I admit that I am groping around in the dark where views about essential properties are concerned. — Clarendon

Okay, fair enough.

I suppose that if someone says humans are essentially physical and essentially conscious, that's consistent with what's of intrinsic value about us being something that is essentially not physical. And so I think I can agree with someone who says that humans are essentially physical and essentially conscious. — Clarendon

I think that's right.

I am a human, but I do not think I am essentially a human.

...

Someone who says that we - the things that are of intrinsic moral value - are essentially physical and essentially conscious would be saying that consciousness is an essential feature of physical things. — Clarendon

Regarding these points, let's look at (1) (emphasis added):

1. If an object is intrinsically morally valuable, then it is morally valuable in virtue of some/all of its essential properties. — Clarendon

Suppose object X is essentially conscious and essentially physical. If physical things are not essentially morally valuable, and yet conscious things are essentially morally valuable, then the question of whether object X is morally valuable turns on the matter of whether we employ "some" or "all" within (1). If we use "some" then X is morally valuable, whereas if we use "all" then X is not morally valuable.

(Of course, the substratum problem rears its head here as well, for one might object that, if the "all" interpretation is true and humans are essentially physical and essentially conscious, then this proposition must be false: <physical things are not essentially morally valuable AND conscious things are essentially morally valuable>. Or in other words: the whole set of propositions is of course mutually interacting.)

Perhaps something can be intrinsically morally valuable due to answering to a concept and the moral value supervene on something essential to the concept rather than the thing itself. — Clarendon

Perhaps. I would want more detail on how the "definitional" approach and the "metaphysical" approach diverge or converge.

But even so, we can simply run the thought experiment where we ourselves are concerned and simply remove any and all of those features that our moral value is proposed to be supervening on and see if it remains.

For example, if my intrinsic moral value is claimed to be supervening on the fact I am a human, then I can simply imagine finding out that I am not one (as I did above) and see if this affects my intrinsic moral worth. — Clarendon

Yes, that seems right to me.

As it does not — Clarendon

I'm not so sure about this myself.

we still arrive at the conclusion that we are not physical things — Clarendon

I think it all goes back to "some" versus "all." Aristotle would say that the dignity proper to a human being does not derive from physicality per se, and yet that humans are nevertheless essentially physical beings.

Of course we must ask what is happening on a mind/body dualism view, such as your own. This seems to turn on the matter of how we adjudicate the question of whether we are essentially physical/bodily. If we use "all" in (1) then the question is answered. In that case we cannot be essentially physical if we have moral worth. If we use "some" in (1) then the mind/body dualist must search out some other argument for why we are not essentially physical.

Hmm I'm not disagreeing with you, but my comments stand. It may be that people don't 'agree' with this, but like noting the sky is blue - there are arguments, but it's blue (how and why are the arguments to be had). There are (Banno is getting toward this, although I seem to recollect he does think some form of morality can be objectified just not intrinsically) no good candidates for discussion when it comes to intrinsic moral value. All arguments fall away as soon as the human mind is removed from the picture. Some weak arguments for animals expressing moral behaviour but that doesn't seem at all deliberative or, indeed, 'moral' in the sense of some extra fact about reasoning beyond impulse and risk assessment. I do conceded i'm no animal behaviourist, but that seems to be the overall takeaway from those discussions.

My argument, in helping itself to the notion of intrinsic value, does not commit me to any particular view about those ontological commitments, I think. — Clarendon

No, I don't think it does. But as I see it, that's weakness. There's nothing to appeal to which could give an intrinsic type of quality. I think.

However, though a physical thing's shape and size and location can change, it doesn't seem possible for it not to have a shape, size or location. — Clarendon

But think of a photon.

What bothers me about your argument is the "hedgehog" - we cannot infer hedgehog conclusions from non-hedgehog premises. If that we are non-physical things is the conclusion of a deduction, then that conclusion must be present somewhere int he assumptions of the argument. You've built in to your argument that anything whose intrinsic value supervenes on consciousness is non-physical.

I think the talk of essences distracts from that basic problem. The Aristotelian idea of an essence - "that which makes something what it is" - vergers on useless. If the argument could be reworked in model terms, using necessary properties rather than essences, the issue might be made clearer.

I'll leave you to it.

As it is often put, a valid deductive argument extracts the implications of its premises. That's its function. I assume that it is no vice in an argument that it does this, but the point of such arguments.

Where a vice may arise is if one of the premises asserts the conclusion (although this would not by itself render the argument invalid - 'T, therefore T' is valid - so much as uninformative). But it seems to me that none of the premises of my argument assert the conclusion. And so if the conclusion follows from the premises, then nothing has been gotten out that was not put in. The argument will simply have successfully shown us what was implicit in what our reason already tells us.

For example, the claim that -


1. If an object is intrinsically morally valuable, then it is morally valuable in virtue of some/all of its essential properties.

- does not assert that no physical thing has consciousness as a property (and so does not beg the question of what kind of a thing our minds are).

Likewise -

2. Our minds are intrinsically morally valuable objects

does not assert it either. Both premises, taken by themselves, are entirely consistent with the thesis that we are physical things.

3. Conclusion: therefore the objects that are our minds are morally valuable in virtue of some/all of their essential properties

As this just follows deductively from 1 and 2, this is not question begging (for neither 1 nor 2 are question begging).

This -

4. Our minds are (plausibly) intrinsically morally valuable because they bear conscious states

is a neutral premise too. It does not assert that no physical thing can bear conscious states.

This -

5. Conclusion: therefore the objects that are our minds have bearing conscious states as one of their essential properties.

is entailed by 3 and 4 and so cannot possibly be question begging unless a premise that preceded it is.

This -

5. Consciousness is not an essential property of physical objects

is not question begging either. Indeed, I think most physicalists about the mind would accept it, for they do not typically argue that it is definitive of a physical object that it can bear conscious states, but make the much more modest claim that it is possible for physical objects to bear conscious states. This premise also seems independently verifiable by reason - it is prima facie implausible to think consciousness is a defining feature of a physical thing. (Even if there is disagreement over exactly what a physical things defining features are, consciousness seems clearly not to be among the plausible candidates).

And this -

6. Conclusion: therefore, the objects that are our minds are not physical objects

follows logically. And so 6 does not contain more than was in the premises and the premises whose implication it extracts are not question begging.

Maybe that's wrong and it does beg the question against the physicalist about the mind - but I don't think it does at this stage. I think the average physicalist about the mind would accept all the premises. Perhaps upon learning what their combined implication is they might set about trying to challenge one of the premises (although I personally think that would be question begging....), but that'd be a burden or cost or embarrassment given they each seem independently plausible.

But think of a photon. — Banno

I am not sure I can, not unless I am being asked to think of a very tiny shaped thing. But anyway, I think this misses the point - which is that whatever features are proposed as being definitive of a physical thing, they're not going to include consciousness. And that's really all my argument needs. Precisely what is definitive of a physical thing can be left open, then.

I think the talk of essences distracts from that basic problem. The Aristotelian idea of an essence - "that which makes something what it is" - vergers on useless. If the argument could be reworked in model terms, using necessary properties rather than essences, the issue might be made clearer. — Banno

I do not see what you're getting at here. We could talk of intrinsic properties instead - the point is just that intrinsic moral value supervenes on intrinsic properties (which seems analytic). It's not clear to me that introducing necessity could make anything clearer, given the exact relationship between necessity and intrinsic properties seems open to some dispute.

But let's say - and I am not convinced this is true - that an object's essential (or intrinsic, if one prefers) properties are properties it has of necessity. Then all that would mean where my argument is concerned is that we are necessarily not physical things.

As it is often put, a valid deductive argument extracts the implications of its premises. That's its function. I assume that it is no vice in an argument that it does this, but the point of such arguments... — Clarendon

Great post. :up:

Well, I suppose my point is that the moral premises of my argument are very strong.

Someone who denies that anything has intrinsic moral value would also have to deny that anything has extrinsic moral value as well (as extrinsic moral value presupposes intrinsic moral value - not everything can be extrinsically morally valuable, for instance).

But that means denying intrinsic moral value means being a moral nihilist.

Now, of course a moral nihilist would reject my argument as unsound. But then all I'm going to do is say that my argument establishes the truth of this claim:

Either moral nihilism is true, or our minds are not physical things.

That, I think, is quite an astonishing conclusion! I think we can safely say that the vast bulk of physicalists about the mind have no idea they need to affirm moral nihilism if they're to be consistent!

That's a good line of thinking, well put.

Where a vice may arise is if one of the premises asserts the conclusion — Clarendon

We must take care here - if an argument is valid, then asserting the premises taken together is just asserting the conclusion. Nothing novel comes from a deductive argument. So if your argument is valid, then the conclusion is present in the assumptions. (added: that's the generic flaw in arguments for the existence of a god).

So, where?

Well,

Look at the critical premise: Premise: “Physical essential properties (shape, size, location) are poor candidates; intrinsic moral value plausibly supervenes on consciousness or rationality.”
There's an implicit assumption: "Any essential property that grounds intrinsic moral value cannot belong to a purely physical thing." This is already what the conclusion asserts: that intrinsic moral value depends on non-physical features, therefore, the bearer (us) is non-physical.

The argument is valid only because this assumption is built in, even if it’s unstated. Without it, the argument would only show that intrinsic moral value depends on consciousness, but not that consciousness is non-physical.

_______
There's a difference between imagining a photon and thinking about one. Photons are considered to be physical. Yet they do not have a determinate location, nor a size, nor a shape... unless you are willing to interpret those terms quite broadly.


_______
Added: I really should emphasis that I think your intuition that values are not physical is correct. But your argument can't demonstrate that it is correct.

This is a very interesting and creative argument. I will target points where it might be vulnerable. In short, I think a physicalist could challenge (1) & (2) of your argument because (1) & (2)'s plausibility shifts based on different readings of "intrinsically morally valuable."

1. If an object is intrinsically morally valuable, then it is morally valuable in virtue of some/all of its essential properties. — Clarendon

There are at least two readings of "intrinsically morally valuable" that affect the plausibility of premise (1). You seem to take this premise as analytical, with "an object being intrinsically morally valuable" meaning "value grounded in intrinsic (or essential) properties of that object."

However, one could also read it as "valuable for its own sake." This reading is often assumed as the same as the first, but I think they are distinguishable. In this second sense, premise (1) is not definitionally true. An object may be valuable for its own sake, but this value being based on extrinsic properties of that object. For instance, the pen used by Abraham Lincoln to sign the Emancipation Proclamation might be valuable "for its own sake," being something we should respect and consider when we act, but this value is based on its extrinsic property of serving a role in an important historical event. Thus, it seems at least a coherent view that objects could be taken into consideration for "their own sake" without this being grounded in their essential properties.

Still, I think you are quite explicit that the meaning you intend is the first ("essential property") for premise (1), but I believe premise (2), in turn, is only clearly plausible given the second ("for its own sake") reading. And the physicalist that is also a moral realist could then insist on the second reading to avoid the force of your argument.

2. Our minds are intrinsically morally valuable objects — Clarendon

The physicalist might accept that our minds are valuable "for their own sakes" without committing to these being based on essential properties of the mind. What is intuitive about premise (2) is that our minds should be taken into moral consideration for their own sakes. In contrast, that the moral value of our minds is grounded in their essential properties does not strike me as nearly as initially plausible. So the strength of premise (2) might be affected by a conflation the two different readings.

Just as one possible example, "having a phenomenal past," that is, having had phenomenal experiences in the past, might be necessary for us being moral ends in ourselves, but "having a phenomenal past" does not seem essential to a mind. There was a point where a mind came to be when it had no phenomenal past: when it first came into existence! If true (which is very debatable), there is a non-essential property that determines intrinsic value "for its own sake." This example is likely controversial and would need much more defense, but I think it shows that it is a coherent idea that the value of our minds "for their own sake" could be grounded in something non-essential.

Given the stipulated, essentialist sense you use, the physicalist could just deny (2) because this premise is less plausible than it seems when untangled, while still avoiding the bitter taste of moral nihilism.

In either case, again, a very interesting argument.

Thank you for your very thought provoking response. And I agree that it is vulnerable in the way you mention and have been pondering this.

I mentioned that something might be morally valuable due to intrinsic properties of the concept to which it answers, but that also something might be morally valuable due to intrinsic properties of the thing itself. I have now found that the distinction in question is expressed by talking about something's 'de re' identity versus its 'de dicto' identity. And so I now have the terminology I need to distinguish between something's being intrinsically valuable 'de re' (where this means that it is intrinsically valuable because of what it, the object itself, is) and something's being intrinsically valuable 'de dicto' (where this means that it is valuable due to intrinsic features of the concept to which it answers).

The pen example you gave would be an example of something that is intrinsically valuable de dicto, as it is morally valuable not because it is a physical thing - even though it is - but because it answers to the concept 'pen used by Lincoln'.

What I hold is that my mind's intrinsic moral value is represented to be de re, not de dicto. This is because whether I am represented to be this person, the thinker of this thought, the human being now speaking, or me with a phenomenal past or me without one, or in any other way that truly refers to me, the truth of what my reason represents to be the case is unchanged. That is, regardless of which description I am given, I am intrinsically morally valuable no less. This invariance under co-referring substitution shows that my reason’s representation is de re: it concerns the object that I am, not any description or concept under which I may fall (I think).

if that is correct, then as my intrinsic moral value is intrinsic de re not de dicto, and none of any physical object's de re intrinsic properties are plausible candidates for the ground of my value, the argument goes through....I think.