In the end it's all about power. — praxis

It's about how the mind can best determine an increase of what is vital for the body to prolong its existence. So, perhaps. Unfortunately (or perhaps fortunately), we become blinded by that which we do not understand, and so inevitably make choices that seem wise or conducive to this psychotic goal, yet eventually... make a fatal misstep. And so, the pendulum of power is, perhaps doomed, perhaps favored, to swing back and forth, forevermore. Some ranges of motion simply take longer than others. To no credit of those who become unwitting pawns of fate that a lost world has no choice but to imagine they have any control or influence over. Which they ultimately do not. No mortal does.

anti-realism is not a coherent perspective, it's just a means of labeling a position one finds threatening — ProtagoranSocratist

"Anti-realism" in meta-ethics just refers to the claim that there are no facts about values; which is quite popular as a position. Plenty of people embrace this term as a label for their own ideas; I am pretty sure it is coined by anti-realists themselves.

I don't believe that one can make such a 'hard distinction' between scientific truths and moral truths. — boundless

The Count was quick to point this out and I agree.

I think human reality is largely shaped by human needs or purposes—and human values. We don’t share the same values however, so if there are objective values, who is right and who is wrong? And what is the purpose of insisting that one set of values is Correct? It provides the means to harness collective power.

I think Bonobos might come a little closer to virtues than Chimpanzees because of the difference in their social organization. The leap from these species to humans is huge, and apparently, that is so because of the organization of our brains and social order. Science is now claiming that Neanderthals were closer to modern humans than we once thought. Why they are hidden in our genes but also became extinct is still up for debate. Was it social order or verbal skills that made the difference between Neanderthals and modern humans?

I read, in a research lab, that a Bomobo bit a researcher after saying he would do so if the worker did not correct a wrong. That is how an animal without language sets its boundaries. There is a claim that some of these animals learn enough language to communicate verbally. They are social animals with some rules determining right and wrong behavior, but not the language to be philosophical. Even horses are said to pass culture on to their offspring. I hope that discussion culture falls under the subject of ethics and morals.

We might to able to identify our major cultures and if they there are social differences in their morals and ethics. But I also think our Western understanding of Asians is not adequate for the task.

Would you like to pick up from here and say something? We might consider how different the discussion would go if we held a more scientific mindset, as opposed to assuming Christianity pretty much covers the subjects of morals and ethics, and proceeded with Protestant assumptions.

"Anti-realism" in meta-ethics just refers to the claim that there are no facts about values; which is quite popular as a position. Plenty of people embrace this term as a label for their own ideas; I am pretty sure it is coined by anti-realists themselves. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, for me the phrasing instead would be "subjectivist", which states moral truths exist, but ONLY subjectively. So that still means i can use moral values if they are beneficial to my selfish interests, or ignore them if they appear harmful or immoral. I don't know if Ayn Rand ever called herself that, her excuse was rationalism.

I think claiming there are "no facts about values" is confusing, because facts tend to imply shared information, and there are plenty of those. However, i guess some folks see anti-realism as the best framing for their suspicions on morality.

Interestingly, geocentrism most definitely expressed anthropocentric values and Galileo paid the price for extracting those values from astronomy. In the end it's all about power. — praxis

It was actually Nietzsche who argued this in "Geaneology of Morality", that "the good people" are just the powerful imposing what is "good" on the basis of what is good for them. To me, the point of how to make life better for everyone with a loss of moral absolutism is an interesting one, yet i'm pretty it's impossible currently given that human psychology tends to be more motivated by fear and anxiety than pleasure.

It's not sustainable to ascribe to and abide by a moral system that disregards how the world really works. Idealism like that drives people crazy. — baker

I personally don't think think it's impossible for those things to happen, and it really depends on what attacking and punishing looks like. It's not idealism to know that the hierarchically powerful are not all powerful or godlike.

Maybe you can't assassinate a president and expect to get away with it, but i would suspect a president's cabinet members do hurt them sometimes, but in a much more minor way. I would argue that believing in the social infallibility of leaders is crazier than thinking it's impossible to harm them without getting away with it.

As an example: let's say a single parent is abusing their kids. Wouldn't it be possible for that kid to kill the parent and get away with it? It would be much easier for the kid to do that if there weren't police, and it wouldn't necessarily be good for the kid's future, but i'm just saying that it's possible.

This strange idea that philosophy should be cut off from real life ... — baker

nah i'm unfortunately just a sensitive person and sometimes i don't want to talk about specific things on the internet ;-) I don't think it can be fully cut off from other things you do, even though it's always the case that people are like "let's not talk about this, let's do something else", and sometimes that approach appears necessary for group cohesion. I was having some thoughts about how punishments for extreme crimes could be improved to be less harmful and less hypocritical, but i am not quite ready to start a discussion on that kind of a rabbit hole here yet.

Would you like to pick up from here and say something? We might consider how different the discussion would go if we held a more scientific mindset, as opposed to assuming Christianity pretty much covers the subjects of morals and ethics, and proceeded with Protestant assumptions. — Athena

TBH, I never wanted to assume the truth of Christianity from the start in my posts, not sure why you think that. I was just arguing that, in my opinion, virtue ethics is a better view about ethics than other models. Virtue ethics is also generally coupled with the 'intellectualist' model of freedom, i.e. that a rational being is truly free when he or she is freed from all 'obscurations' that prevent him or her to recognize properly the good with the assumption that being 'rational' means to spontaneously desire what is recognized as good, in contrast to the 'libertarian' model which, instead, simply assert that freedom is the same as 'deliberative power' to choose among alternatives.

This model of ethics and freedom was certainly accepted among many Christians in history but I think you find it also asserted in completely different traditions like, say, Platonism, Neoplatonism, Aristotelism etc in the 'West' and also in Indian religions. For instance, in Buddhism Nirvana is said to be achieved when spiritual ignorance ('avidya') ceases precisely because the 'enlightened' isn't said to be deluded about what is truly the highest good for him/her.

I now believe, after having reflected upon these things, that these kinds of ideas about freedom and ethics - irrespective (of some form) of Christianity, Buddhism or even 'secularism' etc being right - make most sense and they are the only that allow us to avoid considering 'virtuous behaviour' as the result of merely following an external code which is unrelated to our own nature.

Having made this clarification, sure, I think that scientific studies about the behavior of animals actually give us more understanding about human ethics. I am a bit reticent, however, to use it as a starting point because as you note there are differences among animal species. Still, I believe that the best approach is to study directly what happens among humans. I believe we should make the same observations we can make about animals in the case of humans.

So, I believe that the starting point of this kind of inquiry would be: what is good for a given human being? Considering that humans seem to be 'social animals', i.e. that human beings can't really be in total isolation from other human beings, we might think that, perhaps, relationships with others are essential for the good of a human being. So, how should people relate to each other in a way that it is good for them?

Are cultural differences enough a barrier to prevent us to make some judgments about other cultures? For instance, it seems that it is better for children to be raised by parents who truly love them. This is something that certainly seem to be supported by research in psychology. If we encountered a society that doesn't consider important how parents treat their children, would the difference among our cultures prevent us to say that such a society is simply wrong about this? Are we so hopelessly constrained by our own cultural context that we aren't able to make any judgment about other cultures?

The Count was quick to point this out and I agree. — praxis

:up:

I think human reality is largely shaped by human needs or purposes—and human values. We don’t share the same values however, so if there are objective values, who is right and who is wrong? And what is the purpose of insisting that one set of values is Correct? It provides the means to harness collective power. — praxis

I believe that the best approach here is to carefully examine all proposed 'set of values' with a critical spirit in a similar way one does in science (although the approach can't be the same of course). I happen to believe that, as I said, in the beginning of this post, virtue ethics and the intellectualist model of freedom are right precisely because they make the most sense and not devalue ethics as the mere following of an extrinsic moral code that is estranous, as you put it, to our 'needs or purposes'.

So, I believe that the starting point is to assess and try to find out what what are these 'needs' and 'purposes' are. Clearly some of the 'needs' aren't culturally dependent. It seems that, for instance, all children need genuine love when they are raised. Are we going to argue that this depends on a given culture? Or, instead, we might consider that, say, after reading the brutal effects that being raised in a dysfunctional or even abusive context can have on a person, perhaps we are allowed to say "it is good for children, irrespective of their cultural context, to be raised in a loving environment" as something that might apply to cultural contexts different from our own.

TBH, I never wanted to assume the truth of Christianity from the start in my posts, not sure why you think that. — boundless

I did not think you personally started with Christian notions, but I think it is so much a part of our Western culture that it would be unavoidable.

a rational being is truly free when he or she is freed from all 'obscurations' t — boundless

What are possible obscurations to rational thinking?

'libertarian' model which, instead, simply assert that freedom is the same as 'deliberative power' to choose among alternatives. — boundless

I don't like labels, and I am realizing that is hindering my ability to understand what you are saying. I mean, I know virtually nothing about libertarians. On the other hand, I feel strongly about the importance of learning virtues, but now I am thinking that learning virtues may be culture-bound and that this may be inadequate. Such as, I recently learned, some cannibals feel strongly about the rightness of eating their loved ones when they die. Culturally, eating people is forbidden, but to the cannibals who eat their loved ones, to not eat them is terrible. I think culture puts some limits on what we can think about.

For instance, in Buddhism Nirvana is said to be achieved when spiritual ignorance ('avidya') ceases precisely because the 'enlightened' isn't said to be deluded about what is truly the highest good for him/her. — boundless

I have listened to a long explanation of meditation and Buddhism, which makes me think that enlightenment is a totally different frame of mind from our everyday thinking. I don't think I am ready to be free of being a part of our common lives with all our social concerns.

I now believe, after having reflected upon these things, that these kinds of ideas about freedom and ethics - irrespective (of some form) of Christianity, Buddhism or even 'secularism' etc being right - make most sense and they are the only that allow us to avoid considering 'virtuous behaviour' as the result of merely following an external code which is unrelated to our own nature. — boundless

Interesting, given the Buddhist choice of disassociating from the cycle of life and death. Some days I think I am ready to do that, but I am still desiring my attachments, which give my life a personal meaning. I think I perfer the ups and downs of our lives to a state of bliss and no attachments.

So, I believe that the starting point of this kind of inquiry would be: what is good for a given human being? Considering that humans seem to be 'social animals', i.e. that human beings can't really be in total isolation from other human beings, we might think that, perhaps, relationships with others are essential for the good of a human being. So, how should people relate to each other in a way that it is good for them? — boundless

Well, what would be good for me is an end to pain and more energy, so I could do more volunteering and have greater life satisfaction. This is so far from what I think you are talking about, but, back to us being animals, our health and the amount of energy we have. plays into our decisions. It is hard to be the person I want to be when dealing with pain and having very little energy. Like many people my age, I am learning to keep my mouth shut and let the young find their own way. The way to relate to others is to be encouraging but not interfering. Wow, that is hard for me to do!

It's not idealism to know that the hierarchically powerful are not all powerful or godlike.

Maybe you can't assassinate a president and expect to get away with it, but i would suspect a president's cabinet members do hurt them sometimes, but in a much more minor way. I would argue that believing in the social infallibility of leaders is crazier than thinking it's impossible to harm them without getting away with it. — ProtagoranSocratist

They're not necessarily considered infallible, they're untouchable -- at least for those low enough in the hierarchy.

I was once talking to a Catholic priest. I gave a real-life example of one person causing great material damage to another person, namely, making the person homeless by destroying their home (and everything that comes along with experiencing that damage). Curiously to me, he replied, "We cannot understand evil."

So, to revisit:

What matters to me is how you personally are led to behave towards someone who you perceive as deliberately thoughtless, rude, careless, negligent, complacent, lazy, self-indulgent, malevolent, dishonest, narcissistic, malicious, culpable, perverse, inconsiderate, intentionally oppressive, repressive or unfair, disrespectful, gluttonous, wrathful, imprudent, anti-social, hypocritical, disgraceful or greedy. Do you not feel the impulse to knock some sense into them , give them a taste of their own medicine, get them to mend their ways? Do you not aim for their repentance, atonement and readiness to apologize? — Joshs

To which I replied that the socioeconomic status of myself and the other person respectively plays the determining role in how I would think about such a person's actions.

I still think it's naive and idealistic to think a person of low status could correctly measure or evaluate the words and actions of a person of high status. It's naive and idealistic to think that the same measurments apply to everyone, regardless of status. This doesn't mean that one must think of the higher-ups as infallible, but that one is not in a position to judge them. A quietism as summarized by the priest above seems to be a much more viable way to live, in contrast to wasting one's resources in a futile pursuit of "justice", or becoming cynical and jaded (and worse) upon realizing that one's sense of right and wrong cannot be acted on in cases that seem to need it most.

*double post*

I still think it's naive and idealistic to think a person of low status could correctly measure or evaluate the words and actions of a person of high status. It's naive and idealistic to think that the same measurments apply to everyone, regardless of status. — baker

i think you're conflating and assuming way too much. Who is the ultimate judge of "correct"? Here's a John Cage quote to further elaborate on what i'm saying:

“A ‘mistake’ is beside the point, for once anything happens it authentically is."

It should be noted that John Cage largely got famous for making very weird and unconventional music, some of it isn't even "music" in the technical aspect. His interest was re-writing the classical music standards: you can complain that a person of "lower status" couldn't have done what he did, but the truth is that we are creative animals, and what we do is what we do: it doesn't apply to a standard until we use them. I get you feel anguished that double standards exist, yet i do not need to internalize them, nor do i need to except some horribly slavish existence. Some will, some people will have it so bad they can't think of their life in any other way, but you don't need to bring every other person into it. It's very, very naive to think the rich and powerful are always happy.

You are talking about status...but what type of status are you talking about? People apply measurements, but the measurements themselves have absolutely no objective value. I personally don't want to go down your train of thought of trying to impose an objective truth, to me that's really depressing, because i can no longer judge a situation for myself. I can't go through my life using the opinions of others as a reference ONLY, while assuming that i can't know or judge at all. That's pretty viciously masochistic yet seemingly common.

I still think it's naive and idealistic to think a person of low status could correctly measure or evaluate the words and actions of a person of high status. — baker

the biggest issue is not that you are wrong, but the same can be said in reverse. For example, the racist trope about african americans being lazy came into being because the latter would be tired after working all day, and white people thought that this was a sign of their inherent laziness. Where great distance exists between two people, the ability to properly judge them diminishes. If a low status person attended a university, it could happen that they have all the tools they need to judge the words and actions of other people, but this of course is never guaranteed....it could be an awful university, it could be that the lower status person will feel too alienated by the culture and curriculum to get very far, yet i don't see how someone could get through there life without being open to different possibilities...

I did not think you personally started with Christian notions, but I think it is so much a part of our Western culture that it would be unavoidable. — Athena

Ok.

What are possible obscurations to rational thinking? — Athena

A lot of things. I made the example of addiction before. An addict clearly acts against one's own good. And this is because they prefer the good feelings experienced by indulging into the addiction over the long term benefit of stopping it.
Another possible example might be excessive 'self-importance', e.g. someone who tries to force their will on others which likely result in isolation, excessive suspiciousness and fear.

I don't like labels, and I am realizing that is hindering my ability to understand what you are saying. I mean, I know virtually nothing about libertarians. On the other hand, I feel strongly about the importance of learning virtues, but now I am thinking that learning virtues may be culture-bound and that this may be inadequate. Such as, I recently learned, some cannibals feel strongly about the rightness of eating their loved ones when they die. Culturally, eating people is forbidden, but to the cannibals who eat their loved ones, to not eat them is terrible. I think culture puts some limits on what we can think about. — Athena

By 'libertarianism' I mean the position that equates 'freedom' with the mere 'ability to choose between different alternative'. In my view, this understanding is incomplete.

Choices are made with an end in view. If we aren't constrained to act otherwise, if we are presented with different options, we choose the 'best' alternative, i.e. what we think is good for us (even when we experience a 'cost' for such a choice - e.g. in an 'altruistic' choice - we regard it is better to act in a certain way despite the 'cost'). However, we can be wrong in our thinking about what is good and this leads us to choose what isn't good for ourselves.

Regarding the differences between cultures I do think that the best explanation is actually that societies can be wrong in their practices, just like individuals can. I do recognize the possibility that I am 'constrained' in my judgments by my own cultural and social prejudices but I also believe that an excessively 'relativistic' approach leads to absurdity. To make a different example, slavery has been seen as 'something natural' for a very long time. I believe that nowadays we are simply more aware of the evil that slavery is and those societies that considered slavery as 'normal' were simply deluded.

Also such a relativism would also make questionable the dialogue between cultures. If we are so constrained by our cultural and social prejudices, how could possibly have benefit by having a dialogue with someone from a different socio-cultural context?
As always, perhaps, the truth is in the middle.

I have listened to a long explanation of meditation and Buddhism, which makes me think that enlightenment is a totally different frame of mind from our everyday thinking. I don't think I am ready to be free of being a part of our common lives with all our social concerns. — Athena

Neither do I. In any case, I was just using Buddhism as an example where virtue ethics seems to be central. IIRC, some scholars disagree with this interpretation of Buddhist ethics because in Buddhism there is the central tenet of 'anatman', not self, which is generally interpreted as meaning that the 'self is illusory'. At the same time, however, for an 'unenlightened' disciple the 'virtue ethics model' seems to best represent the way in which Buddhism ethics 'works'.

Incidentally, this idea that "we should cultivate virtue because it is good for us" was actually common in Antiquity. It is certainly found also in Greek and many Christian thinkers. However, in the latter case, there are undoubtedly also streams of thoughts that seem to reduce ethics to 'following rules of an extrinsically imposed system' (especially from the Late Middle Ages, if I am not mistaken). But you also find many thinkers that agreed that virtue is it's own good, that we should cultivate virtue because it is beneficial to ourselves and so on.

Well, what would be good for me is an end to pain and more energy, so I could do more volunteering and have greater life satisfaction. This is so far from what I think you are talking about, but, back to us being animals, our health and the amount of energy we have. plays into our decisions. It is hard to be the person I want to be when dealing with pain and having very little energy. Like many people my age, I am learning to keep my mouth shut and let the young find their own way. The way to relate to others is to be encouraging but not interfering. Wow, that is hard for me to do! — Athena

Ok, I see and I appreciate that :up: Note, however, how the conception of 'what the good for us is' influences the 'ideal' of life we have and how the former depends also on the 'worldview' one has.

For someone who has a 'secularist' worldview, clearly, the 'good' arguably is 'flourishing' in this life. And it makes perfect sense in such a framework.

A traditional Buddhist would, however, point out that, if Buddhism is correct, we are bound in samsara and, ultimately, 'flourishing' doesn't resolve the deeper lever of suffering we are into. In other words, those effort would be amielorative but, ultimately, would be unsatisfactory. Practicising for the ending of the cycle of death and rebirth would be the 'highest good' for them. So, in this framework, a monk or a nun that tirelessly practise to achieve Nirvana with limited social contacts would be seen as wiser than an activist.

A Christian can similarly argue that social, environmentalism activism is good. But, again, the general worldview that a Christian has is different from that of a 'secularist' and this influences also the conception of what the 'good' is and certainly for a Christian activism alone can't be the 'highest way of life'.

I could go on with examples.

So the reason why I said that discussing about 'what is good' is the starting point is that it is the foundation upon which ethics is oriented. Also, I think that too often a 'religious life' is assumed to be a life where one imposes to oneself an extrinsic 'moral code' that one follows only due to fear. Incidentally, I also believe that extreme forms of relativism also have the same problem. If there isn't any 'objective' ground upon which we can base values, ethics etc, at the end of the day there is a risk that one system imposes itself. It is no wonder why IMO Nietzsche made so many references to conflict while also be a critic of 'morality' as a form of 'denial of life'.

It was actually Nietzsche who argued this in "Geaneology of Morality", that "the good people"[virtuous] are just the powerful weak-willed masters/slaves imposing what is "good" on the basis of what is good for them. — ProtagoranSocratist

So the reason why I said that discussing about 'what is good' is the starting point is that it is the foundation upon which ethics is oriented. — boundless

Forgot to mention that 'what is good' for a person seems to be related to the 'what is a person' and this would in turn imply that ontology and ethics are related. Ethical values can't be an 'arbitrary code' that has no bearing to the ontology of human beings in order to be meaningful.

, i accept that and will let it stand because a much bigger part of his critique was slave moraliry (the inversion of master morality), because of how it relates to christianity, but it should be known to people reading this thread that Nietzsche phrased this issue very differently than we have, and it's up to them to read Geneology to interpret Nietzsche themselves.

Sorry for the insubstantial response. I thought better of it and came back to try adding some substance.

My reading of N is basically that virtue ethics is life denying or slave morality and very much in the game of social power dynamics.

i personally think N tried to avoid preaching simple morals, for that reason trying to "know the truth" about his ideas is almost impossible.

He indisputably preached creativity, self-overcoming, and the affirmation of life.

sure, but with preaching, it's always about what the person means: the Nietzsche morality he was using to replace christian thinking is pretty far from clear-cut.

↪praxis sure, but with preaching, it's always about what the person means: the Nietzsche morality he was using to replace christian thinking is pretty far from clear- — ProtagoranSocratist

Let’s say for the sake of argument that Nietzsche-interpreters like Deleuze and Focault are right in seeing the direction of the ethical for Nietzsche not within a particular content of belief, nor any particular rule or principle of conduct, but as continual creative self-transformation and self-invention. Would this be appealing to you?

Would this be appealing to you? — Joshs

Of course, the source of my disagreement was praxis trying to argue that my take on Geneaology of morality was false, and that his edited version was correct. They both work IMO, even if criticisms like "Nietzsche was the prototype for nazi and fascist ideology" are mostly false. What i like about him is the ambiguity and multi-faceted dimension of his writing. I don't like the prospect of turning his writing into a self-help authority.

I think some scholars speculate that he was deliberately ambiguous to avoid being taken as an authority.

What i like about him is the ambiguity and multi-faceted dimension of his writing. I don't like the prospect of turning his writing into a self-help authority. — ProtagoranSocratist

What I like about Nietzsche is that I am able to discern in his work a substantive, radical and quite focused philosophical stance. There is ambiguity in any philosopher. For me what is most admirable about him is not the ambiguous aspects, but the aspects the philosophers I most admire are in general agreement about, such as the meaning of concepts like eternal return and will to power. I can’t imagine a powerful philosophy which doesn't help one makes sense of one’s world and oneself. In that respect all good philosophy is ‘self-help’ . No one understood that better than Nietzsche, who believed that all philosophy was autobiography, and whose philosophical insights rescued him from desperate sickness back to health time after time.

In that respect all good philosophy is ‘self-help’ — Joshs

For me what is most admirable about him is not the ambiguous aspects, but the aspects the philosophers I most admire are in general agreement about, such as the meaning of concepts like eternal return and will to power. I can’t imagine a powerful philosophy which doesn't — Joshs

The part that makes it fun, at least for me, is the ambiguity. Otherwise, i wouldnt read his books themselves, but i would leave it up to some academic interpretation. Kaufman was a pretty good source for that among others, yet there's always room to make your own, even after all this time.

I still think it's naive and idealistic to think a person of low status could correctly measure or evaluate the words and actions of a person of high status. It's naive and idealistic to think that the same measurments apply to everyone, regardless of status. This doesn't mean that one must think of the higher-ups as infallible, but that one is not in a position to judge them. A quietism as summarized by the priest above seems to be a much more viable way to live, in contrast to wasting one's resources in a futile pursuit of "justice", or becoming cynical and jaded (and worse) upon realizing that one's sense of right and wrong cannot be acted on in cases that seem to need it most. — baker

Just checking - does this work the other way? Would it also be naive and idealistic to think a person of high status could correctly measure or evaluate the words and actions of a person of low status. And I'm also interested in what you count as high status.

You are talking about status...but what type of status are you talking about? People apply measurements, but the measurements themselves have absolutely no objective value. I personally don't want to go down your train of thought of trying to impose an objective truth, to me that's really depressing, because i can no longer judge a situation for myself. I can't go through my life using the opinions of others as a reference ONLY, while assuming that i can't know or judge at all. That's pretty viciously masochistic yet seemingly common. — ProtagoranSocratist

Here's the thing: How do you cope with blatant injustice done to you, and you have no recourse for rectifying it? Without becoming cynical and jaded?

Here's the thing: How do you cope with blatant injustice done to you, and you have no recourse for rectifying it? Without becoming cynical and jaded? — baker

You can't really dish out punishment without either committing some crime, or getting some collective approval that someone committed a wrong against you

Just checking - does this work the other way? Would it also be naive and idealistic to think a person of high status could correctly measure or evaluate the words and actions of a person of low status. — Tom Storm

This is moot, because the person of higher status is automatically correct by virtue of their higher status.

And I'm also interested in what you count as high status.

Someone with more socioeconomic power.


Look, I'm not an elitist. I'm interested in having a measure of peace of mind and not becoming cynical and jaded in the face of injustice.

If you look at popular religion/spirituality, as well as popular psychology, the advice usually goes in the direction that the ordinary person (who doesn't have the means to revenge themselves) should embrace a type of amoralist, anomic stance where they are quietly okay with whatever happens or is done to them (or others). Morality doesn't seem to be something everyone could afford.

You didn't answer my question.