And is the "medium" you speak of conspiratorial thinking, or something else? — Leontiskos

I just suggested watching Owens on Charlie Kirk for two reasons. The first is as a polished example of the new media. Tucker Carlson and Fox News in general turned conspiracy theory into a powerfully profitable and self-sustaining industry. Now you have huge money going into self-organising YouTube communities where the viewers get to be part of the reporting team.

Everyone is tied into a tight circle where the skill at discovering conspiracies improves for all. You are not just passively viewing Fox and its weirdos. You are being drawn into the industry in an active way.

The other thing is then how there is so much information to keep the story going. Every event has so much cell phone footage from so many angles, or citizens sleuths running around interviewing each other, immediately finding all the strange coincidences that are going to be there to be found. With so many involved on the ground, there are swiftly any number of dots for a conspiracy theory to join.

I think that's part of the reason why he got so quiet after seeing his own theories debunked by his own authorities. — Leontiskos

Even months ago, AI gave a lot of shit answers. Good only for a laugh. But now it is becoming very useful for self factchecking.

Of course, you then have to be in the habit of self factchecking. :smile:

Banno feels like he is here to run the cosy introductory philosophy tutorials of his fond memory. That would be why he treats us like confused first year students having to retread the well worn paths of ancient debates. We are allowed to speak, but as tutor, he gets to steer and gently reveal our neophyte errors of thought. We should be warmly appreciative of his condescension. And learn to stick closely to areas where he has already prepared the answers.

What's your point? Are you just acknowledging what I said about background beliefs being involved in our epistemic judgements? — Relativist

The point is clear, I hope - evidence is always equivocal. There is always a point about which folk may disagree.

I contend that more credence should be given to claims that are supported by evidence, than those that are purely speculation. — Relativist

No one would disagree ( :wink: ). At issue is how "supported by evidence" is payed out. From Quine-Duhem, we see that there are always ways to question the evidence. So the issue becomes when questioning the evidence is reasonable, and when it isn't. And it seems there is often no clear clean place at which to draw the line.

Hence,

Plausibility is a factor in epistemic judgement. — Relativist

And not the result of the application of an algorithmic method. I think you see this, but perhaps what's been said here will better articulate it.

Feyerabend's conclusion is that "Anything Goes" in choosing between hypotheses. That's too far. The trouble with "anything goes" is that we are obliged to choose, and so if anything goes, we may as well choose the easiest path, which will be what we already hold true - again, a recipe for confirmation bias. The trouble with "anything goes" is that it will amount to "everything stays the same".

But instead we can admit that the process is fraught with difficulty, and not so clean and clear as some theorists would suppose. Scientific method is not algorithmic, but communal. It is human, involving the interaction of many, many people in an organised and cooperative fashion. I'd argue that this process involves not interfering with the work of others, responding to their claims in a way that is relevant, and doing so publicly; basic liberal virtues. Values not on show in places in this very thread.

Part of that is the issue of demarcation, the separation between science and non-science, which relates to your discussion of conspiracy theories. The idea is that conspiracy theories are not scientific; they do not conform to scientific methods. Now this is I think pretty much toe right sentiment, but given that we are unable to set out what that scientific method is quite as clearly as some suppose, and hence that the difficulty in setting out what counts as a conspiracy theory and what doesn't, a bit of humility might be needed. It won't help to just tell a conspiracy believer that their theory does not match the evidence, because for them it does.

Just noticed an article in the recent Philosophy Now that is germane: Popper, Science & Democracy.

I just suggested watching Owens on Charlie Kirk for two reasons. The first is as a polished example of the new media. — apokrisis

Okay, I will have a look. I generally don't watch conspiratorial material because it causes the algorithm to give me more of the same, and this muddies up my feed (and I don't have a VPN to fully insulate myself). But I'll suck it up for once. :razz:

The other thing is then how there is so much information to keep the story going. Every event has so much cell phone footage from so many angles, or citizens sleuths running around interviewing each other, immediately finding all the strange coincidences that are going to be there to be found. With so many involved on the ground, there are swiftly any number of dots for a conspiracy theory to join. — apokrisis

Fascinating.

Even months ago, AI gave a lot of shit answers. Good only for a laugh. But now it is becoming very useful for self factchecking. — apokrisis

I tend to use it in areas where the programming and the training would tend to produce an accurate response, but I think it is deceptively difficult to gauge its reliability. The manner in which we vet and eventually come to trust an authority turns out to be a rather complex process.

Banno feels like he is here to run the cosy introductory philosophy tutorials of his fond memory. That would be why he treats us like confused first year students having to retread the well worn paths of ancient debates. We are allowed to speak, but as tutor, he gets to steer and gently reveal our neophyte errors of thought. We should be warmly appreciative of his condescension. And learn to stick closely to areas where he has already prepared the answers. — apokrisis

I can vouch for that a hundred times over. Awhile back there was a wild thread where Banno chastised his wayward students, insinuating that the deplorables were forcing him into private message conversations. The thread didn't go well for Banno and had to be closed by the mods, which I ahead of time. :lol:

Your engaging in yet an another conversation about me instead of about my arguments is gratifying. It implies you have no were left to go.

- You've been failing to answer arguments and even posts for months now. No one is holding their breath for you to engage in philosophy. .

Of course! I'll go further: discussing our reasoning with others can help us improve our judgements, by getting additional facts before us, and alternative theories. It forces us to think through our reasoning with more rigor, and to justify the various intermediate judgements that lead to the position we're defending. — Relativist

Okay, I agree.

Good, but do you also agree that if everything is an IBE then there is no intelligibility given that no differentiation is possible? — Leontiskos

Absolutely not. I can't imagine why you'd suggest no differentiation is possible. Do you worry about losing your keys in an interdimensional portal? Do you worry your spouse might be an extra-terrestrial? If you do not differentiate, how can you ever make ANY decision? — Relativist

If everything is an IBE, then what sense does it make to exhort someone to engage in IBE? Or to argue in favor of IBEs?

Okay, good. So would we say that, at least in some cases, there is the real explanation and nominal explanations are better or worse depending on how well they approximate the real explanation? If so, then an IBE is presupposing the ontological existence of an aitia/cause/explanation. — Leontiskos

Yes, to the 1st question (I think).

I don't understand the 2nd. What's the ontological status of descriptions of events in the public sphere? What does it matter? The appropriate objective is truth, and this is irrespective of one's preferred theory of truth, theory of mind, or the metaphysical foundation of reality. — Relativist

Let me put it this way: if some explanations are better and some are worse, then what are they better or worse in relation to?

For example, if I run a 100m dash in 16 seconds and you run it in 13 seconds, by what standard do we say that you did better than I? Isn't it by the standard, "The shorter the time, the better" (which is equivalent to, "The faster, the better")?

1. If there are better and worse explanations, then they must be better or worse relative to some standard
2. The standard is the true explanation
3. The true explanation is not an IBE
4. Therefore, not everything is an IBE

If Sherlock Holmes is working a case then he has any number of candidate theses floating around his head. Some are better than others. Also, something actually happened in reality that he is trying to understand. The best explanation will (arguably*) be the one which most closely approximates the thing that happened in reality. That is what his spectrum of worst/worse/better/best is aiming at.

Note too that there may be a witness who knows exactly what happened. They know the answer to the question that Holmes is asking. I don't think we would call their knowledge an IBE. They have the answer to the question, "What happened here?," and that answer is not an IBE.

My point is that if you try to make everything an IBE, then IBEs make no sense. An inference to the best explanation presupposes the possibility of the real explanation. Depending on our questions and their level of specificity, a single real explanation may not be possible, but in many cases it is possible, and especially so in a theoretical or conceptual sense.

This general problem in abduction is called being "the best of a bad lot". — Relativist

Okay, sure. I don't want to get into that tangent, as I think it might take us too far afield.


* "Arguably" in the sense that we don't have to get into the subtopic of better-relative-to-available-evidence vs. better-relative-to-the-reality-being-investigated.

You've been failing to answer arguments and even posts for months now. — Leontiskos

From you, yes.

Awhile back there was a wild thread where Banno chastised his wayward students, insinuating that the deplorables were forcing him into private message conversations. — Leontiskos

Yes. The advantage of PF over the more focused private chats one might have with one's peers is that it is so wide open and the challenges come from all directions. That's what I like. Having to fend off all possible viewpoints. The uncontrolled element is the greatest part of the appeal.

But to come on PF and find someone fussing about like a prim substitute teacher, trying to make a class of larrikins stick to the kind of syllabus that would have been acceptable to a 1960s Oxbridge don, is a major irritation.

Your engaging in yet an another conversation about me instead of about my arguments is gratifying. It implies you have no were left to go. — Banno

Oh and that is the other annoying thing. Everything truly has to be about him in egocentric fashion. He really is gratified as even being scorned is still being noticed.

And as you say, show us the argument. Earn the respect. Take your chances along with the rest of us.

Everything truly has to be about him in egocentric fashion. — apokrisis

And will continue to be so, as long as you two talk about me rather then the topic at hand.

You don't have to make this a conversation about me. But you choose to. You can stop any time you like.

I didn't start the conversation about me. But I am happy to encourage it.

I didn't start the conversation about me. — Banno

:lol: :lol: :lol:

If I were teaching a logic class I would ask you to provide an argument for your conclusion, "...Therefore, no conspiracy theory is an IBE."

If you reply that some conspiracy theories are IBEs, but this is rare, I would point out that the conspiracy theorist agrees with you. The conspiracy theorist would not be a conspiracy theorist if they thought that conspiracy theories were common or mundane explanations. It is precisely the rarity that they are attracted to. — Leontiskos

I haven't gotten something across to you guys some of my basic contentions:

1) Most of our beliefs are established as subjective inferences to best explanation. Consider the alternatives: few beliefs are established by deduction, and few are basic. What else is there?

Someone who believes the 9/11 destruction of the twin towers was a false flag operation by the US government believes that this best explains the "facts" that he "knows".

But he's made errors in his analysis: errors we can identify by presenting my own IBE. This could entail identifying additional facts, debunking falsehoods he accepts (through another IBE), identifying implausible background assumptions he's making. This would be MY subjective IBE, but if I've done it correctly, I expect it would persuade any rational person to drop their belief in this conspiracy.

If I succeeded at that, you might characterize my argument as an objective reason to reject the theory. I don't characterize it that way, because I'm viewing this in terms of establishing belief. A sound argument listed in a logic textbook, or on an internet forum, has no relevance to anyone unless they read it, understand it, and accept it - thus establishing a belief.

2) A belief established by IBE is rationally justified if done "correctly". I've discussed some aspects of valid analysis . Example: it takes into account all the relevant information known to the person: (we shouldn't cherry pick; we're not omniscient).

3) a belief that has been rationally justified by abduction can be rationally defeated by another IBE (e.g. one that includes previously unknown or overlooked information; undercutting an assumption on the basis of implausibility).
-

One opts that not even God knows what my next question would be?
So if the universal mind cannot have perfect knowledge, we as mere mortals cannot posses it as well.

- At every step of the way if you just starting doing some philosophy and presenting some arguments for your positions the ridicule would dissipate. The reason you are ridiculed is because it is ridiculous to avoid philosophical argument while pretending to be the brilliant magister of TPF.

At issue is how "supported by evidence" is payed out. From Quine-Duhem, we see that there are always ways to question the evidence. So the issue becomes when questioning the evidence is reasonable, and when it isn't. And it seems there is often no clear clean place at which to draw the line. — Banno

I agree. We're discussing IBEs, and doing them rationally. Two reasonable people could reach different conclusions on the same data, because subjective judgement is usually involved. This includes judging what is plausible:

Plausibility is a factor in epistemic judgement.
— Relativist
And not the result of the application of an algorithmic method — Banno

Yes!

Part of that is the issue of demarcation, the separation between science and non-science, which relates to your discussion of conspiracy theories. The idea is that conspiracy theories are not scientific; they do not conform to scientific methods. — Banno

I don't agree with framing it that way - because the issue is epistemology, not science per se. This includes applying epistemology to science, but I'm talking about it more broadly.

Now this is I think pretty much toe right sentiment, but given that we are unable to set out what that scientific method is quite as clearly as some suppose, and hence that the difficulty in setting out what counts as a conspiracy theory and what doesn't, a bit of humility might be needed.

But we could define a "conspiracy theory" using epistemology. But we don't need to, and it could create a red herring - debating both the definition and whether or not it applies in any given case. It's better to just confront a theory directly and demonstrate how the conclusion is unwarranted.

I only brought up conspiracy theories because most of us are aware of what they are, and that there are good reasons to reject them. This was to illustrate the use of an IBE framework to evaluate claims.

It won't help to just tell a conspiracy believer that their theory does not match the evidence, because for them it does.

One can only point out the reasoning flaws. But it becomes a religion for many of them.

1) Most of our beliefs are established as subjective inferences to best explanation. Consider the alternatives: few beliefs are established by deduction, and few are basic. What else is there? — Relativist

You could give a clear definition of deduction and then persuasively argue that, given the large number of beliefs each person holds, very few of them are arrived at via deduction. But I would say that the same thing holds for inference. If we give a clear definition of inference then we will find that, given the large number of beliefs each person holds, very few of them are arrived at via inference. This includes inference to the best explanation. So as noted earlier, it seems that by "inference to the best explanation" you mean something exceedingly broad and also rather vague.

If we are talking about the practical way that most people arrive at beliefs, then I think the best work on the subject is John Henry Newman's An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, where he develops his "illative sense" among other things. If we are talking about this practical matter, then I don't think deduction or inference or basic beliefs are the right answer, especially in isolation.

But he's made errors in his analysis: errors we can identify by presenting my own IBE. This could entail identifying additional facts, debunking falsehoods he accepts (through another IBE), identifying implausible background assumptions he's making. This would be MY subjective IBE, but if I've done it correctly, I expect it would persuade any rational person to drop their belief in this conspiracy. — Relativist

But my argument is to point out that this is no longer abduction but the full Peircean reasoning cycle - and so the one that hopes to arrive at the most objective possible answer, given that nothing can be absolutely known and just placed safely enough beyond reasonable doubt.

So if someone has a sketchy conspiratorial IBE, then your offering of further deductive consequences and their checkable facts is what ought to expose the conspiracy and give inductive confirmation for your own preferred interpretation.

However do we expect people to be so rational that they can indeed change their “beliefs” when confronted by a more organised causal narrative?

Conspiracy theorists are usually invested in some shared community narrative, as in the establishment always lies and so - IBE - must have good reasons for all the cover-ups we see. And the fairly objective truth is that governments and corporations and the elite do routinely lie - even though it may be for good intentions or because it makes their lives simpler.

So if you want to argue a counter-narrative, it has to engage with the conspirator’s structure of belief on what may be its own well-structured level. A third party might find your IBE to be an argument from political naivety even if your family member’s IBE is the more sloppily developed and unlikely for what seem like commonsense reasons.

So yes. IBE is how we always have to get the game going. If catshit is found on the carpet, we will jump to the obvious conclusion. The cat did it rather than the CIA or little green men.

But abduction is simply the first step of a properly rational response. To check it out in scientific fashion, we need the pincer movement of constructing a theory - a complete causal model - and then tying that to the inductive confirmation. Adding sufficient correlation to our story about a causation.

Circling back to Hume, this shows that “only correlations” is the feature and not the bug of pragmatic reasoning. It is not the problem that is defeating our hopes of truth and making “everything sociology” as our dopey PoMo teaching assistant would have it. Instead, it is the business of making measurements in a way that could even secure the causal model we have deduced.

Measuring the world is an art. Peirce well knew this given that his paid job was setting measurement standards for what became the US National Bureau of Standards.

What can count as a fact is its own kettle of fish. So even correlations are epistemically subjective. On the same level as our causal theories.

Some fool might claim it an objective fact that Australia's highest mountain is Mount Kosciuszko, standing at 2,228 meters above sea level. But who determines even the level of the sea when that is always changing by even meters. And bits are always crumbling off mountains.

So correlations are only as good as the theoretical presumptions being built into the constructions of the facts as in fact some set of logical counterfactuals.

We build the measuring instrument. It is essentially a switch. The switch either flipped or it didn’t and now we have our reading. A number on a dial. We can plug that into our probabilistic model and add a sigma confidence interval to properly secure its status as a correlative fact. It can be deemed as true for all practical purposes.

So Hume is always being trotted out. But that is simply a useful point to kick off the tutorial. Most of us have heard it all many times before. Only the teaching assistant seems to never learn from the regular rehearsal of the same old arguments.

If everything is an IBE, then what sense does it make to exhort someone to engage in IBE? Or to argue in favor of IBEs? — Leontiskos

It frames a discussion. Have you never encountered a guy who makes some assertion, then says, "prove me wrong"? This establishes an unreachable goalpost. By ackowledging our beliefs are warranted by abduction, a discussion is feasible, and can be productive for both sides. Productive in various ways: undercutting the other guys belief ("proving" him wrong, in an abductive sense); or simply helping both sides to understand the other's point of view - when both positions are defensible.

Let me put it this way: if some explanations are better and some are worse, then what are they better or worse in relation to? — Leontiskos

In relation to each other, but based on thorough, valid reasoning and more plausible assumptions, that are least ad hoc. Extreme example: misplacing your car keys vs the keys having been sucked into an interdimensional portal. The latter depends on implausible assumptions.

1. If there are better and worse explanations, then they must be better or worse relative to some standard
2. The standard is the true explanation
3. The true explanation is not an IBE
4. Therefore, not everything is an IBE — Leontiskos

The IDEAL is a true explanation, but since we don't have direct access to truth, it can't be the standard(not directly). Rather, we should apply truth directed approaches: valid reasoning (avoiding contradiction; recognizing entailments), meeting the necessary explanatory scope, considering the plausibility of background assumptions, avoid force fitting data to the hypothesis,...

The process is analogous to being on a jury, charged with weighing evidence to reach a verdict. Your vote is your IBE.

If Sherlock Holmes is working a case then he has any number of candidate theses floating around his head. Some are better than others. Also, something actually happened in reality that he is trying to understand. The best explanation will (arguably*) be the one which most closely approximates the thing that happened in reality. That is what his spectrum of worst/worse/better/best is aiming at. — Leontiskos

Again, we don't have access to the truth. It could very well be that the available evidence supports a false conclusion more than (the unknown) true one. But the evidence is all we have to go on, and (more often than not) it will be true (if we use good, consistent standards)

My point is that if you try to make everything an IBE, then IBEs make no sense. An inference to the best explanation presupposes the possibility of the real explanation. Depending on our questions and their level of specificity, a single real explanation may not be possible, but in many cases it is possible, and especially so in a theoretical or conceptual sense. — Leontiskos

Yes, an IBE presupposes there is a true explanation.

Yes, a single, specific real explanation isn't always possible. A more general explanation may still be possible, or at least some may be ruled out. It can be appropriate to reserve judgement.

So if you want to argue a counter-narrative, it has to engage with the conspirator’s structure of belief on what may be its own well-structured level. — apokrisis

That's right. Doesn't that mean that you have to recognize the plausibility of the "conspirator's" narrative? Which is a long way from attempting to "debunk" anything. It seems to me that it actually means putting one's own non-conspiracy narrative at risk. Starting from the belief that the narrative is obviously wrong, is adopting a stance from which it is impossible to do this.

One should also consider whether constructing and presenting an argument may be an ill-advised approach, because it puts the "conspirator" on the defensive, which makes it more difficult for them to recognize the weaknesses and implausibility of their theory. Rationality may be the best guide to truth, but it is not always the best way to persuade people. Recognising and taking into account emotions and biases may be the only effective approach. Sometimes, the best policy is not to engage, but to change the subject.

By ackowledging our beliefs are warranted by abduction, a discussion is feasible, and can be productive for both sides. Productive in various ways: undercutting the other guys belief ("proving" him wrong, in an abductive sense); or simply helping both sides to understand the other's point of view - when both positions are defensible. — Relativist

Perhaps it is necessary to bear in mind that it is possible for two incompatible interpretations of data to be right, or at least not wrong.

Yes, a single, specific real explanation isn't always possible. A more general explanation may still be possible, or at least some may be ruled out. It can be appropriate to reserve judgement. — Relativist

Yes. But we seem to prefer to reach a conclusion, even when we don't need to decide. Perhaps we just don't like the uncertainty of indecision.

Most of our beliefs are established as subjective inferences to best explanation. Consider the alternatives: few beliefs are established by deduction, and few are basic. What else is there? — Relativist

This is a good approximation, perhaps.

We do make inferences, sure. The question I would bring back to you is that of what makes one inference "the best" among those available. It need not be the case that one inference is the best explanation we have - indeed, it is more common that there are multiple inferences that satisfy the evidence at hand.

And yet we are often obliged to choose. The evidence is insufficient for the choice to be determined, so there are other things at play, including our other beliefs, and the practices we share with those around us. Our epistemic choices are guided by more than evidence; they include the whole form of the life in which we are engaged.

And here Feyerabend's thoughts come in to play. What he shows is that sometimes we infer, not to the best explanation, but to some other explanation - and that this can be a very good thing. You will come across many examples in his book, so I will not list them here.

Now the problem with calling inference to the best explanation, abduction, and listing it alongside deduction and induction, is the air of logical determinism that is given to what is in reality a practice fraught with ambiguity and guesswork. There's a lot going on here that is plainly irrational.

And this brings us back to Hume. His talk of “custom and habit” reminds us that much of our reasoning isn’t strictly rational at all — it’s rooted in the patterns we’ve come to expect, both individually and collectively. What Hume saw as psychological, Wittgenstein turned into grammar, and Feyerabend showed as scientific practice: we act, speak, and infer within a shared way of life. Causation, explanation, belief — all of these belong as much to what we do as to what we think.

You could give a clear definition of deduction and then persuasively argue that, given the large number of beliefs each person holds, very few of them are arrived at via deduction. But I would say that the same thing holds for inference. If we give a clear definition of inference then we will find that, given the large number of beliefs each person holds, very few of them are arrived at via inference. This includes inference to the best explanation. So as noted earlier, it seems that by "inference to the best explanation" you mean something exceedingly broad and also rather vague. — Leontiskos

I do mean this broadly, and I don't claim that simply being an "IBE" makes it a justifiable belief.

It's reported that Trump has declared Portland Oregon a "war zone". I believe that he did say that. It's been reported in multiple sources, and I saw a video in which he made that statement. I could be wrong: I have not checked the sources, and haven't verified the video wasn't a deepfake. But IMO, the best explanation for the evidence is that he really did say that, despite the fact that the statement itself is implausible. We don't typically think through these things in this detail, but they're implicit in accepting something as fact. So in this case, I'd argue that my belief that Trump made the statement is warranted, despite the fact that it's possibly false. What other basis could there be to claim this is warranted, other than a valid IBE?

By contrast, I heard from one source* that Trump based his "war zone" comment on watching a video of riots in Portland that occurred in 2022. Suppose that's true. He made an IBE, but failed to do any due diligence to validate that what is saw does actually reflect current conditions, so I'd say it's an unwarranted belief on his part.

____
* I'm not fully buying this yet, since it's just one source. So I'm reserving judgement.

If we are talking about the practical way that most people arrive at beliefs, then I think the best work on the subject is John Henry Newman's An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, where he develops his "illative sense" among other things. If we are talking about this practical matter, then I don't think deduction or inference or basic beliefs are the right answer, especially in isolation. — Leontiskos

I found the essay online, and asked Claude (AI) to summarize the chapter on "The Sanction of the Illative Sense". Here's a link to the summary, also pasted below:

Main Argument
Newman introduces the concept of the "Illative Sense" - a natural faculty of judgment that allows us to reach certainty in concrete matters where formal logic alone cannot take us. He argues against both extreme skeptics who deny we can have certitude, and rationalists who believe only formal logic can justify beliefs.
Key Points
1. The Nature of the Illative Sense

It's the mind's ability to judge correctly in concrete, real-world matters
Similar to how we exercise judgment in morality (Aristotle's phronesis), aesthetics, or social conduct
Each person must exercise it individually - it's personal, not mechanical
It operates throughout reasoning: at the start (identifying first principles), during arguments (weighing evidence), and at conclusions (determining when proof is sufficient)

2. Why We Need It

Formal logic deals with abstract propositions, but life requires judgments about concrete realities
The gap between probable evidence and certain conclusions can't be bridged by syllogisms alone
We naturally possess certitude about many things despite lacking mathematically rigorous proofs

3. Its Legitimacy

Newman argues we should accept our mental faculties as we find them, just as we accept physical nature
The widespread human capacity for certitude proves it's not a mistake or weakness
God gave us these faculties, and they're adequate for discovering truth when properly used
4. Practical Applications
Newman illustrates how the Illative Sense works in historical inquiry, showing how respected scholars (Niebuhr, Grote, Lewis, etc.) reach different conclusions from the same evidence because they operate from different assumptions, viewpoints, and judgments about what constitutes reasonable interpretation.
Philosophical Significance
Newman is defending common-sense certainty against both radical skepticism and narrow rationalism, arguing that legitimate knowledge requires personal judgment guided by developed intellectual habits, not just formal proofs. — Claude

Nothing he says conflicts with my claims. He focuses only on deduction, makes vague claims about "common-sense" and asserts that it's fine to accept the product of theses senses. Abduction is consistent with "common sense", but is better positioned for criticism, correction, and debating conflicting views where two individuals' "common sense" leads them to different conclusions. Philosophers of history that came after Newman point to abduction as a key process of historians (see this). Abductive conclusions by historians are sources of debate among them.

But a critical difference is that Newman doesn't discuss warrant - justifying the belief (as far as I can tell). He just assumes the "illiative sense" is reliable.

It seems to me that it actually means putting one's own non-conspiracy narrative at risk. Starting from the belief that the narrative is obviously wrong, is adopting a stance from which it is impossible to do this. — Ludwig V

Exactly.

One should also consider whether constructing and presenting an argument may be an ill-advised approach, because it puts the "conspirator" on the defensive, which makes it more difficult for them to recognize the weaknesses and implausibility of their theory. — Ludwig V

Or unfortunately, any argument won't "compute" as there is not that kind of disciplined structure in the heads of those you might want to argue it out with.

And in general, society is built more on folk not asking the probing questions. Of themselves, let alone others. Religion, culture, politics and economics all want to place their own limits on rational inquiry. There is much that must be taken simply on faith and belief for society to continue to function smoothly in some customary fashion.

Sometimes, the best policy is not to engage, but to change the subject. — Ludwig V

Which is why forums like PF would have value. There are now so many triggering subjects out there in the general population that it is nice to have the kind of unguarded and non-defensive discussions we have seen in threads such as this.

I jest of course! :smile:

By ackowledging our beliefs are warranted by abduction, a discussion is feasible, and can be productive for both sides. Productive in various ways: undercutting the other guys belief ("proving" him wrong, in an abductive sense); or simply helping both sides to understand the other's point of view - when both positions are defensible. — Relativist

Perhaps it is necessary to bear in mind that it is possible for two incompatible interpretations of data to be right, or at least not wrong. — Ludwig V

Absolutely, and I've acknowledged this in several posts.

Yes, a single, specific real explanation isn't always possible. A more general explanation may still be possible, or at least some may be ruled out. It can be appropriate to reserve judgement. — Relativist

Yes. But we seem to prefer to reach a conclusion, even when we don't need to decide. Perhaps we just don't like the uncertainty of indecision. — Ludwig V

I agree, but it can still be debated as to whether or not one is warranted (rationally justified) in believing that conclusion.

But we could define a "conspiracy theory" using epistemology. — Relativist

What I've read, including the paper I've already cited, leads me to think that the term functions in the way offten described by Bernard Wooley in Yes, Minister

It’s one of those irregular verbs, Minister:
I have an independent mind,
you are eccentric,
he is round the twist.

Or in our case,

I question the official story,
you believe in conspiracies,
he’s a paranoid lunatic.

The epistemic issue here is that it's again not just the evidence that is being used, but the background against which that evidence is being evaluated. Things are not so clear cut as they might seem.

Perhaps it is necessary to bear in mind that it is possible for two incompatible interpretations of data to be right, or at least not wrong. — Ludwig V

Just so.

If we are talking about the practical way that most people arrive at beliefs, then I think the best work on the subject is John Henry Newman's An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, where he develops his "illative sense" among other things. — Leontiskos

Thanks for the pointer. Newman and Peirce were saying much the same thing. Peirce developed it more broadly as the mathematical logic – introducing his sign of illation – that then justified his pragmatic approach to truth.

There is Peirce's On the Algebra of Logic as one reference.

But then I also really like Kauffmann's teasing paper, The Mathematics of Charles Sanders Peirce.

it is more common that there are multiple inferences that satisfy the evidence at hand. — Banno

I agree, but when that is the case - we aren't warranted in choosing only one of them. But we would be warranted in excluding those that don't fit the evidence so well.

And yet we are often obliged to choose. The evidence is insufficient for the choice to be determined, so there are other things at play, including our other beliefs, and the practices we share with those around us. Our epistemic choices are guided by more than evidence; they include the whole form of the life in which we are engaged. — Banno

I agree, and I alluded to that when I mentioned the role of our background beliefs. Because they are beliefs, we are treating them a factual (truths) - at least to the extent that the beliefs are categorical (not expressions of certainty). This is perfectly fine most of the time. We should strive for consistency in our beliefs. There are times when we should question our background beliefs, but it's impractical to do so constantly.

And here Feyerabend's thoughts come in to play. What he shows is that sometimes we infer, not to the best explanation, but to some other explanation - and that this can be a very good thing. You will come across many examples in his book, so I will not list them here. — Banno

Like Galileo? Copernicus? As I see it, they are simply dropping the background assumptions of the then-current conventional wisdom, and developing new hypotheses freed of those constraints. I join Feyerabend in applauding that. The question is: how and when should we apply that? I suggest "the how" is in terms of reconsidering certain background beliefs. The "when" is...I don't know, but it can't be constantly. Similarly, scientists DO often operate within the current conventional wisdom of their field, and I expect this is more often than not.

Now the problem with calling inference to the best explanation, abduction, and listing it alongside deduction and induction, is the air of logical determinism that is given to what is in reality a practice fraught with ambiguity and guesswork. There's a lot going on here that is plainly irrational. — Banno

Either you're misunderstanding me, or I'm misunderstanding you. But you seem to be inferring that IBE determines an answer, just like deduction does. I don't think that at all (see the first point in this post).

Sure, there's ambiguity and guesswork, and we should be honest about when we are guessing and when there is ambiguity.

I have said an IBE is not necessarily rational. But it can be. Again, I'm discussing belief: my position is that most beliefs are established by IBE, but only a subset of these are warranted beliefs. We often draw conclusions based on irrational reasons. The IBE model provides a framework for discussion between people with different views, a discussion that can expose irrationality on either side.

You just seem to be objecting to use of the term. Don't use it, if you don't want to. But when I refer to something as a "conspiracy theory", I have a certain sort of epistemic framework in mind that renders it irrational. We could discuss this further in another thread, but it seems moot to the points I'm trying to make here.

Things are not so clear cut as they might seem. — Banno

Or instead, the subjective basis of our cognitive projects is stating the bleeding obvious. We can move swiftly on to the how and the why when it comes to digging ourselves out of this mire.

We are no longer animals as we now reason at a collective social level. But then beyond that everyday manufacturing of consent, we can even transcend "sociology" by cultivating the habits of pragmatic inquiry.

Anglo logicism was of course another story of an early enthusiasm for logic chopping and reductionist metaphysics way over-shooting the mark. It needed a Jesus figure in a flawed Wittgenstein who first sinned and then repented. Sort of was working his way back to pragmatism, but in confused bits and scraps, such was the horror of being caught out again by a totalising enterprise.

Peirce – in the paper I just cited – set off on the right foot as he began his logical investigations at the level of neurobiology. The new psychological research of his day on how nervous systems form their habits of interpretance. This just was starting from the right place as evolution invented thinking of any kind first.

I have said an IBE is not necessarily rational. But it can be. — Relativist

Good. Then we are agreed that abduction, considered as inference to the "best" explanation, does not determine one explanation, and is not itself a rational process. Do we also agree that as a result it doesn't serve to answer Humes Scepticism?

And yes, I am discussing the use of the term, and so its meaning. What I would bring out is that it is not so easy as some might suppose to set out what is a conspiracy theory and what isn't. That the detail is important.

Or one might accept some doctrine as the ultimate truth, and then save oneself the trouble of thinking by simply lambasting any objections. That works, too.