A teleporter scenario seems benign for that reason. — apokrisis

Teleporter:

A enters booth 1 -> disassemble A -> transmit info to booth 2 -> assemble B -> B exits booth 2

My version (what should have happened) :

A enters scanner -> transmit info to printer -> assemble B -> "disassemble" A -> B exits printer

My version (what actually happened) :

A enters scanner -> transmit info to printer -> assemble B -> B exits printer -> "disassemble" A

All three versions perform the same fundamental operations. The only difference is when the disassembly of A happens.

In the teleporter, the disassembly happens right after entering the booth. I'm my version, it was supposed to happen after B was assembled. But the orderly made a mistake, and A saw B walking around before "disassembly".

The later the disassembly happens, the worse the case seems for continuity. But isn't this "seeming" just intuition? Why should it matter, metaphysically speaking, when the disassembly happens?

You have a single world-line or identity at any moment in that a single embodied state gets broken down, then rebuilt, with no leakage of selfhood, just the kind of halt and reboot of going to bed everynight. — apokrisis

Is this sort of reasoning intuitive, or metaphysical? Does the universe really track such things, such that one scenario counts as embodied continuity, and the other does not? Or is it we who are tracking such things as we read these stories, merely thinking as we do that we are tracking the universe.

Why should it matter, metaphysically speaking, when the disassembly happens? — hypericin

You built your version of the thought experiment based on a series of confusions. The victim had a mistaken belief about how it worked. The technician let the victim recover consciousness and see the copy. So the argument is based on things going wrong rather than things going to plan. And thus the “when” is indeed an issue already. We should be discussing the plan that was intended where the idiot victim would have got what he paid for and never woke up to realise he had been plainly idiotic.

And then if you consider your the successful version of the plan, there is a both a copying of the info and a “disassembly” which is not actually a disassembly in being a temporary division of a person into his form and his matter. It is a permanent destruction of the originally embodied person rather than a momentary deconstruction.

So we are comparing apples and oranges. The teleporter is being critiqued on the basis that things happen as they should. And it also speaks to an embodied story on consciousness and identity that goes back to Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory of substance.

Again, you leave me unclear what it is you really want to argue here. But to the degree the teleporter operation is conceivable as something real, an embodied approach to the issue of conscious identity would make it seem OK to disassemble and reassemble a person as the combination of some quantity of completely general matter and its equally unique and specific organising pattern.

But your victim seemed to be thinking that the mind was something more. It was not about a structure of material organisation but some kind of spirit that could hop across and wake up somewhere else.

The nature of this confusion in terms of its metaphysical commitments was unclear. But it sounded Cartesian. So as I say, the story is entertaining. But in what way is it enlightening?

This is an argument against the wisdom of undertaking human cloning. — ChrisH

No that is not what I was going for, I'm not interested in that question. I'm trying to wrap my head around the notion of an individual splitting.

The core question here, for me: is it rational for the original to accept the treatment? According to bodily continuity, it is a hard no. According to psychological continuity... it is deeply unclear. Once or the other must be right, either it is rational or or isn't.

You believe in psychological continuity, so what do you think?

In my view, neither the original nor the clone will be aware of which they are. The only way they can deduce who they may be is from external information which may or may not be trustworthy. — ChrisH

I'm not sure if you understand. It is a very queer situation. In the intended sequence (original is killed before the clone wakes up), there is no doubt: the original will wake up as the clone (assuming he wakes up at all). But in the scenario I gave, original woke up, then was killed. So to the original, as he woke up, it might have seemed horribly unlucky. Why couldn't he have been the clone?

As if the universe rolled dice, and deposited him in one or the other body depending on the roll. Absurd. But if so, then was there any chance of the original washing up as the clone? If not, it must then be irrational to accept the treatment.

If only the clone were produced (with no operational shenanigans or mishaps), the clone would have the exact same identity as the person who stepped into the machine. They are subjectively the same (even if the clone is produced in a spatially separate location than where the original stepped into the machine), because they have the exact same physical structure that leads to the same mental patterns, memories and personalities. — finarfin

My argument was only that a difference in spatial location would cause the clone and the original to be different people. The difference in spatial location would cause their mental patterns and memories to be different, thus making them different people. I wasn't making a comment on which, if any of them, were "you".

I am sympathetic to the idea that through our life we are not the same person. As our mental patterns and memories change we change as a person. Otherwise you face the problem of having two of the same person walking around.

Once or the other must be right, either it is rational or or isn't.

You believe in psychological continuity, so what do you think? — hypericin

I'm not sure what you're asking. For me bodily continuity arguments simply don't work. As far as I can tell psychological continuity is what is important to most people.

I'm not sure if you understand. — hypericin

I'm pretty sure I do.

I'm not sure if you understand. It is a very queer situation. In the intended sequence (original is killed before the clone wakes up), there is no doubt: the original will wake up as the clone (assuming he wakes up at all). But in the scenario I gave, original woke up, then was killed. So to the original, as he woke up, it might have seemed horribly unlucky. Why couldn't he have been the clone? — hypericin

It doesn't matter what scenario you construct, neither the original nor the clone know which they are when they wake (and it's quite possible to construct a scenario where no one knows which is which).The point being that If the two are treated differently, it's because we choose to do so.

As far as I can see nothing you've said impacts in the slightest on whether or not personal identity is a matter of psychological continuity.

The victim had a mistaken belief about how it worked. The technician let the victim recover consciousness and see the copy. So the argument is based on things going wrong rather than things going to plan. And thus the “when” is indeed an issue already. We should be discussing the plan that was intended where the idiot victim would have got what he paid for and never woke up to realise he had been plainly idiotic. — apokrisis

Why on earth are you concerned about following a "plan" that exists only as a part of a fiction?

What is relevant to us is the implications of when the victim is killed. What are the relevant differences, if any, between the different versions?

And then if you consider your the successful version of the plan, there is a both a copying of the info and a “disassembly” which is not actually a disassembly in being a temporary division of a person into his form and his matter. It is a permanent destruction of the originally embodied person rather than a momentary deconstruction. — apokrisis

It depends on whether the original molecules are transmitted or not. If they are somehow transmitted, then there is a difference, but it is a difficult argument to explain why this difference matters. If instead, the teleporter operates by scanning the victim, disassembling the victim, sending the information, and reconstructring the victim with a separate set of molecules, I claim that this is logically equivalent to my version.

Again, you leave me unclear what it is you really want to argue here. But to the degree the teleporter operation is conceivable as something real, an embodied approach to the issue of conscious identity would make it seem OK to disassemble and reassemble a person as the combination of some quantity of completely general matter and its equally unique and specific organising pattern. — apokrisis

My argument is that, if my version doesn't work for you as an example of successful personal continuation, than neither does the teleporter. So I disagree with what you wrote here. If you think my version fails but the teleporter is ok, you are simply falling for a sleight of hand in the teleporter story, such as: that there is only ever one copy of the victim... that the victim's molecules may be recycled... that the process is instantaneous. I don't believe any of these are metaphysically relevant. They are only relevant to our intuitions.

But your victim seemed to be thinking that the mind was something more. It was not about a structure of material organisation but some kind of spirit that could hop across and wake up somewhere else.

The nature of this confusion in terms of its metaphysical commitments was unclear. But it sounded Cartesian. So as I say, the story is entertaining. But in what way is it enlightening? — apokrisis

He believed either that, or psychological continuity as @ChrisH maintains, or some muddle of the two, or was merely going with the flow. The point is, this example, to me, clearly fails as an instance of personal continuity. So the reader is forced to claim that even this example constitutes continuity (ChrisH), is forced to explain why the teleporter suceeeds while this fails (you), or is forced to reject the teleporter as well (me).

Why on earth are you concerned about following a "plan" that exists only as a part of a fiction? — hypericin

I was confused by what you were directing an argument against. It seems that you were attacking misconceptions shown in some other thread. So sure, it all you want to do is highlight the fact that minds can't jump into different bodies, then go for it.

But I still don't follow how it is then that argument.

If the business model of the clone facility relies on the metaphysical belief that mind is the pattern that informs the structure of the body, that is one thing. One can kind of go along with that from the embodied perspective that I would take. And that would only leave what seems to be the queasy decision that one would have to make to think the procedure was worthwhile.

One has already accepted that there is no "psychological continuity" in the sense your mind would somehow jump across and occupy the clone with its already functionally ready to go neural machinery, prepared with a fully faithful copy of your embodied state.

But if the issue is that some poster needs to be convinced that the mind is then not something over and above its physical instantiation as some pattern of information that all the relevant neurology has, then maybe your tale of confusions might have some impact on that.

And indeed, it should be hard to find the clone procedure plausible and not then see it as support for the embodied physicalist view while still also treating the mind as something – as in some kind of Cartesian spirit stuff – that can flit off to inhabit the cloned self. There is an inconsistency if that is the misconception in play.

So sorry but I thought you were first asking as straight-out "would you still do it?" question. And then that you were wanting a general metaphysical conclusion. But now it seems to be just targeting the problem that the standard Cartesianist would have here.

My argument is that, if my version doesn't work for you as an example of successful personal continuation, than neither does the teleporter. — hypericin

Again, we are debating science fiction at this point. And my view of personal continuation is based on science fact. So I pointed out that we deal with some level of this issue for real just when we go to sleep, when we turnover our molecules, when we think back over our many years of growing up.

The teleporter and the cloner might be on some kind of continuum as to how they might then stretch that everyday acceptance that I am me, based on the fact that I wake up in the same bed with the same aches every morning and a "to do" list of intentions for the day ahead.

The teleporter promises to disassemble my information and my matter and then reassemble them. I would probably be OK with that whether or not my existing atoms were recycled or replaced like for like. If it worked as advertised, then psychologically I wouldn't have any clear reason to be more worried than when I go to sleep – and understand there will be some busy rewiring going on inside my head to do stuff like consolidate memories and do some molecular level house-cleaning.

But the clone procedure creates a lot of messiness about psychological continuity, even if it is just on the larger social side of that equation. An embodied mind exists not just in a body but in a society and a world that already has a "me" shaped hole for myself. There is my wife, kids, bank account, rights and responsibilities, a personal history that a lot of other people are connected to and would be affected by.

Society at large would have to accept the procedure as unproblematic for my clone to be treated as me after it replaced me. My wife would have to not mind that a copy of her husband returned home that night and maybe brought a little urn of ashes to sprinkle under her favourite rose bush.

So viewed from the embodied perspective, I would say that my death would have to be concealed from society for the cloning operation to be counted as a success. Would you treat a clone as actually the same person? Well I guess if the clone is a greatly improved one, perhaps you would. There are all sorts of things you might want gene edited or neurally tweaked.

Getting off the track but you can see why I would say the teleporter raises less confusions. The cloning process might be put on a similar footing if instead everyone knew I had climbed into some dissolving vat after having my information scanned, and then that information was used to regrow me rapidly until a few hours later, I suddenly stood up and started wiping off the slimy goo from my limbs, ready to shower and slot back into the society-shaped hole that is just as much part of any claims to a "psychological continuity".

So the reader is forced to claim that even this example constitutes continuity (ChrisH), is forced to explain why the teleporter suceeeds while this fails (you), or is forced to reject the teleporter as well (me). — hypericin

Yes, I see now that what seemed like a general question was a targeted repost. Good luck with your efforts. :up:

Didn't see topic until late

In the far future, cloning has been perfected. It is possible not merely to grow a new body with the same genetics, but to create an absolutely perfect physical duplicate, with any undesirable features edited away. — hypericin

Given such ability, it would seem prudent, if your hand hurts due to arthritis, to simply cut it off and print a new one without the problem. This seems far easier than printing a whole new, but different body. If it's a photocopy, it's going to have all the same problems, so you want to 'shop' it first to fix the pains or maybe the cancer or tattoos or whatever.

Is the new thing you? Probably the same answer as asking if you're the same person you were 20 years ago. Different, but pragmatically the same person.

As the brain is physical, mental features survive with perfect fidelity.

You're assuming physicalism here. Under dualism, the new body will have its own immaterial mind, not the original, or maybe it will be a p-zombie, not having a mind at all. It will not be able to tell the difference.

The main question is, not that you've printed a new you, will the original-you be willing to jump into the chipper-shredder so that the new thing can assume your identity? Will the new thing be you? That depends on definitions. The original surely knows that he's going into this not to make a 2nd copy.

The doctor explains: "The procedure is quite simple. We put you under, and scan your entire cellular structure.

Why do these stories always require being 'put under'. If it does what it claims, it should work as you walk down the hall. No pain felt, since anything painful is alteration of the body and will be felt by the new body.

Tears of joy streaming down your face

Correction: Tears of joy stream down the face of the copy. Your use of pronouns is inconsistent.

Both the doctor and yourself turn to you in shock. "He's still alive!" shouts the doctor. "Nurse, get in here now!"

OK, so smiting the original is part of the plan, hence the anesthesia to prevent objection.

and you realize with dismay that this large red face is the last thing you will ever see.

Not necessarily so, since you called the printed guy 'you'. Problem is, you're using that pronoun for two different characters. Best to be clear about things.

The clone is somebody else entirely

How do you know this? By what criteria is this assessment made, and by whom? By what criteria do you currently assert that you're the same person as 'you' last year? Without these answers, you're just being either undefined or at least unclear.

You mention 'bodily continuity', but you're hardly the same parts as you were a long time back. You don't have a gram of original material in you. Continuity is usually based on memory, but the clone has that much.

For the record, they do have teleport machines, but only for small things (small enough that 'intact' isn't an applicable adjective), and it isn't a copy/delete op, it's definitely a move. The issue of 'is it the original' did come up.

Would you accept the treatment?

Strangely enough, I would, but I don't have a dualistic notion of identity, but rather a pragmatic one. It is meaningfully different than the transporter since the copy/paste method leaves both versions, even if one is slated to be terminated shortly thereafter.

I think what makes you you is your mental patterns and memories. The material that gives rise to this is irrelevant. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Agree.

Why would I choose to die so that my replica can live? I don't understand that. You've not cured my illness. — Hanover

You seem to use different definitions then. Do you know what they are? From my PoV, I chose that the defective replica dies (who would only get in the way). My illness has been cured. Hence my willingness to do something like that.

What if both live? Then a new identity must be assigned to one of the two. Who gets the wife, and what happens to the other when severed from his relationship with all loved ones?

Who gets the wife — noAxioms

I suspect, in any event, the wife chooses.

Given such ability, it would seem prudent, if your hand hurts due to arthritis, to simply cut it off and print a new one without the problem. — noAxioms

Perhaps, but that is a different thought experiment.

Is the new thing you? Probably the same answer as asking if you're the same person you were 20 years ago. Different, but pragmatically the same person. — noAxioms

It is more than pragmatic. We defer immediate gratification for rewards in the future, sometimes 20 years or more. This would only make sense if we believed we were the same person. These actions are never altruistic, we don't save money to benefit some alien successor entity.

You're assuming physicalism here. Under dualism, the new body will have its own immaterial mind, not the original, or maybe it will be a p-zombie, not having a mind at all. It will not be able to tell the difference. — noAxioms

For the purposes of this thought experiment I am assuming physicalism.

Why do these stories always require being 'put under'. — noAxioms

I did this to stimulate the intuition that the original->clone one continuous individual, in the same way that teleporter TEs do. But then challenge that intuition when the original wakes up.

Correction: Tears of joy stream down the face of the copy. Your use of pronouns is inconsistent. — noAxioms

This was intentional, to emphasize that from the clone's perspective, the clone feels they are continuous with the original.

How do you know this? By what criteria is this assessment made, and by whom? By what criteria do you currently assert that you're the same person as 'you' last year? Without these answers, you're just being either undefined or at least unclear. — noAxioms

That which benefits the next year's 'me', benefits me (as far as I believe, and behave). But that which benefits the copy clearly does not benefit the original.

You are dead. Your clone is alive. Your clone is indistinguishable from you. Nobody, not even your colone, will ever know it is a copy.

But what if! What if they fixed your body, and made a clone that had the problem you went in for? Then it would be you who thanked the doctor, and the clone who was murdered in the back.

I feel the need to drop biased language of calling the two people 'original' and 'duplicate', since that language already biases the answer of which one is 'you'.
So I will refer to 'defetive' and 'repaired' versions of the person.

I suspect, in any event, the wife chooses. — Hanover

Right, but the spouse presumably already agreed to the procedure, and expects a single-repaired partner in return. The choice was already made. The implications of a replace-machine is different than that of a copy machine. The latter is excellent for training one really great soldier and printing countless copies of him to overwhelm the enemy.

It is more than pragmatic. We defer immediate gratification for rewards in the future, sometimes 20 years or more. This would only make sense if we believed we were the same person. These actions are never altruistic, we don't save money to benefit some alien successor entity. — hypericin

You point out a mistake in my wording. Pragmatic reasoning is driven significantly by beliefs, and my response was a rational one, not a pragmatic one. Given that this was new technology, yes, a person, even me, would approach the device with trepidation.

Imagine otherwise. There's a sort of door that you walk through that builds a new you on the other side, consuming the original. It isn't tech, it's natural, a plant maybe that does this. Any child learns that if he hurts himself (skinned knee), you just pass through the portal and it makes the boo-boo go away. The pragmatic side would very quickly accept such a convenience. But as a grown person with our experience, doing it for the first time, and with such obvious copy/paste/delete in that order with significant delays between where one might even interact with the other, yea, it gets scarier.

The total ease of fixing a boo-boo would evolve away our instinct to not do stupid things. Case in point: divorce is sufficiently easy that far less care is given these days to get it right the first time.

Why do these stories always require being 'put under'. — noAxioms

I did this to stimulate the intuition that the original->clone one continuous individual, in the same way that teleporter TEs do. But then challenge that intuition when the original wakes up.

Sleep not required for any of that, only that the two don't meet.

Thing is, depending on your interpretation of physics, this sort of thing goes on all the time anyway, without the repair of course. This is why I ask how you know you're the same person as last year (or 2 seconds ago). Answer: you don't, since assuming otherwise violates the law of identity. But that's rational thinking, not pragmatic rationalization of beliefs. Difference is which causes the other.

This was intentional, to emphasize that from the clone's perspective, the clone feels they are continuous with the original.

It's deceptive. Tears run down the face of the repaired version. Whether this is you or not is the question, not an answer to be presumed by the wording.

Similarly, one could go the Theseus route and replace one piece at a time until the whole thing has been done, even the non-defective parts. If it's done that way, is it still you? If not, at what point did it cease being the original?

That which benefits the next year's 'me', benefits me

That's the pragmatic thinking. I see it sort of as a pay-it-forward sort of thing. I draw breath not for the benefit of me, but for the benefit of the alien 10 seconds from now, who technically has no claim on being the 'me' that drew the breath.

This having gone on all along, I rationally have little if any trepidation for accepting the procedure. But it would admittedly be nice if the side that holds the intuitive beliefs wasn't told how it works.

Nobody, not even your clone, will ever know it is a copy. — Patterner

The OP says you know. It was a voluntary procedure.

Nobody, not even your clone, will ever know it is a copy.
— Patterner
The OP says you know. It was a voluntary procedure. — noAxioms

Somehow, I missed the part that the clone saw what was going on. I was thinking he didn't know, so would live thinking he was the original. And there would be no reason anybody who ever met him would think otherwise.

But the original had been murdered.

So now I realized the clone knows he's not the original. That's bound to have an impact on him.