Welcome to the forum. This is a thoughtful OP which will hopefully gain some traction.

It's not the first time I've heard people combine progressive historical sentiments with Christianity. — ProtagoranSocratist

I would highly recommend the historian Tom Holland on this topic. His thesis is not that Christianity produced progress per se, but rather that our contemporary world has been massively shaped by Christianity. This means, for example, that our criteria for progress are by and large Christian-birthed criteria.

One of my goals is to read Copleston's entire works on the history of philosophy — ProtagoranSocratist

Copleston is great. :up:

Copleston is great. :up: — Leontiskos

Yeah i can't read it cover-to-cover, but i somehow managed to do it with volume II in the "history of philosophy." I think maybe anything related to plato's literal text besides a soundbite is too rough for me, but aristotle seems to be more rationalistic and logical...

I'm wondering what it would take for a universal morality to be achieved, or if it's even possible. — ProtagoranSocratist

If you do, explain why you (seem to) assume that "a universal morality" is more beneficial than the absence of one.

One of my goals is to read Copleston's entire works on the history of philosophy ...

FWIW, I'd recommend more contemporary (& secular) histories such as

• Peter Adamson's podcast & book series A History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps

• Bryan Magee's The Great Philosophers: An Introduction to Western Philosophy

If you do, explain why you (seem to) assume that "a universal morality" is more beneficial than the absence of one. — 180 Proof

Oh not at all, i just wanted to start the many possible questions with that one: it was rhetorical in the sense that i do not believe it, or think it's possible. Christian fundamentalists are not the only people who evoke a morality that "should" apply to strangers, and it's pretty much impossible to avoid talking about the scope of moral ideas when trying to lay a code of ethics or impose "right and wrong".

... it was rhetorical in the sense that i do not believe it, or think it's possible. Christian fundamentalists are not the only people who evoke a morality that "should" apply to strangers, and it's pretty much impossible to avoid talking about the scope of moral ideas when trying to lay a code of ethics or impose "right and wrong". — ProtagoranSocratist

What's wrong with saying that moral truths exist independently of human opinion.

It seems to me that there are moral facts (e.g., “torturing children for fun is wrong”) that are true regardless of what anyone thinks.

What's wrong with saying that moral truths exist independently of human opinion. — Colo Millz

What's wrong?

I can't verify moral truths.

It seems to me that there are moral facts (e.g., “torturing children for fun is wrong”) that are true regardless of what anyone thinks. — Colo Millz

Seems like pretty blatant emotional manipulation to me: you start by insinuating that moral truths are separate from human opinion: then you try your best to project the image of children being tortured.

I can't verify moral truths. — ProtagoranSocratist

Moral truths may be “verifiable” in principle if one adopts rationalist, consequentialist, or intuitionist frameworks.

But even a cultural relativist would say that moral truths can be verified simply by referring to the norms of the societies in question.

But even a cultural relativist would say that moral truths can be verified simply by referring to the norms of the societies in question. — Colo Millz

Alright, this is a much more interesting and workable response. One can extrapolate a moral truth from the people they know, and even if a society violates a moral truth (two examples being: capital punishment is arguably "cruel and unusual punishment", and so is a life sentence for being found with a bag of marijuana), it's something to go on as a naturally selfish person.

Most pre-modern theories of "objective moral truths" (a modern way of putting it) are at least prima facie as "verifiable" as those of the relativist/emotivist. However, I think the big thing to realize here is that:

A. Virtually all pre-modern ethics are virtue ethics (in the East as much as the West) and so they are framed fundamentally differently from the dominant modern moral theories (utilitarianism, deontology/Kantianism, and divine command theories) because they do not make "laws" their explanatory center point.

B. They do not separate "moral good" as a sort of sui generis, wholly separate "sort of good" that is distinct from the good of "good food," "good evidence," "good argument," "a good baseball player," "a good car," etc. For instance, for Plato, the Good is present even if what merely appears good (and so in evils that people choose because they think they are good). But this is as true for later Christian thinkers like Aquinas; all things that are "good" in any way are so by participation in the Good. Indeed, for the medievals, "Good" is a transcendental property of being precisely because it is a conceptual not real distinction. Goodness is "being as (truly) desirable." It doesn't add anything over and above being (just as there is not the reality of a thing and, over and above it, its truth—yet of everything that is, it is true that it is). And yet, because they make a distinction between apparent and real goods, such a distinction is "objective" in a sense (but not Kant's sense, which would be rejected as incoherent).

So, the older ethicist wants to say to the emotivist, Kantian, and utilitarian: "justify your claim that moral good is unique and unrelated to other goods." But the thoroughgoing relativist/anti-realist generally cannot justify this distinction because they don't think "moral goodness" is real in the first place.

Thus, the real question is a more global "values anti-realism." Nothing is good or bad in any sense. Yet this is prima facie way less plausible. Is it not truly bad for a bear to have its leg crushed in a bear trap? Is it not truly bad, at least ceteris paribus, for human children to be lit on fire? The fact that these things are bad for these organisms seems directly tied to what they are, and are seemingly verifiable. For them to be "unverifiable" we would have to say that the empirical facts of medical science, veterinary science, zoology, psychology, etc. are not really facts. Why aren't they real facts? If we just say they aren't real facts because they involve values and values aren't factual then all we have done is beg the question and assumed our conclusion as a premise.

Second, global values anti-realism is straightforwardly self-refuting. If nothing is truly good or bad then there can be nothing truly "good" about good argument, good evidence, good faith, etc. Indeed, if nothing is truly better or worse (truly more or less desirable) then truth cannot be "better" than falsity. And so, when the anti-realist expects us to agree with them because what they say is true, they have no grounds for expecting this of us. "Good" just means "I like." So if I don't like anti-realism, I ought not affirm it.

Likewise, if "good" means "I currently like...," then a late night tequila shot is "good for us" when we want it and becomes "bad for us" when we wake up hungover. Smoking is good for us... until we get lung disease and regret smoking. Etc. But this leads to a sort of global misology where we can never be wrong about anything and every decision we make is "good" (for us), which is absurd.

Prima facie, virtue ethics is very plausible. A strong rebuttal to it needs to show that, all else equal, it is not better for man to be:

Courageous instead of cowardly or rash.
Temperate instead of gluttonous/licentious or anhedonic/sterile.
Loving instead of wrathful or cold
Possessing fortitude instead of being slothful and unmotivated
Hopeful instead of fearful
Strong instead of weak
Agile instead of clumsily
Prudent instead of lacking in consideration
Wise instead of wise
Faithful instead of recalcitrant
Etc.

But prima facie, on average, it is better to possess those virtues rather than their corresponding vices. To be sure, a virtuous man might suffer from bad fortune, and a wicked man might benefit from good fortune, but fortune is by definition outside our control. Virtue is what makes us happiest with what is within our control. It also makes us more self-determing, less ruled over by our appetites and external causes, and so more free and self-governing (which is what allows us to flourish in spite of fortune). Hence, the anti-realist has to say the virtues aren't better for man, or else that they mean something different in every instance and don't really exist (a hard claim to make, since Eastern cultures have fairly similar core virtues).

I think the plausibility of anti-realism rests on the modern framing of ethics. Alasdair MacIntyre has a famous book, After Virtue, about how this framing emerges. It comes from Reformation era theology. And he argues that it is what makes modern ethics incoherent. I think he is right at least in broad outline here.

Thus, the real question is a more global "values anti-realism." Nothing is good or bad in any sense. Yet this is prima facie way less plausible. Is it not truly bad for a bear to have its leg crushed in a bear trap? Is it not truly bad, at least ceteris paribus, for human children to be lit on fire? — Count Timothy von Icarus

But who is saying that nothing is good or bad in any sense? Are you maybe hinting that someone was implying it here? Are you hinting that Nietzsche and Stirner were saying this? Because the quote Nietzsche gave that i posted directly contradicts that, and many of his other aphorism do as well. The whole reason i posted that was to advertise that this is NOT i'm trying to argue, but it seems that people try to project that onto philosophers who criticize morality in a more general sense, rather than technical issues with specific standards.

Even though i'm not willing to provide quotes at the moment, Nietzsche places a value on honesty in multiple places in his texts, so to me it would seem he thought that was one of the more important ideas when practicing a rational morality. Stirner, however, did not blatantly posit values: his style was more concerned with showing that there's a problem with assuming any of them are objective. However, you can still infer some vague things about his preferences from his philosophy alone.

My personal orientation to good and bad is that it's subjective 100% of the time: when the tiger eats the monkey, it's good for the tiger, bad for the monkey. The tiger gets nourishment, the monkey feels unpleasant and dies. The tiger can't be "morally wrong" because it can't question its behavior. However, this subjectivity gets extremely complex when you have humans who believe in free will and compatibilism.

Thus, the real question is a more global "values anti-realism." Nothing is good or bad in any sense. Yet this is prima facie way less plausible. Is it not truly bad for a bear to have its leg crushed in a bear trap? Is it not truly bad, at least ceteris paribus, for human children to be lit on fire? — Count Timothy von Icarus

sorry, my other response got posted prematurely: i hit enter and it posted, but i was just using it to make a new paragraph. It probably has something to do with my browser or hidden setting:

the subjectivity aspect of "good and bad" also goes beyond predation, especially when it comes to situational responses. Doing one thing in one situation will lead to positive results, and other times negative responses. While i can't give any specific examples at the moment like i did with the tiger, this becomes painfully true when you consider what you should and shouldn't say to other people...but i would assume that if you're being honest, and you're not intentionally trying to hurt people with your words, there can't be anything morally wrong about it.

You also mention Plato: my understanding with him and other Greeks is they largely believed moral righteousness was correlated correlated with the happiness that you feel, and that independent of the latter factor, that there was no basis for talking about morality or justice. However, the question becomes: to what extent can this be established objectively and scientifically. What behaviors lead to happiness, which ones lead to unpleasantness? I believe it's possible to answer this to a limited degree. One could argue that the mere studying of moral philosophy could improve people's lives, but you would have to acknowledge that this lack of study in moral philosophy has more to do with people not wanting to do it more so than a systemic failure in education.

My personal orientation to good and bad is that it's subjective 100% of the time: when the tiger eats the monkey, it's good for the tiger, bad for the monkey. The tiger gets nourishment, the monkey feels unpleasant and dies. The tiger can't be "morally wrong" because it can't question its behavior. However, this subjectivity gets extremely complex when you have humans who believe in free will and compatibilism.

Right, but is it not a fact that "being eaten by a tiger is bad for monkeys?" It seems to me that this is obvious. What monkeys are tells us at least something of what is good for them.

Likewise, is it not a fact that it is—at least all else equal—better for human to be strong rather than weak, agile instead of clumsy, intelligent instead of dim witted, courageous instead of cowardly, knowledgeable rather than ignorant, prudent instead of rash, possessing fortitude instead of being weak of will, healthy instead of sick, etc.?

But who is saying that nothing is good or bad in any sense? — ProtagoranSocratist

My point was that the bracketing out of "moral goodness" as a wholly distinct "sort of goodness" comes from early modern Christian theology. Those who reject that theology need to justify using the distinction rather than just assuming it and going from there. Without such a distinction, anti-realism about values is presumably global

the subjectivity aspect of "good and bad" also goes beyond predation, especially when it comes to situational responses. Doing one thing in one situation will lead to positive results, and other times negative responses. — ProtagoranSocratist

Sure, I can help with an example: it is good to scoop up your own toddler when they fall and start crying. It is probably not good to run and scoop up a stranger's kid from the park. It might be good to bow to an elder if not doing so would grievously and needlessly insult them in some cultural context, and bizarre in another context. No serious moral realist theory fails to take account of such variances though.

You also mention Plato: my understanding with him and other Greeks is they largely believed moral righteousness was correlated correlated with the happiness that you feel, and that independent of the latter factor, that there was no basis for talking about morality or justice. However, the question becomes: to what extent can this be established objectively and scientifically. What behaviors lead to happiness, which ones lead to unpleasantness? I believe it's possible to answer this to a limited degree. — ProtagoranSocratist

That's more of Aristotle's framing, but yes, the good is desirable. But, since we are often wrong about what will be good for us, the focus is on what is truly desirable, not what merely appears to be desirable. So, the Republic centers on why justice (and freedom) are truly desirable.

"Happiness" here is a translation of eudaimonia, which might be better rendered as "flourishing" or "blessedness."

And yes, knowledge here might be "limited." As Aristotle points out, it is foolish to demand greater specificity than a topic allows. But as for what can be known, it seems that it is better to be: strong, healthy, agile, courageous, wise, prudent, magnanimous, loving, etc. than their contraries.

What can be known "scientifically" and "objectively" is another matter. I have seen people define objectivity such that even physics is subjective because it is shaped by the mind. Aristotle thought ethics and politics were a practical science. But if "scientific" means presupposing that values are subjective, then obviously this will be impossible, not because of any truth about the human good, but because "science" has been defined so as to exclude such truths regardless of if they exist. The sciences are saturated in value judgements however, so such a framing is always a preformative contradiction.

One could argue that the mere studying of moral philosophy could improve people's lives, but you would have to acknowledge that this lack of study in moral philosophy has more to do with people not wanting to do it more so than a systemic failure in education. — ProtagoranSocratist

Well, on the older view of ethics as the study of ends, how to live a good life, and how to be a good person, I think people do study this. The self-help industry is huge, wellness terminology has flooded our everyday speech, novels and media focus on these questions, etc. Explicit moral philosophy is banished from most curricula however because teaching any positive content is anathema to liberal individualism. However, I'd argue that students are indoctrinated into a particular ethics, a sort of therapeutic, individualist liberalism that oscillates between civic humanism and emotivism. It's just that this ethics pretends it isn't an ethics, and pretends that its forms of indoctrination are uniquely liberatory because its presuppositions are those of "pure reason" and possess an epistemic humility no prior systems possess (arguably, this is just another sort of dogmatism though).

My personal orientation to good and bad is that it's subjective 100% of the time: when the tiger eats the monkey, it's good for the tiger, bad for the monkey. The tiger gets nourishment, the monkey feels unpleasant and dies. The tiger can't be "morally wrong" because it can't question its behavior. However, this subjectivity gets extremely complex when you have humans who believe in free will and compatibilism.
— ProtagoranSocratist

Right, but is it not a fact that "being eaten by a tiger is bad for monkeys?" It seems to me that this is obvious. What monkeys are tells us at least something of what is good for them.

Likewise, is it not a fact that it is—at least all else equal—better for human to be strong rather than weak, agile instead of clumsy, intelligent instead of dim witted, courageous instead of cowardly, knowledgeable rather than ignorant, prudent instead of rash, possessing fortitude instead of being weak of will, healthy instead of sick, etc.? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Good for the tiger, bad for the monkey—demonstrates that good and bad are relative, doesn’t it?

To see what I mean about the modern paradigm, just consider that if you wrote a paper in most schools claiming that:

-ethics is wholly bunk and we should just act selfishly; or
-ethics comes from God by command and anyone who tries to justify it otherwise is kidding themselves
-ethics is a wholly formal, Kantian duty
-ethics is absolutely unknowable and everyone who says anything is unjustified

Would all probably lead to fine grades if they were well written and well argued. The only one that might get you in trouble is the divine command theory one, potentially on the grounds that the Bible and the Koran are not proper sources for a humanities class.

This is very much unlike mathematics or even history, where to give multiple wholly contradictory answers will generally mean one is wrong. The paradigm seems invisible here because it rules out nothing.

Yet the paradigm becomes visible if you consider what would happen if you wrote a paper justifying racism, sexism, defending Hitler, etc. A high school English student who justifies the society of A Handmaid's Tale might very well end up with a call home, particularly if the teacher thinks they are serious.

But what this shows is that the process is the focus of moral education (Dewey, Rodgers, etc.), although with certain bounds (no racism, etc.). Yet this isn't really an absence of ethics, it's just a particular dominant type that is taught.

Relative in what sense? What exactly is: "All else equal, it is bad for a monkey to be eaten," relative to? Certainly not the tiger. To the extent that the tiger has beliefs, I don't imagine it thinks what it is doing is good for the monkey either.

Or for: "having access to proper water and sunlight are good for my plant," if this is relative, in what context is it false?

Relative in what sense? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Relative to the perspective of the individual.

What exactly is: "All else equal, it is bad for a monkey to be eaten," relative to? Certainly not the tiger. To the extent that the tiger has beliefs, I don't imagine it thinks what it is doing is good for the monkey either. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The tiger enjoys a satisfying monkey hunt and meal—which is good.

Or for: "having access to proper water and sunlight are good for my plant," if this is relative, in what context is it false? — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is false for anything that may compete for your plants water and sunlight.

Relative to the perspective of the individual. — praxis

So when a child feeds their cat antifreeze because it looks like a fun drink. Cats love antifreeze too. Is it thus truly good for the cat to drink antifreeze because all the individuals in question think it is so?

The tiger enjoys a satisfying monkey hunt and meal—which is good. — praxis

This is simply changing the subject to what is good for the tiger. Again, is it false that is "bad for the monkey to be eaten?"

Is it a fact that it is "bad for women to be raped," or does this somehow become false and it is good for women if they are raped just in case you're a rapist? But not even most rapists believe this.

Let me ask, on this view, how is it ever possible for someone to be wrong about what is good?

-ethics is wholly bunk and we should just act selfishly; or
-ethics comes from God by command and anyone who tries to justify it otherwise is kidding themselves
-ethics is a wholly formal, Kantian duty
-ethics is absolutely unknowable and everyone who says anything is unjustified

Would all probably lead to fine grades if they were well written and well argued. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I disagree, because the blunt framing: "-ethics is wholly bunked and we should just act selfishly" is confused and hypocritical moral preaching. The third point about Kant is similar to what Nietzsche has argued about ethics, with the former's "categorical imperative", but overall he respected that Christianity was an origin for moralism, and Kant was a re-framer, and that is why Nietzsche was mostly respected in the academic circles he was a part of, even though i don't totally agree with his ideas...there's a pretty extreme degree of nuance that gets lost with "ethics is bunk" and "we should just act selfishly". My judgements about 1#, apply to point 4#: it can't be "absolutely unknowable" because our use of the word "ethics" proves otherwise.

[edits: i had skipped over point 2# for whatever reason first time around, probably because i was using my phone, i can't really comment on 2# as it does depend on the religion/ideology of the school, it's a pretty standard christian/judaism/muslim argument though]

The self-help industry is huge, wellness terminology has flooded our everyday speech, novels and media focus on these questions, etc. Explicit moral philosophy is banished from most curricula however because teaching any positive content is anathema to liberal individualism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The therapeutic and pedagogical discussions you bring up are a form of informal moral philosophy, but i would argue explicit moral philosophy is not taught in schools because it involves young people who don't really want to be there...explicit moral philosophy is very hard, it's spoken about with incredibly abstract terms and systems, my tiger and monkey lesson is simple and has more of a resemblance to self-help logic. The very kind of supple and valuable lessons you can learn from formal moral philosophy are swept under the rug, so to speak, because our liberal/individualist system places more value on christian-based moral teachings, productivity at work, and achievements...these have some scattered elements which prepare children for office work, hierarchies, and manual labor. I think the basic format ("go sit down in a desk, kid") is more of an issue than what is taught. Someone brought up torturing children as a vague moral example of...something...but the very school system does torture children "compassionately".

Have you seen the television show "the good place"? The difference I'm trying to illustrate between informal philosophy and formal philosophy is plain in the show: it's about questioning the absolutist notions of heaven and hell, and as a result of creator preference, the characters keep name dropping Jame's Scanlan's "what we owe each other", as an obvious attempt to get viewers to buy the book. However, "what we owe each other" is a little misleading, because the title says "i know exactly what we owe each other", yet the actual contents are very convoluted and not pleasurable to read. Much of formal philosophy is like this, and we embrace it still because of the logical challenge and desire to creatively express our ethics and narratives. Formal philosophy is for people who like to think and argue, not for people who want simple answers, not for people who launch Machiavellian schemes (even though machiavelli was arguably a philosopher). The demagogues use formal philosophy temporarily and move on, but rarely do they write a peer-reviewed philosophy publication or wind up as professors...

Prima facie, virtue ethics is very plausible. A strong rebuttal to it needs to show that, all else equal, it is not better for man to be:

Courageous instead of cowardly or rash.
Temperate instead of gluttonous/licentious or anhedonic/sterile.
Loving instead of wrathful or cold
Possessing fortitude instead of being slothful and unmotivated
Hopeful instead of fearful
Strong instead of weak
Agile instead of clumsily
Prudent instead of lacking in consideration
Wise instead of unwise
Faithful instead of recalcitrant
Etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

We could follow the virtue ethicist and treat these attributes as real, objective qualities of persons validated though third person consensus. Or we could treat them as truisms which pre-suppose a prior assessment of culpability. For instance, when we say murder is immoral, we don’t really need to add the ‘immoral’ part since murder already implies a value judgement which allows us to distinguish it from a more value-neutral term like ‘killing’.

All of the terms you listed above are truisms in that what they have in common is the assumption that the person they are describing has fallen below a norm of conduct. But they imply more than this. If we perceive a person to operating with the best intentions, trying their best given the circumstances and the limits of their physical and intellectual capabilities, then we don’t apply these adjectives to them. We only apply them when it appears to us that the person is deserving of our blame. And in what circumstances do we assign blame and culpability to the other? When we believe they knew better than to do what they did, when we interpret their behavior as capricious, as deliberately and willfully suppressing their better, more caring and empathetic instincts.

But do these blameful judgements reflect objective realities about another’s character, or do they reflect our own inability to see the world from the other’s unique vantage? What if the fault lies not in their ‘capriciousness’ but in our inadequate assessment of their motives and outlook? Given that the blameful, accusatory adjectives you listed impel us to respond with disapproval, punishment, demand for conformity and shunning, they may in many cases justify and even institutionalize a certain immorality and violence toward those who violate our expectations. As Ken Gergen writes:

“We commonly suppose that suffering is caused by people whose conscience is flawed or who pursue their aims without regard for the consequences to others. From a relational standpoint, we may entertain the opposite hypothesis: in important respects we suffer from a plenitude of good. How so? If relationships-linguistic coordination--are the source of meaning, then they are the source as well of our presumptions about good and evil. Rudimentary understandings of right versus wrong are essential to sustaining patterns of coordination. Deviations from accepted patterns constitute a threat. When we have developed harmonious ways of relating-of speaking and acting--we place a value on this way of life. Whatever encroaches upon, undermines, or destroys this way of life becomes an evil. It is not surprising, then, that the term ethics is derived from the Greek ethos, the customs of the people; or that the term morality draws on the Latin root mos or mores, thus affiliating morality with custom. Is and ought walk hand in hand.

I disagree — ProtagoranSocratist

With what, the examples themselves? But my point isn't that those positions are correct, but that our current systems allows students to pick between them as equally "right" alternatives. Whereas racism, sexism, Hitlerism, or even fundamentalism are not considered worthy of exploration by the "autonomous agent."

All of the terms you listed above are truisms in that what they have in common is the assumption that the person they are describing has fallen below a norm of conduct. — Joshs

It seems to me like you're just absolutizing a certain (problematic) post-Enlightenment understanding of virtue here, such that virtue is really always grounded in deontological standards and variance from them. But I think that's a poor way of understanding it, and at any rate a dismissal of virtue ethics on the grounds that opposing modern views use its terms wrong doesn't seem like a fair criticism.

This is most obvious in terms of the physical virtues. When we say that Tom Brady is dexterous, we don't mean "in comparison to doing his best," but "in comparison to every other person." He is excellent at throwing a ball where he wants it when he wants it. Fleet-footed Achilles isn't called such because he tries his best to run (presumably, all the men he chases down are trying their best to run away as well). He has arete (virtue, excellence) because he is the most excellent in his particular role as a warrior.

And, all else equal, it is better to be healthy, strong, intelligent, wise, prudent, just, etc. than their contrary. That has nothing to do with "blame" per se. Although we might blame people for their vices, that is not why they are vices, or what defines them as vices.

Of course, there is also the objection that strength, agility, courage, prudence, wisdom, fortitude, charity, etc. don't exist. But this seems absurd. It seems particularly absurd for the physical virtues because some people are clearly stronger, faster, healthier, etc., and yet it also seems rather absurd to say that this is so for the intellectual virtues, or for the practical virtues. Some people are particularly impulsive and rash for instance. Whether they ought to be "blamed" for this is besides the point as far as prudence being a virtue.

the television show "the good place"? — ProtagoranSocratist

This is a good example. The philosopher character is an extreme comic example of indecisiveness. It is not excellent to have this level of indecisiveness; that is what makes the character humorous. One need not "blame" him to think he could benefit from a change.

With what, the examples themselves? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, i was saying that i highly doubt any teacher beyond an elementary school teacher would accept "we should all be selfish" as an argument on a philosophy paper...because the only way you could back it up is by giving examples of how your preferences benefit you...and schools never put individual preference over the curriculum outside a process that allows that (i.e., disability related concerns)

Of course, there is also the objection that strength, agility, courage, prudence, wisdom, fortitude, charity, etc. don't exist. But this seems absurd. It seems particularly absurd for the physical virtues because some people are clearly stronger, faster, healthier, etc., and yet it also seems rather absurd to say that this is so for the intellectual virtues, or for the practical virtues. Some people are particularly impulsive and rash for instance. Whether they ought to be "blamed" for this is besides the point as far as prudence being a virtue.

the television show "the good place"?
— ProtagoranSocratist

This is a good example. The philosopher character is an extreme comic example of indecisiveness. It is not excellent to have this level of indecisiveness; that is what makes the character humorous. One need not "blame" him to think he could benefit from a change — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would make a distinction between assessments of capabilities which do not involve determinations of intent or motive and those which do. Going back to your list:

Courageous instead of cowardly or rash.
Temperate instead of gluttonous/licentious or anhedonic/sterile.
Loving instead of wrathful or cold
Possessing fortitude instead of being slothful and unmotivated
Hopeful instead of fearful
Strong instead of weak
Agile instead of clumsily
Prudent instead of lacking in consideration
Wise instead of unwise
Faithful instead of recalcitrant

Of these examples, it seems to me that only ‘strong vs weak’ and ‘agile vs clumsy’ don’t necessarily involve judgements concerning motive, but they could depending on their context of use. Those which deal with motives are blameful in that they assume on the part of the other a capricious ‘knew better than to do what one did.’ What’s crucial in blame is the belief that there is a close proximity between what they actually did and what they know they should have done. The distance between the two is a kind of straying or wandering off the path, a giving into temptation. Because blame is based on belief in this proximity, it leads to the further belief that we can cajole or coerce the other back to where we believe they know they should have been, and how they should have acted. We tell them a little more ‘willpower’ will carry them over to the righteous path. This may be dished out in a ‘loving’ way, but it rests on an underlying basis of hostility.

How might your list change if you focused on the possibility that you are construing their motives and capabilities inadequately?

Courageous , temperate, loving, fortitude, prudent and faithful become transformed into assessments which are not the product of the application of an inner willpower, but involve behaviors which reflect how the situation makes sense to one, given one’s pre-existing means of understanding.

because the only way you could back it up is by giving examples of how your preferences benefit you.. — ProtagoranSocratist

Sure you could, you could:
A. Argue for moral anti-realism, nothing objectionable there.
B. Point out that all decisions must thus be motivated by "pragmatism."
C. Argue that individuals seeking their own preferences is what makes the world go round, drawing on liberal political economy, etc.

You know, Ayn Rand, Gordon Gecko "greed is good." Or even a Sam Harris: "reasonable individuals want to maximize their well-being and that's why justice can be justified," or a Rawlsian elevation of the abstract chooser's reasonable self-interest vis-á-vis a wholly procedural "justice" as set over the presumed unknowability or irreducible plurality of the good.

I did say "well-argued." The procedure is important. Whereas, even if you swamp an argument for race or sex segregation and unequal rights in peer reviewed citations and make no logical errors, I imagine that's still going to land you in hot water.

You know, Ayn Rand, Gordon Gecko "greed is good." Or even a Sam Harris: "reasonable individuals want to maximize their well-being and that's why justice can be justified," or a Rawlsian elevation of the abstract chooser's reasonable self-interest vis-á-vis a wholly procedural "justice" as set over the presumed unknowability or irreducible plurality of the good. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, i get where you're coming from now, but Ayn Rand posited new ethics based on her irrational arguments relating to capitalism ("self-reliant strength is good, perfectionism is good"). I think Gordon Gekko himself was meant to be the moral set up against the "greed is good" ideology. I want to point out that these are just specific kinds of justifications for selfish behavior, when there are potentially infinite possibilities...but as you say, phrasing is crucial for success.

I can only say that I think that is a reading largely or wholly absent from the tradition. Aristotle's typology, for instance, has it that the furthest state of vice is precisely one where the person prefers vice and sees it as better. That's a theme in Plato too, who famously has Socrates argue in several places that no one ever knowingly does wrong (a point picked up by many Patristics).

Do you think it is impossible to define prudence, intelligence, wisdom, gluttony, etc. without having to ground them in blame?

I don't see why it should be. For temperance for instance, there is presumably a mean vis-á-vis the satisfaction of some appetites that is healthy regardless of what people currently think it is. Likewise, it's particularly hard to see how the intellectual/doxastic virtues could even be defined in terms of blameworthiness. What makes the intellectual virtues to be virtues at all is that the lead towards understanding, not that they meet some sort of criteria of proper effort. If this was the case, everyone could become wise simply by "trying hard." And this is originally just as true for the practical virtues. Bad choices don't become good ones just because you tried your best.

Courageous , temperate, loving, fortitude, prudent and faithful become transformed into assessments which are not the product of the application of an inner willpower, but involve behaviors which reflect how the situation makes sense to one, given one’s pre-existing means of understanding. — Joshs

Well, if you ground virtue in blame and layer this on, doesn't that mean that no one is ever more courageous, temperate, just, intelligent, wise, etc. than anyone else? They are all doing their best given their understanding, right?

But doesn't that seem absurd? Certainly some people are wiser, more just, more intelligent, etc.

I can only say that I think that is a reading largely or wholly absent from the tradition. Aristotle's typology, for instance, has it that the furthest state of vice is precisely one where the person prefers vice and sees it as better. That's a theme in Plato too, who famously has Socrates argue in several places that no one ever knowingly does wrong (a point picked up by many Patristics).

Do you think it is impossible to define prudence, intelligence, wisdom, gluttony, etc. without having to ground them in blame? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Obviously someone makes a decision to behave in a certain way because in the moment of the decision they perceive that course of action as preferable to the alternatives they see as available to them. This doesn’t contradict my assertion that the affects of anger and hostility are at play in grounding one’s assessment of why they preferred that course of action. What matters to me is how you personally are led to behave towards someone who you perceive as deliberately thoughtless, rude, careless, negligent, complacent, lazy, self-indulgent, malevolent, dishonest, narcissistic, malicious, culpable, perverse, inconsiderate, intentionally oppressive, repressive or unfair, disrespectful, gluttonous, wrathful, imprudent, anti-social, hypocritical, disgraceful or greedy. Do you not feel the impulse to knock some sense into them , give them a taste of their own medicine, get them to mend their ways? Do you not aim for their repentance, atonement and readiness to apologize?

How might your response to, and attitude toward, someone who errs in any of these ways differ your response to a student who can’t grasp the principles of calculus because it is too advanced for their grade level, but you know they are bright and can be tutored to understand the material? Are you saying your attitude toward this student will be the same as when he punches his classmate in the face or puts thumbtacks on the teacher’s seat and injures them?

What matters to me is how you personally are led to behave towards someone who you perceive as deliberately thoughtless, rude, careless, negligent, complacent, lazy, self-indulgent, malevolent, dishonest, narcissistic, malicious, culpable, perverse, inconsiderate, intentionally oppressive, repressive or unfair, disrespectful, gluttonous, wrathful, imprudent, anti-social, hypocritical, disgraceful or greedy. Do you not feel the impulse to knock some sense into them , give them a taste of their own medicine, get them to mend their ways? Do you not aim for their repentance, atonement and readiness to apologize? — Joshs

That depends entirely on our respective socio-econimic statuses and the relative positions we hold in the power hierarchy. If the person is above you in the hierarchy, you better keep your nose down, or face retaliation.

That depends entirely on our respective socio-econimic statuses and the relative positions we hold in the power hierarchy. If the person is above you in the hierarchy, you better keep your nose down, or face retaliation. — baker

I’m more interested in what you feel like doing, what you would do if allowed to, than in what you can or can’t get away with. I’m focused on what impulses are implied in the structure of anger and blame, not whether you dare express those impulses.

I’m more interested in what you feel like doing, what you would do if allowed to, than in what you can or can’t get away with. — Joshs

It's absolutely vital to know one's place in society, and to actually internalize it. The criticism whispered quietly to the side with one's face down is a sign that one hasn't accepted one's place in society.
Those below have no business criticising those above.