapsed into neuroscience. To assume that physical causes are the only real causes is already a philosophical commitment, and a highly contestable one. There are many alternatives to physicalism always being debated, look at the new discipline of ‘consciousness studies’ which encompasses a huge range of different approaches.

Let's see. You admit that the mind is not 100% physical. Then you state that the nonphysical part "seems unknowable". But instead of trying to get beyond the way that things "seem" to be, and actually develop some knowledge about the nonphysical, you conclude that any such approach would merely be "guesses". — Metaphysician Undercover

I'll clarify. I think one could justifiably claim there is something "nonphysical" involved, but I also think one could justifiably deny it.

Philosopher Michael Tye proposes one way to deny it: he proposes that there is some aspect or property that exists in all things that is undetectable by any objective means available to science, but manifests only when there exists the physical structure (like a brain) that can produce consciousness. I don't personally embrace it, but it's an interesting theory and I infer that one could develop other hypotheses along these lines (e.g. a broader view of what is "physical"). Of course, none can be verified - so this direction entails a space of possibilities, not a definitive answer.

How does this validate physicalism? You blatantly admit that physicalism is wrong, by accepting the reality of the nonphysical. Then instead of progressing toward where this leads, making an effort to understand the nonphysical, you steadfastly cling to physicalism in a hypocritical way, as if the nonphysical, which you clearly recognize, yet fail to understand, is irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

What I suspect you're considering hypocritical is that I would hold onto physicalism despite it being falsified by the presence of something nonphysical. As I told Wayfarer, if we treat a metaphysical theory as a conjunction of axioms, then that makes sense: the conjunction is false if any one axiom is false.

But this falsification is narrow: it applies exclusively to mind (mental activity). Physicalism is still the most successful metaphysical system there is; successful because it depends on the fewest ad hoc assumptions, it primarily depends on things we know about the world through direct experience and through science, coupled to the most parsimonous ontology. It accounts for causation, universals, laws of nature, and a theory of truth. Should I abandon these virtues simply because there may be some unknowable/ unanalyzable aspect of the mind that doesn't fit? I could rationalize physicalism with ad hoc assumptions, as Michael Tye did, but that seems unjustifiable. It's more intellectually honest to acknowledge that we don't know, and should leave open the space of possibility. At worst, I'm in a position similar to physicists regarding Newton's gravity theory, in the period before general relativity was published; Newton's formula generally worked (orbit of Mercury notwithstanding), and it was the best they had.

Nevertheless, I'm pragmatic. If one is going to embrace a metahphysical theory, I suggest it should be the one that is arguably an "inference to best explanation" among available theories, while remaining open to new information. I wrote about this awhile back on a Christian apologetics forum, and I recently heard Graham Oppy express a similar sentiment. No metaphysical theory is perfect, but if I judge one to fit reality better than any other, then it's the one I will apply in nearly all cases. I will not apply it to the "explanatory gap", because it's truly an unknown - and I don't think any speculative hypothesis is better than any other.

Clearly, your problem is in the assumption that the unphysical is unknowable. What justifies this assumption? You recognize the reality of the unphysical, so by that very fact, you know it to some extent. How is it possible for you to recognize something then proceed to the conclusion that the thing you recognize is unknowable? That conclusion is completely unsupported. Even if you have tried, and failed in attempts to understand it, that would not produce the conclusion that the thing is unknowable.

I suggest that you are proceeding from a faulty assumption about what constitutes "knowable"... — Metaphysician Undercover

First of all, I'll respond to "How is it possible for you to recognize something...". All I've recognized is that there is a good reason to believe there is something about consciousness that may be impossible to account for with a physicalist paradigm. What that actually IS is unknown to me.

"Even if you have tried, and failed in attempts to understand it, that would not produce the conclusion that the thing is unknowable."

That's only part of it, but I'll try to be more precise. It is my (fallible) epistemic judgement that it is unknowable. The basis of my judgement is:

1) it is currently unknown to me.
2) If the question had been definitively answered, there would be no controversy about it among professional philosophers (& philosophers rarely settle anything).
3) I can conceive of no means to draw a definitive conclusion about it.

If you have the answer, and can make a compelling case for it, please share it.

If you have an idea about how a definitive conclusion could be drawn, please share it.

If you simply object to the strong wording I used, I'll acknowledge that I wasn't asserting it to be impossible that a definitive answer can be found. Rather- given the absence of any means to settle the matter at hand, nor any hint about how to proceed to do so, then for all practical purposes, it is impossible. Nevertheless, I will be forever in your debt if you can show that it is more than a bare possibility that the answer can be determined.