And once we admit potential as ontologically real, we also re-introduce the idea of inherent directionality — Wayfarer

This "inherent directionality", within ontological potential, is why apokrisis' claim that physics speaks of "pure chance", and absolute necessity, is false. Physics never gets to "pure chance", nor do physicists assume such a thing. Apokrisis does, and some other cosmologists do, but that's not physics. Physicists have to deal with the reality of the less-than-ideal, which confronts them at every event. Pure chance and absolute necessity is never a part of that. The mathematics applied, of course, assumes ideals, but this does not equate with "the ontology of modern physics", it would be more properly called "the ontology of modern mathematics". But it's not common to base ontology solely in mathematical axioms, because these deliberately do not account for the reality of less-than-ideal physical world.


Are you claiming that some AI told you that Ontic Structural Realism is the ontology of modern physics? I think that AI needs some fine tuning in relation to its biases.

You just get angrier as the years go past.

Again, just check out what I already told you seven years ago. Long before AI was around to deal with one's more mundane intellectual chores.

Inspired by the twists and turns of modern physics with its foundations in permutation symmetries, structural realism has become a big thing in metaphysics. The slogan is “relations without relata”. Reality exists by conjuring itself up out of a pure holism of relations.

It's controversial because of course there must be something concrete, individual and material to be related, right?....

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4383/of-relata-and-relations-grounding-structural-realism/p1

But again, please understand what I see as the fundamental category error in this formulation. By casting the non-physical in terms of 'spiritual/supernatural objects', you are already framing it within the paradigm of objectivism - the assumption that whatever is real, is, or could be, an object of cognition....empiricist presuppositions ... — Wayfarer

I brought up the "spiritual/supernatural" because there are common beliefs about it, and my purpose was to explain what it means to be physical.

So you question objectivism. I don't see any reason why I would. Sure, it's a backgound assumption, so add it to the set of physicalist postulates, and we still get a coherent theory. Coherence is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for truth.

This is a metaphilosophical point concerning questions about how philosophy itself is conceived. — Wayfarer

A meta-analysis would be great, but I don't think you're doing that. Rather, you're presenting
an alternative paradigm. I'll try to understand if it is coherent, but also if it answers more questions than it raises.

All that in mind, “the nature of being” can be understood very differently. In phenomenological (and also Indian) philosophy, being is participatory: something we are always already enacting, not a detached object of analysis — Wayfarer

How does our "participation" in existence differ from the participation of the sun? The sun has had a key role in the development of life on earth. Of course, it wasn't by choice.

Do you objectify the sun? Does it exist independently of you? It's not clear if the question is answerable in your paradigm.

The challenge is that we are so immersed in this orientation that we don’t see it; it provides the spectacles through which questions are viewed. Philosophy, to my mind, means learning to look at those spectacles, not only through them. — Wayfarer

All paradigms (spectacles) are interpretive frameworks, including a paradigm of "participatory existence".

But the upshot is, there are things that are subjectively real, that is, can only be known first-person, but which are as foundational as any purported 'atomic objects of cognition'. This is what we designate Being, which includes the irreducible fact of the subject to whom the objective world is disclosed. — Wayfarer

The term, "subjectively real" seems problematic. The "contents" of my mind (my mental states) are objectively real - but known only to me. If I'm interpreting you correctly, you are simply suggesting the converse of objectivism. I'm waiting to hear some epistemic virtues, besides "possible".

nothing is said about what is spiritual, that might only be because, with Wittgenstein, there is 'that of which we cannot speak', but which is nevertheless of foundational significance in philosophy. But the upshot is, there are things that are subjectively real, that is, can only be known first-person, but which are as foundational as any purported 'atomic objects of cognition'. This is what we designate Being, which includes the irreducible fact of the subject to whom the objective world is disclosed. — Wayfarer

One must assume the "spiritual" exists in order to consider it of significance. I get it, that you referred to it being foundational to philosophy- but in that respect, philosophy's foundation was a product of its time. It's moved on, for good reasons. I gather that you're challenging the direction it took, but swimming against the current is extremely challenging.

my take on universals is that they are intrinsic to the way in which the mind assimilates and interprets sensory experience. Intellectual abstractions, the grasp of abstract relations and qualities, are what binds rational conceptions together to form coherent ideas. But these are neither 'in the world' nor mere pyschological constructs, they are universal structures of intelligibility disclosed through consciousness. (As you've mentioned Edward Feser's blog, see his Think, McFly, Think.) — Wayfarer

I've previously read the Feser article. The general problem I have with it is that he framed thinking in a paradigm incompatible with materialism, and then showed how it's incompatible with materislism.

The paradigm is potentially useful, and probably coherent - but it didn't help me understand your stance on universals. I get it, that the abstractions aren't in the world (outside our minds) and you regard this mental aspect as irreducible, but the concept of each universal has something to do with the world outside ourselves - does it not? I claim that the universal "90 degrees" that I conceptualize is exhibited in the walls of my room. The abstraction is distinct from the walls that exhibit it, but it describes an aspect of the walls- and this same as aspect is exhibited in many places. This exhibition/instantistion is omitted from your account.

Even the competing interpretations are trying to account for the fact of observer-dependency, — Wayfarer

No. The interpretations account for the measurements. Referring to this as "observer dependency" implies there's something special in the relation between a human observer and the quantum system being measured. The more objective description is "entanglement" - which occurs when a quantum system interacts with a classical object.

What is real, is a range of possibilities expressed by the wave-function (ψ), which are condensed into a single value by registration or measurement (the so-called 'wavefunction collapse' — Wayfarer

I disagree with your claim that "what is real is a range of possibilities". The possibilities you refer to are predictions of what will be measured, when complementary properties (like position and momentum) are measured. What is real is the quantum system. Were there no entanglements with a classical object (such as occurs with a measurement) the system would continue down the deterministic path of its wave function.

This does imply there's an aspect of reality that seems inscrutable: what is happening when entanglements occur. Is the wavefunction collapsing? Is there a branching to many worlds? Are there remote, hidden variables? All we can do is engage in metaphysical speculation.

So when you write that “particulars are reducible … all the way down to atomic states of affairs,” you’re really invoking a metaphysical picture inherited from classical physics. But precisely that picture is what quantum mechanics has called into question, forcing contemporary physicalism to uncouple itself from physics as such. Which, again, implies that Armstrong's 'atomic facts' are conceptual placeholders. — Wayfarer

Again: no. Physicalism doesn't depend on particles being the ontological ground. According to current physics, quantum fields are more fundamental than particles. Quantum fields fit the state-of-affairs model: they are particulars with properties and relations to other quantum fields.

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There a great many problems with your claims, but they boil down to you (and possibly some) physicists making metaphysical claims. The actual science is independent of all the metaphysical claims you made.

One more thing: you imply that there's some consensus on some particular metaphysical model (among physicists? Among philosophers?) I sincerely doubt that. I know it's not true of philosophers - a majority embrace, or lean toward, physicalism.

This is why physicalism is a very problematic perspective. Mathematical axioms assume the existence of mathematical objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

The fact that the language of mathematics treats abstractions as "existing" does not entail that they do.

This indicates that what you state as the approach of physicalism, "physicalism defers to physics the identification of what exists", is mistaken. — Metaphysician Undercover

A physicist making a claim about the ontological status of mathematical abstractions is doing metaphysics, not physics. It's a question that cannot be settled by empirical evidence or scientific methodology.

how anyone portrays the ontology of modern physics is just a matter of personal preference. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed.

So two guys who ran the risks of heresy charges and book bans unless they made a show of still being good Catholics. Their moves towards materialist explanations had to be publicly renounced — apokrisis

It is true that Descartes had to forego the publication of some of his works for fear of religious persecution, and that the trial of Galileo was arguably the marker of the ‘scientific revolution’. But I don’t think that the ‘Cartesian division’ that I referred to was solely a result of those political pressures. Another major impetus was epistemological, with Galileo’s recognition of the importance of the Platonic dianoia and with his identification of the so-called ‘primary attributes’ of bodies - those attributes being just the ones ideally suited to his new physics. Obviously a contestable argument, but this division is where the pervasive notion of the ‘purposelessness’ of matter (and hence the Cosmos) originated. Meaning, purpose and intentionality was 'subjectivized' with the external world being conceived in purely mechanical and quantitative terms.

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, Pp 35-36

But you’re spot on in saying that the fear of religion was a factor. And it remains a motivation for the continual re-definition of physicalist explanations in light of the implausibllty of lumpen materialism, whilst trying to avoid the hazards of anything that sounds 'spiritual'.

I brought up the "spiritual/supernatural" because there are common beliefs about it, and my purpose was to explain what it means to be physical. — Relativist

I understand that - what is physical is defined in contrast with or distinct from what is supernatural or spiritual. That's a part of my point - it is an aspect of the 'Cartesian division' which I've already referred to. I'm trying to explain what is wrong with the expresssion 'spiritual/supernatural objects' by saying that terminology comes from a kind of conceptual confusion which can be traced back to Descartes' 'res cogitans' ('thinking thing'). The attempt to objectify or think of 'the spiritual' (whatever it may or may not be) in such objective terms is a category error (which Gilbert Ryle also said in Concept of Mind, in relation to Descartes.) There is no objective existent which corresponds with 'spirit' because (again whether it is real or not) it transcends the subject-object division. (Which is why mystical practices are aimed at deprecating the sense of 'otherness' or self-identification which characterises egoic existence.)

How does our "participation" in existence differ from the participation of the sun? — Relativist

The sun, to our knowledge, is not a rational sentient being, as are we.

The idea of participatory ontology is part of cognitive scientist John Vervaeke's roadmap. There are four ways of knowing: propositional, perspectival, procedural and participatory (ref.)Participatory knowledge is the knowledge of what it’s like to occupy a role in your environment or relationships. Vervaeke considers this to be the most profound of the four types of knowledge. It involves being in a deep, transformative relationship with the world, participating fully in something that is wider than you.

It is not just knowing about, but knowing through active engagement and transformation within specific contexts or environments. It shapes and is shaped by the interaction between the person and the world, influencing one’s identity and sense of belonging.

This kind of knowledge is experiential and co-creative, often seen in the dynamics of relationships, culture, and community participation.

A large part of Vervaeke's analysis is how our immersion in propositional knowiedge, at the expence of other forms of knowing, results in just that sense of separateness and division, which, I would argue, philosophy proper is aimed at ameliorating (for which see Pierre Hadot's writings on philosophy as a way of life).

Of course, this is all light years away from David Armstrong's physicalism. I know, he was Head of Department where I studied undergrad philosophy. (Can't speak highly enough however of Associate Prof, Keith Campbell, who's 'Philosophy of Matter' course was a highlight of my degree studies.)

I gather that you're challenging the direction it took, but swimming against the current is extremely challenging. — Relativist

You're telling me! :rofl:

Referring to this as "observer dependency" implies there's something special in the relation between a human observer and the quantum system being measured. The more objective description is "entanglement" - which occurs when a quantum system interacts with a classical object. — Relativist

The 2022 Physics Nobel was about this. Indeed, “observer dependency” could be rephrased more precisely as “measurement-dependency” or “interaction-dependency” - but it still marks a break from naïve objectivism (where objects are assumed to have definite properties regardless of measurement).

The Nobel presentations also did not try to “resolve” what “real” means in the sense of ontology. The experimental results deepen the mystery, and many interpretations still vie for supremacy.

And then, there's the all-too-obvious point that all such measuring devices and instruments are extensions of human sensory abilities. 'The apparatus has no meaning unless the human observer understands it and interprets its reading,' as Schrödinger put it.

the concept of each universal has something to do with the world outside ourselves - does it not? I claim that the universal "90 degrees" that I conceptualize is exhibited in the walls of my room. The abstraction is distinct from the walls that exhibit it, but it describes an aspect of the walls- and this same as aspect is exhibited in many places. — Relativist

Of course it does. But again I'm trying to draw attention to the implied understanding in your framing of the issue, of the separateness of mind and world. Universals, in the medieval account, are the way in which the intelligible features of the world are absorbed by intellect. As I put it in Idealism in Context:

Aquinas, building on Aristotle, maintained that true knowledge arises from a real union between knower and known. As Aristotle put it, “the soul (psuchē) is, in a way, all things,” meaning that the intellect becomes what it knows by receiving the form of the known object. Aquinas elaborated this with the principle that “the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower.” In this view, to know something is not simply to construct a mental representation of it, but to participate in its form — to take into oneself, immaterially, the essence of what the thing is. (Here one may discern an echo of that inward unity — a kind of at-one-ness between subject and object — that contemplative traditions across cultures have long sought, not through discursive analysis but through direct insight.) Such noetic insight, unlike sensory knowledge, disengages the form of the particular from its individuating material conditions, allowing the intellect to apprehend it in its universality. This process — abstraction— is not merely a mental filtering but a form of participatory knowing: the intellect is conformed to the particular, and that conformity gives rise to true insight. Thus, knowledge is not an external mapping of the world but an assimilation, a union that bridges the gap between subject and object through shared intelligibility.

So, participatory knowledge, again. The way in which this type of realism fell out of favour, to be replaced by nominalism and empiricism, is the subject of a fascinating book, The Theological Origins of Modernity, M A Gillespie. And that's also related to epochal changes in consciousness.

I know there's a lot to take on in all of this, but your questioning is causing me to recap what I've been studying. I know it's very different to the Anglo analytic philosophy.

Quantum fields fit the state-of-affairs model: they are particulars with properties and relations to other quantum fields. — Relativist

That’s precisely the issue: the category “states of affairs” is elastic enough to accommodate whatever physics happens to throw up. It’s not doing explanatory work so much as retrofitting itself to whatever the latest theory says exists.

The actual science is independent of all the metaphysical claims you made. — Relativist

Utter bollocks. But go ahead and back your assertion up with the argument that might sustain it. :up:

One more thing: you imply that there's some consensus on some particular metaphysical model (among physicists? Among philosophers?) I sincerely doubt that. I know it's not true of philosophers — Relativist

You are not sounding sufficiently familiar with either the metaphysics or the physics. But prove me wrong if you like.