Isn't it just sufficient to say that human beings simply do not know why things behave the way that they do? — Metaphysician Undercover

It seems pretty silly to me to think about the subject in such a black and white way. Some people clearly know more about why things behave as they do, than do other people.

Some people clearly know more about why things behave as they do, than do other people. — wonderer1

How so? Do you mean that you know more about why you behave the way that you do, than I know about why you behave the way that you do? But we're talking about "things" plural, and that would only be knowing about the behaviour of one thing.

Do you think that someone who knows about laws of gravitation, and knows how to apply some universal laws of gravitation, knows more about why things fall, then the person who only knows that they fall because of gravity?

You can’t give a straight answer so only give me crooked ones. — apokrisis

I answer your challenges to the best of my ability, but not always to your liking. I’ve been here for a decade and I know where the boundary lines are in terms of philosophical commitments, that anything that could be considered religious is outside that boundary. Especially when it comes to you. Make no mistake, I’ve learned a lot from your posts, but about science, not about philosophy, which is mainly of instrumental value to pragmatism. (Incidentally, here is a report about Stevenson’s activities.)

How can you seriously propose that time is generated from something which requires time. — Metaphysician Undercover

But my argument is that time is generated from rotation. The first time that something could go around in a circle and so be different from the first time something was also going off in straight line of the same scale.

This is of course the quick and dirty account. But it’s based on the maths of the symmetries underpinning quantum field theory. How SO(3) breaks down into its double cover of SU(2). You can get the fluctuation that is a vector gauge boson. A particle that exists as it has the dimensional structure that is an action in a direction. A translational degree of freedom which carries with it a transverse plane of rotation - a spin that cashes out an intrinsic energy. The constant field strength of a quantum oscillator.

And even this is still the quick and dirty account. Much more maths is involved. And I agree that physics hasn’t been able to fully resolve the issue of what time is at the Planck scale.

Indeed, most simply run classical time straight through the Planckscale and through its final singularity point to come out the other side. Quantum magic is used to paper over the brief disappearance from view and a mirror version of our universe is then discovered emerging in this other classical time dimension.

But I prefer approaches that deal with what happens at the Planckscale and its unit 1 description of the Universe where the classical and the quantum bend into each other so to speak. A singularity is avoided. We instead have a symmetry breaking in terms of the Planck triad of constants, c, G and h. Spacetime extent emerges in conjunction with quantum mechanical content. And c sets the fundamental beat of doubling and halving - doubling of radius and halving of energy density.

Time is emergent as the exponential curve of expanding and cooling this creates. A first moment that is immediately followed by a second moment twice the global scale and half the local energy density. Another period doubling gives you a x4 and x1/4. And so on in powerlaw fashion.

As a fundamental way of looking at the ticking cosmic clock, it’s taken about 7 billion years to achieve the latest period doubling - a doubling of the cosmic horizon coupled to a fall in the Universe’s temperature from about 5 degrees K to 2.7 degrees today.

So time emerged as part of the Planckscale package. What is remarkable is that a clock was set ticking that marked out its moments as geometric growth - the period doubling of a thermal process, or a doubling of spacetime extent and quantum mechanical content. And that this metronomic beat was not disrupted too much by the fact that its contents was evolving its state.

A hot relativistic plasma broke to become a cold comoving and gravitating dust. Matter could suddenly go slower than light and that did indeed change the cosmic expansion rate/dilution rate by a whole order of magnitude. Radiation dilutes at the fourth power as it also redshifts in the time direction while matter dilutes at only the third power. If it wasn’t for the appearance of dark energy, the cosmic clock of time would have gone right off its track. There wouldn’t have been enough gravity exerted by the material contents to continue a smooth doubling-halving through the current matter dominated period of cosmic history.

But then dark energy kicks us in the opposite direction. It now both accelerates us back up to the original geometric or logarithmic beat of time and then overshoots. Time again will break down and effectively come to an end as the cosmic horizon becomes frozen in place and no more temperature fall becomes possible.

So even if you can’t follow these details, you can see how time is an emergent description of what the universe is doing as a material system. The basic period doubling clock relies on matter being in a critical balance as described under inflation and the Lambda-CDM concordance model.

And the reality is that even with dark matter, the Universe was 70% light in this regard. The spring driving the cosmic clock was only a third wound up. The fact that mass condensed out of the radiation flow was a boon as that did something to reorganise the passing of time within a now comoving reference frame. Then dark energy adds its new upward flick where time is halted by a horizon. Unless you want to think of its as continuing in some still more transformed way as the superluminal expanse that flows on over the cosmic horizon.

I answer your challenges to the best of my ability, but not always to your liking. I’ve been here for a decade and I know where the boundary lines are in terms of philosophical commitments, that anything that could be considered religious is outside that boundary. — Wayfarer

There is a boundary between philosophy as making rational sense of the world and philosophy as making shit up. Philosophy is critical thinking. And it should be applied with full rigour to all our social narratives. Then let the cards fall where they may.

Religion is generally fine as the useful myths that a society organises itself by. To the degree that society is just its own thing, it can be as fictional as it pleases. But if a society has to exist in the world, then it needs to pay attention to this global fact. Even if it just shifts to faction, the narrative has to work in the sense of promoting functional behaviour at the collective social scale.

So religion is fine to the degree it works in this pragmatic sense. We are social animals. We do need to be bound by a collective world model to all become the productive inhabitants of this world. A transcending narrative is a basic requirement of social-semiosis.

But are religions good at adapting to changing circumstance? The Anglican Church certainly seems so. Belief in anything is optional. Social cohesion and public service is at the centre of what it does. Buddhism and Confusicanism likewise might be equally progressive within their own social contexts. I'm not sure anyone wants to be run under the rule of mullahs or evangelicals any time soon.

Or maybe that is my mistake as I have enjoyed all the benefits of a progressive and pragmatic social order. I feel no urge to go back to the certainties of life as lived in previous centuries.

But yeah. It is not that I rule out even children recalling past lives. As a pragmatist, I just weigh the evidence for or against. I spent a few years deliberately looking into all the fringe science looking at telepathy, hypnosis, spiritualism and whatever. Especially where it was being done under laboratory conditions. I even took part in experiments to get a taste of how thing were operated.

So I have no problem at all with science investigating the various species of idealist belief. But I've followed closely the results from when that was done. This is all familiar terrain. Been there and done that. Heard any amount of equivocation in the process while also agreeing that science can't pretend to prove the negative. It can only claim to have constrained the scope for doubt. Or in terms of the fringe, the scope for belief in its claims.

There is a boundary between philosophy as making rational sense of the world and philosophy as making shit up. — apokrisis

You can't even discuss it without becoming antagonistic, never mind that I have endeavoured to maintain a civil discourse throughout our debates.

It's not a debate when you equivocate and waffle. If you want to believe that it is antagonism you face rather than rigour, then OK.

If civilisation and culture want values and meaning, do they really have to commit to idealism and its absolutism? Can't a sorry old pragmatist like me not have values and meaning without all the claptrap? Just living a productive life and enjoying it? — apokrisis

A salient question. My take is that we are better off without the idea of overarching values, because that leaves us with the freedom to create our own values. This is not to refer to the pragmatic values that are essential to community functioning, but to say that those values don't need to be presented as given by a transcendent/ divine lawgiver.

All the empirical evidence is for states that were preceded in time by another state, so this pattern would not apply to a hypothetical initial state
— Relativist

Then obviously, the concept of "initial state" is not consistent with physical reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's an unjustified conclusion. The evidence implies either an infinite series or something unique to initiate the series.

Why do i need to present you with a theory about this? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because an initial state (a unique thing) with potential to produce a subsequent state is also consistent with the evidence. So you need a rational reason to rule this out.

Or maybe that is my mistake as I have enjoyed all the benefits of a progressive and pragmatic social order. I feel no urge to go back to the certainties of life as lived in previous centuries. — apokrisis

I think it's more likely that you can't see what anything in religions mean, except for in the social sense, of how they help society hang together. Of course the religious will say that there's another dimension altogether, which is symbolised (and dogmatized) in various forms and lexicons. But if you can't see that there's anything real to be conveyed then it's all equivocation and waffle as far as you're concerned.

I think it's more likely that you can't see what anything in religions mean, except for in the social sense, of how they help society hang together. — Wayfarer

If that is a thought that comforts you, OK.

You're the one who brought in Buddhist dependent origination, I thought it worth saying what it means.

My take is that we are better off without the idea of overarching values, because that leaves us with the freedom to create our own values. — Janus

I will state the obvious in that we have this freedom as a right and then the responsibility to exercise it as a fact. Modern society reformed itself to become an open market of value making.

That was working not too bad before social media came along and pushed the consensus beyond a hierarchical balance and into dysfunctional polarisation. Two sides now only wanting to cancel each other out.

I knew what it meant from the systems science perspective. And also just in having grown up in Asia and seeing it as part of the daily social habit, woven in with British imperialism, Chinese communism and other interesting social creeds.

That was working not too bad before social media came along and pushed the consensus beyond a hierarchical balance and into dysfunctional polarisation. Two sides now only wanting to cancel each other out. — apokrisis

Yea, the problem of ideology and dogmatism, political or religious—the inevitable polemic—us and them. Even if you offer a rational critique of an ideology, you are automatically cast by the ideologue or the dogmatist as ignorant or vicious—as "one of them".

Some people clearly know more about why things behave as they do, than do other people.
— wonderer1

How so? — Metaphysician Undercover

Some people develop areas of expertise, e.g. auto mechanics and MDs.

What would be the point of me offering up a theory, when I readily accept as fact, that me, nor any other human being, has even the vaguest idea, or any sort of knowledge at all, concerning why things behave the way that they do. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you really think that is an accurate claim about yourself? Or do you recognize that an MD is apt to know more than most people, about why your body behaves the way it does?

But this is precisely the meaning of 'relativism'. It is 'what is right for me' and 'what is right for you.' You have your reasons, and I mine. It is kind of obligatory in a pluralist culture but it needs to be seen for what it is. — Wayfarer

You are mischaracterising what I said. I said I was giving you the benefit of the doubt. That doesn't mean I think we're both right. Of course I think you're wrong.

I previously told you I do not consider truth relative. It was irrational (and rude) to ignore this. If you didn't understand, you should have asked.

There is only one set of truths, but there are no oracles to reveal it. All we have are our rational faculties, and the limited set of facts available to us. As I've also argued, most rational choices are inferences to best explanation (IBE) made on the evidence we have considered. Unlike deduction, IBE is not sufficient to prove conclusively that we're correct. Another's opinion may be equally rational, but based a different set of evidence and background beliefs*. This is sufficient reason to reserve judgement. I expressed this in a positive way, out of politeness.
_________
*This is the only "relativism" I have in mind with my screen name: we make our epistemic judgements relative to our background beliefs. This statement is neutral to the one set of actual truths, and doesn't entail making background beliefs beyond questioning. This may seem trivially true, but we often overlook it when having a discussion on controversial topics.

_____

Furthermore, my arguments against physicalism have been mainly metacognitive (based on arguments from the structure of cognition) and transcendental (in a neo-kantian sense) rather than objective. — Wayfarer

"Mainly"? My perception is that you've mainly asked questions that demonstrated you don't understand physicalism, and have reacted in ways that suggest you aren't interested in understanding it. You certainly don't grasp my perspective, so you aren't positioned to cast a rational judgement on it.

Our approaches are different: I start with the general facts about the world, whereas you start with some assumed framework on the structure of cognition: a framework that is untethered to any clear facts about the world- it's just about the way things seem to you after having considered various other mind-centric approaches. My problem with this approach is that your starting point is on shaky grounds - introspection, speculation, and rationalization. You have yet to acknoweldge any facts about the extra-mental world.

Does consideration of phenomenology lead you to reserve judgement on the inferences of science? Because if you were as confident of those facts as most people are, you would acknowledge the reasonableness of starting with those facts and seeking meta-explanations of them. Those facts have stronger epistemic support than any speculative theory on the structure of cognition.

Are persons objects? When you interact with your loved ones, are you interacting with objects? Persons can be treated as objects for some purposes — demographics, epidemiology, or even grammar — but ordinarily we relate to them as beings, with an “I–Thou” relation rather than an “I–It.” If divine beings are real, they would be real in the same way — as beings, not as objects. — Wayfarer

Everything that exists is an object. "Object" is synonymous with "existent". This doesn't imply we don't relate also to them as fellow human beings. They still exist.

So when you define “physical” in contrast with “spiritual/supernatural objects,” you are already working within that modern boundary — one which is itself the result of a particular history, not an inevitable metaphysical truth. — Wayfarer

Read more carefully. I didn't "define" it this way, I said I "made sense of it" this way. Sure, this was because of my background framework (Catholic education). But you seem to agree there are no "spiritual/supernatual objects" - so you have no basis for claiming I'm wrong to rule this out. Doing so does not preclude the spiritual/supernatural being manifested in different ways. I can entertain this - if you can make a good case for it.

Our sense of what is real is often defined within the bounds of what is scientifically verifiable in principle. That’s why we tend to assume that if something is to be considered real, it must be an object. But that’s very much a feature of our culture, shaped by the scientific revolution. Other philosophical traditions don’t take objectivity as the sole criterion. — Wayfarer

The perception of objects is innate (perhaps also influenced by culture), not shaped by science education. Science objectifies additional perceived aspects of realty, but cognitively grounded in our innate sense.

That's great that there are alternative philosophical traditions that would have a different framework. That vague fact doesn't falsify our natural framework. You'd have to present a specific framework and show how it is superior.

As for abstract objects... My heuristic is that they don't exist, but they're real, in that they're the same for any rational intellect. — Wayfarer

What you wrote seems consistent with what I've said.

The SEP Article on the Philosophy of Mathematics would be worth a read. I particularly liked this observation:

"Bernays observed that when a mathematician is at work she “naively” treats the objects she is dealing with in a platonistic way. Every working mathematician, he says, is a platonist (Bernays 1935). But when the mathematician is caught off duty by a philosopher who quizzes her about her ontological commitments, she is apt to shuffle her feet and withdraw to a vaguely non-platonistic position. This has been taken by some to indicate that there is something wrong with philosophical questions about the nature of mathematical objects and of mathematical knowledge."

But the article gives a variety of perspectives.

Oh, please. I gave reference to an article on it. There is plenty that is 'vague about the ontology', which can be summed up in one word: uncertainty. — Wayfarer

There are 2 relevant senses of uncertainty:
1) fallibilism: we can't be certain of many facts
2) quantum uncertainty.

Neither of these favors or disfavors my ontology vs others. These uncertainties apply to ANY theory: And yet, you seem to think the associated "vagueness" only applies to physicalism! No ontological theory can be established with certainty, and all viable theories have to be consistent with quantum mechanics - if it's to be treated as factual, rather some misguided consequence of our cultural history.

The irony is that you're treating the science of quantum mechanics as factual, while simultaneously criticizing the scientific framework as "speculative". Which is it? Do you accept facts established by science?

In your mind, it's a nice, neat system, where 'states of affairs' can be used to label the shifting sands of scientific speculation for the purposes of argument. — Wayfarer

Nice and neat = not vague. Indeed, the metaphysical theory is a nice neat system, that's robust enough to be consistent with science despite theory falsification/revision/replacement.

Now you're revealing your attitude toward science as "speculative". So...you regard the claims of physics as speculations on par with pseudo-science and conspiracy theories?

Many posts ago I mentioned that my metaphysical theory goes hand in hand with my epistemology. My epistemology respects IBEs. This provides an idealized basis for evaluating conspiracy theories, opinions on current events, historical theories, and nearly every aspect of everyday judgement. I believe that, when applied properly, it leads to more rational judgements- as well as decisiveness. It also leads me to be open-minded, willing to challenge my beliefs based on new information. Of course, because my beliefs form a "nice and neat" package, some of my views aren't easily changed- many logically related beliefs are involved, forming a coherent world view. My ontological theory comprises a portion of this world view; I adopted it as an IBE, finding it consistent with all the rest of my beliefs.

The claims of science are IBEs with strong support. That seems undeniable. They are about as rock-solid as an IBE can be, because they have been tested and verified. Even these can be wrong, but that gives us even more reason to be suspicious of speculations with a less secure epistemic basis. So WHY should I NOT embrace the metaphysical theory that best accounts for these scientific "facts"?

On the other hand, if your skepticism is so extreme that you can't accept the claims of science, you're left with very little that you can claim as belief, since little is as strongly supported. That's not irrational, but it's a dead end. So when I asked this:

So again, this expresses only how I make sense of it. That's apparently inadequate for you because you have different view - but it's a view you haven't explained. You seem to be implying we should treat "spiritual or supernatural" differently - not as objects, but as -------what? You haven't said. Don't leave it "indeterminate" and vague. — Relativist

Rather than answer, you responded with:

The very division between “natural” and “supernatural” is a historical artifact.. . — Wayfarer

A non-answer. Here's more questions you haven't answered:

we do not see the phenomenon 'in itself', as it is, independently of our observation of it. We're involved in producing the outcome.
— Wayfarer
We're only involved in producing the contents of our minds. And we have employed our minds to get an understanding of what exists outside of it. Are you suggesting this is futile? I don't think you are, but it's consistent with your vague claims. If you agree it's not futile, then what IS your point? — Relativist

Why would I think this "transformative relationship" involves something more than a change to the mind that is involved, and the impact we have through our actions? — Relativist

. You suggested that maybe the moon doesn't exist when we aren't looking at it! I get the phenomonolgy point, but we're talking ontology- are you not willing to commit to the existence of the objects of ordinary experience? Do you deny the existence of astronomical objects? Do you propose skepticism on everything other than your mind? — Relativist

ALL you've done is to point to reasons to think various claims may be wrong: they're framework dependent; shaped by culture or history; or it's simply that other possibilities can't be ruled out. But you haven't provided an alternative that could produce a "better explanation", and you haven't proposed an alternative to IBE in theory choice.

Returning to the first point, about me giving you the benefit of the doubt on having rational views, I'll add this. It appears you have almost no beliefs about ontology; you are mired in skepticism. That's not irrational, per se, but I can't see how you can apply this level of skepticism consistently across all aspects of the world that you deal with.

Naturalism is a metaphysical system that assumes as a first principle that the natural world comprises the totality of reality. The natural world consists of ourselves, the world that is reflected in our senses, and everything that is causally connected through laws of nature.
— Relativist

Where 'the natural world' is what can be detected by the senses (augmented by instruments) or hypothesised on the mathematical analysis of such data. But already, this excludes the observer. — Wayfarer

You omitted the relevant portion of the quote. I highlighted it in bold.

We are part of the natural world; we were produced by it, and we interact with it constantly (cause-effect relationships). The question is: how do we not fit the definition? Support your answer with evidence, and don't give it in terms of some framework that you can't fully defend as complete and coherent.

The irony is that you're treating the science of quantum mechanics as factual, while simultaneously criticizing the scientific framework as "speculative". — Relativist

Bingo. :lol:

But my argument is that time is generated from rotation. — apokrisis

But rotation is an activity which requires time. This puts time as prior to rotation. Rotation cannot get started without the passing of time. Therefore it is impossible that rotation is the cause of time, or that time is generated from rotation.

The logic I use above is the same type of logic by which Aristotle demonstrates that eternal circular motion is physically impossible in De Caelo. He starts by showing how eternal circular motion is logically possible. All the mathematical principles, the Ideals, are consistent and sufficient to support the reality of eternal circular motion. However, he then goes on to explain how any circular motion would involve a body which is moving in that motion. And, the body would consist of matter. The material body, would have been generated in the past, and would corrupt in the future, therefore the eternal circular motion is physically impossible.

The same logic can be applied to your claim that time is generated from rotation. Rotation is an activity which requires something which rotates. The thing which is rotating is a physical thing, a temporal object, existing in time. Therefore time is prior to rotation, rotation occurs within time, and it is impossible that time is generated from rotation.

This is of course the quick and dirty account. But it’s based on the maths of the symmetries underpinning quantum field theory. How SO(3) breaks down into its double cover of SU(2). You can get the fluctuation that is a vector gauge boson. A particle that exists as it has the dimensional structure that is an action in a direction. A translational degree of freedom which carries with it a transverse plane of rotation - a spin that cashes out an intrinsic energy. The constant field strength of a quantum oscillator. — apokrisis

All this happens in time. it is not an account of how time is generated.

So even if you can’t follow these details, you can see how time is an emergent description of what the universe is doing as a material system. — apokrisis

No, i don't see how it is possible that time is emergent from something material. And, you should be able to understand this as well. All material things are temporal, having their beginnings and endings in time. As demonstrated by Aristotle's argument in Bk 9 of metaphysics, which I referred to, anything eternal must be actual.

Some people develop areas of expertise, e.g. auto mechanics and MDs — wonderer1

But these are specifics, this type of thing, or that type, according to the area of expertise. What we were talking about is why things (in general) behave the way that they do.

Do you really think that is an accurate claim about yourself? Or do you recognize that an MD is apt to know more than most people, about why your body behaves the way it does? — wonderer1

Yes, I really think it is an accurate claim. And, I do not think that an MD knows more about why I behave the way that I do, then I do.

That's an unjustified conclusion. The evidence implies either an infinite series or something unique to initiate the series. — Relativist

This is not true. Evidence indicates that becoming, or change, is a process of transition. Therefore the series ends, but it does not end abruptly at a point, it transitions to something else. This is neither an infinite series nor a unique point which initiates the series, it is a process of change.

Because an initial state (a unique thing) with potential to produce a subsequent state is also consistent with the evidence. So you need a rational reason to rule this out. — Relativist

I explained the rationale behind ruling out the "initial state". An "initial state" is an ideal which is arbitrarily assigned in the application of systems theory. As an "ideal" it has nothing which directly corresponds with it in the physical world. Take the eternal circular motion referred to above, in my reply to apokrisis, as an example. It is a logical possibility, and an ideal, but it is actually physically impossible. It is common that ideals are actually physically impossible, because the physical world lacks the perfection of the ideal. But that does not make the ideals useless. Many are extremely useful, for all sorts of purposes. However, when it comes to cosmology, and we assign the ideal as a fundamental property of the universe, when the ideal is actually physically impossible, this is a mistake which is very misleading. It is sometimes called the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Both you and apokrisis make this same mistake, of designating an ideal which is actually physically impossible, as a fundamental property of the universe. I believe this type of mistake is common to all forms of physicalism.

That's an unjustified conclusion. The evidence implies either an infinite series or something unique to initiate the series.
— Relativist

This is not true. Evidence indicates that becoming, or change, is a process of transition. Therefore the series ends, but it does not end abruptly at a point, it transitions to something else. This is neither an infinite series nor a unique point which initiates the series, it is a process of change. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your reply makes no sense. You agree there wasn't an infinite series, and you had asserted that this entails a "God" initiating it- which is something unique.

This inference has no implication at all as to the characteristics of this (so called) God. All we know is that this "God" is some thing that kicked off the sequence of universe states.

I explained the rationale behind ruling out the "initial state". An "initial state" is an ideal which is arbitrarily assigned in the application of systems theory. As an "ideal" it has nothing which directly corresponds with it in the physical world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Non-sequitur. Even if the universe was created by Yahweh, it entails an initial state of Yahweh (and nothing else). So it's self-defeating to rule out an initial state.

This inference has no implication at all as to the characteristics of this (so called) God. All we know is that this "God" is some thing that kicked off the sequence of universe states. — Relativist

Sure, how does that mean that what I said makes no sense? It seems to make complete sense to me. There is something which caused the reality of the universe which we know and understand, but we do not know anything else about this cause.

Non-sequitur. Even if the universe was created by Yahweh, it entails an initial state of Yahweh (and nothing else). So it's self-defeating to rule out an initial state. — Relativist

This supposed conclusion is contrary to the argument. The argument demonstrates that the "thing" you refer to as prior to all the physical states, is explicitly not a state. That is why God is understood as immaterial. To characterize it as a state is to demonstrate that you are either failing to understand it, or refusing to accept it. Judging by the rest of our discussion, I think you are refusing. I think you actually grasp the force with which the argument disproves the physicalism of your faithful devotion, and so you practise denial because you are not prepared for apostasy.

Sure, how does that mean that what I said makes no sense? — Metaphysician Undercover

What made no sense is why you disagreed with my statement:

The evidence implies either an infinite series or something unique to initiate the series. — Relativist

You responded, "This is not true".

And yet, you now actually seem to agree (you said, "sure").

The argument demonstrates that the "thing" you refer to as prior to all the physical states, is explicitly not a state.That is why God is understood as immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have only established that the "thing" is unique, in that it differs from the series of transitional universe states you regard as the evidence. Now you're using the terms "physical" and "immaterial" but haven't defined them. I infer that "physical" applies to each of those transitional universe states, "immaterial" applies to the unique thing. So applying these labels adds no information. I don't see how you could justifiably add information, because the evidence only points them being different. This is already captured with "unique".

To characterize it as a state is to demonstrate that you are either failing to understand it, or refusing to accept it.

I can't understand a claim of yours that you haven't adequately explained. You seem to be using the word, "state" different from the way I defined it.

I gave you a hypothetical scenario involving the hypothetical deity, Yahweh, which entailed an initial state of Yahweh (sans universe). I'll add detail so you can identify what you disagree with:

Yahweh (sans universe) causes the series of transitional states of the universe; causation entails a temporally prior cause and temporally posterior effect. Hence there is a series of states, sequenced in time, that begins with Yahweh (sans universe).

In this scenario, Yahweh sans universe is indeed a state, per my definition of state. You haven't provided an alternate definition.