But this falsification is narrow: it applies exclusively to mind (mental activity). — Relativist

That seems very significant to me. Mental activity has done extraordinary things than would never happen without it. And how far will it go? Will there be Dyson Spheres scattered across the universe one day? Will we have FTL travel? Physicists could probably do a pretty good job off predicting what the universe would look like in 10B years if all life on Earth ended right now. But there is no possibility of predicting what the universe will look like in 10B years if we remain in it.

Physicalism is still the most successful metaphysical system there is; successful because it depends on the fewest ad hoc assumptions, it primarily depends on things we know about the world through direct experience and through science, coupled to the most parsimonous ontology. It accounts for causation, universals, laws of nature, and a theory of truth. — Relativist

This is obviously false. Physicalism cannot explain the reality of the nonphysical, which we all experience daily, therefore it is clearly not the most successful metaphysical system.

It accounts for causation, universals, laws of nature, and a theory of truth. — Relativist

This is totally wrong. Physicalism does not account for causation. Physicalist causation leads to infinite regress, and that does not qualify as accounting for it. Physicalism does not account for any laws, as they are themselves, nonphysical. And, I have no idea what type of "truth" you'd be talking about here, if you are not talking about correspondence between Ideas (nonphysical), and physical reality. What kind of "theory of truth" does physicalism support?

The things that you claim physicalism can account for, it obviously cannot.

That's only part of it, but I'll try to be more precise. It is my (fallible) epistemic judgement that it is unknowable. The basis of my judgement is:

1) it is currently unknown to me.
2) If the question had been definitively answered, there would be no controversy about it among professional philosophers (& philosophers rarely settle anything).
3) I can conceive of no means to draw a definitive conclusion about it.

If you have the answer, and can make a compelling case for it, please share it.

If you have an idea about how a definitive conclusion could be drawn, please share it.

If you simply object to the strong wording I used, I'll acknowledge that I wasn't asserting it to be impossible that a definitive answer can be found. Rather- given the absence of any means to settle the matter at hand, nor any hint about how to proceed to do so, then for all practical purposes, it is impossible. Nevertheless, I will be forever in your debt if you can show that it is more than a bare possibility that the answer can be determined. — Relativist

It is you who has made the definitive judgement, that the nonphysical is unknowable.

To say that something is physical is already to draw upon a lot of theoretical abstraction and conceptualisation. ‘This means that’, or ‘this is equivalent to that’ is an intellectual judgement based on abstraction rather than anything physically measurable. You might argue that were we to understand the brain well enough, we could identify the structures which underpin meaning, but even that requires the kind of abstraction that we seek to explain. I can’t see how a vicious circularity can be avoided. — Wayfarer

In my book to say something is physical is to say it is either mind-independently existent and measurable, a property or activity of something mind-independently existent and measurable or a relation between mind-independently real and measurable existents.

Thus I would consider theoretical abstraction and conceptualization to be physical insofar as they are activities of (at least) humans, who are mind-independently real and measurable existents.

So, your objection is without teeth, and what you can't see is irrelevant, for me.

That seems very significant to me. Mental activity has done extraordinary things than would never happen without it. — Patterner

Our activities are concentrated around one out of the 10^23 stars in the observable universe, during a period of maybe 1 million years, in a universe 13.7 billion years old. Of course our activities are significant to ourselves, but I see no basis to consider them of cosmic significance.

It is you who has made the definitive judgement, that the nonphysical is unknowable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, with the qualifications I described. If you believe I'm wrong, then please disabuse me. How can we know anything about aspects of reality that cannot give us one bit of empirical evidence?

I'm not insisting that we can only obtain knowledge through empirical evidence - there are, for example, analytical truths. I'm open to other means if you can propose some.

Our activities are concentrated around one out of the 10^23 stars in the observable universe, during a period of maybe 1 million years, in a universe 13.7 billion years old. Of course our activities are significant to ourselves, but I see no basis to consider them of cosmic significance. — Relativist

Sure, assuming we're the only ones in the universe. We certainly don't have evidence that there are others. But the same laws of physics are operating around those 10^23 stars, so it seems reasonable that there are.

Also assuming our activities never break free of that one star. Which is surely going to happen, if we manage to survive ourselves.

Mental activity can change the universe in ways that cannot be calculated or predicted. Who can say if it will? It's done a job on this planet. Maybe it will on the cosmos.

This is obviously false. Physicalism cannot explain the reality of the nonphysical, which we all experience daily, therefore it is clearly not the most successful metaphysical system. — Metaphysician Undercover

I assume you're referring to philosophy of mind issues. Physicalism can account for a good bit, but (as I've acknowledged) not everything. So what DOES explain the nonphysical aspects of mind? As I said, I'm interested in whatever theory is best explanation- in terms of explanatory scope, parsimony, and ad hoc-ness. I'm open to proposals for additional criteria. What metaphysical theory surpasses physicalism as a better explanation?

This is totally wrong. Physicalism does not account for causation. Physicalist causation leads to infinite regress, — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it doesn't entail infinite regress. I'll refrain from guessing at what you're referring to, so please explain why you think this.

Physicalism does not account for any laws, as they are themselves, nonphysical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Seriously, it sounds like you don't understand physicalism. Law Realists suggest that laws are ontological relations between universals. Every instantiation of the relevant set of universals will necessarily instantiate the same effect.

I have no idea what type of "truth" you'd be talking about her — Metaphysician Undercover

Indeed, you don't have any idea. You are pontificating about something you know nothing about. I'm referring to truthmaker theory. A truthmaker is something that exists in the world, to which a true statement corresponds.

I'm making an effort to have a discussion that is reasonable and polite. You're making it difficult by making judgements based on your own lack of understanding. You COULD ask, instead of pontificating.

I was serious that I'm open hearing better theories, and particularly interested in understanding how you think we could actually learn something about the presumably nonphysical aspect of mind. Why have you not addressed this?

What I would suggest is dropping the assumption that physicalism is the only viable philosophical framework — Wayfarer

I agree. Most of mental life is better considered from completely different perspectives. My issue is specifically with ontology: what actually exists. I think ontology can be set aside for the issues you raised. If this is wrong, and there is such a dependency then there's a burden to make an epistemological case for that ontology.

So my caution is this: philosophy of mind should not be collapsed into neuroscience. To assume that physical causes are the only real causes is already a philosophical commitment, and a highly contestable one. There are many alternatives to physicalism always being debated, look at the new discipline of ‘consciousness studies’ which encompasses a huge range of different approaches. — Wayfarer

I suggest that the "philosophy of mind" issues that concern you could be dealt with without pinnning it to an ontology. This reminds me of your comments about teleology - which can be treated as a paradigm - an explanatory framework , not requiring an ontological commitment to teleology.

I doubt "consciousness studies" depends on a particular ontology of mind, because that would make it a house of cards.

Sure, assuming we're the only ones in the universe. — Patterner

I think it's unlikely that there are other intelligent life forms near enough to us, for them to impact us. But we clearly have different perspectives.

Yes, with the qualifications I described. If you believe I'm wrong, then please disabuse me. How can we know anything about aspects of reality that cannot give us one bit of empirical evidence? — Relativist

Sorry Relativist, I cannot disabuse you because the abuse is self-inflicted. You'll have to take up that task yourself.

"Evidence" is a loaded term. What qualifies as "evidence of X" for me does not necessarily qualify as "evidence of X" for you. This is because the proposed piece of evidence, Y, will either be considered as evidence of X, or not considered as evidence of X, depending on the apprehended relation between X and Y.

Accordingly, the evidence, Y, may be empirical, and the thing which it is evidence of, X, may be nonphysical. Therefore there is no need to assume that there cannot be "one bit of empirical evidence" for the nonphysical. For those who understand the relation between the physical and nonphysical, every physical thing is evidence of the nonphysical. And that is why the theologists commonly claim that each material thing is evidence of the immaterial God. But if you do not understand that relation between the physical and the nonphysical, you will not apprehend the physical as evidence of the nonphysical.

Now, once you get beyond that mental block, which is preventing you from seeing the physical as evidence of the nonphysical, then you can start to understand the reality of many different nonphysical things. And, one nonphysical aspect, A, will serve as evidence for another nonphysical aspect B. Under these circumstances, we can know something about the nonphysical aspect, B, without one bit of empirical evidence for that knowledge. The empirical evidence is for A, and A is nonphysical, but it is evidence of B. The relation between A and B, which allows A to qualify as evidence of B is also nonphysical, being a logical relation. Therefore we can know about B without one bit of empirical evidence for this knowledge.

Physicalism can account for a good bit, but (as I've acknowledged) not everything. — Relativist

Well, unless it can account for every aspect of one thing, any one thing, absolutely, 100%, then it does not account for anything. It would only partially account for things. Since physicalism does not account for any one thing, in any absolute sense, then we can conclude that physicalism cannot account for anything. The best it can do is provide for a partial accounting. So, to have a complete account of anything, we need to include the nonphysical.

No, it doesn't entail infinite regress. — Relativist

Physicalist causation involves infinite regress, because each effect requires a previous cause. Then that cause requires a previous cause as well, ad infinitum. Therefore physicalism does not "account for causation", it simply takes causation for granted.

Seriously, it sounds like you don't understand physicalism. Law Realists suggest that laws are ontological relations between universals. Every instantiation of the relevant set of universals will necessarily instantiate the same effect. — Relativist

A "universal" is nonphysical, as are the relations between universals.

A truthmaker is something that exists in the world, to which a true statement corresponds. — Relativist

The relation between a statement and "the world" is nonphysical..

You COULD ask, instead of pontificating. — Relativist

I apologize for my attitude, but sometimes it's enjoyable to play the pontiff. You should try it sometime, you might enjoy it too, haha.

I was serious that I'm open hearing better theories, and particularly interested in understanding how you think we could actually learn something about the presumably nonphysical aspect of mind. Why have you not addressed this? — Relativist

I didn't answer, because I couldn't believe that someone could seriously be asking such a dimwitted question. Have you never tried introspection? Introspection is by definition, the examination of one's own mental and emotional processes. This is not a physical examination. Do you honestly believe that a person could learn absolutely nothing from such an examination?

Once again, I apologize for the attitude. However, I just cannot take you seriously when you ask questions like this. Then, you top it off with "I was serious that I'm open...". . That's the biggest piece of bullshit I've been hit with today. Your mind is closed tighter than a drum. You've locked yourself out, so that you cannot even get into your own mind. Oh my God! What can we do for you?

Most of mental life is better considered from completely different perspectives. My issue is specifically with ontology: what actually exists. I think ontology can be set aside for the issues you raised. If this is wrong, and there is such a dependency then there's a burden to make an epistemological case for that ontology. — Relativist

When we use the word ontology, it’s worth pausing to consider what the term actually means. The derivation is instructive. It comes from the Greek verb εἰμί — “to be.” More specifically, from its present participle ὤν, ὄντος — “being.” So ontology is not originally about compiling a list of things that happen to exist, but about inquiry into the nature of being as such. I’ve sometimes put it informally as the study of “I am-ness.” That’s not strictly correct in grammatical terms, but it conveys something important about the distinction between philosophical ontology and the objective sciences.

Charles Kahn’s classic study The Greek Verb “To Be” and the Concept of Being (sent to me in respect of this very issue!) shows how the Greek verb 'to be' carries a rich set of nuances: copulative (“x is y”), existential (“x is”), and veridical (“it is true that x”). This polyvalence gave early philosophers—from Parmenides’ to eon estin (“being is”) to Aristotle’s remark that “being is said in many ways”—the linguistic resources to elevate being itself into a philosophical concern.

Ontology, then, is not merely a massive catalogue of “what exists.” That is an ontic question, about beings and the nature and kinds of things that exist. Ontology, in its deeper sense, is about the nature of being itself—what it means to be, from the perspective of being (and we 'human beings'). And here the questions of ontology and epistemology are inevitably entangled: what it means “to be” cannot be separated from what it means “to know.” Nor can the question omit what kind of realness abstracta—numbers, logical principles, universals—instantiate. The physicalist insists that all of these ultimately depend on, or supervene upon, the physical; but the nature of that dependence is anything but obvious, and many of the physicalist explanations question-begging.

So yes, philosophy does have concerns that lie outside the domain of physics — but those concerns are not derivative from physics. The idealist argument I maintain is that “what is” inevitably includes a subjective pole: what is real, is real for a subject, even when we imagine a universe devoid of observers, since that imaginative act is itself only performed by a subject.

I doubt "consciousness studies" depends on a particular ontology of mind, because that would make it a house of cards. — Relativist

Well, you keep asking me for alternatives, it is a very fertile source for them. It's a cross-disciplinary subject matter embracing philosophy, science, neurobiology, and many other perspectives. Physicalism is represented but it is also challenged. It is by no means a single philosophy - that's the point!

Really, what you're saying, very politely is, 'hey, philosophers can worry about all these ethereal notions. It's the scientists who know what really is.' That is the zeitgeist.

Ontology, then, is not merely a massive catalogue of “what exists.” That is an ontic question, about beings and the nature and kinds of things that exist. — Wayfarer

Ontology is the general study of being, of what it means to be or to exist. Once the general characteristics shared by all beings are decided then what can be counted as a being can be
established.

With your etymological prescriptions you make it sound like it is a monolithic study in the sense that there could be only one way to think about it. However, you have an eccentric understanding of 'being' such that for you it applies only to living beings, whereas the most common meaning of 'to be' is simply 'to exist', and the most common meaning of 'to exist' is not 'to stand out for some percipient' but simply 'to be'.

And, contrary to what you claim, part of ontology does consist in deciding what all beings or existents have in common, and thus what kinds of things, and what particular things, can be said to exist. Yours is a tendentious and dogmatic, as opposed to an openminded, approach, unsurprisingly.

With your etymological prescriptions you make it sound like it is a monolithic study in the sense that there could be only one way to think about it. — Janus

I did no such thing. Even the source I quoted said shows how the Greek verb 'to be' carries a rich set of nuances: copulative (“x is y”), existential (“x is”), and veridical (“it is true that x”). What I am saying, which is consistent with my general philosophy, which is that 'being' is something more than, or other than, the description of 'what exists', and that the term 'ontology' originally conveyed this meaning, even if it has changed over time.

But "x is y" is not an explicit assertion of being as such, but an assertion about some being's characteristics. That it exists is already implicitly given. On the other hand "x is" is explicitly an assertion of existence. "It is true that x" is not necessarily an ontological claim at all.

I agree 'being' is not the description of "what exists" it is a noun referring to an existent or a verb referring to the act or fact of existing.

Anyway, you acknowledge that what ontology is considered to consist in may have changed over time, but the point is that it is the contemporary understanding, or range of understandings, of what ontology is concerned with that is important.

Why look back to the ancients when they did not have the immense benefit of our prodigious scientific knowledge and understanding? Ontological enquiry should be about what it is reasonable to think about being today, not two thousand years ago.

Can any of the physical-chemical sciences explain the intentionality of consciousness or explain what a noema is better than phenomenology? Or the Pythagorean theorem better than geometry? Or what a universal better than philosophy? Or what is beauty better than aesthetics? Or what is a correct argument better than logic? Or how prices functions better than economy? Or what is a morphema better than linguistics?

For me, there are several categories in the world that are irreducible to one another.

Heidegger had quite a bit to say about 'the forgetfulness of being' in Being and Time. He traced it back to the ancient Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle in particular, and found fault with the way that the Western metaphysical tradition had 'objectified' being. So - how would it be possible to 'forget being'? If we've forgotten being, what has been forgotten?

I agree with you. But physicalism can’t really allow ontological differences as it is monistic, right? There is only one kind of fundamental substance, and it is the subject matter of physics. Everything else is derived from that.

Ontology is the general study of being, of what it means to be or to exist. Once the general characteristics shared by all beings are decided then what can be counted as a being can be
established. — Janus

I believe the issue which Wayfarer is trying to bring to our attention, is that there is a specific type of characteristic of being, which is only provided by the first person perspective, I, or myself. Since this is a real characteristic of the being which I call "myself" we need to determine whether it is a characteristic of all beings before we can make any conclusive judgement about "the general characteristics of all beings".

But "x is y" is not an explicit assertion of being as such, but an assertion about some being's characteristics. That it exists is already implicitly given. — Janus

That is a mistaken approach. The predication is made of a subject, and the subject need not exist. It might be imaginary, a possibility, or a misapprehension. Until we determine what it means to exist, we cannot take existence of anything for granted.

Why look back to the ancients when they did not have the immense benefit of our prodigious scientific knowledge and understanding? Ontological enquiry should be about what it is reasonable to think about being today, not two thousand years ago. — Janus

I believe, the relevant point is that many ancient philosophers practised introspection, and had very good understanding of the first person perspective of being. Scientific knowledge is based in empirical observation, and does not include that first person perspective, which is sometimes called "subjective".

To be clear, a being only has direct, immediate access to the internal composition of any being, through itself. Any other attempt to access the internal composition of a being is always mediated, either by dividing a being, to see its internal parts (in which case we lose the principle of unity), or through the use of some tool (in which case the tool contaminates the observation). The only way to truly observe the internal aspects of any being directly and immediately, is through self introspection, which is "subjective". Therefore subjective knowledge is a very valuable part of the knowledge of being.

Since it is necessary to consider this first person perspective, subjective knowledge, before making any conclusive judgements about "the general characteristics of all beings", we need to look beyond scientific knowledge and understanding. This is not to say that we ought to exclude scientific knowledge, but that it is necessary to consider other knowledge beyond scientific knowledge. In doing so we look for the best sources, and these tend to be those which have stood the test of time, ancient sources which have been tried and accepted in practise, and which remain relevant today.

I believe the issue which Wayfarer is trying to bring to our attention, is that there is a specific type of characteristic of being, which is only provided by the first person perspective, I, or myself. — Metaphysician Undercover

That’s close to what I mean. But it’s also an observation about the peculiarity of the modern sense of existence. David Loy, independent Buddhist scholar, says ‘ The main problem with our usual understanding of [secular culture] is that it is taken-for-granted, so we are not aware that it is a worldview. It is an ideology that pretends to be the everyday world we live in. Most of us assume that it is simply the way the world really is, once superstitious beliefs about it have been removed.’

When Heidegger speaks of the “forgetfulness of Being” (Seinsvergessenheit), he means that Western philosophy since Plato has tended to think only in terms of beings (entities, things) and not Being itself — the more fundamental horizon that makes beings intelligible in the first place. This forgetfulness leads to the modern picture of the world as divided into subjects (thinking selves) and objects (things “out there”). That is, the human being is conceived as an isolated subject standing over against an objective realm of things (what David Loy says we take to be ‘the world as it really is’).

Heidegger’s solution to that is Dasein — literally “being-there.” Rather than beginning from an isolated consciousness, Heidegger insists that we are always already Being-in-the-world. Our existence is not something added on top of a neutral subject, but a fundamental openness to, and involvement with, the world. In this sense, human beings are never separate from their world; they are inextricably bound up with it. This is why Heidegger criticises the subject–object schema as a distortion inherited from the Cartesian picture.

I mention it, because it is an insight into the original concerns of ontology.

Yes. But we must keep in mind that physicalists have chosen a couple of sciences (in this case, physics and chemistry) from which they seek to derive, reduce, or explain everything else. We must be very attentive to how things are derived and ask ourselves if there really is a valid explanation and reduction of the world to specific categories and concepts from specific sciences.

I believe that this cannot be done without losing the operability of the other sciences (or disciplines) that describe the world. Imagine that in mathematics there is a reduction to physics and you have concepts of speed, time, energy, mass, etc., and you have to use them to develop Pythagoras' theorem. You can't!

Can any of the physical-chemical sciences explain the intentionality of consciousness or explain what a noema is better than phenomenology? Or the Pythagorean theorem better than geometry? Or what a universal better than philosophy? Or what is beauty better than aesthetics? Or what is a correct argument better than logic? Or how prices functions better than economy? Or what is a morphema better than linguistics? — JuanZu

Chemistry provides a more useful explanation of interactions between atoms and molecules associated with chemical bonds than does quantum field theory. Biology provides the more useful accounts of physiology and disease than quantum chemistry. In all these cases, this does not imply that these sciences are not, in fact, reducible to fundamental physics.

When I've said that (IMO) physicalism is the "best explanation", this is in comparison to other complete metaphysical theories. Physicalism is the theory that all existing things are grounded in physical nature.

I'll address some of the issues you raised.

An intention is a disposition to behave in some general or specific way. It reflects some mediation between stimuli and response.

I think "noema" equate to "mental object". I'd just deny that they are objects (ontological). They reflect a component of thinking, a general or specific pattern (neural networks are adept at pattern recognition), often associated with a memory (e.g. a visual memory).

Chemistry provides a more useful explanation of interactions between atoms and molecules associated with chemical bonds than quantum field theory. Biology is the more useful means of understanding physiology and disease than quantum chemistry. In all these cases, this does not imply that reductionism is false. — Relativist

I don't think you fully understand what a reduction means. What do you understand by reduction in any case?

That’s close to what I mean. But it’s also an observation about the peculiarity of the modern sense of existence. David Loy, independent Buddhist scholar, says ‘ The main problem with our usual understanding of [secular culture] is that it is taken-for-granted, so we are not aware that it is a worldview. It is an ideology that pretends to be the everyday world we live in. Most of us assume that it is simply the way the world really is, once superstitious beliefs about it have been removed.’ — Wayfarer

i would characterize this "usual understanding" as the lazy way. It's "the lazy way" because superstitious beliefs, spirituality, and even the freedom of choice, all relate to the extremely difficult aspects of reality to understand. The common, or usual understanding, of reality, will remove these as either unreal or irrelevant. This means that the most difficult aspects of reality to understand, are simply ignored by the common or usual way of understanding, producing "the lazy way".

An intention is a disposition to behave in some general or specific way. It reflects some mediation between stimuli and response. — Relativist

This is not an accurate explanation of "intention". Intention produces completely novel things. Therefore it is not an inclination in a general or specific way, but an inclination toward a particular act. And, since the intentional act is toward something completely new, it cannot be said to be a mediation between stimuli and response. It produces a new thing. If it is to be described as a mediation, it is the mediation between the agent and the act. The agent being free to act in a multitude of ways, will act in a particular way, and intention is what produces the particular way which is produced, rather than another way.

Physicalism is the theory that everything that exists, is composed of physical things, and that they act and assemble entirely due to physical forces due to laws of nature.

Reductive physicalism implies that complex (or higher level) objects are composed of simpler (lower level) objects, and ultimately reducible to whatever is fundamental. Non-reductive physicalism entails the notion that novel properties ontologically emerge in higher level structures.

That's it's domain, and it is only falsified by identifying some existing thing that doesn't fit the model.

So yes, philosophy does have concerns that lie outside the domain of physics — but those concerns are not derivative from physics. — Wayfarer

Of course! Physicalism does not subsume or supplant all of philosophy, or even all of science. Analogously, it would be absurd for a viticulturist to try and predict the composition of phenolic compounds that result in certain flavors or textures in wine, using quantum field theory.

Even if some useful/meaningful philosophical paradigm is inconsistent with physicalism, it doesn't automatically falsify physicalism. Falsifying it on the basis of paradigm inconsistency would be at least as complex as it would be for a physicalist to try and give a physicalist account of the issue.

Again, I have acknowleged that there are good reasons to believe there is something non-physical about mental activity. You have also acknowledged that there is something physical about mental activity. It seems pointless to debate what portions of the gray area are more, or less, likely to point to something non-physical.

You define physicalism as the thesis that everything that exists is physical, but then you also agree that philosophy has concerns that “lie outside the domain of physics.” That seems to pull in two directions: if philosophy really does deal with realities not derivative from physics, then physicalism can’t capture everything.

Non-reductive physicalism tries to close this gap with “emergence.” But that makes the view unfalsifiable, since any anomaly can simply be reclassified as “emergent.”

So the tension is this: either physicalism covers all that is real, in which case philosophy reduces to physics; or else philosophy genuinely addresses irreducible realities, in which case physicalism does not cover everything that is real. Which is it?

:up:

:up:

Again, I have acknowleged that there are good reasons to believe there is something non-physical about mental activity. — Relativist

Then clearly it is illogical for you to believe that physicalism is the best ontology. You are logically inconsistent because you define physicalism as "the theory that everything that exists, is composed of physical things, and that they act and assemble entirely due to physical forces due to laws of nature". Then you say "there are good reasons to believe there is something non-physical about mental activity". Obviously, you have good reasons to reject physicalism, yet you do not. Why not just reject physicalism and get it over with? Why not move along to better ontologies which recognize the "good reasons to believe there is something non-physical about mental activity."

Physicalist causation involves infinite regress, because each effect requires a previous cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Evidence" is a loaded term. What qualifies as "evidence of X" for me does not necessarily qualify as "evidence of X" for you. This is because the proposed piece of evidence, Y, will either be considered as evidence of X, or not considered as evidence of X, depending on the apprehended relation between X and Y. — Metaphysician Undercover

I generally prefer to use "evidence" in the broadest sense: data (excluding nothing). I specifically referred to empirical evidence (data that is obtained by observation). Here, we're dealing with metaphysical "theories", which (I suggest) are best thought of as explanatory hypotheses for the data. The "data" consists of all the uncontroversial facts of the world. The explanatory hypotheses would be the various metaphysical "theories" that endeavor to account for all these facts.

Accordingly, the evidence, Y, may be empirical, and the thing which it is evidence of, X, may be nonphysical. Therefore there is no need to assume that there cannot be "one bit of empirical evidence" for the nonphysical. For those who understand the relation between the physical and nonphysical, every physical thing is evidence of the nonphysical. And that is why the theologists commonly claim that each material thing is evidence of the immaterial God. But if you do not understand that relation between the physical and the nonphysical, you will not apprehend the physical as evidence of the nonphysical — Metaphysician Undercover

This presupposes that something nonphysical exists. That is hypothesis, not an uncontroversial fact. There are metaphysical theories that assume this, but it's nevertheless a controversial assumption (there are clearly professional philosophers who deny this). That's why I stress that it is the uncontroversial facts of the world that need to be best accounted for.

once you get beyond that mental block, which is preventing you from seeing the physical as evidence of the nonphysical, — Metaphysician Undercover

You should publish a paper that proves there are non-physical objects, so that the physicalist philosophers can learn the errors of their ways and start working on something productive. According to a survey of professional philosophers, over half of them "accept or lean toward" physicalism (source). I'm not suggesting truth is derived by majority vote, but rather that you might want to reconsider your arrogant view that only someone with a "mental block" would deny the existence of non-physical objects.

Physicalist causation involves infinite regress, because each effect requires a previous cause.

Or...there is an uncaused initial, foundational state of affairs that exists by brute fact. This seems to me the preferable alternative to a vicious infinite regress, irrespective of whether or not physicalism is true. My personal theory is that the uncaused, initial state exists out of metaphysical necessity - but this depends no one beliefs about ontological contingency.

Well, unless it can account for every aspect of one thing, any one thing, absolutely, 100%, then it does not account for anything. It would only partially account for things. Since physicalism does not account for any one thing, in any absolute sense, then we can conclude that physicalism cannot account for anything. — Metaphysician Undercover

Non-sequitur. Suppose we take as a premise that there exists something nonphysical. That does not imply that every existing is (at least) partly nonphysical. We only need to account for the things (and their properties) that we know (i.e. have strong reasons to believe) exist.

A "universal" is nonphysical, as are the relations between universals. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are obviously unfamiliar with the concept of immanent universals. Example of this view: a 45 degree angle does not have some independent existence; rather, it exists in its instantiations. It reflects a specific physical relation between two objects.

The relation between a statement and "the world" is nonphysical.. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not an ontological relation; it is semantics: the definition of "truth" expressed as a pseudo-relation between a statement and some aspect of reality.

I didn't answer, because I couldn't believe that someone could seriously be asking such a dimwitted question. Have you never tried introspection? Introspection is by definition, the examination of one's own mental and emotional processes. This is not a physical examination. Do you honestly believe that a person could learn absolutely nothing from such an examination?

Once again, I apologize for the attitude. However, I just cannot take you seriously when you ask questions like this. Then, you top it off with "I was serious that I'm open...". . That's the biggest piece of bullshit I've been hit with today. Your mind is closed tighter than a drum. You've locked yourself out, so that you cannot even get into your own mind. Oh my God! What can we do for you? — Metaphysician Undercover

You have demonstrated that your arrogance is rooted in ignorance - you seemed unaware that there are views that differ from your own, that respected philosophers hold to - not just "dimwits" like me. On the other hand, you've mentioned nothing that I wasn't already aware of.

Heidegger had quite a bit to say about 'the forgetfulness of being' in Being and Time. He traced it back to the ancient Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle in particular, and found fault with the way that the Western metaphysical tradition had 'objectified' being. So - how would it be possible to 'forget being'? If we've forgotten being, what has been forgotten? — Wayfarer

For me "forgetfulness of being" is not an intellectual oversight, but a failure to live to the fullest due to being distracted by various kinds of preoccupations. Consumerism is a big one―so I see materialism in that sense as the "enemy", but I don't see materialism as a metaphysical position as detrimental at all, unless it be considered that all such intellectual preoccupations distract us from living to the fullest.

And I don't think it is the case that such intellectual pursuits (provided they don't become unhealthy preoccupations) need detract from a life lived to the fullest.

The mere struggle to survive can be an all-consuming distraction. I wonder how the ancient peasants―those lacking any intellectual education―lived. Did they live fuller lives than we do today? And how many people today are preoccupied with working out the best metaphysics? Do all, or even most, or even many, people have a propensity to be driven by intellectual concerns? Are there more such people (as a percentage of the population) today than there were three thousand, two thousand, one thousand or five hundred years ago?

What could "forgetfulness of being" even mean to those who lack an intellectual interest?

Again, I have acknowleged that there are good reasons to believe there is something non-physical about mental activity. — Relativist

I asked you before, and you gave no answer, as to what good reasons there are to think there is something non-physical about mental activity? Presuming that you have in mind something other than the obvious notion that "abstractions, concepts, generalities and logic are not physical".

I believe the issue which Wayfarer is trying to bring to our attention, is that there is a specific type of characteristic of being, which is only provided by the first person perspective, I, or myself. Since this is a real characteristic of the being which I call "myself" we need to determine whether it is a characteristic of all beings before we can make any conclusive judgement about "the general characteristics of all beings". — Metaphysician Undercover

It seems obvious that all percipients have some kind of "first person perspective", so of course beings can be classed as living and non-living, sentient and non-sentient, and even sapient and non-sapient. None of that has been forgotten or is even controversial, though.

Animals arguably live with more presence than we do―our symbolic language has enabled us to become caught up in all kinds of "mind-distractions", and that is what i would say is "forgetfulness of being". And there are all kinds of other pursuits which can become unhealthy preoccupations. That is not to say I think an intellectual pursuit, or any other kind of pursuit, necessarily leads to forgetfulness of being.

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I don't think you fully understand what a reduction means. What do you understand by reduction in any case? — JuanZu

The simplest definition of reductionism is this:

If x reduces to y, then it can in a relevantly strong sense be explained in terms of y.
--source

Example: chemical reactions can (in principle) be explained in terms of fundamental physics. Chemistry is concerned mainly with the structure and reactions of atoms and molecules. These structures and reactions are a consequence of the properties of their components. The study of those components, and their properties, is fundamental physics. I doubt that anyone suggests there's some ontological emergence occurring when molecules interact that is not due to the properties of the components (as studied by physics). This relationship can be described as "Chemistry is reducible to Physics". This relationship between chemistry and physics is uncontroversial.

Is Biology reducible to Chemistry and Physics? No behavior has been observed that is inconsistent with either of these disciplines, so this is a reason to believe it to be reducible. An alternative would be ontological emergence: that novel properties emerge in higher level structures, properties that are not a consequence of the properties of the constituent parts. It seems to me the basis for believing in ontological emergence is weak, but I'll leave it at that because this seems sufficient to describe what I mean by reductionism.

Again, I have acknowleged that there are good reasons to believe there is something non-physical about mental activity. — Relativist


I asked you before, and you gave no answer, as to what good reasons there are to think there is something non-physical about mental activity? Presuming that you have in mind something other than the obvious notion that "abstractions, concepts, generalities and logic are not physical". — Janus

Sorry I overlooked your question. This was the issue that Wayfarer and I were discussing, so I (erroneously) took it for granted.

The "good reason" to believe there is something nonphysical involved is simply that set of issues that is referred to as the "hard problem of consciousness": fully accounting for all aspects of our subjective experience of consciousness. For example: how do feelings of hunger and pain, arise from the firing of neurons, or accounting for the perceived quality of some specific color.

As a computer guy, I also think about these things in terms of whether or not a machine could be programmed to exhibit the same qualities that our minds exhibit. I'm stumped, and it seems that most physicalist philosophers are, as well.

This does not prove physicalism is false - that would entail an argument from ignorance. It could very well be that in the future, these issues will be resolved - and we'll be able to construct robots that have subjective experiences of qualia. But arguments from ignorance can often be cast as inferences to the best explanation, and I think one could argue that the hard problem is better explained by assuming some non-physical aspect is required. That's what I'm calling the "good reasons".