A short and related article I stumbled upon: "Getting Serious about Seriousness, Aristotle on the meaning of Spoudaios," by Matthew Lu.

I think the claim is supported logically by the fact that no purely logical reason for considering races to be inferior or superior seem to be possible. If they were possible, it should be easy enough to find them, or they certainly should have been found by now, and yet they have not been, and seemingly cannot be, found, hence the conclusion that they at least do not seem to be possible.

But that's the very thing the racist denies, they will point to decades of studies on intergroup IQ scores, peer reviewed studies on rates of violent crimes when controlling for income, historical differences in regional development, etc.

The "race realist" (like the "gender realist") often comes armed with a wealth of scientific studies. And they can also point to no small number or cases where people have been persecuted for, or driven out of the sciences for daring to contravene the "social construct" or "no differences narrative," hence casting aspersions on "scientific consensus" as being manufactured by fear of accusations of "racism."

Stephen Pinker has some good stuff on this. The most common response to this issue, something like what you're saying, implies that: "if there are actually meaningful differences between races, then racism actually wouldn't be bad and maybe we should even become racists." It forces anti-racists to have to litigate the interpretation of expert data like IQ studies, behavioral genetics, etc. and get into debates about statistical controls, etc. because they have already accepted premises like: "if there is intergroup variance in anything other than the 'physical' (i.e., the mental) then racism is actually acceptable." Indeed, the "meritocracy" imagined by modern liberalism would tend to suggest this.

This is a problem that is very widespread and I think it stems from an inability to ground human dignity and worth in anything in post-modern liberalism. So racism has to be opposed on the grounds that is a transgression of the liberal ideal of individuals getting proper deserts for their actions. The transgression of racism in neo-liberalism is not the dehumanizing and alienating circumstances of the urban and rural underclasses afterall, but rather that membership in this "lower class," and more importantly membership in the small, and ever shrinking "winner class" are not evenly distributed across racial categories, implying that some exceptional individuals are not receiving appropriate desert.

For instance, a common position for both leftist elites and guys like Charles Murray is that automation, AI, etc. will deprive a vast underclass of work and make them dependent on "the state." And while both argue that standards for this underclass should be improved (they have instead been declining by many measures), they think its existence is inevitable. Racism then, is about the relative rates of people of x group making it to the upper class, whether we should expect that this is proportional to population statistics or whether we should expect between group variance in attainment to this class. The problem is not the "meritocracy," but only whether the meritocracy is effectively sorting winners from losers based on the "right" criteria, and not depriving would-be exceptional individuals from exceptional individual status.

The racists' case is thus made easier, since it becomes an argument about proper sorting. The wealth gap between white and black Americans is now larger than it was under Jim Crow (and the Arab-Jewish gap in Israel). Yet if this can be shown to result from proper "data-driven decision-making" and meritocracy, so much the worse for equality. Hence, we get debates over whether credit scores are "structural racism," because they are an example of a mechanism effecting such outcomes.

Race and sex, being highly visible and biological, are the preferred identities of analysis here. They are "constructs" but they are the focus precisely because exceptional individuals cannot yet transcend them if they choose to. Whereas class, religion, ethnicity, regional background, etc. tend not to be a focus, because the upwardly mobile individual is responsible for transcending (and really abandoning) them.

This is a problem that is very widespread and I think it stems from an inability to ground human dignity and worth in anything in post-modern liberalism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ding ding ding. :up:

See also:

My suggestion would be to think about a vegetarian who confronts you, "No species is, tout court, inferior to another." Do you have to stop eating meat? Is their claim falsifiable? Does "tout court" have a discernible meaning in that context? If we cannot enslave those of a certain race, can we enslave those of a certain species?

(Of course it is possible that this suggestion will only confuse you - haha. Still, if natural reason can make these sorts of judgments about species, then at least some "tout court inferior" claims are not nonsensical or unfalsifiable. Note too that racism only came to an end with substantive answers to the falsifiability question. Racism would never have come to an end if we just claimed that the racist had the burden of proof (because the burden of proof is culture- and time-relative).) — Leontiskos

Another observation is that “being at cross purposes” seems to play a fairly significant role in dismissal. — Leontiskos

One thing I am interested in understanding are the cross-purposes involved in more minor dismissals. When people aren’t engaging rationally, what exactly is it that they are doing instead? What is their purpose or telos? (I have noticed that the number of people who restrict themselves to rational inquiry is incredibly small, even on a philosophy forum.)

In the U.S. Trump provides a good example. He dominates political discourse, and there are lots of people who say they want to discuss politics, but what they actually want to do is beat the anti-Trump drum. Rational discussion of a political issue strikes them as a distraction, and sooner or later they find their way back to their telos of beating the anti-Trump drum. One is then presented with the simple choice of either providing the person with the anti-Trump catharsis that they desire, or else finding an interlocutor who is able to engage in more interesting activities.

That sort of thing is a type for what happens in so many pseudo-intellectual dialogues. There is a feigned interest in X while the true interest lies in Y (and it is precisely the dissimulation which is frustrating). Soon enough focus is lost and the person falls back into the rut of their pet thesis or their pet modus operandi.* That shift is most readily apparent when one is faced with one’s own cognitive dissonance, and thus flees into safe, familiar platitudes. In severe cases the person’s whole approach becomes bound up with justifying that flight from genuine philosophical discourse.

In these more minor cases we should try to work through the problems, but how is that done? One way is by enforcing <standard Socratic principles of dialogue>. Another is by becoming painfully clear about what thesis the person is arguing for and what arguments they are relying on to support it (i.e. a move towards formalized argumentation).

Yet the root problem is a bit deeper, and regards a rectification of the sub-philosophical telos. This is where Socrates really shines, and he usually preempts the whole issue by asking his interlocutor if they want to engage in dialogue at the outset. The general idea is to somehow persuade or encourage one’s interlocutor to engage in real philosophy instead of simply regurgitating the half-baked thoughts that have been floating around their heads for the last 15 years.


* This is precisely the age-old problem of <rationalization> or subordinating reason to the passions.

We are judging an action or behavior, and we agreed that such a judgment is a moral judgment — Leontiskos

No we haven't. Your quoted exchange (assuming I agreed) doesn't show this. It shows that a "moral dismissal" results from a "moral judgement". That moral judgement is not assessed.

Then give your definition of 'judgment.' It seems to me that looking at the rubric and determining which answer is correct will require a judgment, namely judging which answer is correct — Leontiskos

Then computation is judgement. I reject this. Deliberation is judgement (assuming it results in something). Marking the exam without a set rubric (i.e I must know hte answers and judge whether student has gotten it right) would be this.

it seems ad hoc to exclude the judgment of the comedian from being a moral judgment — Leontiskos

This could be right, ubt I'd have to review the discussion and I'm not in place to do so right now. I cannot remember exactly what I excluded there.

If you need a 10-foot pipe and you examine two possible candidates, you are inevitably involved in judgments, no? — Leontiskos

Perhaps I should have used the term 'schedule'. An actual, written schedule of right responses.

No we haven't. Your quoted exchange (assuming I agreed) doesn't show this. It shows that a "moral dismissal" results from a "moral judgement". That moral judgement is not assessed. — AmadeusD

Okay, let's look. Here is the exchange laid out:

Nevertheless, let's save the term "moral dismissal" for the situation where you dismiss someone based on a moral judgment of their own actions or behavior. Ergo: "I am dismissing you because of such-and-such an action of yours, or such-and-such a behavior of yours, and I would do so even if I had ample time to engage you." — Leontiskos

You responded:

I think this is the right way to think of a 'moral' judgement in this context. — AmadeusD

Note that your response has to do with a moral judgment, not merely a moral dismissal. The idea here is that to morally judge someone is to judge their actions or behavior. If you want to propose a different definition of moral judgment, then you can of course do that.

Then computation is judgement. I reject this. Deliberation is judgement (assuming it results in something). Marking the exam without a set rubric (i.e I must know hte answers and judge whether student has gotten it right) would be this. — AmadeusD

Yes, I think computation involves judgment. If I give you a math problem you will require judgment in order to solve it.

Here is a definition of judgment that seems fine to me:

The central problem is that of understanding the capacity of the mind to form, entertain, and affirm judgements, which are not simply strings of words but items intrinsically representing some state of affairs, or way that the world is or may be. The affirmation of a judgement is thus the making of a true or false claim. — Judgment | Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy

(I would say that judgment already involves affirmation, but that's a minor difference.)

This could be right, ubt I'd have to review the discussion and I'm not in place to do so right now. I cannot remember exactly what I excluded there. — AmadeusD

<Here> is the post where I spoke about a comedian's ability to read the room.

Perhaps I should have used the term 'schedule'. An actual, written schedule of right responses. — AmadeusD

Whether rubric or schedule, I think both involve judgments. It's just that they involve simple or relatively easy judgments.

If I give you directions to my house you will still be involved in judgments. "Drive north on Central avenue, take a left on 22nd street, and arrive at the third house on your right, which is green." You are merely following directions and rules, but you are still involved in judgments. For example, the judgment of whether this street is 22nd street.

ou responded: — Leontiskos

To the fictional quotation. In that context that is the right way to think about a moral judgement. I am unsure that you could say i've agreed to the moral judgement being made. No, I don't mean on the facts - I mean, i would not take it as given that the conception in that quote is a moral judgement. In the event, I do think it is - so, I've probably just been unnecessarily confusing in this part of the exchange. To be clear: I think that is the right way to think about moral judgement in the context of dismissal - I am unsure a moral judgement is occurring in the quote.

Yes, I think computation involves judgment. If I give you a math problem you will require judgment in order to solve it. — Leontiskos

That would include machines 'judging'. That does not currently seem at all open to us.

Whether rubric or schedule, I think both involve judgments. It's just that they involve simple or relatively easy judgments. — Leontiskos

I would not want to say that recognition alone (which a schedule requires, and naught else) is judgement. Perhaps I need a better 'version' of 'judgement' to support this. But it seems to be pretty obviously the case that machines do not judge in the way we want to say humans do (or, higher animals in general). It may be that an adequate definition of judgement has to include literally ever act (given every act is a version of "this/that".

For example, the judgment of whether this street is 22nd street. — Leontiskos

No, that's not up to me. Either when i get there there's a 1:1 match between you directions and my location, or there is not. I do not judge whether that is the case - it either is or isn't and I observe which it is. However, that analogy doesn't hold with my point - if you gave me an active, working Google Maps. I closed my eyes, followed the directions(pretend for a moment this wouldn't be practically disastrous lmao) and then the Maps tells me i've arrived - that's what I'm talking about. I am literally not involved in any deliberation - I am, in fact, still taking instruction. It would have been a judgement whether to actually engage this course of action, though, to be sure.

To be clear: I think that is the right way to think about moral judgement in the context of dismissal - I am unsure a moral judgement is occurring in the quote. — AmadeusD

Hmm, okay. Well maybe the rest will help clarify some of this.

That would include machines 'judging'. — AmadeusD

No, I don't think machines "judge," hence the scare-quotes on both our parts. Thus when we talk about a human "computing" and a machine "computing" we are talking about two different things. One difference is that human computation involves judgment whereas machine computation does not.

I would not want to say that recognition alone (which a schedule requires, and naught else) — AmadeusD

I want to say that a schedule requires following, no? If I am to keep a schedule then I must recognize what I am to do, and then do it, no? Else, a schedule that no one is following is apparently not functioning as a schedule at all.

But I think the act of recognition involves judgment too. "This is 22nd street," or, "This is not 22nd street," are both acts of recognition and also judgments.

It may be that an adequate definition of judgement has to include literally ever act (given every act is a version of "this/that". — AmadeusD

Good, and this is perhaps one of the more foundational places where we may be disagreeing, because I think every choice involves judgment. Still, I am happy to distinguish speculative from practical judgment.

No, that's not up to me. Either when i get there there's a 1:1 match between you directions and my location, or there is not. I do not judge whether that is the case - it either is or isn't and I observe which it is. — AmadeusD

My point was that judgments must be leveraged in order to follow the directions. But is your claim here true? When you get to the end of the directions do you observe whether you have arrived, or judge whether you have arrived? In either case it would seem that you must decide whether you have arrived at the destination, no?

However, that analogy doesn't hold with my point - if you gave me an active, working Google Maps. — AmadeusD

I actually meant to include that scenario, but forgot. :up:

I closed my eyes, followed the directions(pretend for a moment this wouldn't be practically disastrous lmao) and then the Maps tells me i've arrived - that's what I'm talking about. I am literally not involved in any deliberation - I am, in fact, still taking instruction. — AmadeusD

I don't think closing your eyes helps you avoid judgment. To decide to obey (Google Maps) is a judgment. To decide when to turn your steering wheel with your eyes closed in relation to the instructions you are hearing is a judgment. I think auditory directions involve judgment just as visual directions involve judgment.

One difference is that human computation involves judgment whereas machine computation does not. — Leontiskos

Yes, nice. So far, so good.

But I think the act of recognition involves judgment too. "This is 22nd street," or, "This is not 22nd street," are both acts of recognition and also judgments. — Leontiskos

In this case, it seems one of my later comments will come in handy.. Let's see...

Good, and this is perhaps one of the more foundational places where we may be disagreeing — Leontiskos

b-b-b-b-bingo. Nice. Always good to find the niggle.

In either case it would seem that you must decide whether you have arrived at the destination, no? — Leontiskos

No. I decided to trust the app. It tells me - I obey the relayed information. Note that I could be in Guam. But i judged the app to get me to wherever you live.

To decide to obey (Google Maps) is a judgment. — Leontiskos

Yep, as above. That I have arrived is no longer up to me. I don't have the ability to judge it otherwise on the assumption I will hold to the jdugement about Google maps.

I think auditory directions involve judgment just as visual directions involve judgment. — Leontiskos

Yes, I can see why too. But I think jdugement should be a little more circumscribed to capture how it is used.

To decide when to turn your steering wheel with your eyes closed in relation to the instructions you are hearing is a judgment — Leontiskos

Nah, that's input-> output in this scenario. If I crash, I crash.

No. I decided to trust the app. It tells me - I obey the relayed information. Note that I could be in Guam. But i judged the app to get me to wherever you live. — AmadeusD

Sure, you can decide (judge) that the app is to be trusted. Sort of like how you can trust a taxi cab driver to get you to your destination. Still, at the end of your journey you still have to judge that the app or cab driver is telling you that you have arrived (even though you are trusting them at the same time).

A case where no subordinated judgment occurs would be when you go under general anesthesia for surgery, simply trusting that you will wake up on the other side. Waking up is not a judgment, and so in that case there is only one act of trust-judgment. You are trusting that the judgments of others will cause you to wake up.

Yes, I can see why too. But I think jdugement should be a little more circumscribed to capture how it is used. — AmadeusD

Similar to "moral," philosophical definitions of "judgment" are going to be more precise and encompassing than colloquial definitions. That's why I used the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. If we go with colloquial definitions then we will run into things like the Sorites paradox mentioned earlier, and the reasoning will not be watertight. We can do that if we like, but then we no longer have a warrant to complain that the reasoning isn't watertight. If we want watertight reasoning then we must abandon vague definitions.

Nah, that's input-> output in this scenario. If I crash, I crash. — AmadeusD

It would be rather strange for someone to try driving somewhere and not care if they crash. To crash would be to fail to achieve your goal, and therefore you are generally always trying not to crash when you are driving somewhere.

Still, at the end of your journey you still have to judge that the app or cab driver is telling you that you have arrived (even though you are trusting them at the same time) — Leontiskos

This flows back to whether or not you require every mental action to be a judgement. I do not - so, on my view this is a recognition only. I have simply taken what I've been told "We're here!" and run with it. I've not assessed it in any way (other than to pick up which words were aimed at me... is that hte judgement you mean? That's what Im calling recognition, to be clear).

A case where no subordinated judgment occurs would be when you go under general anesthesia for surgery, simply trusting that you will wake up on the other side. — Leontiskos

This is analogous: I judged my condition, the surgeon and medical advice, and the prognosis to go under the knife (or, anaethesia as you note). In the former, I could literally be unconscious, and be schluffed out of the car, and I'd still be wherever I actually was, regardless of whether it was 'correct'. Is it just that I am conscious you're wanting to hang something on, in that example?

If we want watertight reasoning then we must abandon vague definitions. — Leontiskos

I don't quite think this is available to us, so I'm happy with that. Although, I think the problem is actually that people have different ideas of what's captured by the concept (even on the definitions given by x or y source).

generally always trying not to crash when you are driving somewhere. — Leontiskos

Correct. But I've designed a scenario where I am not engaged in the prior activity, in terms of judgement. I can judge that hte crash fucking sucked, but I made no attempts to divert, or incur a crash.

This flows back to whether or not you require every mental action to be a judgement. — AmadeusD

I require every judgment to be a judgment, and I gave my definition of judgment <here> by following the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Nowhere in that definition is the claim that every mental act counts as a judgment. I noted that you are free to offer a different definition of judgment.

I do not - so, on my view this is a recognition only. I have simply taken what I've been told "We're here!" and run with it. I've not assessed it in any way (other than to pick up which words were aimed at me... is that hte judgement you mean? That's what Im calling recognition, to be clear). — AmadeusD

I think we're circling back to this and the conversation that followed:

I think assessing against a rubric requires judgment. If you need a 10-foot pipe and you examine two possible candidates, you are inevitably involved in judgments, no? — Leontiskos

You can say, "Oh, I only recognized that the first pipe was 10 feet long and the second was not," but in no way does this fail to count as a judgment given the definition I have laid out. The same holds with, "Recognizing that I have arrived at my destination." How did you recognize that if not by judging that the Google Maps voice told you that you arrived?

If you think recognizing that X is true involves no judgment, then you are denying the Oxford definition I have provided. Do you have an alternative definition?

This is analogous: I judged my condition, the surgeon and medical advice, and the prognosis to go under the knife (or, anaethesia as you note). In the former, I could literally be unconscious, and be schluffed out of the car, and I'd still be wherever I actually was, regardless of whether it was 'correct'. Is it just that I am conscious you're wanting to hang something on, in that example? — AmadeusD

I raised the example because I believe it to be disanalogous. In the Google Maps scenario you must judge that you have arrived. In the anesthesia scenario you need not judge that you should wake up. In that case you are literally woken up by someone else. In that case no volitional act is required, judgment or otherwise.

I agree that there are differences between recognizing that you have arrived at your destination, and deciding to take a taxi cab. But both are judgments given the definition I have provided. I don't think it makes sense to say, "I knew that I arrived but I did not judge that I arrived." When philosophers talk about judgment this is what they are talking about.

I don't quite think this is available to us, so I'm happy with that. — AmadeusD

Okay, but it seems that many of your complaints have to do with a lack of watertight reasoning due to vague definitions (e.g. "moral," "right," "judgment," etc.).

Correct. But I've designed a scenario where I am not engaged in the prior activity, in terms of judgement. I can judge that hte crash fucking sucked, but I made no attempts to divert, or incur a crash. — AmadeusD

It seems like you are saying that you might get in a crash and regret the crash, and then when someone asks you why you got in a crash, you could reasonably answer, "Oh, I didn't know I wasn't supposed to crash when driving. I make no attempts to avoiding crashing." That seems patently unreasonable, no? This all goes back to my claim:

To decide when to turn your steering wheel with your eyes closed in relation to the instructions you are hearing is a judgment — Leontiskos

The process here is something like, "I hear the instruction telling me to turn left, and then I turn left." For some reason you want to remove all judgment from that action, as if Google Maps turns the steering wheel for you and you do nothing at all. Or as if you put yourself on autopilot and cease to be an intermediating agent between Google Maps and the car. None of that seems reasonable. It seems pretty straightforward that when carrying out instructions one is engaged in judgments, even if they are subordinated to a proximate end and infused with an intention of trust.

Nowhere in that definition is the claim that every mental act counts as a judgment. I noted that you are free to offer a different definition of judgment. — Leontiskos

This absolutely ignores what I've said. You haven't addressed it. I can wait, but its also not entirely needed - your definitions are your definitions. They don't matter much to the discussion. I made a point about your definition which has been glossed over. That's fine. But not my problem.

I think we're circling back to this and the conversation that followe — Leontiskos

I'm going to ignore this section - it is absolutely pointless. I told you my view was otherwise, and explained something from that view point. We disagree about there being a judgement at that precise moment. This is not interesting.

How did you recognize that if not by judging that the Google Maps voice told you that you arrived? — Leontiskos

By recognizing it and making no judgement. If all that happened was a green light lit up on a HUD, all i've done is seen something and exited the car. You'll not get me to say this is a judgement. This is what I wanted to avoid - I thikn your definition sucks, you probably think so about mine.

Do you have an alternative definition? — Leontiskos

I gave you several. I also gave my own. This particular response of yours is uncharacteristically ignorant and uninteresting.

In the Google Maps scenario you must judge that you have arrived — Leontiskos

Nope. We've had that game. Moving on..

you should wake up — Leontiskos

This isn't in any way relevant to judging to go under the knife, which was in question. No sure where this came from. Uncharacteristic.

But both are judgments given the definition I have provided. — Leontiskos

Yep. Its a shit definition, in my view, and I proceeded on that basis. I've been explicitly clear and you're running over dead horses ad infinitum.

When philosophers talk about judgment this is what they are talking about. — Leontiskos

You really, truly need to re-read everything I've said because this aint it chief.

It seems like you are saying that you might get in a crash and regret the crash, and then when someone asks you why you got in a crash, you could reasonably answer, "Oh, I didn't know I wasn't supposed to crash when driving. I make no attempts to avoiding crashing." That seems patently unreasonable, no? — Leontiskos

I do not have the patience to correct this utterly insane take.

It seems pretty straightforward that when carrying out instructions one is engaged in judgments, even if they are subordinated to a proximate end and infused with an intention of trust. — Leontiskos

Ok. Disagreed.

This absolutely ignores what I've said. You haven't addressed it. I can wait, but its also not entirely needed - your definitions are your definitions. They don't matter much to the discussion. I made a point about your definition which has been glossed over. That's fine. But not my problem. — AmadeusD

What point have you made? Spell it out. Here is what I see:

I said:

L1. To judge is to affirm something as true or false {Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy}
L2. To believe that I have arrived at the end of my trip I must affirm as true that I have arrived
L3. Therefore, to believe that I have arrived involves a judgment

You responded:

A1. Suppose every mental act counts as a judgment
A2. If so, then L3 would be true
A3. But not every mental act counts as a judgment
A4. Therefore, L3 does not follow

And my response was that I have never claimed A1. A1 is a strawman. Thus your counterargument failed, and now you must decide whether to accept argument L1-L3 or else offer a different counterargument.

By recognizing it and making no judgement. If all that happened was a green light lit up on a HUD, all i've done is seen something and exited the car. You'll not get me to say this is a judgement. This is what I wanted to avoid - I thikn your definition sucks, you probably think so about mine. — AmadeusD

You haven't given a definition at all. You want to say that you see a green light lit up on a HUD and determine that you have arrived at your destination, but that you in no way judge that you have arrived at your destination. That doesn't make any sense, and you have provided no definition of 'judgment' to make sense of it.

I gave you several. I also gave my own. — AmadeusD

Where is it? It would have been much easier to simply quote yourself giving the definition rather than write a long post of nothing-burgers.

No, that's not up to me. Either when i get there there's a 1:1 match between you directions and my location, or there is not. I do not judge whether that is the case - it either is or isn't and I observe which it is. However, that analogy doesn't hold with my point - if you gave me an active, working Google Maps. I closed my eyes, followed the directions(pretend for a moment this wouldn't be practically disastrous lmao) and then the Maps tells me i've arrived - that's what I'm talking about. I am literally not involved in any deliberation - I am, in fact, still taking instruction. It would have been a judgement whether to actually engage this course of action, though, to be sure. — AmadeusD

I don’t mean to interrupt, but it seems like you both may basically agree on what a judgment is, but are finding fault with the application of the definition to the scenario, or various scenarios.

If I am not mistaken, I think you both would agree that the bolded part above speaks to a moment of judgment. Amadeus said it, and it seems to reflect a moment Leon is describing as judgment.

So you must be agreeing on something basic/essential/definitional about judgments.

Amadeus seems to be saying no more judgment is needed to carry out the course of action.
Leon is saying there are more pivotal moments requiring more judgments.

This may mean you are disagreeing with some underlying definition of judgment, but then I don’t think Amadeus would have made the above bolded statement if there was some glaring conflict between you regarding the nature of judgment.

I happen to agree with Leon, and don’t see how you can follow directions blindly, and skip adjudicating between when a step is completed and when the next step begins. When I am following directions, I know that I could misunderstand the direction and go astray and end up lost and not at my destination. I also know that Google maps is wrong and has led me to the wrong destination. So at each step, I have to decide “Is the last step completed yet? Can I move on to the next step? Is where I am driving what is meant by this next step? Is Google still correct of should I switch to Apple Maps?

Often these interim judgments are easy and immediately made, but that doesn’t mean they aren’t judgments.

I don’t mean to interrupt — Fire Ologist

On the contrary, your input seems like it might be helpful in making progress.

Amadeus seems to be saying no more judgment is needed to carry out the course of action.
Leon is saying there are more pivotal moments requiring more judgments. — Fire Ologist

I think that's right. I tried to get at the difference by talking about a "subordinated judgment" <here>.

I happen to agree with Leon, and don’t see how you can follow directions blindly, and skip adjudicating between when a step is completed and when the next step begins. When I am following directions, I know that I could misunderstand the direction and go astray and end up lost and not at my destination. I also know that Google maps is wrong and has led me to the wrong destination. So at each step, I have to decide “Is the last step completed yet? Can I move on to the next step? Is where I am driving what is meant by this next step? Is Google still correct of should I switch to Apple Maps?

Often these interim judgments are easy and immediately made, but that doesn’t mean they aren’t judgments. — Fire Ologist

Yes, these are good points. :up:
Pointing out the fact that error can occur both in our own judgments and with navigation applications is quite helpful.

I am happy to distinguish between, say, hard judgments and easy judgments, but I think both are judgments.

On the contrary, your input seems like it might be helpful in making progress. — Leontiskos

No.

I know that I could misunderstand the direction and go astray and end up lost and not at my destination. — Fire Ologist

That's not a judgment.

“Is the last step completed yet? Can I move on to the next step? Is where I am driving what is meant by this next step? Is Google still correct of should I switch to Apple Maps? — Fire Ologist

I have already conditioned these out of my example.

So I think you have done the same mis-understanding as Leon has. There is no room for judgment in my examples, unless the definition is highly irregular. I designed them that way to pick up whether Leon wanted "judgement' to mean something other than deliberation. I don't think it does. Leon seems to (but wont quite say that).

This should actually clear up any answers to Leon's last reply too.

I have already conditioned these out of my example. — AmadeusD

Would you do me a favor and show me your example and how you conditioned these out of it?

The example was (roughly, and I've perhaps streamlined it here) that I am in a cab, having told the driver where I'm going and to wake me up when we arrive.

There was then a question about being conscious. I do not think merely being conscious changes anything (just to cover that, quickly). I cannot remember Leon's take, but he wants to say all mental activity is judgement, from what I understand. That's fine - just not a framework I recognise either in practice, or the definitions given.

To be brutally clear: In my example, I may be woken up, get out of the car, have the cabbie drive away - and then start judging things. Relates similarly to the maps thing, but that wasn't the greatest version of the TE.

The example was (roughly, and I've perhaps streamlined it here) that I am in a cab, having told the driver where I'm going and to wake me up when we arrive. — AmadeusD

That's just false, AmadeusD. Here is the example:

if you gave me an active, working Google Maps. I closed my eyes, followed the directions(pretend for a moment this wouldn't be practically disastrous lmao) and then the Maps tells me i've arrived - that's what I'm talking about. I am literally not involved in any deliberation - I am, in fact, still taking instruction. — AmadeusD

I gave the example of "waking up" as an explicitly different example:

Sure, you can decide (judge) that the app is to be trusted. Sort of like how you can trust a taxi cab driver to get you to your destination. Still, at the end of your journey you still have to judge that the app or cab driver is telling you that you have arrived (even though you are trusting them at the same time).

A case where no subordinated judgment occurs would be when you go under general anesthesia for surgery, simply trusting that you will wake up on the other side. Waking up is not a judgment, and so in that case there is only one act of trust-judgment. You are trusting that the judgments of others will cause you to wake up. — Leontiskos

You've literally lied about the example given, which was never about a taxi driver waking you up. You are resorting to this because you have no good arguments to support your strange case that no judgment occurs when you respond to the Google Maps app or the taxi driver telling you that you have arrived. Note that the lie does not help you at all, because after the taxi cab driver wakes you up, you still have to form the judgment that you have arrived. Your new example in which the taxi cab driver wakes you up in no way answers the question of how you know that you have arrived without any judgment.

I cannot remember Leon's take, but he wants to say all mental activity is judgement — AmadeusD

More nonsense:

Nowhere in that definition is the claim that every mental act counts as a judgment. — Leontiskos

You responded:

A1. Suppose every mental act counts as a judgment
A2. If so, then L3 would be true
A3. But not every mental act counts as a judgment
A4. Therefore, L3 does not follow

And my response was that I have never claimed A1. A1 is a strawman... — Leontiskos

You've stopped doing serious philosophy in this thread. You have resorted to, "The Oxford definition sucks and I refuse to give my own definition." You then went on to consistently mischaracterize what you and others have said in this thread. :roll:

(@Fire Ologist)

Here is the example: — Leontiskos

I reworked this, twice - to be to do with being asleep, and to do with a driver. I do want to engage over you misrepresenting a rather long, arduous conversation over the particular verison you wish to critique. My responses are my responses. I would prefer you either drop this, or engage with the full conversation rather than your chosen issues to crtique (in this case, misleadingly).

You've literally lied about the example given — Leontiskos

Nope. Not, at all. You can just go back and see that you're cherry-picking. Not my issue. I explained the relevance of being conscious to the issue, and at that stage I pulled you up on that being the difference. So, yeah, I acknowledged this and responded in my terms. Nothing wrong with that. You can be upset if you like. I cannot understand many of your responses, as I've said all along - you clearly don't understand what's being said. Yet claim you do...

ore nonsense: — Leontiskos

I require every judgment to be a judgment, and I gave my definition of judgment <here> by following the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. — Leontiskos

The link isn't a definition. Its a discussion that gives us nothing.

You said you require every choice to be a judgement. That is tautological. It means every mental act is a judgement, because it is not possible to carry out a mental act without choice to do so. You have said as much, in trying to critique my account. Either cop to that, or don't. Not my issue, again.

you have no good arguments — Leontiskos

Is this like.... an actual joke?

ou have resorted to — Leontiskos

Nope. That is entirely fucking false to the point that you have finally actually upset me. Wont respond again unless you stop being an asshole.

Nope. Not, at all. You can just go back and see that you're cherry-picking. — AmadeusD

When you misrepresent the conversation my answer is always the same:

It would have been much easier to simply quote yourself... — Leontiskos

You claim that you have said something, but you can't quote yourself saying it, because it is nowhere to be found. Fire Ologist asked:

Would you do me a favor and show me your example and how you conditioned these out of it? — Fire Ologist

You failed to answer him. You failed to point to the quote or even the post where you said, "that I am in a cab, having told the driver where I'm going and to wake me up when we arrive." Why did you fail to point to it? The answer is simple: because it doesn't exist. You are trying to rewrite the past in your favor.

An interesting question that follows upon the OP is this: Does it undermine the strong rejection to rationally illuminate the grounds for strong rejection? For example, if one deems something beyond the pale, is that "deeming" undermined by the act of explaining why it is beyond the pale?

Does it undermine the strong rejection to rationally illuminate the grounds for strong rejection? — Leontiskos

That is an interesting question because I believe it is frequently how people act (ignoring reasons associated with deeming something beyond the pale), but it is not necessary to do so, and indeed, if we abandon rational illumination, we abandon community and the possibility of morality.

We are talking about “strong” rejection, and this highlights the passion and emotion in it. To recognize what is beyond the pale draws with it an emotional response. Someone decapitates a kitten and an emotional revulsion is instinctual. But to recognize what is beyond the pale is also a specific judgement, a deeming, and these specific determinations can be “rationally illuminated”. Taking a breath and being rational about a “strong” rejection, will take some of the passion out of it in favor of dispassionate reasoning that can illuminate. And so in a sense, rational illumination undermines passionate strong rejection. And when passions alone or primarily drive the deeming of something beyond the pale, someone might also deem reasons may undermine the determination made from emotion.

But I am not sure this emotional/psychological analysis takes your question far enough.

As we all at times think, the depravity of some actions is so obviously beyond the pale, to even ask to illuminate the grounds for such judgments is to call something already obvious into question, and thereby potentially undermine its obviousness, which in turn undermines whether it is truly beyond the pale in the first place. This all means someone might judge that, when faced with what is clearly deemed beyond the pale, there is no reason to resist one’s passionate response nor is there reason to seek the illuminating details that justify one’s judgment. And further, as we are fallible when seeking rational illumination, we may undermine our own intellectual confidence by failing to reasonably illuminate what we have already strongly rejected and passionately deemed beyond the pale. (Like we just know 2+2=4 is beyond the pale, but if we can’t show our math, we may force ourselves to question something we passionately already know is true.)

But seeing rational illumination as undermining what has been deemed beyond the pale, seems like intellectual cowardice. And in my estimation, an unwillingness or inability to engage in rational illumination and discussion of one’s grounds for one’s determinations is part of the essence of behavior that may be beyond the pale. A determination of what is beyond the pale is not merely the product of strong emotion (or it is often based on reasons as well). Maybe the person who says “beheading kittens is always wrong so any person who did that or does that should be written off as beyond the pale” is being purely emotional about their esteem of kittens, but reasoning and logical inference and sound observation remain available for discussion. “Kitten killers are beyond the pale” is like any other determination, subject to rational scrutiny. And whenever one chooses to ignore rational scrutiny, or one cannot control one’s emotions enough to allow room for rational scrutiny, one is flirting with what I see as the most basic component of behavior that is beyond the pale, namely the avoidance of reason.

To apply what I am saying, Charlie Kirk said things many folks believed were beyond the pale. He wanted policy that many saw as harmful beyond the pale. But, to me, he did what he did in a debate forum, in the public square, inviting challenge and seeking rational grounds and illumination in every subject matter. Someone else deemed his very act of talking to be beyond the pale, that Kirk’s words did actual harm, and had to shut those actions down by killing him. Do I write off the shooting as beyond the pale without giving the shooter a hearing? No, as I would be treating the shooter the same way it looks like the shooter treated Charlie Kirk. But if the shooter will not or cannot rationally illuminate his grounds for shooting Charlie Kirk, then I have reasonable ground to deem the shooting as beyond the pale. And if the shooter asked me what I thought before he shot Charlie, and the shooter couldn’t or wouldn’t provide a reasonable basis to justify killing Kirk, I would tell him that shooting Kirk will be beyond the pale.

The pale, it seems to me, is reasonable discussion. What is beyond the pale is always in part beyond discussion. So, in any debate, nothing can be said that is beyond the pale. (In a debate is key context here - one can do tremendous harm beyond the pale with words, but not so in a debate among adults).

I still don’t have grounds to deem the shooter himself as beyond the pale. I cannot write him off and bury him in a ditch just because I saw him shoot Kirk. We must have faith, and find hope, and forgive, and love, and use reason and our words and our example to change hearts. Don’t get me wrong, shooting people for their political speech alone is always wrong and beyond the pale, but it is precisely the silence and foreclosing of discussion that makes it wrong, and so we must interrogate the shooter, seek his rational illumination and then judge the nature of his crime. I suspect he will not be able to justify shooting a man like that. But it would be beyond the pale to judge the shooter without hearing him out. (And this has nothing to do with criminal judgement and punishment - we all have a law against assignation, and if we catch someone cold in the act of assassination, they go to jail or get the death penalty - present the facts and apply the law; but we don’t judge them evil, or find their soul or whole being beyond the pale without a hearing. Such judgment may be further beyond the pale then the motivations behind the shooting.)

As we all at times think, the depravity of some actions is so obviously beyond the pale, to even ask to illuminate the grounds for such judgments is to call something already obvious into question, and thereby potentially undermine its obviousness, which in turn undermines whether it is truly beyond the pale in the first place. This all means someone might judge that, when faced with what is clearly deemed beyond the pale, there is no reason to resist one’s passionate response nor is there reason to seek the illuminating details that justify one’s judgment. And further, as we are fallible when seeking rational illumination, we may undermine our own intellectual confidence by failing to reasonably illuminate what we have already strongly rejected and passionately deemed beyond the pale. — Fire Ologist

Yes, good points. :up:

And whenever one chooses to ignore rational scrutiny, or one cannot control one’s emotions enough to allow room for rational scrutiny, one is flirting with what I see as the most basic component of behavior that is beyond the pale, namely the avoidance of reason. — Fire Ologist

Okay, interesting.

Do I write off the shooting as beyond the pale without giving the shooter a hearing? No, as I would be treating the shooter the same way it looks like the shooter treated Charlie Kirk. But if the shooter will not or cannot rationally illuminate his grounds for shooting Charlie Kirk, then I have reasonable ground to deem the shooting as beyond the pale. And if the shooter asked me what I thought before he shot Charlie, and the shooter couldn’t or wouldn’t provide a reasonable basis to justify killing Kirk, I would tell him that shooting Kirk will be beyond the pale. — Fire Ologist

Okay.

Don’t get me wrong, shooting people for their political speech alone is always wrong and beyond the pale, but it is precisely the silence and foreclosing of discussion that makes it wrong, and so we must interrogate the shooter, seek his rational illumination and then judge the nature of his crime. I suspect he will not be able to justify shooting a man like that. But it would be beyond the pale to judge the shooter without hearing him out. — Fire Ologist

Okay, and this relates to things like the paradox of tolerance.

I suppose one inroad into this topic is Elizabeth Anscombe's comment:

If someone really thinks, in advance, that it is open to question whether such an action as procuring the judicial execution of the innocent should be quite excluded from consideration—I do not want to argue with him; he shows a corrupt mind. — Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 40

Now if Anscombe's interlocutor thinks that procuring the judicial execution of the innocent is a live option, and if such a person is to be deemed beyond the pale, then at some point or another they must be "written off." Or in your words the discussion must be "foreclosed." The interlocutor will want to keep talking and arguing, but at some point he must be written off.

Indeed if judging someone beyond the pale involves writing them off, then to write off or "foreclose" cannot itself be beyond the pale. This is the paradox.


I myself was thinking more along the lines of the idea that something which is beyond the pale inherently lacks rationality, and therefore is going to be more or less opaque to rational scrutiny. If this is right, then something which can be rationally and transparently proscribed cannot be beyond the pale; and therefore the object of evil that is beyond the pale will always remain fuzzy. For example, we can rationally and transparently proscribe a particular mathematical error, and hence such an error is not beyond the pale. Because the error is "understandable" it is able to be formally/rationally corrected (and because it is able to be formally/rationally corrected, it is understandable).

Ultimately, though, I think proscription necessarily prescinds a bit from the intelligibility of what is proscribed. For example, we say, "Thou shalt not murder," and even though murder is itself an endlessly confusing or privated act, nevertheless the proscription itself remains rational and intelligible. Of course, whether it does remain rational and intelligible is an interesting question. Can, "Do not φ," be transparent if φ is opaque? Presumably the condition must be drawn "materially" rather than "formally," and this may be precisely why an act like murder always retains a certain degree of ambiguity (and why, for example, someone might claim that capital punishment is a form of murder, or that fining a thief is a form of theft).

(Then, bringing in your points, the interesting question arises of how one is to avoid licensing premature dismissals if the object of dismissal necessarily lacks a certain degree of intelligibility.)