Although, speaking of 'atomic facts', and as Buddhist philosophy has now been introduced, Buddhism has a psycho-philosophical schema, known as abhidamma (sanskrit abhidarma) comprising a voluminous account of the atomic facts ('dhammas') of existence. It is a confusing aspect of Buddhism, that the term 'dhamma' (dharma) means both the overall teaching of Buddhism, and also the minutae of experience. But this is due to the inherently phenomenological nature of Buddhist philosophy, in that a 'dhamma' is a 'momentary atom of experience', rather than an enduring particle of matter. Abhidhamma nevertheless gave rise to an elaborate theory of 'Buddhist atomism' in the early period, even down to the purported, minute temporal duration of each moment. This comprises a detailed scholastic catalogue of the types of 'moments of experience' that arise according to the various causes and conditions as explained in the 'chain of dependent origination' (noted above. Scholars have noted similarities with A.N. Whitehead's process philosophy, although the convergences ought not to be over-stressed.)

Vagueness is suspicious: it tends to be both unconvincing and incorrigible. Unconvincing, because of the lack of clarity needed to analyze and evaluate it. Incorrigible because one can twist the vague meanings on the fly in order to counter objections. — Relativist

If you're not interested in discussing it further, I'm ok with that. :up:

Although you charge me with vagueness, I can’t help noticing that physicalism itself is equally vague, if not more so. When it defines “physical” as “whatever physics will someday describe,” or as a “state of affairs” (which in practice means “whatever happens to be the case”), how is that not vague? My point all along has been that consciousness and experience are foundational: they are the ground of all science and philosophy. If that doesn’t fit into the the physicalist frame, that may say more about the limits of the frame. These are nearer to metacognitive arguments—about the conditions that make science and philosophy possible in the first place—than to statements of purported facts, which is the only kind your framework recognises.

Some people explain the Universe as a universe based on matter. But there also exists something which we call value or meaning. A Universe consisting only of matter leaves no room for value or meaning in civilizations and cultures. Matter alone has no value. We can say that the Universe is constructed with matter, but we must also say that matter works for some purpose. — Nishijima-Roshi, Three Philosophies and One Reality

This runs into a problem when science tells us matter is shaped by a thermodynamic purpose. The Big Bang could happen as it was a grand carving out of the very Heat Sink it was throwing itself headlong into. The Universe expands so it can cool, and cools so it can expand. Some material crud forms in the midst of all that once the temperature has dropped to a few degrees from absolute zero and distance has grown so that planets are only moderately warmed by the dying fusion embers that is their local star.

Then civilisation and culture can rise up out of the biofilm that starts to coat a rocky planet with a convenient temperature. You get little critters and then clever apes. A narrative game starts up that leads to a technological one. You get a lot of talk about values as the way to coordinate a bunch of people using an easily sharable social algorithms. Little aphorisms like the Golden Mean and "do unto others". It helps bind the people to the authority of a value system if they believe it is not just pragmatically optional but absolute and damnable by hell fire. Or perhaps instead penalised by coming back in the next life to try over from the level of a bug or mushroom.

Hey, when faced with the strained metaphysics used to bolster ontic idealism, I do start to see the advantages of nihilism.

If civilisation and culture want values and meaning, do they really have to commit to idealism and its absolutism? Can't a sorry old pragmatist like me not have values and meaning without all the claptrap? Just living a productive life and enjoying it?

Can't a sorry old pragmatist like me not have values and meaning without all the claptrap? Just living a productive life and enjoying it? — apokrisis

If that's what you value, knock your socks off! :grin:

So you're just making the modest claim that the argument convinces you of god's existence. You are not claiming that it constitutes undeniable proof that no rational person could deny. — Relativist

Of course, I said the proof is "irrefutable", I didn't say it was "undeniable". As you've aptly demonstrated, anyone can deny anything, no matter how irrefutable it is. All they need to do is fabricate a completely fictitious, imaginary "logical possibility", claim that they believe this "possibility" instead, and start denying. But denying it does not refute it, so I continue to believe that it is irrefutable.

Nevertheless, I did explain why it might be false: the possibility that there was an initial state of affairs that was physical (no gods). So there are at least 2 logically valid explanations for the existence of the universe: (A) God ; or (B) a physical initial state. — Relativist

I'll repeat myself. All empirical evidence indicates that any, and every, "physical state of affairs" is posterior in time, to the potential for that state. Since this is known with the highest degree of certitude possible, then we can conclude that any proposed "initial state of affairs that was physical" (simply interpreted as 'first physical thing') necessarily had a cause which was actual, and prior to it in time. That's a nonphysical cause. This conclusion requires the further premise that something actual is required, as cause, to produce any actuality from potential.

You haven't proven (B) false, so you should acknowledge that it is possibly true, and that this implies God possibly does not exist. Do you acknowledge this? — Relativist

I don't dispute (B), the "physical initial state". The point though, is that the argument demonstrates that an actual cause of such a thing is necessary. The potential for that initial physical state, by itself, does not suffice as the cause of it. That actual cause is something nonphysical, and what is commonly referred to as God.

Apokrisis will insist that a cause is not necessary, that the physical initial state just sprang into existence from infinite potential, as a quantum fluctuation, or some type of symmetry breaking. But this is irrational for the reasons I explained above. In a realm of infinite possibility there would be nothing which could actualize (select) one possibility (quantum fluctuation or symmetry breaking) instead of the others, all possibilities being balanced and equally possible.

When the argument of "chance occurrence", random event, abiogenesis, etc., is taken to the extreme, such as when it is taken to explain the very existence of "the physical universe", its irrationality becomes extremely evident. It's a matter of saying that something comes from nothing, where "nothing" is replaced with "potential". The physical universe comes from the potential for it. But this requires that we make "potential" into something real, and the only way to do this is to assign to it some degree of actuality, which is not physical. So we assume the actual existence of the nonphysical.

This runs into a problem when science tells us matter is shaped by a thermodynamic purpose. The Big Bang could happen as it was a grand carving out of the very Heat Sink it was throwing itself headlong into. The Universe expands so it can cool, and cools so it can expand. — apokrisis

I can't help but notice the teleological implications in this expression - purpose, 'throwing itself ' 'so it can...'. All intentional language. Maybe that's what came back into physicalism with semiotics, but it sounds idealist to me.

perhaps instead penalised by coming back in the next life to try over from the level of a bug or mushroom. — apokrisis

In Buddhist lore, there is no God handing out penalties. Everything that befalls one is one's own doing - that's what karma means. But it also says those who behave like animals may indeed end up being one.

Can't a sorry old pragmatist like me not have values and meaning without all the claptrap? — apokrisis

I'm sorry you thought my post was 'claptrap'. I intended it as a sincere attempt to make a serious philosophical point.

What, about the passage you quoted, suggests either? — Wayfarer

Its...

Matter alone has no value. — Nishijima-Roshi, Three Philosophies and One Reality

In logic, the corollary of that is that value alone has no matter. And that is absolutist talk, matey!

As a relativist or dichotomist, I would says "matter" might be regarded as a state of minimal value, and "value" as a state of minimal matter. This phrasing makes clear my ontic commitment. I am speaking of matter and value as now the connected limits of a dynamical balance. Reality is to be found in between these limiting ideas. Reality is always some hylomorphic mix of matter and value – if that is the terminology you insist on using.

It sort of works from a systems point of view as value does speak to purpose or telos. But form is also important as purposes have to be embodied as causal structures – structures of constraint. When you call something good, or beautiful, or divine, or whatever, the question becomes, well what is the shape of that? What does that look like in practice?

Even Plato's realm of ideas had this hierarchical structure. The universal notion of the Good anchoring the Universe of mathematical forms that gave structure to the concept of the ultimately optimal. The sub-realm of triangles gets to know what its best – most beautiful and regular – shape is. Then all the triangles that are increasingly ugly and mishappen in some way. Down to the truly crappy triangles being scratched out with a twig in the sand.

Absolutist talk sounds important and impressive. But it equivocates.

If you parse this phrase carefully, what function is "alone" serving? Does matter have no value after it has been emptied of value, and so some value had to have been there all along? Just as little as possible. Matter becomes defined as a state of infinitesimal value, and then that seeming so close to zero, we can forget to ask how matter might enjoy both some kind of value and also no kind of value in the same breath.

Idealism can shrink its inconsistencies very small with coy wording. Yet always the equivocation lurks.

In logic, the corollary of that is that value alone has no matter. And that is absolutist talk, matey! — apokrisis

I'm surprised you say that. What, then, of the corrollary I noted from Wittgenstein? Him also?

I think it maps perfectly well against the 'cartesian division' that I already noted - the fact that according to early modern science, 'physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers.' I'm not saying that your pansemiotic metaphysics adheres to that, but I think it's a fair characterisation of the mainstream scientific worldview, at least until quite recently. The objective sciences deal with quantitative measurement, whereas values are qualitative judgements. That is the origin of Hume’s is-ought problem. It could quite easily be argued that the whole point of biosemiotic philosophy was to ameliorate this division. This ought not to be controversial.

When you call something good, or beautiful, or divine, or whatever, the question becomes, well what is the shape of that? What does that look like in practice? — apokrisis

In pre-modern philosophy that is the subject explored by Pierre Hadot. But let’s not lose sight of the thread - it was you that introduced the Buddhist chain of dependent origination to the conversation, in association with several other schools of thought. I sought to elaborate on that, in respect of the claim that life and mind can be completely understood in thermodynamic terms. So I pointed out that Buddhist philosophy would not agree with that; that human existence cannot be regarded solely in those terms. But that as to why not, it is not through positing some ‘non-physical existent’. I realise it’s a subtle and difficult point to get across, but it was not made idly, it can be supported with reference to sources, hence the mention of Nishijima, who was no ‘idealist absolutist’.

The objective sciences deal with quantitative measurement, whereas values are qualitative judgements. — Wayfarer

I don’t agree but it’s not an issue. You are talking here about epistemic idealism and that’s near enough pragmatism. We are modellers of reality and so always on the side of subjectivity in that sense. No problem there.

It’s how you slide into ontic idealism which I question. I appreciate that you do make an effort to bat for idealism. But the pattern seems to be that one minute we are talking about cognition as a useful way of constructing “the world” - an embodied model of the world as it is from a point of view that includes an “us” as its centre - and the next you assume that an ontological argument has been made. That this “us” is more than just a figment or avatar of that world modelling activity. Suddenly something that was an agreed part of the epistemic process has broken free and exists in its own unplaced realm outside the pragmatic modelling relation an organism has with it’s environment.

I sought to elaborate on that, in respect of the claim that life and mind can be completely understood in thermodynamic terms. — Wayfarer

But that’s not what I say. What I say is that life and mind are so grounded in the task of navigating entropic flows that it would be hard to escape this most basic reasons for evolving a body and a mind.

Humans - as social organisms - could perhaps have the complexity to rise above the world in some way. Yet look close at human history and one doesn’t see that. There is a lot of talk about high flying ideals, yet all the social activity cashes out in creating a machinery of exponential growth.

it can be supported with reference to sources, hence the mention of Nishijima, who was no ‘idealist absolutist — Wayfarer

So where does value come from in this telling? Is it on the side of the epistemic relation between an organism and its world, or is it something more - an ontological level break between the realm of matter and the realm of ideas?

So what is this something else other than matter which exists in this Universe? — Nishijima-Roshi, Three Philosophies and One Reality

Exactly. Walk me through it.

We can call that something spirit, but if we do we should remember that in Buddhism, the word spirit is a figurative expression for value or meaning. We do not say that spirit exists in reality; we use the concept only figuratively. — Nishijima-Roshi, Three Philosophies and One Reality

Your source equivocates. That is what I pointed out. Is the qualification that spirit is only used figuratively meant to walk us back from the ontic to the epistemic? We talk as if value and meaning are separate from material being and yet share the same Universe, but that separateness is then just a figure of speech?

Are we walking idealism all the way back to semiosis - which indeed says physical systems share the world with organismic systems? Entropy can be regulated by information. Clearly I would be happy with that and only want to claim that semiosis is the well worked out scientific theory that now makes good this epistemic version of idealism.

But you appear to want to defend some version of ontic idealism. And your sources likewise equivocate at the crucial point.

But you appear to want to defend some version of ontic idealism. — apokrisis

You, yourself, actually "defend some version of ontic idealism". I'm surprised that you still haven't come to recognize this. Your first principle, absolute potential, the symmetry which is the foundation for symmetry-breaking, is nothing but an ideal. Therefore you place the ideal as prior to everything. That is common to physicalism, as physics leans heavily on mathematical ideals.

This is actually what happened to "materialism" over the years. People would grasp "matter" as the first principle of the material world, without realizing that "matter" was simply an ideal, as Berkeley demonstrated. Then materialism was reducible to idealism, and Marx demonstrated that the inversion of this is also true. The result is that materialism and idealism are actually equivalent. Aristotle demonstrated this as well.

I don’t take issue with physicalism because you hold it, but because I believe it’s a mistaken philosophical view. — Wayfarer

Remember that I never set out to convince you physicalism is true. My objectives were to help you understand it, and to provide my justification for believing it.

I believe I’ve given you many grounds on which I and others believe physicalism to be a mistaken philosophical view, but that you don’t recognize the arguments.

Your reasons seem to boil down to fact that it's inconsistent with your other beliefs. It's perfectly reasonable to interpret new information in terms of one's background beliefs, and it's justified to to reject a proposal on that basis. But this rejection is subjective: epistemically contingent on your particular background beliefs (subsumed in your overall noetic structure).

But this means YOUR reasons to reject it do not falsify MY beliefs. And vice versa: my reasons to reject your position are epistemically contingent upon my background beliefs. The difference is that I recognize this contingency - and that's why I can respect your position. You overlook this contingency, and hence you conflate your subjective basis for rejecting physicalism with an objective falsification.

If you happen to think you are rejecting it on some meta-ontological principles, so they rise above subjective judgement, then state these principles and be prepared to show how they apply to your theory.

The term "physicalism" is used largely for historical reasons. These are discussed in the SEP article on physicalism. Personally, I make sense of it by considering proper subsets of the sorts of things commonly treated as existing: spiritual/supernatural objects (e.g. angels), abstract objects, and physical objects. Physicalists deny the existence of the first two. — Relativist

The argument is that the reference to "spiritual/supernatural objects" is a category error. That by declaring the 'spiritual or supernatural' to consist of 'objects' you are making it an empty set. — Wayfarer

What categories should I have used when explaining how "I made sense" of the meaning of "physical"- after you indicated I'd "left the meaning of 'physical' indeterminate"? I referenced categories of hypothetical objects that many take for granted:

-supernatural/spiritual objects- a common belief about God and angels
-abstract objects - a common belief of platonists

So again, this expresses only how I make sense of it. That's apparently inadequate for you because you have different view - but it's a view you haven't explained. You seem to be implying we should treat "spiritual or supernatural" differently - not as objects, but as -------what? You haven't said. Don't leave it "indeterminate" and vague.

Although you charge me with vagueness, I can’t help noticing that physicalism itself is equally vague, if not more so. When it defines “physical” as “whatever physics will someday describe,” or as a “state of affairs” (which in practice means “whatever happens to be the case”), how is that not vague? — Wayfarer

You're either being disingenuous or you didn't make an effort to understand what I said. I precisely defined the way "state of affairs" is used in the ontology, distinguishing it from the common use of the term: 1) as a term that applies to everything that exists, from the foundational to the most complex; 2) that it consists of a particular, with its properties and relations

State of affairs (so defined) is the most fundamental concept in the ontology. Armstrong labelled his book, "A World of States of Affairs".

I referenced this model when referring to immanent universals, and pointed out that quantum fields fit the model. The ontology hangs together quite consistenly, and if you don't see that - then you were premature in dropping the topic. There's nothing vague about the ontology itself, so any perceived vagueness could be cleared up. No one's compelling you to pursue it further, but recognize the folly of trying to falsify something you don't understand.

I did not say, "physical is what physics would someday describe". I said that an idealized, complete, perfect physics would do so (I also said this is unachieveable). I described this in terms of everything in existence being causally connected- this being the basis for my claim about a complete, perfected physics. If that wasn't sufficiently clear, you could have asked - but that was when you'd decided you didn't have anything more to say about it. I will offer this- my definition of naturalism:

Naturalism is a metaphysical system that assumes as a first principle that the natural world comprises the totality of reality. The natural world consists of ourselves, the world that is reflected in our senses, and everything that is causally connected through laws of nature.

You naively complained (in effect) that physicalism didn't provide a catalog what exists, but you have said very little about what you believe exists. You suggested that maybe the moon doesn't exist when we aren't looking at it! I get the phenomonolgy point, but we're talking ontology- are you not willing to commit to the existence of the objects of ordinary experience? Do you deny the existence of astronomical objects? Do you propose skepticism on everything other than your mind? This lack of clarity is considerably broader than the finer points of physicalism.

I am left wondering: do you deny the existence of objects, and types of objects, that have been identified by physics to date? I mean this in the falibilist terms associated with science, but also in terms of being justified as belief by the strength of its epistemology.

Of course it sounds vague when what you want is something very specific, determinable by scientific enquiry, an 'atomic fact'. Questions of this kind are always elusive, that's why the positivists wanted to declare them all meaningless as a matter of principle. They're difficult in a way different to technical and scientific questions. — Wayfarer

You don't need to put it in scientific terms, but you need to be as "determinate" as you expected me to be. So far, you've made no specific claims, just vague allusions. I haven't noticed any specific claims about what exists. If I've overlooked it, remind me. If you can't do this is straightforward terms, then understand why this is problematic.

The only thing being "transformed" is the mind of the person, not the external world.
— Relativist

There, again, is your belief that the world is a certain way, that it has a determinate existence external to your cognition of it. But this is just what has been called into question by both cognitive science and quantum physics. — Wayfarer

You're being unreasonable. You had said, "It involves being in a deep, transformative relationship with the world, participating fully in something that is wider than you."

Why would I think this "transformative relationship" involves something more than a change to the mind that is involved, and the impact we have through our actions? The sentence makes perfect sense in those terms. I did suspect you had something more in mind, but I shouldn't have to guess.

My point of view: we are part of the world; part of the earthly ecosphere. So OF COURSE we are participants. This much is consistent with naturalism. So describe what you mean about this participation that renders it inconsistent with naturalism.

we do not see the phenomenon 'in itself', as it is, independently of our observation of it. We're involved in producing the outcome. — Wayfarer

We're only involved in producing the contents of our minds. And we have employed our minds to get an understanding of what exists outside of it. Are you suggesting this is futile? I don't think you are, but it's consistent with your vague claims. If you agree it's not futile, then what IS your point?

[Quote Whereas in classical physics, we're at arms length from the outcome, we can maintain that sense of separateness which objectivity requires. But that sense of scientific detachment and objectivity, is also very much a cultural artifact, typical of a very specific period in history and culture. It is also where objectivist physicalism is located.[/quote]
This seems like a vague reference to your vague cocept of "participatory' . Is there anything outside your mind that you commit to existing? Is it justified to believe there are planetary systems in Andromeda? If so, how do we "participate" with these?

The fact that you will invariably interpret this as being a causal sequence where consciousness is one thing, the effect another, is the same issue as treating the spiritual or supernatural as 'an object'. As I said, requires perspectival shift to see why. — Wayfarer

Of course it requires a perspectival shift, but you need to explain this alternate perspective! Vague allusions doesn't do it. Vague reference to phenomenonlogy doesn't do it whe you also haven't acknowledged the actual existence of anything external to yourself. I expect you do, but if so- explain how we can know this despite the phenomenology. This is why it's vague.

[b)You've provided no reason to think this is a false distinction[/b]
— Relativist

I just have! I'm trying to convey a difficult point about the nature and limitations of objective thought, but everything I'm saying is interpolated into an idiom within which only what is considered objective is admissable. — Wayfarer

No, you did not provide a reason. You merely suggested there's an alternative perspective that makes different distinctions. You would need to outline this perspective, the distinctions it makes, and explain how it's superior (not just different).

Since you acknowledge it's a difficult point, don't blame me for being the obstacle to understanding. You've treated my questions as obstinacy, but all I'm doing is reflecting back how I interpret what you said. You haven't given me an alternative, interpretive framework.

But you also need to establish some common ground, such as by identifying some things we both agree exist.