In that simplistic dichotomy, where is the "logical efficacy" of the OP? Is it in the "top-down constraints" or the "bottom-up degrees of freedom". Is it the top-down logical or intentional efficacy that the OP was arguing against? :smile:I would suggest that what we call an accident is the opposite of what we call a necessity. So the more fundamental dichotomy is chance and necessity. Or what in the systems view is the top down constraints and the bottom up degrees of freedom. — apokrisis
My claim is that there are only a limited number of situations where it has Collingwood’s logical efficacy. — T Clark
Peircean triads. Is it the degrees of freedom below, the constraints above, and the resulting phenomena?
— T Clark
That’s it. Between the downward constraints and the bottom up construction, the reality that emerges inbetween as the dynamical balance. — apokrisis
In that simplistic dichotomy, where is the "logical efficacy" of the OP? Is it in the "top-down constraints" or the "bottom-up degrees of freedom". Is it the top-down logical or intentional efficacy that the OP was arguing against? :smile: — Gnomon
I don't see how it's possible to deny that there is order in the universe, regardless of humans perceiving it. — Patterner
How does this relate to the sign, the object, and the interpretant. — T Clark
Is it the top-down logical or intentional efficacy that the OP was arguing against? — Gnomon
True. Billiard balls are causal, but not self-causal. So what is the initial cause of their motion? Does the cue ball initiate the aim & activity on the table? Or does the chain of causation link back to an intentional*1 Prime Cause, with the mental goal of moving all balls into pockets?The fact that humans engage in intentional behavior implies only that some causation is the product of intent. Not that all causation is. — Relativist
Collingwood's abstruse concept is over my untrained head. I simply construe the term to mean that the conclusions follow logically from the premises. But the path of reasoning can be traced from Top-Down or from Bottom-Up, and can be evaluated as Statistical (permanent pattern) or Intentional (aimed at future state). :smile:In that simplistic dichotomy, where is the "logical efficacy" of the OP? Is it in the "top-down constraints" or the "bottom-up degrees of freedom". Is it the top-down logical or intentional efficacy that the OP was arguing against? :smile: — Gnomon
This is not what Collingwood meant by logical efficacy. — T Clark
I probably missed the point of the OP. But the subsequent clarifications only muddied the water for me.So the OP was about the limits of the efficacy of the mechanistic mindset. The complaint was that because it seemed a severely limited view of Nature in practice, one might as well give up on the very idea of believing in “causality”. — apokrisis
Quantum Uncertainty does place limits on some traditional universal assumptions underlying the "mechanistic mindset". But those squishy lower-level limits don't seem to have much efficacy on the macro scale. So, we continue to depend on the "pragmatic usefulness" of our causal models for designing machines. — Gnomon
As long as we keep those acausal animals penned-up on the quantum scale, we seem to be safe from the anarchy of Chaos. — Gnomon
A book well worth reading is Peter Hoffmann's Life's Ratchet: How Molecular Machines Extract Order from Chaos. — apokrisis
Ahem… — T Clark
My conclusion - identifying one element as the cause of another depends on where you look. What constitutes the cause is a matter of convention, not fact. It works when you can isolate the elements of the phenomena you are studying at from their environments, e.g. electrons in a physics experiment. It works for certain everyday events at human scale, e.g. if I push the grocery cart it moves. It is a much less useful explanation for most phenomena. My claim is that there are only a limited number of situations where it has Collingwood’s logical efficacy. — T Clark
Reduction to efficient cause is a mindset based on certain metaphysical presuppositions. — apokrisis
My suggestion was to get back to the metaphysics as it was first envisaged in Greek discourse. — apokrisis
And didn't Collingwood offer his own update on Hegelian dialectics – one that boils down to the unity of opposites – as well as being an epistemic idealist? — apokrisis
We can't – in Kantian fashion – know the truth of our metaphysical presuppositions directly. They are after all logical arguments if they have any rigour wort — apokrisis
Complexity is different as it speaks to emergence, self-organisation and topological order. A theory of the Universe has to be able to model the emergence of space, time and energy as its three major ingredients. And why shouldn't physics and cosmology have that ambition? — apokrisis
No. My mindset is based on my understanding of how the word causality is generally understood by people who don’t recognize the limitations of the concept associated with complex systems. — T Clark
When I go back to what I wrote about the chain of causality, one thing that jumps out to me is that constraints—events that prevent future events—have a bigger effect on what happens in the world then causes—events that result in future events. — T Clark
I’m not familiar with that. I only turned to Collingwood when he confirms my prejudices. — T Clark
I agree with all this, although, as I’ve said many times in this thread, I don’t think it makes sense to call this causality. — T Clark
…so naturally I thought that was the direction you might explore. The systems perspective. Causality as so much more than cause and effect. The story of just efficient cause. — apokrisis
That seems odd on what is supposed to be a philosophy board. Again, you introduced constraints as a better approach in the OP. Was the thread meant to tread no further in that direction? — apokrisis
My conclusion - identifying one element as the cause of another depends on where you look. What constitutes the cause is a matter of convention, not fact. It works when you can isolate the elements of the phenomena you are studying at from their environments, e.g. electrons in a physics experiment. It works for certain everyday events at human scale, e.g. if I push the grocery cart it moves. It is a much less useful explanation for most phenomena. My claim is that there are only a limited number of situations where it has Collingwood’s logical efficacy. — T Clark
So often, causality is an important concept in interpersonal relationships where people try to exert control over one another. Often, it's in the form of assigning blame; attributing a single cause is necessary in oder to effectively blame someone for something happening. — baker
People generally love to attempt to simplify interpersonal interactions like that; as if people were mere things, objects, that can (and should) be shoved around. — baker
Another frequent application of single-cause thinking is when one person tries to get another person to do something and assumes that one single command or push should be enough (and that if it isn't it means that the other person is "obstinate", "rebellious", or "stupid"). — baker
Rather than blame, I would more likely say responsibility or accountability. As you note that’s in relation to causality as it applies to human action. I intended to avoid all the complications associated with that by limiting the discussion to non-intentional causality. — T Clark
If I don't understand a word, I Google it.Collingwood's abstruse concept is over my untrained head — Gnomon
Here’s an idea— if you don’t understand a word don’t use it.
I simply construe the term to mean that the conclusions follow logically from the premises. — Gnomon
This is not correct. — T Clark
But my argument would be that the mechanical notion of causality only arises within the context of intentional being. — apokrisis
If I hit a cue ball and it bounces off the bumper and into the eight ball which goes in the corner pocket, what caused the eight ball to move into the pocket? Me? The cue? The cue ball? The pool table? My muscles and bones? The electrons in the outer valence orbital of the atoms at the surface of the ball that exert repulsive force as they approach each other? My mother who gave birth to me? My friends who convinced me to go to the bar? The car that I rode in to get to the bar? The star that created all the elements that make up the pool balls? — T Clark
This quote is much more to the point than the rambling OP of opposition to some vague notion of imparted motion and being.But my argument would be that the mechanical notion of causality only arises within the context of intentional being. — apokrisis
If there was no First Cause, and no continuation of causation, and no explanation for Ontology, then the world is ultimately causeless & meaningless & irrational & absurd. — Gnomon
Ouch! That kind of complexified conjecturing makes my amateur philosopher head hurt. It's so far over my little pointy pate, that I probably shouldn't even comment. Do all those polysyllabic words add-up to agreement or disagreement with my quoted summation (#) of the Argument Against Causation?My argument is instead the one to be found in Anaximander, Peirce and quantum field theory. The Cosmos exists as the constraint on possibility. It emerges not from fundamental intentionality nor from fundamental mechanistic cause but from the fundamental vagueness of unorganised free potential. An essential state of everythingness that then must start to self-cancel until it becomes reduced to some coherently organised somethingness. A realm of inevitable structure. — apokrisis
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