Thanks for the pointer. Newman and Peirce were saying much the same thing. Peirce developed it more broadly as the mathematical logic – introducing his sign of illation – that then justified his pragmatic approach to truth. — apokrisis
Good. Then we are agreed that abduction, considered as inference to the "best" explanation, does not determine one explanation, and is not itself a rational process. Do we also agree that as a result it doesn't serve to answer Humes Scepticism — Banno
Are there NO easy cases, in your opinion?And yes, I am discussing the use of the term, and so its meaning. What I would bring out is that it is not so easy as some might suppose to set out what is a conspiracy theory and what isn't. That the detail is important. — Banno
Well, I won't disagree, but point out that "the best" remains ill-defined. If we are in agreement as to which explanation is the best, then we should accept it; but here, "the best" might just be "the one we accept"...Do you agree that inference to the best explanation can warrant a belief? This of course is only if it was done rationally. — Relativist
:blush: Pretty much. Welcome to philosophical analysis.Are there NO easy cases, in your opinion? — Relativist
"The best" is always the one we accept. But if the ensuing belief is warranted, that's all that matters. There's isn't a recipe for warrant.Well, I won't disagree, but point out that "the best" remains ill-defined. If we are in agreement as to which explanation is the best, then we should accept it; but here, "the best" might just be "the one we accept"... — Banno
Isn't "warranted" just another way of saying "best"? If it's best, then it's warranted, and if it is the one warranted move, then it's the best?But if the ensuing belief is warranted, that's all that matters. — Relativist
Hume's scepticism — Banno
No. Being warranted means to be rationally justified.Isn't "warranted" just another way of saying "best"? — Banno
Is your aim here to understand Hume, and then to move on to Kant's response? that is, are you after an exegesis, or are you looking for broad answers? It seems to me that you have a pretty good grasp of both Hume and Kant. — Banno
In Wittgenstein, those “necessary conditions” become grammatical rules rather than transcendental structures: not timeless features of mind, but conventions of our shared linguistic practice. In Davidson, the unity of apperception becomes the principle of interpretive coherence: understanding others and the world depends on fitting utterances and actions into a rational, causal, and linguistic web. And in Feyerabend, even that web becomes plural — our patterns of causation and justification are practices that can vary across scientific paradigms. — Banno
We seem to be circling. Being warranted means to be rationally justified, and something is rationally justified if it is warranted. The best explanations are the ones which are rationally justified, and those are the ones that are warranted, and they are the ones we accept. A subjective best inference may not be warranted, but then it would not be the best inference, and so not justified, and not the best.No. Being warranted means to be rationally justified. — Relativist
So what would Wittgenstein's response to Hume's scepticism be? — JuanZu
Can you explain a little about that in relation to Hume's scepticism? — JuanZu
Here's your error. The "best" in an IBE is not necesarily warranted (rationally justified). It just means it was chosen as "best" because it was subjectively judged to be better than alternatives that were considered.The best explanations are the ones which are rationally justified, — Banno
Here's your error. The "best" in an IBE is not necesarily warranted (rationally justified). It just means it was chosen as "best" because it was subjectively judged to be better than alternatives that were considered. — Relativist
So an inference to the best explanation is actually an inference to any explanation? — Banno
At issue is finding a solution to Hume's scepticism. That is, how we can move from a finite set of observations to the "objectively best" general conclusion. We know that this is not something that can be done by a valid deduction. — Banno
Seems to me that JuanZu is pointing to the prima facie discrepancy between our being confident in a belief based on being "associated with a vivid impression" and a generalisation that is inferred therefrom. I'd understood that as much the same as Popper's basic statements. Hume didn't have a conception of the Duhem-Quine thesis, of course, so took "vivid impressions" as incontrovertible. I don;t see that we could maintain such a thing nowadays.In Hume, legitimate beliefs exist. They occur in a process of recurrent association. A belief is legitimate when it is associated with a vivid impression. For example, the belief that one object will move after another is based on past experience of their constant conjunction. Hume concluded that fundamental beliefs, such as the existence of an external world or the existence of the self, are not rationally justifiable but are legitimate because they are the result of experience and custom. — JuanZu
Hume didn't have a conception of the Duhem-Quine thesis, of course, so took "vivid impressions" as incontrovertible. I don;t see that we could maintain such a thing nowadays. — Banno
Charles Sanders Peirce challenged David Hume's skepticism about induction by reconceiving the purpose of inductive reasoning and framing it as a self-correcting process of inquiry. He argued that Hume's critique was based on a flawed, static view of induction, failing to grasp its long-term, statistical nature within a community of scientific investigators.
Hume's problem can be summarized by two points:
Inductive reasoning is not grounded in deductive logic; it is a "probabilistic leap of faith".
We cannot rationally justify the belief that the future will resemble the past.
Peirce's objections to Hume's skepticism include:
The long-run statistical justification of induction: For Peirce, the validity of induction does not rest on guaranteeing a single conclusion. Instead, it is justified by its statistical reliability over the long run. The scientific process, as a collective and ongoing endeavor, employs induction to correct its errors over time.
A "psychological" vs. "real" doubt: Peirce argued that Hume's skepticism relied on a "paper doubt," an artificial pretense of questioning everything. In contrast, Peirce's philosophy of pragmatism asserted that genuine doubt is triggered by genuine surprise or a disruption of a settled habit of belief. Since scientists have no genuine doubt that inductive reasoning produces valuable results, they are justified in continuing to use it.
Rejection of the search for absolute certainty: Peirce accepted that induction does not provide certain knowledge, but he argued that this is not its goal. The purpose of inquiry is not to reach absolute certainty, but rather to fix belief and approach the truth over time. He saw the rationalist search for absolute certainty through deduction as a futile dream.
The distinction between abduction, deduction, and induction: Peirce refined the traditional view of induction by splitting it into two distinct parts: abduction (generating hypotheses) and inductive confirmation (testing those hypotheses). For Peirce, induction is not a standalone method but part of a three-step cycle of scientific reasoning.
In summary, Peirce’s pragmatic perspective reframed the problem of induction. Instead of seeking a rational justification for why a single inductive inference should be trusted, he focused on the practical and statistical reliability of the inductive process as a whole. This process is used by a community of inquirers to progressively refine their beliefs over time, even if absolute certainty remains elusive.
I don't see anyone here suggesting extreme scepticism - including Hume. His point seems to be pretty much the one you are now making.This doesn't imply we should all adopt extreme skepticism. — Relativist
We cannot rationally justify the belief that the future will resemble the past.
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