I'm not attacking a strawman - you’re treating “the facts of science” as if they were metaphysically transparent, a window to 'how the universe truly is', when they are plainly not. — Wayfarer

This is a strawman simply because we have no more reliable, or even any other reliable, guide, to "how the universe truly is" than science.

Who are you showing this to? Yourself? Me? If it's me, then it's only worth my time if you are trying to convince me, rather than just "witnessing" it to me (like the Jehovah's witness tells me, when I answer the door). Otherwise we're just stating our positions and reacting to what the other person says- a waste of our time. — Relativist

If you are waiting for Wayfarer to provide an actual argument you'll be waiting a long time, perhaps forever. I have never seen a genuine argument form him―all I've seen is dogma and cut and paste passages from supposed authorities.

If you are waiting for Wayfarer to provide an actual argument you'll be waiting a long time, perhaps forever. — Janus

You might turn your attention to the 3 arguments presented in the post above this one.

Such as the claim that 'It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how Nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about Nature'. How would you respond to that?

Such as the claim that 'It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how Nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about Nature'. How would you respond to that? — Wayfarer

I'd say that is a claim, not an argument. (Wasn't it Niels Bohr who said that, and why should we not see your use of it as an appeal to authority?) Can you provide an argument that supports it.

Can you provide an argument that supports it. — Janus

I provided the argument for it upthread, but it was ignored. That argument was, you have wildly divergent views of what quantum physics means (realist, idealist, anti-realist etc), so how can you appeal to physics for a metaphysical thesis, when these foundational issues are still a matter of controversy.

...supposed authorities... — Janus

They're known as 'citations'.

You're skipping over my key point, in that quote:
that philosophical issues can generally be dealt with while ignoring ontology. Ontology could be more of a distraction. — Relativist

Philosophical differences are always deeply rooted, and unless the difference is very mundane (making it not a real philosophical issue) the differences cannot be resolved without addressing ontological principles. As you yourself admit, ontology provides grounding. And philosophical difficulties are issues with principles, premises, which require analysis of the grounding, to resolve the differences. You might have noticed that discussions at TPF generally end up becoming disputes over ontological differences.

This is a strawman simply because we have no more reliable, or even any other reliable, guide, to "how the universe truly is" than science. — Janus

This claim could only be justified by begging the question. If you restrict your definition of "universe", to that which is studied by the empirical sciences, then the claim is true. But if you allow that "universe" extends to all those aspects of reality which are hidden from the empirical sciences (a very large part of reality as Wayfarer has proven), then your claim that "we have no more reliable, or even any other reliable, guide, to 'how the universe truly is" than science', must be blatantly false.

The falsity is due to the fact that we need to include within our guide to understanding how the universe truly is, all the aspects which are hidden from the empirical sciences. Therefore the guide must include evidence from the empirical sciences, but not be restricted to those principles, thereby employing a method which extends beyond them. A common example is "metaphysics", which by its name goes beyond physics. This allows that the knowledge derived from physics gets incorporated into a larger field, ?metaphysics", which would provide a more reliable guide to how the universe truly is, by using the knowledge derived from physics, other sciences, as well as other fields.

That argument was, you have wildly divergent views of what quantum physics means (realist, idealist, anti-realist etc), so how can you appeal to physics for a metaphysical thesis, when these foundational issues are still a matter of controversy. — Wayfarer

The divergence merely reflects that fact that the experimental results are counter-intuitive, which leaves it open for physicists themselves, who are not immune fomr having their own metaphysical preferences, to expound those preferences.

In any case science is not confined to physics, and I would also include everyday unbiased observation under the umbrella of science, since it is the basis upon which all conjecture and hypothesizing are founded.

They're known as 'citations'. — Wayfarer

Nothing wrong with citing actual arguments, but presenting bare statements made by experts certainly seems like an appeal to authority.

But if you allow that "universe" extends to all those aspects of reality which are hidden from the empirical sciences (a very large part of reality as Wayfarer has proven), then your claim that "we have no more reliable, or even any other reliable, guide, to 'how the universe truly is" than science', must be blatantly false. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you give an example of what the concept <universe> might be extended to in order to include things
other than what is either observable or the effect of something observable?

Therefore the guide must include evidence from the empirical sciences, but not be restricted to those principles, thereby employing a method which extends beyond them. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you acknowledge that science is a guide to metaphysical speculation. Can you cite another?

I don’t intend to misrepresent you, but when you define physicalism as the thesis that everything that exists is composed of physical things, governed by physical forces and laws of nature, supported by an argument from 'the scope of physics', then from my point of view it does sound like physics is being taken as the ontological grounding for your metaphysics. How is it not? — Wayfarer

Because physics is not ontology/metaphysics.

Physics tells many things about the natural world - all of which are best guesses - very GOOD guesses, thanks to the methodology that is truth-directed (verification, falsification, revision, supplanting). Ontology entails postulating general features of existence. The postulates of physicalism transcend physics, and are not contingent on any particular theories in physics. Falsifying a theory in physics has no bearing on the axioms of physicalism.

Example: Armstrong's "atomism" is an ontological claim that there is an irreducible bottom layer of physical reality. It is not based on atomic theory, quantum field theory, or string theory - but based on judgement against a vicious, infinite regress. i.e. it is based on the tools of philosophy, not science. If quantum fields are actually the ontological rock-bottom, that would be consistent with the ontological claim, but the ontological claim is not contingent upon it. (Furthermore, science could never demonstrate that an ontological bottom has been found).

Physicalism respects the discoveries of physics, and as such is a form of scientific realism, but it doesn't entail treating any specific findings in physics as an element of the ontology or as a set of assumed facts upon which it depends.

Physicalists do adopt the implication of physics that there are on laws - but based on it being a best explanation for the success of physics*, and respect for the epistemoligical basis of science.

I hope this helps you understand why it's incorrect to say that physics (that set of defeasible theories) cannot be considered the ontological ground that physicalism depends on. If physics were completed and perfected, then it would do so, but that's just an idealization; it's unrealistic to think that will ever happen*.

Confusion arises in discussions when the term "physics" is used to refer to this idealization. In my discussions, I try to be consistent with referring to "laws of nature" as the actual, ontological laws. When I discuss "laws of physics", I'm referring to current theory. Gaps in current theory (e.g. dark matter & energy; quantum gravity) are irrelevant to the ontology- they just demonstrate the incompleteness of physics. Similarly with theory revision: Newton got a lot right with gravity.

You also suggested that I claimed physicalism is "supported by an argument from 'the scope of physics'. I haven't said that. The scope of physics is the natural world. The scope of ontology is the totality of existence. Physicalists are philosophers who assert the physical world to BE the totality of existence, but it is not a conclusion derived from physics. Rather, it is a conclusion based on an absence of adequate evidence of anything else, and parsimony. Indeed, physicalists respect what physicists have learned about nature: physics provides a set of "facts" about the world that have stronger epistemic support than many other claims about what exists. But also, as I said earlier the postulates of physicalism are actually beyond the scope of science - so despite physicalism's effective scope being physical reality, it's scope of discourse transcends physics.

_____________


*Some physicalists, including Armstrong, suggest physics will eventually be completed. I am more pessimistic, because there are limits to what we can investigate empirically. My understanding is that string theory is close to being a complete physics- accounting for the quantum fields and gravity. But critics are correct in noting that it's not possible to test it empirically. Similarly with confirming some interpretation of QM.

Would I be correct in saying that you believe that 'ontology' comprises 'the set of all actually existing things', — Wayfarer

Ontology INCLUDES the set of all actually existing things, but it also includes theory about the structure of reality. Examples: 1) Armstrong's postulate that everything that exists is a "state off affairs", with 3 kinds of constituents 2) the postulate that laws of nature are relations between universals, account for causation and reflect a necessitation.

do you recognize any cogency in David Chalmers' argument? That 'the nature of experience' cannot be fully captured by scientific descriptons? If you don't, why not? If you do, how does it fail as argument against physicalism? — Wayfarer

It reflects a problem for science rather than a problem for physicalism. It's problematic for a physicalism that assumes science can and will answer all questons about the natural world but I noted my disagreement with that. I do not expect science to necessarily be able to answer every question about the physical world.

In principle, I'm open to a theory of mind that includes something inconsistent with physicalism. But I've seen nothing but possibilities being proposed that have no epistemological basis to support them. These unnatural possibilities aren't even put in the form of an explanatory hypothesis to entertain against natural ones. They simply entail something vauge existing that is undetectable/unanalyzable by science.

If undetectable/unanalyzable answers are reasionable to consider, this should include undetectable/unanalyzable physical possibilities- something that fits the physicalist paradigm: everything that exists is a state of affairs, causation is due to relations between universals, and causal closure. It would be different if I were singularly focused on philosophy of mind, but I'm interested in the broader metaphysical landscape.

scientific method assumes at the outset a division between subject and object, and assigns primary reality to the objectively-measurable attributes of objects, while assigning appearances to the so-called 'secondary attributes' of the subjective mind. I'm saying that physicalism overlooks or ignores this methodological division, and this has philosophical consequences. — Wayfarer

I think you mean "philosophical implications". The implication I see is paradigm failure. That alone doesn't falsify physicalism. I'm not rationalizing and demanding physicalism be proven logically impossible, because my position is based on Inference to Best Explanation. I would need to see a better explanation than physicalism.

Yet they're saying that physics does not describe nature as it is. Do you think that is so? If not, why? — Wayfarer

I agree that the physics only establishes the efficacacy of the calculations, but it does tell us something about the ontological nature of the system it describes, and nothing about it is inconsistent with physicalism. It's a strike against standard scientific realism (which assumes the model descriptions as accurate), but is exactly the point of ontic structural realism.

I can consider most philosophical issues even when framed in terms inconsistent with physicalism. That's because I regard the framing as paradigm, which can be utilized without ontological commitent to the paradigm.
— Relativist

This seems to rest on a misunderstanding of philosophy as such. Scientific models can indeed be treated as paradigms without ontological commitment — Newtonian mechanics still works fine for spacecraft navigation, even if we know relativity is more fundamental. Same with quantum physicists' 'Shut up and calculate'. But philosophy isn’t just a pragmatic use of conceptual models. Its concern is precisely with what is real, and what it means to exist. To treat philosophical frameworks as if they can be referenced without ontological commitment is to miss the point of philosophy. Ontology can't be firewalled of to a specialised sub-division separate from the rest of philosophy, it's intrinsic to it. — Wayfarer

So...you disagree, and you explained why you disagree, but you've given me no reason to change my mind- you have demonstrated no failure of treating it as paradigm. Neither did you respond to this:

But if there are issues (or solutions to issues) that DO require some (non-physicalist) ontological commitments, why wouldn't you have the burden of making a case for those commitments? If you believe it impossible to meet the burden, then how can you than construe this as an error my part? Sure, you disagree with me on physicalism, but if you haven't truly falsified it to me, then you have no rational basis to complain about my view on the subject. To do so seems similar to a Christian lamenting my failure to experience the joy of Jesus' love for me, because I'm an ignorant atheist. — Relativist

I've given the above arguments repeatedly over the course of this thread, and to my recollection, you haven't engaged with any of them, other than the vague accusation of them being 'category mistakes'. If they are, then how so? — Wayfarer

The category mistakes involved conflating physics with physicalist ontology, and I did say that. More broadly, I said you didn't understand physicalism. I hope this lengthy reply helps to better understand physicalism and its relation to physics.

BTW, I'm sure I brought up Ontic Structural Realism before. I recall you having a more favorable attitude toward it vs standard scientific realism.

Can you give an example of what the concept <universe> might be extended to in order to include things
other than what is either observable or the effect of something observable? — Janus

There is a huge part of the so-called "universe", dark matter, dark energy, etc., which is neither observable nor the effect of something observable. The effects of these are observable, but these are not themselves observable, nor are they the effect of something observable. We might hypothesize that they are the effect of spatial expansion or some such thing, but spatial expansion is not observable or the effect of something observable. From our observations, we conclude logically that there must be something (spatial expansion), which causes what we observe. This is what the theologists say about God, His effects are observable. but He is not Observable.

This common feature of "the universe", that there are thing which are not observable but have effects which are, I believe is due to the nature of time. The only things observable are things at the present, so all observation are past in time by the time they are noted as observed. However, there is a vast part of time, which is perhaps even bigger than the past, which is known as the future. The future is unobservable for the reason just stated. And, since the future consists of possibilities, this is not the effect of something observable, nor the effect of something observed.

So you acknowledge that science is a guide to metaphysical speculation. — Janus

No, science is not a guide to metaphysical speculation, just evidence to consider in metaphysical speculations. Both the successes and failures of science need to be considered objectively, and judged accordingly. Since it consists of both, and its parts must be judged, it cannot itself be the guide for that judgement. Metaphysical speculation is itself the guide, and intuition is what inspires it.

Philosophical differences are always deeply rooted, and unless the difference is very mundane (making it not a real philosophical issue) the differences cannot be resolved without addressing ontological principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Lots of philosophical issues can be discussed without first establishing a common ontology. This includes discussions of epistemology and science.

As you yourself admit, ontology provides grounding.

Yes, but it's not always necessary to demonstrate how the issues map to the ontological ground. We usually just claim a supervenience relation.

When it IS necessary, each side can either choose to make a case for their ontology, or they can simply agree to disagree based on their respective background beliefs.

Firstly it is science that posits the existence of dark matter and energy on the basis of observations. So, they are considered to be a part of the Universe as understood by science.

You are now saying science is not a guide, but you said this earlier:

Therefore the guide must include evidence from the empirical sciences, but not be restricted to those principles, thereby employing a method which extends beyond them. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the guide includes evidence from the empirical sciences then the empirical sciences are guiding metaphysical speculation. Intuition is always itself guided by the current state of knowledge or scientific paradigm. Intuition in unconstrained speculative free play can come up with anything that isn't a logical contradiction, so by itself is not a reliable guide at all. I don't prefer referring to it as intuition anyway, but rather as imagination―creative imagination invents hypotheses designed to explain what is observed―it's known as abduction.

Only in situations where one has a choice of hypotheses is the degree of certainty needed.
— Relativist

In this case, you have what you called good reason to believe that the hypothesis is false. How would this affect the degree of certainty? — Metaphysician Undercover

The judgement is between 2 or more competing hypotheses, for the sole purpose of selecting one. And remember I have replaced my term "good reason" with "relevant information". This relevent new information may, or may not, change the ranking. Consider the auditory evidence of a second shooter of Kennedy: this new information doesn't change my relative ranking of the 2 hypotheses. In cases where it is a closer call, new relevant information could change the judgement.

To reiterate: modest Bayesianism does not entail assigning an absolute probability; rather: just a relative ranking.

[I think it is irrational to choose a hypotheses when there is strong evidence (good reason) which indicates that it is false.

Semantics. I previously addressed this:

If I use your private lexicon, I would not label the point a "good reason" to reject physicalism, but rather that it constitutes relevant information that should be taken into account (as I previously described, and you ignored). — Relativist

______________________

However, the issue is really much more complicated than what you describe. What happens often, is that a person will select a hypotheses with incomplete data, as you suggest. The extent of the data which is unknown is itself unknown, so the certainty level may be higher than it ought to be. The relevance of the unknown data cannot be accounted for, because the data is unknown. Therefore the data which is judged is arbitrarily weighted relative to the unknown data. — Metaphysician Undercover

You seem to be mistakenly treating certainly level as a probability that can be calculated, and indicating the actual probability is unknown - because our knowledge is limited.

That's not what we're doing. We're just producing a relative ranking of the hypotheses based on whatever information is available.

Then, as time passes more data will become available to the individual(s) who made that judgement. The data may actually be directly contrary to the accepted hypotheses, but since the hypotheses is already accepted, and plays an active role in the lives of those who accept it, they simply adjust, make an exception to the rule to allow for the now evident contrary data, and continue to work with the hypotheses, which we now have data that confirms it is faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

Good description of what often occurs, but do you agree that it can be more rational to reevaluate the hypotheses (there need to be at least 2) than to "adjust and make an exception"? That's my point.

This is actually very common in physics. — Metaphysician Undercover

There tends to be no viable alternative hypothesis to the then-current accepted theory. But it's more complicated than that. Refer to Kuhn's, "Structure of Scientific Revolutions"

Physicalism is an ontological grounding thesis. It's a gross caricature to suggest this means physics can replace epistemology.
— Relativist

Yes, physicalism is an ontological grounding thesis. However, epistemology is what ontology grounds. Therefore it is you who speaks nonsense here. — Metaphysician Undercover

How does the fact that there is an ontological ground to epistemolgy (invariably discussed as a supervenience relation) support your claim that physics can replace epistemology? Consider the relation between meteorology and the more fundamental science of thermodynamics and fluid dynamics - which obviously ground it - just one level down.. No one would suggest replacing meteorology with direct application of thermodynamics and fluid dynamics.

You interpreted "good reasons" to entail facts that contradicted my prior judgement. I explained this was not what I meant by the phrase. I have identified no facts that contradict physicalism. If I use your private lexicon, I would not label the point a "good reason" to reject physicalism, but rather that it constitutes relevant information that should be taken into account (as I previously described, and you ignored).
— Relativist

Your use of "facts" here is misplaced. You have talked yourself out of the usefulness of "facts", by insisting that beliefs are judged by degree of certainty. So if there is such a thing as a fact, it is irreleavnt because you do not consider any beliefs to be facts. — Metaphysician Undercover

The context is that we're selecting a "best explanation" for a set of data that we are assumed to be facts, from a set 2 or more possible explanations that have been proposed. You still seem be treating this as traditional Bayesianism.

Yes, I believe the cosmological argument provides irrefutable proof of God. In case your not familiar with it, here is a simplified version.

We observe that it is always the case that the potential for the physical object is prior in time to the actual existence of any physical object... — Metaphysician Undercover

The observations you refer to are entirely within a temporal context, such that for any observed object, X, we observed a time (Tp) prior to its existence. So we can conclude that the state of affairs at Tp necessarily had the potential to produce X.

Your inductive inference applies to all cases in which an object comes into existence from a state of affairs in which it did not exist. It does not apply to an initial state of affairs (Si); because there was no prior time at which Si did not exist. There's no objective reason to believe an initial, uncaused, physical state of affairs could not have existed.

I have just conclusively shown that your argument is non-sequitur.

I appreciate the time and care you've taken to explain your viewpoint but I'm afraid we'll remain at loggerheads.

Example: Armstrong's "atomism" is an ontological claim that there is an irreducible bottom layer of physical reality. — Relativist

But how can physicalism transcend physics? If physics is not relevant to physicallsm, then why describe such a foundational ontology as “physical” at all? Physical compared to what?

And if the irreducible bottom layer of reality cannot, even in principle, be identified by or with the theories of physics, then on what basis is it called "physical"? Armstrong’s “atoms” may be a neat philosophical posit but unless they’re tied to some determinate content, why regard them as more than symbolic? And if they’re only symbolic, then the reality they possess is conceptual rather than physical.

And what, for that matter, is the supposed threat of “infinite regress”? If Armstrong’s atoms were shown to be untenable, what regress would be entailed? It seems to me that invoking the specter of regress is simply a way to secure closure by stipulation — to insist that there must be a final layer, whether or not physics ever finds one.

Physicalism respects the discoveries of physics, and as such is a form of scientific realism, but it doesn't entail treating any specific findings in physics as an element of the ontology or as a set of assumed facts upon which it depends. — Relativist

How convenient!

The scope of ontology is the totality of existence. Physicalists are philosophers who assert the physical world to BE the totality of existence, but it is not a conclusion derived from physics. — Relativist

But surely the totality of existence includes human beings. You're not seeing the point of Chalmers critique:

It (the 'hard problem' is problematic for a physicalism that assumes science can and will answer all questons about the natural world — Relativist

But it's important to grasp that this is not the meaning of the 'hard problem'. It's not the want of knowledge about the natural world. It's pointing to a matter of principle, not something which can be solved by the accumulation of further facts. In a way, the hard problem of consciousness is simply a rhetorical device: it is pointing out that no matter how sophisticated the objective understanding of consciousness, the first-person nature of experience (or existence) will always elude that description. That isn’t a gap waiting to be filled — it’s the structural blind spot of objectivist science. But I won't repeat myself, and thanks again.

Firstly it is science that posits the existence of dark matter and energy on the basis of observations. So, they are considered to be a part of the Universe as understood by science. — Janus

Exactly as I said they are names applied to something not understood, nor observed, but the effects of them are observed. This is just like the theological "God", something not understood, nor observed, but the effects of God are observed.

If the guide includes evidence from the empirical sciences then the empirical sciences are guiding metaphysical speculation. Intuition is always itself guided by the current state of knowledge or scientific paradigm. Intuition in unconstrained speculative free play can come up with anything that isn't a logical contradiction, so by itself is not a reliable guide at all. I don't prefer referring to it as intuition anyway, but rather as imagination―creative imagination invents hypotheses designed to explain what is observed―it's known as abduction. — Janus

I see no point to discussing ambiguity in the meaning of "guide". I think I adequately made my point.

Lots of philosophical issues can be discussed without first establishing a common ontology. This includes discussions of epistemology and science. — Relativist

Of course, we discuss our philosophical differences. And if we proceed philosophically without differences its because our underlying ontological assumptions are compatible and there is nothing to establish.

The judgement is between 2 or more competing hypotheses, for the sole purpose of selecting one. — Relativist

That's not what we've been discussing. The judgement is whether or not to continue with the acceptance of the hypotheses, physicalism, when there is new evidence (relevant information) which contradicts it. We have not been discussing alternatives. I maintain, that when the operating hypotheses is demonstrated as deficient, it is time to seek a new one.

Consider the auditory evidence of a second shooter of Kennedy: this new information doesn't change my relative ranking of the 2 hypotheses. — Relativist

That judgement is irrational. The new evidence directly contradicts what you believe, yet you claim it does not change the degree of certainty in your belief. That, is being irrational, plain and simple.

We're just producing a relative ranking of the hypotheses based on whatever information is available. — Relativist

Again, you are making a strawman representation of our discussion, as if we are ranking competing hypotheses. We are not, we are considering the acceptability of one specific hypotheses, named as "physicalism". And, we are judging whether it is something to be believed, when we have "relevant information" which directly contradicts it.

Good description of what often occurs, but do you agree that it can be more rational to reevaluate the hypotheses (there need to be at least 2) than to "adjust and make an exception"? That's my point. — Relativist

Why do you think there needs to be at least two? That's not what we are discussing. We are discussing the judgement of one hypotheses. The scientific method works to judge one hypotheses, with experimentation. There is no need for at least two. That is some arbitrary condition which you are trying to impose, because you have a model which operates in that way, but it's just a strawman model, not at all representative of real judgement in this sort of situation.

How does the fact that there is an ontological ground to epistemolgy (invariably discussed as a supervenience relation) support your claim that physics can replace epistemology? — Relativist

That's not my claim, in fact it is the opposite of my claim. My claim is that believing in physicalism is believing that physics can replace metaphysics as the grounding for epistemology. And, I say that this is a false belief, not a true one.

Consider the relation between meteorology and the more fundamental science of thermodynamics and fluid dynamics - which obviously ground it - just one level down.. No one would suggest replacing meteorology with direct application of thermodynamics and fluid dynamics. — Relativist

Good example. Metaphysics grounds epistemology, which grounds the sciences and physics. You (through the means of physicalism), suggest that we can take physics a few levels down, and replace metaphysics with the direct application of physics. Does your example help you to understand why physicalism is unacceptable?

The context is that we're selecting a "best explanation" for a set of data that we are assumed to be facts, from a set 2 or more possible explanations that have been proposed. You still seem be treating this as traditional Bayesianism. — Relativist

Strawman! We are judging one hypotheses, physicalism.

Your inductive inference applies to all cases in which an object comes into existence from a state of affairs in which it did not exist. It does not apply to an initial state of affairs (Si); because there was no prior time at which Si did not exist. — Relativist

There is no initial state of affairs. Any such initial state would be arbitrarily imposed, and would be a "physical condition", so this is irrelevant to the argument, and you are using it as an attempt to impose a physicalist premise.

There's no objective reason to believe an initial, uncaused, physical state of affairs could not have existed. — Relativist

Yes there is a reason to believe this. The proposed "uncaused, physical state of affairs" is contrary to all the empirical evidence, which supports the inductive premise of causation. There is absolutely no empirical evidence which is contrary to this inductive premise. Therefore, that an "uncaused, physical state of affairs could not have existed" can be known with the highest possible degree of certitude.

I have just conclusively shown that your argument is non-sequitur. — Relativist

No, you have just presented me with an irrelevant and false proposition, that an initial state of affairs is required. The irrationality of an initial state of affairs, in the absolute sense, with no prior time, demonstrates that any proposed initial state, itself requires a prior cause. That is exactly the case with the proposed "Big Bang". It must be either reduced to a nonphysical mathematical "singularity" as the initial state (which is irrational because its a mathematical, nonphysical "state"), or else understood as having a prior cause, God or some other sort of universe creating mechanism.

how can physicalism transcend physics? If physics is not relevant to physicallsm, then why describe such a foundational ontology as “physical” at all? Physical compared to what? — Wayfarer

I googled the definition of Transcend:
"to rise above or go beyond the limits of"

Each of the postulates of physicalism goes beyond what physics can properly do:
-identify the ontological structure of existents as states of affairs
-the ontology of universals: that they exist at all; that they exist immanently
-the ontological structure of laws (relations between universals); physics can identify instrumentalist methodology (equations). As I described, theoretical models are heuristics and/or metaphysical claims.
-that physical reality = the totality of reality.

And if the irreducible bottom layer of reality cannot, even in principle, be identified by or with the theories of physics, then on what basis is it called "physical"? — Wayfarer

Axiomatic, but justified. The states of affairs (SOA) model is consistent and coherent, and entails a hierarchical structure such that complex SOAs are composed of lower level SOAs. Introducing additional, nonphysical, categories of existent is superfluous and unparsimonious.

Armstrong’s “atoms” may be a neat philosophical posit but unless they’re tied to some determinate content, why regard them as more than symbolic? And if they’re only symbolic, then the reality they possess is conceptual rather than physical.

Because an ontological/metaphysical theory entails a theory of what exists. Compare to Thomist metaphysics which assumes every existent has an "essence". This is a postulate based on conceptual analysis- there SEEMS to be something essential to objects that is unique to them. Conceptual analysis is the basis for any ontology.

Nevertheless, someone who is agnostic to ontological theories, or outright rejects physicalism, could treat this ontology as symbolic- a paradigm to which they don't commit. This is the same sort of thing I had in mind regarding my ability to discuss philosophical issues within a paradigm that's inconsistent with physicalism. I can regard the paradigm as symbolic, but useful to considering the topic.

And what, for that matter, is the supposed threat of “infinite regress”? — Wayfarer

An infinite regress of causes implies each effect can be accounted for by the immediately prior cause. This has 2 vices: 1) It entails an infinite past, because causation entails a temporal sequence. I have argued in other threads that this is mpossible 2) The infinite series (as a whole) is left unaccounted for.

Similarly with composition: every object that is examined is accounted for by simpler and simpler components. The absence of a bottom layer implies the series as a whole isn't accounted for, and it would be impossible for an infinite number of parts to assemble.

How convenient! — Wayfarer

How frustrating. For me.
My perspective: throughout this discussion I got signs that you didn't understand physicalism. Your questions conclusively prove I was correct- and imply none of your criticisms are relevant to me. Your falsifications fail because they are rooted in that lack of understanding.

Remember, I am not trying to convince you; you're trying to convince me. Only because you admitted that, I thought it might be worthwhile to take the time to answer your questions to help you understand. A remark like this suggests to me you aren't trying to understand, and are instead casting judgement, rooted in your own perspective.

The scope of ontology is the totality of existence. Physicalists are philosophers who assert the physical world to BE the totality of existence, but it is not a conclusion derived from physics.
— Relativist

But surely the totality of existence includes human beings. You're not seeing the point of Chalmers critique: — Wayfarer

This portion of my response did not deal with Chalmer's claims - but I addressed it later in my response. Here, I was explaining the difference between physics and physicalism, and their relationship to each other. You have clearly misunderstood it, and the comment you reacted to was part of my explanation. Appropriate responses would be "ah, I get it now (at least partly)", or a follow-up question to get additional clarification if it still wasn't clear.

It (the 'hard problem' is problematic for a physicalism that assumes science can and will answer all questons about the natural world
— Relativist

But it's important to grasp that this is not the meaning of the 'hard problem'. It's not the want of knowledge about the natural world. — Wayfarer

My comment was a response to a specific issue you raised:

do you recognize any cogency in David Chalmers' argument? That 'the nature of experience' cannot be fully captured by scientific descriptons? If you don't, why not? If you do, how does it fail as argument against physicalism? — Wayfarer

I'll be blunt. You were attacking a strawman: a false view of physicalism that assumes "scientific descriptions" must possible for everthing. I went on to say, "I do not expect science to necessarily be able to answer every question about the physical world." I expanded on this in my subsequent 2 paragraphs.

I made additional comments that you didn't comment on, and asked you some questions you didn't answer.

You had complained that I hadn't adequately responded to all your objections, and had dismissively claimed "category error" and "strawman". I took that to heart and tried to give you more complete answers. This took a lot of time. So it's frustrating that you give no indication that you've understood anything I've said, and instead merely give me a subjective negative reaction. This is not an effective way to meet the objective you stated - which entailed making headway in convincing me.

So it seems like it's time to agree to disagree.

how can physicalism transcend physics? If physics is not relevant to physicallsm, then why describe such a foundational ontology as “physical” at all? Physical compared to what?
— Wayfarer
I googled the definition of Transcend:
"to rise above or go beyond the limits of"

Each of the postulates of physicalism goes beyond what physics can properly do:
-identify the ontological structure of existents as states of affairs
-the ontology of universals: that they exist at all; that they exist immanently
-the ontological structure of laws (relations between universals); physics can identify instrumentalist methodology (equations). As I described, theoretical models are heuristics and/or metaphysical claims.
-that physical reality = the totality of reality. — Relativist

Thanks for clarifying. But this seems to sharpen the question rather than resolve it. If physicalism transcends physics in the sense you describe, then these postulates are not discoveries of physics but metaphysical commitments. In that case, why call the framework ‘physical’ rather than simply metaphysical realism?

If the claim is that “physical reality = the totality of reality,” then the term “physical” is carrying a great deal of weight. But if what you mean by “physical” is not fixed by physics itself, then what anchors it? Otherwise, “physicalism” looks less like an ontology than a promissory note: asserting that whatever is real must fall under the heading of the physical, even when the meaning of “physical” is left indeterminate.

I’ve already disputed the idea that universals are physical. I’ve been researching it and found another philosopher, E J Lowe, who also disputes this idea from within an analytical perspective. Lowe rejects Armstrong’s “physicalist” version. Armstrong insists that universals exist wholly in each of their instances — so that “redness” is literally a physical constituent of each red object. Lowe argued this borders on incoherence: how can one and the same entity be wholly present in two places at once? He advocates a weak form of immanence, where universals are always instantiated but are not themselves located in space and time. Universals, in Lowe, are not reducible to particulars nor are they spatiotemporal. That’s why he says they are “always instantiated” but not literally in space and time. He goes on to argue on these grounds and other grounds that physicalism is incoherent.

Me, I say that universals can only be recognised by a mind. They are dependent on the mind’s ability to identify likeness etc. They are part of the intellectual apparatus of rational thought.

every object that is examined is accounted for by simpler and simpler components. The absence of a bottom layer implies the series as a whole isn't accounted for, and it would be impossible for an infinite number of parts to assemble. — Relativist

That problem is not addressed by the assertion that at bottom, everything must be physical, especially in the absence of any notion of the physical that is stipulated by physics.

That is really all I have to say on the matter. I am not and will never be persuaded by physicalism.


Re Ontic Structural Realism - I don’t much like their style. Same for much of analytical English-speaking philosophy, Armstrong, Lewis, Quine etc. I’m interested in existentialism, phenomenology, non-materialist philosophy of mind, Buddhism and Eastern philosophy.

A remark like this suggests to me you aren't trying to understand, and are instead casting judgement, rooted in your own perspective. — Relativist

Philosophy is critical. I too feel that criticism of the idealist ideas I put forward is based on their not being understood. Philosophical debates are often like that. But I stand by the criticisms I’ve offered and I don’t see them as having been rebutted.

Each of the postulates of physicalism goes beyond what physics can properly do: — Relativist

In other words, physicalism claims that physics can go beyond what physics can properly do.

In its early modern form, materialism drew its authority directly from the successes of the new science. Galileo’s mathematization of motion, Descartes’ mechanics of matter, and Newton’s laws of gravitation seemed to reveal the basic structure of the cosmos. To be a materialist was simply to affirm that what physics discovered was what reality ultimately consisted of. Nature, on this view, was transparent to the methods of natural philosophy, and materialism gained its prestige by tying its fortunes to the steadily advancing discoveries of science.

By contrast, contemporary physicalism has quietly shifted ground. It still borrows the authority of science, but without committing itself to whatever physics currently says about the world. Instead, it invokes “the scientific worldview” in a more nebulous sense, using scientific facts when they support its claims, but disclaiming any dependence on physics when they do not. The result is less a rigorous ontology than a posture of allegiance: a declaration that, whatever reality ultimately turns out to be, it will count as “physical” by definition. This maneuver preserves physicalism from refutation, but only by reducing its content to a loyalty oath.

By contrast, contemporary physicalism has quietly shifted ground. It still borrows the authority of science, but without committing itself to whatever physics currently says about the world. Instead, it invokes “the scientific worldview” in a more nebulous sense, using scientific facts when they support its claims, but disclaiming any dependence on physics when they do not. The result is less a rigorous ontology than a posture of allegiance: a declaration that, whatever reality ultimately turns out to be, it will count as “physical” by definition. This maneuver preserves physicalism from refutation, but only by reducing its content to a loyalty oath. — Wayfarer

Well, "materialism" seems to have been left behind. But probably, "scientism" is a better word for the modern form then, according to what you describe here. But for some reason, "scientism" has already developed negative connotations, and is generally frowned upon. So those who believe in this sort of ontology prefer to claim "physicalism" because this term has maintained some of that traditional acceptability acquired through that relationship with "materialism".

It's a shifting sea of names. because as that simplistic form of ontology gets exposed as insufficient, the believers adopt a new name, with minor alterations, in an attempt to cover over the insufficiencies.

if what you mean by “physical” is not fixed by physics itself, then what anchors it? — Wayfarer

If physicalism transcends physics in the sense you describe, then these postulates are not discoveries of physics but metaphysical commitments. In that case, why call the framework ‘physical’ rather than simply metaphysical realism? — Wayfarer

(Your first sentence is correct.)

Mathematical realism is less specific: a dualist could be a mathematical realist.

If the claim is that “physical reality = the totality of reality,” then the term “physical” is carrying a great deal of weight. But if what you mean by “physical” is not fixed by physics itself, then what anchors it? Otherwise, “physicalism” looks less like an ontology than a promissory note: asserting that whatever is real must fall under the heading of the physical, even when the meaning of “physical” is left indeterminate. — Wayfarer

The metaphysical system "physicalism" doesn't include a catalog of what exists. I don't think any metaphysical system does that, except for some particular existent, like God in Thomist metaphysics.

Physics identifies things that exist (to the extent that physics tells us something about what exists- per OSR). IMO, any metaphysical system would be suspect if it denied the findings of physics or the non-existence of the objects of ordinary experience. Perhaps an idealist would disagree, but that's another whole discussion.

So physicalism defers to physics the identification of what exists. IMO there's no epistemically superior means of doing so. That deference doesn't entail an ontological commitment to the specific things physics identifies.

Everything that physics theorizes to exist is causally interconnected. Physicalism is a thesis that the complete set of causally connected things comprise the totality of reality. It seems to me it is this interconnectedness that is the anchor.

The term "physicalism" is used largely for historical reasons. These are discussed in the SEP article on physicalism. Personally, I make sense of it by considering proper subsets of the sorts of things commonly treated as existing: spiritual/supernatural objects (e.g. angels), abstract objects, and physical objects. Physicalists deny the existence of the first two.

Lowe argued this borders on incoherence: how can one and the same entity be wholly present in two places at once? — Wayfarer

That is the common issue that is brought up. There are 3 pushbacks:
1) if a property (e.g. redness) is just a single existent, it means each particular red object requires an ontic relation to that existent. This entails a more complex model of existents (i.e. it's less parsimonious).
2) it raises the question of "where" they exist. There's no location in the physical world for them, so one must (unparsimoniously) assume another type of existent - and there to be ontic relations that bridge to it from the physical world.
3) Multiple instantiations of a property is intuitive: we observe multiple objects that all exhibit redness, -1 electric charge, 90 degree angles, etc. And these properties seem both intrinsic and necessary to being the object that it is.

He advocates a weak form of immanence, where universals are always instantiated but are not themselves located in space and time. Universals, in Lowe, are not reducible to particulars nor are they spatiotemporal. That’s why he says they are “always instantiated” but not literally in space and time. — Wayfarer

I'm struggling to see how this differs from what I said. If Lowe believes properties are not particulars, then what are they? Armstrong says they are constituents of particulars. Particulars are reducible to simpler particulars, all the way down to the ground: atomic particulars/states of affairs which are irreducible. These atomic states of affairs still have all 3 sets of constituents (bare particular, intrinsic properties, relations to other particulars). How does Lowe account for them?

Me, I say that universals can only be recognised by a mind. They are dependent on the mind’s ability to identify likeness etc. They are part of the intellectual apparatus of rational thought. — Wayfarer

Sure, they can only be "recognized" by minds, because recognition is a mental process. But surely the existence of universals is not contingent on being recognized by humans. Electrons had -1 electric charge before anyone recognized there were electrons and they each have this exact charge.

Are you are claiming that universals are nothing but abstractions of aspects of the things we perceive, measure, and theorize: existing exclusively in minds but having no ontological significance to the objects thenselves. That would be fine, but it's a different definition.

every object that is examined is accounted for by simpler and simpler components. The absence of a bottom layer implies the series as a whole isn't accounted for, and it would be impossible for an infinite number of parts to assemble.
— Relativist

That problem is not addressed by the assertion that at bottom, everything must be physical, especially in the absence of any notion of the physical that is stipulated by physics. — Wayfarer

I was explaining the GENERAL problems with some infinite regresses, in answer to your question: "And what, for that matter, is the supposed threat of 'infinite regress'?" Any metaphysics that entails a problematic infinite regress has this problem. It's a general issue in philosophy of mathematics.

Regarding the "absence of any notion of the physical that is stipulated by physics", I addressed that above. Again: I don't think any metaphysical theory should have a catolog of existents. They should catalog the types of things that exist in a way that divides all existents into subsets.

That is really all I have to say on the matter. I am not and will never be persuaded by physicalism. — Wayfarer

My objective has never been to persuade you physicalism is true. My objective has been to demonstrate that it is not unreasonable to accept it. I know you will judge it negatively because it's inconsistent with matters important to you, but I hope you recognize that I have different philosophical concerns.

I stand by the criticisms I’ve offered and I don’t see them as having been rebutted. — Wayfarer

I think you mean "refuted", as in proving to you that your position is unreasonable- which I never set out to do.

But I DID refute your flawed understanding of physicalism, and this results in dissolving your case against it to me. You would have to build a case in terms that are consistent with my view of physicalism. I'm not proposing you do this, and I recommend against it. Agree to disagree.

My one hope is that you have a bit more respect for my position after this exchange. I've never lost my respect for yours. I believe your objections are deeper than the details you've gotten wrong and that it's more related to your general world view.

I too feel that criticism of the idealist ideas I put forward is based on their not being understood. — Wayfarer

I don't claim to understand it, but what would help would be some short description of a reasonable form of idealism. Not "Joe says this, Mike says that" and leaving it to the interested reader to explore further. I'm only mildly interested, not sufficiently to do that work.

.

Everything that physics theorizes to exist is causally interconnected. Physicalism is a thesis that the complete set of causally connected things comprise the totality of reality. It seems to me it is this interconnectedness that is the anchor.

The term "physicalism" is used largely for historical reasons. These are discussed in the SEP article on physicalism. Personally, I make sense of it by considering proper subsets of the sorts of things commonly treated as existing: spiritual/supernatural objects (e.g. angels), abstract objects, and physical objects. Physicalists deny the existence of the first two. — Relativist

But again, please understand what I see as the fundamental category error in this formulation. By casting the non-physical in terms of 'spiritual/supernatural objects', you are already framing it within the paradigm of objectivism - the assumption that whatever is real, is, or could be, an object of cognition. Notice the empiricist presuppositions in this attitude. This is a metaphilosophical point concerning questions about how philosophy itself is conceived.

This orientation toward “what is objectively so” is a distinct cognitive mode, one that shaped modern science and the so-called “scientific worldview" (and, hence, so much of modern life). It begins with Galileo’s distinction between primary (measurable) and secondary (sensible) qualities, and with Cartesian dualism, which divided res cogitans from res extensa. A further division soon followed between “natural” and “supernatural.” The Charter of the Royal Society, for instance, explicitly forbade canvassing metaphysical questions, assigning them to the Churches, which then held enormous power.

These divisions can be summarized quickly, but they represent a major chapter in intellectual history (the subject of Edmund Husserl's posthumously published "The Crisis of the European Sciences"¹). The challenge is that we are so immersed in this orientation that we don’t see it; it provides the spectacles through which questions are viewed. Philosophy, to my mind, means learning to look at those spectacles, not only through them.

All that in mind, “the nature of being” can be understood very differently. In phenomenological (and also Indian) philosophy, being is participatory: something we are always already enacting, not a detached object of analysis (even though objectivity has its place). Here, the subject–object split is not the sole lens through which existence must be interpreted. And if nothing is said about what is spiritual, that might only be because, with Wittgenstein, there is 'that of which we cannot speak', but which is nevertheless of foundational significance in philosophy. But the upshot is, there are things that are subjectively real, that is, can only be known first-person, but which are as foundational as any purported 'atomic objects of cognition'. This is what we designate Being, which includes the irreducible fact of the subject to whom the objective world is disclosed.

Are you are claiming that universals are nothing but abstractions of aspects of the things we perceive, measure, and theorize: existing exclusively in minds but having no ontological significance to the objects thenselves. That would be fine, but it's a different definition. — Relativist

I think, again, this question is posed against the implicit division of subject and object, mind and world. And, again, this is so deeply knit into our way of being that it's very difficult to see it any other way. But my take on universals is that they are intrinsic to the way in which the mind assimilates and interprets sensory experience. Intellectual abstractions, the grasp of abstract relations and qualities, are what binds rational conceptions together to form coherent ideas. But these are neither 'in the world' nor mere pyschological constructs, they are universal structures of intelligibility disclosed through consciousness. (As you've mentioned Edward Feser's blog, see his Think, McFly, Think.)

Particulars are reducible to simpler particulars, all the way down to the ground: atomic particulars/states of affairs which are irreducible. These atomic states of affairs still have all 3 sets of constituents (bare particular, intrinsic properties, relations to other particulars). ... Electrons had -1 electric charge before anyone recognized there were electrons and they each have this exact charge. — Relativist

You've opened the door here to the fundamental question that arose with quantum mechanics, that of 'observer dependency'. And you can't defray that by claiming that this is only one of various competing interpretations. Even the competing interpretations are trying to account for the fact of observer-dependency, or show some way in which it can be discounted. And that, in turn, is necessitated by the uncertainty principle. The uncertainty principle doesn’t necessarily imply “no reality” before observation, but it does mean that the classical assumption—that particulars have determinate, observer-independent properties at bottom—can’t be sustained without qualification. What is real, is a range of possibilities expressed by the wave-function (ψ), which are condensed into a single value by registration or measurement (the so-called 'wavefunction collapse'²).

So when you write that “particulars are reducible … all the way down to atomic states of affairs,” you’re really invoking a metaphysical picture inherited from classical physics. But precisely that picture is what quantum mechanics has called into question, forcing contemporary physicalism to uncouple itself from physics as such. Which, again, implies that Armstrong's 'atomic facts' are conceptual placeholders.

My one hope is that you have a bit more respect for my position after this exchange. — Relativist

While I certainly respect your contributions and the clarity and courtesy with which you’ve presented your position, I must respectfully disagree with the philosophy of physicalism.

What would help would be some short description of a reasonable form of idealism. — Relativist

A'friend link' to my Mind-Created World on Medium.

Mind over Matter, interview with Bernardo Kastrup.

--------------------------------------------

1. How the untimely death of RG Collingwood changed the course of philosophy forever, Prospect Magazine, for insights into Ryle's attitude towards Husserl

2. The Timeless Wave of Quantum Physics, Wayfarer.

the result is less a rigorous ontology than a posture of allegiance: a declaration that, whatever reality ultimately turns out to be, it will count as “physical” by definition. — Wayfarer

Personally, I make sense of it by considering proper subsets of the sorts of things commonly treated as existing: spiritual/supernatural objects (e.g. angels), abstract objects, and physical objects. Physicalists deny the existence of the first two. — Relativist

In fact physics has got more rigorous in the sense of shifting the ontological burden from merely a materialist account to one that is instead fully structuralist. So abstract objects are now included. Physics speaks to both material and formal cause.

The old fashion dualistic notion of material being opposed to spiritual being has been upgraded. Matter has been dematerialised in physics. It is now raw potential. Pure possibility. A gradient of change.

The dualist complaint about physics was that it only spoke to inanimate matter – lumps of stuff – and that made it a story of pure contingency. Billiard balls clattering about mindlessly. The materialist view of nature was patently soul-less.

But physics was already riding mathematics to Platonia. Galileo, Descartes and Newton were significant precisely because they were identifying the fundamental symmetries that are the structures organising nature. The structures that turned the raw material potency into some globally necessary state of lawful order. The abstract objects shaping the material objects.

So the birth of materialism was really the birth of mathematical structuralism and the start of the dematerialising of the materialism which is in fact the lay-view of the "real world". The substantial and object-oriented view that is the way we see tables and chairs, billiard balls and falling feathers. The view that understands the world as lumps of stuff all the way down ... until one encounters atoms as the littlest lumps that can't be chopped any finer.

It is this lay-view of matter that got dissolved in conjunction with the maths of symmetry getting beefed up to provide a proper language for talking about the constraints of structure. Science progressed rapidly once it got this trick – reducing matter to pure contingency and reducing form to the absolute logical necessity expressed by mathematical structure.

So the ontology of modern physics is pretty straightforward. It speaks of pure chance in interaction with absolute necessity. And this is the rigorous framework. And one that clearly encompasses everything causal that needs to be said as it spans the metaphysical gamut from chance to necessity.

Who needs a creating god when mathematical logic already enforces its absolute constraints on material possibility. And who needs a creating god when what could possibly deny the existence of chance and contingency?

How can possibility be made impossible except by some constraining hand. It doesn't need creation to exist. It needs limitation to clarify in what precise manner it exists. And mathematical constraint – the natural logic of symmetry – can do that job. Science has spent the last 500 years showing this.

So physicalism is the world as physics would see it. Materialism is an old hat term. Physicalism now clearly sees the world in hylomorphic fashion as an interaction between naked contingency and rigid constraint.

It all starts with a fluctuation. An action with a direction. The most naked material contingency already organised by the most fundamental dimensional constraint. A possibility actualised and revealing the wider structure necessary to its being. Causality tied up in a neat little package. Nothing further needed to account for what is going on.

So physicalism defers to physics the identification of what exists. IMO there's no epistemically superior means of doing so. That deference doesn't entail an ontological commitment to the specific things physics identifies. — Relativist

This is why physicalism is a very problematic perspective. Mathematical axioms assume the existence of mathematical objects. This is implicit in set theory. But physicists do not identify a number, or a set, as an object which exists and which ought to be studied in the field of physics. Yet physicists use mathematics. Therefore physicists in the application of mathematics, assume the existence of mathematical objects, which they do not identify and study as existents.

This indicates that what you state as the approach of physicalism, "physicalism defers to physics the identification of what exists", is mistaken.

So the ontology of modern physics is pretty straightforward. It speaks of pure chance in interaction with absolute necessity. — apokrisis

This is not true. Physicists do not work with pure chance and absolute necessity. That is simply your personal ontological interpretation of modern physics. It is not the ontology which actually underlies the work of physicists. In fact, the issues which are evident in the interpretation of quantum observations clearly indicate that there is no specific "ontology of modern physics". So how anyone portrays the ontology of modern physics is just a matter of personal preference.

Matter has been dematerialised in physics. It is now raw potential. Pure possibility. — apokrisis

Indeed!

...the common conception of “reality” is too limited. By expanding the definition of reality, the quantum’s mysteries disappear. In particular, “real” should not be restricted to “actual” objects or events in spacetime. Reality ought also be assigned to certain possibilities, or “potential” realities, that have not yet become “actual.” These potential realities do not exist in spacetime, but nevertheless are “ontological” — that is, real components of existence.

"This new ontological picture requires that we expand our concept of ‘what is real’ to include an extraspatiotemporal domain of quantum possibility,” write Ruth Kastner, Stuart Kauffman and Michael Epperson.

Considering potential things to be real is not exactly a new idea, as it was a central aspect of the philosophy of Aristotle, 24 centuries ago. An acorn has the potential to become a tree; a tree has the potential to become a wooden table. Even applying this idea to quantum physics isn’t new. Werner Heisenberg, the quantum pioneer famous for his uncertainty principle, considered his quantum math to describe potential outcomes of measurements of which one would become the actual result. The quantum concept of a “probability wave,” describing the likelihood of different possible outcomes of a measurement, was a quantitative version of Aristotle’s potential, Heisenberg wrote in his well-known 1958 book Physics and Philosophy. “It introduced something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality.” — Source

As Heisenberg says, this is broadly compatible with Aristotle's notion of matter as pure potentiality ('res potentia'). And once we admit potential as ontologically real, we also re-introduce the idea of inherent directionality — a kind of natural teleonomy, putting back what Galileo's physics had taken away.

The dualist complaint about physics was that it only spoke to inanimate matter – lumps of stuff – and that made it a story of pure contingency. Billiard balls clattering about mindlessly. The materialist view of nature was patently soul-less. — apokrisis

It's more than a 'dualist complaint', it was an inevitable consequence of the Cartesian/Galilean division. The resulting sense of the cosmos 'devoid of purpose' and 'product of blind forces' still holds a lot of sway in today's world. See for instance this current thread.

Who needs a creating god when mathematical logic already enforces its absolute constraints on material possibility? — apokrisis

Who mentioned God?

Physicalism now clearly sees the world in hylomorphic fashion as an interaction between naked contingency and rigid constraint. — apokrisis

Which is why hylomorphism lives on. By defending universals, D M Armstrong is invoking hylomorphic language, but he drains it of the very thing that makes hylomorphism distinct — the irreplaceable role of form as intelligible order. For him, universals and laws are just physical constituents. That is a flattening of hylomorphism, as it fails to recognise the fundamental role of nous in recognising the forms. By contrast, pansemiotic or process views (including Whitehead’s) retain the sense in which form, meaning, or constraint is not reducible to the physical but is constitutive of intelligible reality.

It all starts with a fluctuation. — apokrisis

Hence the 'six numbers' of Martin Rees. The mother of all a priori's. Why? They were undeniably prior in the sense that they pre-condition everything that subsequently developed. That’s the anthropic cosmological argument in a nutshell - though it needn’t import God into the picture, only the recognition that constraint precedes contingency.

So how anyone portrays the ontology of modern physics is just a matter of personal preference. — Metaphysician Undercover

But it does help to at least know the physics, wouldn’t you agree?

But it does help to at least know the physics, wouldn’t you agree? — apokrisis

Help who, the physicist?

But it does help to at least know the physics, wouldn’t you agree? — apokrisis

Are you suggesting that the metaphysician ought to be instead a physicist, and that being a physicist instead of a metaphysician would make the metaphysician a better metaphysician?

It's more than a 'dualist complaint', it was an inevitable consequence of the Cartesian/Galilean division. — Wayfarer

So two guys who ran the risks of heresy charges and book bans unless they made a show of still being good Catholics. Their moves towards materialist explanations had to be publicly renounced. And then a little later, it was the Church on the back foot. Science was rolling and so all the things that materialism could never explain had to become the dualist defence. Science then kept on rolling and dualism has been pushed right out of the show.

Who mentioned God? — Wayfarer

Who didn’t when Descartes and Galileo were outraging the public by beginning to inject some mathematical and observational rigour into matters ontological?

By contrast, pansemiotic or process views (including Whitehead’s) retain the sense in which form, meaning, or constraint is not reducible to the physical but is constitutive of reality itself. — Wayfarer

Wasn’t Whitehead panpsychic? You are free to define pansemiotic how you like, but I place it firmly on the side of physicalism. Even if it is a physicalism designed to be a suitable ground for the biosemiotic view that accounts for life and mind.

Hence the 'six numbers' of Martin Rees. The mother of all a priori's. Why? They were undeniably prior in the sense that they pre-condition everything that subsequently developed. — Wayfarer

The triadic relation between the three Planck constants is more fundamental. And as a pure “Unit 1” relation, it doesn’t even need to come with some arbitrary number. Its number is simply the symmetry of the identity number - which is 1.

it needn’t import God into the picture, only the recognition that constraint precedes contingency. — Wayfarer

But why does one thing always have to come before the next thing? That is the causal logic that is the root of so much ontological confusion. I am arguing - after Anaximander, Aristotle and Peirce - that constraints and contingency co-arise. Each is the other’s “other”. Or Paticcasamuppada as your Buddhist mates would say.

Are you suggesting that the metaphysician ought to be instead a physicist, and that being a physicist instead of a metaphysician would make the metaphysician a better metaphysician? — Metaphysician Undercover

Nope. I’m suggesting that if you want to talk sense about something, you need to start by understanding something about what it is.

Would you take much notice of a virgin telling you what sex is all about?

You're really not making any sense apokrisis. If you have an intelligent reply to my post, then please present it.

Until then I have only your demonstration that you know nothing about what physicists do. That is, your ridiculous claim that "the ontology of modern physics is pretty straightforward. It speaks of pure chance in interaction with absolute necessity".

Since you asked so nicely I’ll let AI bring you up to date with how current metaphysics views current physics.

Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) asserts the world's fundamental reality is its objective modal structure, which includes relationships and the natural necessity and possibility governing them. The "chance" in OSR relates to the concept of probability and potentiality as aspects of this fundamental structure, alongside necessity. OSR suggests that objects are derivative of this structure, not vice versa, and that the world's fundamental features are not the intrinsic properties of objects but the relational networks they form, which possess modal features like necessity and probability

And I already told you all this seven years ago now.