That is, do you agree with W that it is a mistake to look for the use of a sign as though it were an object co-existing with the sign. Again, since the word "occult" doesn't occur in the quoted passage, I'm not clear how it establishes how W uses it. — Ludwig V

I am not sure that I agree but accept that such a judgement is critical to Wittgenstein's enterprise.

"Occult" appears in the preceding paragraph:

But if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should have to say that it was its use.

If the meaning of the sign (roughly, that which is of importance about the sign) is an image built up in our minds when we see or hear the sign, then first let us adopt the method we just described of replacing this mental image by seeing some sort of outward object, e.g. a painted or modelled image. Then why should the written sign plus this painted image be alive if the written sign alone was dead? – In fact, as soon as you think of replacing the mental image by, say, a painted one, and as soon as the image thereby loses its occult character, it ceases to seem to impart any life to the sentence at all. (It was in fact just the occult character of the mental process which you needed for your purposes.) — BB, page 9

The comment: (One of the reasons for this mistake is again that we are looking for a “thing corresponding to a substantive.”) is developed further at page 11, 48, and 72.

The "occult" is what Wittgenstein is militating against. Note the use of "us" in the following:

The sign (the sentence) gets its significance from the system of signs, from the language to which it belongs. Roughly: understanding a sentence means understanding a language.

As a part of the system of language, one may say “the sentence has life”. But one is tempted to imagine that which gives the sentence life as something in an occult sphere, accompanying the sentence. But whatever would accompany it would for us just be another sign. — ibid. page 9

In the penultimate paragraph of the book there is the following:

Let’s not imagine the meaning as an occult connection the mind makes between a word and a thing, and that this connection contains the whole usage of a word as the seed might be said to contain the tree. — ibid. page 110

I will ponder how to express my comments regarding Kant more cogently.

@Ludwig V

In considering the solipsist, I think it is important to keep the "realist" and "idealist" within shooting range. — Paine

Interesting point. I did class them all to be reactions to skepticism, but each are different, so, worth a look. And I’m trying to wrap my head around Kant as the one looking for something stable, which is not us, thus the “object” but then which cannot be the “real” object, and the gymnastics start.

I think Wittgenstein understands motives as he understands meaning in general — Joshs

But motives have their own logic (p.15), here compared to causes vs reasons.

Our interests are enacted in situations, — Joshs

I am talking about the interests/desires (and feelings, as reasons) of the skeptic, but that is also a possibility in every one of us (including Witt), and so the “situation” is our situation as humans (the human condition). (I also refer to the interests of our culture, imbedded in the criteria for judgment that hold what matters to a certain practice.)

You seem to want to argue that the picture causes the “disquiet”, which is not what I am talking about. Anyway, the skeptic is “cramped” by the forced analogy (the two senses), from which he creates the picture, but this doesn’t explain why first choose “objects” to analogize, which is the matter at hand. And you’ve given no textual evidence for putting things back to front as you have done—I need more to see the logic. I take Heidegger to be dismissing urges as a cause “a push”; but what I am discussing is exactly the “motive” of the skeptic, what they want/desire (to stand before them), which is the object, the objectivity. Yes, I am conjecturing/hypothesizing fear, but as a “reason”, which is not a cause or catalyst. The force that they can’t avoid is that of the analogy once they choose objects as a framework. As I said Witt deals with these terms in the passage on p.15, quoted above by @Paine.

@Paine

What I'm fishing for is a distinction between what explanations we can expect from philosophy and what belongs to a different, less intellectual, mode of explanation. — Ludwig V

And don't we see here the possibility of the characterization and placement of philosophy (reason) in relation to “emotion” as mentioned here? And if we/philosophy is to decide why the skeptic does what he does, isn’t that philosophical? it is, categorically, looking for a “reason” (see above), must it be a certain form of “rationale” to be intellectually, logically valid? Can we not say/hypothesize that Descartes is "worried" by his being wrong? and ask why he pictures it as sleep? what it is that he wants in answering that worry the way he does?

One distinction I'm looking at is precisely that difference between something we can attribute to anyone who holds that view and something that may vary from one person to another — Ludwig V

Me too, as I also mention to @Joshs, but the categorization that it is personal (individual or has to do with the two people arguing) is one of the imposed rationale for forcibly distinguishing “reason” (as defined/defended) from what is lumped together as “emotion” (left to persuasion). Also the charge that this is meant to point out a “flaw” as if one were judging philosophy only by “good” or “bad”, and not anything specific, rigorous, detailed, in-depth, accountable, intelligible.

What we want (!) is a way to dismiss, set aside, reject the doctrine - isn't it? — Ludwig V

I would think we would agree that part of Witt's method or aim here is to get at why in a way that is still analytical/logical (I think I will claim that that is the start and goal of the PI). Circling back, I think we may have to admit that in showing other options/logic, there is no force to Witt's "argument", particularly given the skeptic's "opinion", which I might tentatively posit as the force of conviction (though not of a "belief", but perhaps a decision or choice they nevertheless hold strongly), though I would take this up later after a think.

And my response here is meant as elucidation of the historical mistake I am pointing out and not by way of accusation or that I see us as in argument.

@Joshs @Paine @Ludwig V

Although we may have responses yet to Sec 18, and I do see the subsequent conversations as relevant and interesting and necessary, particularly the discussion of "why" (and "opinion") in Sec 17--which appears to be our driving theme here and which more than likely will continue in the next sections (which may shed some light)--I’m afraid I've hoisted myself on my own petard (in digressing into "reason v. emotion", though that may be relevant in concluding--lo! the hypocrisy), so I'm going to pause in responding to get through the last couple parts. Not to suppress discussion but just to explain I'll be stepping out for the time being. Again, anyone else is free to lead the charge as it may take me some time.

I am talking about the interests/desires (and feelings, as reasons) of the skeptic, but that is also a possibility in every one of us (including Witt), and so the “situation” is our situation as humans (the human condition). — Antony Nickles

I understand that you are concentrating on your writing now so I will wait as long as you like to respond or not, but I am compelled to say this now:

I don't follow your framing of Wittgenstein primarily intending to quell the qualms of the skeptic. What W is putting forth is provocative and has pissed a lot of people off.

The primary reason W puts forth for the "mistakes" he has outlined is the "craving for generality." He plasters the wall with Plato as the poster child for this desire. That is not to say that he "refutes" Plato.

The 'human condition' is the only game in town but is difficult to locate. As Wittgenstein has said elsewhere, he does not want to make that easier for anyone.

the skeptic is “cramped” by the forced analogy (the two senses), from which he creates the picture, but this doesn’t explain why first choose “objects” to analogize, which is the matter at hand. And you’ve given no textual evidence for putting things back to front as you have done—I need more to see the logic. — Antony Nickles

While Wittgenstein does use "wants" and "dissatisfaction," the therapeutic effect of his philosophy, the complete dissolution of the problem once the grammar is clarified, shows that the confusion is linguistic. If the cause were a deep-seated fear, simply showing the proper use of 'know' wouldn't eliminate the fear. It eliminates the problem, thus proving the problem was linguistic, not psychological.
It is as the sense-making of grammatical use that meaning shows up as how things matter to us. This mattering can be described as a logic of sense or a logic of affect-feeling-emotion. What is important is that we not try to fix such terms categorically. Anything that we might be tempted to place within the category of ‘affect’ , such as mood, feeling, desire, emotion or motive, has its existence only in how it works within the mattering of word use.

Shared interests and desires that give rise to reasons are the raw material of sense-making, and it is when the grammar becomes misleading that our interests become the fuel for illusion and intellectual disquiet. For instance, it’s not the interest in securing certainty which produces illusion, it’s when their interest is capture by a misleading picture that ‘desire for certainty ‘ miscarries.

If the cause were a deep-seated fear, simply showing the proper use of 'know' wouldn't eliminate the fear. It eliminates the problem, thus proving the problem was linguistic, not psychological. — Joshs

This is confusing. I understand why someone would not be satisfied by a correction of speech.

In the context of this book, however, the problems of the "linguistic" are taken to be separate and logically prior to the problems of psychology.

That seems to me to be a push against explanation. The different bits keep getting further apart.

Alright $#$%!!, I am a hypocrite (apologies again to @Paine); just one more (hit off the pipe) and then back to the grindstone (and by that I mean the book, not my job; obviously).

"Chose" may not be quite the right word in some cases. — Ludwig V

Touche. "Chose" is a mis-categorization. I think I'm only pointing out that there is something leading up to an "object" being the analogy (that something comes before that, as I argue to @Joshs above)

I've come to the conclusion that the solipsist has a point — Ludwig V

I agree that there is something there as well, and maybe even addressed here, but if not, definitely in the PI; here I take it as obvious he is continuing to try to learn about/investigate the skeptic. I would claim the aim is this "why?" rather than refuting or dismissing the skeptic, or not just those, but at least not before.

But this finding out is not the kind of finding out you are doing when you ask people why they are adopting a philosophical position. In philosophy, we are looking for arguments, not expressions of personal preference. — Ludwig V

But isn't this: "looking for arguments" connected/related to the skeptic turning a "muddle" into a "problem" (that they can "answer", perhaps with a certain knowledge)? and isn't this part of why "arguing" with the skeptic doesn't seem as if it would be effective? and why we are still searching for a fulcrum that changes their mind? It interests me to think of the skeptic's expressions as a "preference", as in a desire. And then: how "personal"? (not individual, but not a "position"--an "opinion"? @Paine).

But I'm not sure that those mundane activities which we barely notice could not be picked out as experiences under some circumstances. — Ludwig V

My descriptions (of thought and experience) are of course not in the text nor meant "empirically", but merely--in attempting Witt's method--as simplified examples of another version/usage (of experience) to proffer a logic/grammar that would be another option to the skeptic's "logic" (but not "the" logic), i.e., this discussion of "experience" is not to "argue" with the skeptic (or anyone) in order to decide on the "right" version--as if only one, requiring that we resolve all versions with each other.

Accordingly, in this example of "experience", I am admittedly pointing out perhaps only one among other senses or usages (than the skeptic's) that would have other logic. I brought up this example to highlight (make explicit) what I see as what follows from the skeptic's picture of experience as a mental mechanism; that it is: ever-present, and that it is: of everything.

Your point is well taken that there is a sense of "experiencing" as awareness of, or attention to, something (even that awareness and attention are regular mental processes). Maybe it’s: being alive to the little things, even, just nothing (no "thing"?) But even that version would I think accede that one can't be mindful/attentive/aware all the time (which @T Clark might speak to) which I take is the logic that follows from the skeptic's picture of experience as a "mental mechanism".

So to say there is a logic to experience that is outside the norm of occurrences (like an uneventful shopping trip), might be just another version/sense/usage of "experience" that doesn't preclude (contradict/relate to) the logic that experience is an event (not always there, as we appear to agree on). And we might even agree that if you are "experiencing" the mundane/an everyday occurrence, you are doing so "outside" of a norm (of being distracted), maybe even being outside your (normal) self (the ego).

So maybe mine is just another usage on the same branch, just: coming from the "external" ("forced" upon us, as we might put it); an "experience" as a thing in response to which we would say "Well! that was quite an experience!". And that is not to say that it cannot still depend on the individual (their "internal"; their “experience” as their history, exposure, etc.); for instance: a white person may judge an event of racism as an "experience", to which a person of color might say "Welcome to my world [of everyday occurrences that I don't even notice anymore (or try to suppress)]".

And maybe this is what the (start of the) work philosophy can do looks like, when back on rough ground.

(**Digression: I take fighting over exactly what is, or how we justify, rule following or pointing or experience (Witt will talk about this as what leads to it being seen as a "scientific" disagreement) to be the single biggest misunderstanding of Witt that stops people from even getting started.

I think we would all agree at this point that these are examples to show there are alternatives to the skeptic's singular, forced "logic". They are meant to be premises so simple that everyone would agree to them, but in the sense of "accept" them as (see them as): having a logic at all. But even getting to where we have described criteria (for one usage in a particular situation) that we accept as "logical", is not the "conclusion", say, the "right" logic in response to the skeptic's "wrong" one, and, particularly, not to satisfy what the skeptic wants (still an open question). I take Witt's investigation (further than Austin's--here I seek confirmation @Banno) to become aware of the unexamined (by reflection, explication) in order to know/see one's self (here, one's skeptic), etc., to be able, finally, to ask: why am I (the skeptic) doing this? and then: what do we really, freely, want? (what is my "real need"?) (PI #108) -- a discussion for later I think.)

@Joshs @Paine @Ludwig V

Section 19 - p. 66-69 uhhhh… what?

@Joshs, @Paine,

I agree with you. But I have some ideas about how to approach this.

The bad news is that I shall be busy today, so I won't be able to get to it until this evening.

That means for about 12 hours.

@Joshs @Paine @Ludwig V

Section 18B - “use” (oh boy, here we go…) p.65 (I can’t face 66-69 yet.)

One of the I think most misunderstood technical terms that Witt—ahem—uses. In the paragraph starting “The meaning of a phrase…”(p.65), we can all probably (hopefully) agree at this point that “The meaning is not a mental accompaniment to the expression”, mirrored off our relation to an object. More specifically, above on that page, not a thing that has “information” that is “what I really mean”. As if “I mean something” was that I make meaning happen—control its implications, connotation, repercussions, etc.

But “the meaning of a phrase for us is characterized by the use we make of it.” (Timeout. I believe a distinction is necessary between the sense of “use” here as “a purpose for or way in which something can be used” (Oxford-1) which is “use” as a noun, as "the herb has various culinary uses" or “habitual or customary usages” Webster’s 6(a)1, and the—I would say more common, and ironically philosophically more popular—sense of “use”, as a verb, where I would employ (use) words, like tools to make what I want**.)

Now above, when he says “the use we make of it”, it might seem like the second version (the verb), because I am making something, maybe the meaning? But “make of” is in the sense of an assessment, like “what ya make of this?” and the “we” is anyone, not (just) the speaker of the phrase. We are assessing the custom, or way, or purpose of this phrase, in this situation, to “show me that there is a use for the [phrase] in the kind of calculus…”. As above, there is a calculus in/of the culinary world, which allows for various uses of herbs “in practice” (p.69), and these are its logic or grammar—the distinctions, criteria, etc.—which are “characterized” by the usage (described by, reflected in). These are also interchangeably termed “senses” by him, like options, possibilities. Of course, we may put what herbs we like in the pot, however, given there is a customary logic to these matters, there will be a discussion to be had (that can be had, re: outliers). And in evaluating the use, he is looking for the grammar, the logic, as to whether, e.g., there are any distinctions pointed out that are possible in this practice/situation, or other criteria met, o,r in contrast, that the phrase does not hit any of those marks and is just spinning its wheels, simply wanting and appearing to do something, but based only on what I want it to be.

**Now, of course, I can choose what I say, but, even then, I do not control meaning, the logic of a usage, what matters in a circumstance or practice. Unfortunately, this might start another confusion, with “intend”, as if intention were an every-present causal mechanism, when it is a logic, and only at times, for example: as a hope (I’m trying to) or an excuse (I was trying to), but “my intention” is not an equivalent of the skeptic’s “my meaning”.

The role of "use" is underlined in the previous paragraph beginning where W is playing a role with: "Then I can still express my solipsism by saying,"

I could also express my claim by saying: “I am the vessel of life”; but mark, it is essential that everyone to whom I say this should be unable to understand me. It is essential that the other should not be able to understand “what I really mean”, though in practice he might do what I wish by conceding to me an exceptional position in his notation. But I wish it to be logically impossible that he should understand me, that is to say, it should be meaningless, not false, to say that he understands me. Thus my expression is one of the many which is used on various occasions by philosophers and supposed to convey something to the person who says it, though essentially incapable of conveying anything to anyone else — BB, page 65 (or 97 internet edition)

The intention to not be understood is an interesting charge to make against the solipsist and other philosophers. This shows that what troubles the solipsist is a condition other thinkers share. This encounter with a more general problem leads to a more general response:

The meaning of a phrase for us is characterised by the use we make of it. The meaning is not a mental accompaniment to the expression. Therefore the phrase “I think I mean something by it”, or “I’m sure I mean something by it”, which we so often hear in philosophical discussions to justify the use of an expression is for us no justification at all. We ask: “What do you mean?”, i.e., “How do you use this expression?” — ibid. page 65 (or 98 internet edition)

Note the "us" and "We" being used here.

@Ludwig V @Joshs

Note the "us" and "We" being used here. — Paine

This is a good distinction to point out. The "us" and "we" being both in contrast to the skeptic ("them"), but also plural, which, as @Paine says below, logically implies something shared and not individual, for example, more than individual reasons with implications only in a disagreement between you and I.

Witt is not explaining how language is used by individuals—claiming, say, that we are always “using” language. Alternatively, we are not, as part of normal conversation, deliberately choosing between the senses of an expression, nor considering their criteria, even when speaking deliberately (choosing what to say) nor even when figuring out what each other (you and I) mean. Those are simply his philosophical methods to see what usage, and what according logic, we and the skeptic make of a phrase.

Now Witt does slip in and out of the sense of “we” as: the philosophers investigating these issues, and “we” for: everyone, as when he frequently claims “when we say…”, for evidence of the grammar of a case. “All this will become clearer if we [philosophers] consider what it is that really happens when we [anyone] say a thing and mean what we say.--Let us ask ourselves: If we say to someone…” (p.34) Everyone can attest to how (by what measures) anyone (our culture) would ordinarily judge that someone successfully “meant what they said”, such as they were genuine, moved, serious, etc.

The intention to not be understood is an interesting charge to make against the solipsist and other philosophers. This shows that what troubles the solipsist [has] is a condition other thinkers share. This encounter with a more general problem leads to a more general response: — Paine

Calling the trouble the skeptic gets into a "condition" is interesting because, in its sense as a situation, we would, grammatically, "respond". But the skeptic interprets their issue as if it were a “problem”, so they are logically driven to: an "answer" (see p. 6, 17, and below), a response in the form of knowledge, as information--certain, specific, empirical, etc.

The very word "problem", one might say, is misapplied when used for our philosophical troubles. These difficulties, as long as they are seen as problems, are tantalizing, and appear insoluble. — (p.46)

That is just to say that trying to fight the skeptic as if their answer were not correct, and ours is, is to get in too close; to get sucked into their confusion. Showing examples of other senses (usages) for a phrase than the skeptic claims, is not in order to be right, but to make a point by basically saying, “see?” to show the conditions which would allow the skeptic's phrase to try do what they want (to give it the necessary context, expectations, implications, logic, etc.)

**Consider the fact that we are also involving our shared "interests" (our shared culture), our "shared judgments" (thus our shared "ordinary" criteria, as in not the skeptic's singular criteria), and our shared practices (thus the "logic" of human history). This commonality is why anyone could offer what the meaning (import) is of what we say (a phrase) in a particular situation (My gun misfires and I shoot your cow--how (in what way) is this a mistake and not an accident?).

And also, this is philosophers doing philosophy addressing philosophical issues--but is there no way in which Witt’s response (or at least the fallout, the rubble of the house of cards) is relevant to everyone? is the “why” of the skeptic relegated to an ivory tower?

The "occult" is what Wittgenstein is militating against. — Paine

Yes. It was/is a common complaint by analytic philosophers against their opponents. They were often identifying a problem with some philosophical idea. But there's a strong rhetorical component to this use - no doubt inherited from the 18th century empiricists. The actual content is something like "empty". I prefer not to use it.

Showing examples of other senses (usages) for a phrase than the skeptic claims, is not in order to be right, but to make a point by basically saying, “see?” to show the conditions which would allow the skeptic's phrase to do what they want (to give it the necessary context, expectations, implications, logic, etc.) — Antony Nickles

Yes. That's relieving the cramp. Though we need to think of someone suffering from cramp who doesn't want to be released from it. The cramp is our diagnosis. But movement can become restricted because it is never used. Perhaps that's better.

The intention to not be understood is an interesting charge to make against the solipsist and other philosophers. This shows that what troubles the solipsist is a condition other thinkers share. This encounter with a more general problem leads to a more general response: — Paine

I think that's a misunderstanding. The requirement that the solipsist's claim cannot be understood by anyone else follows from the solipsist's doctrine. The solipsist misunderstands their own doctrine if they do not understand that it is logically impossible for anyone else to understand it. IMO.

I want to play chess, and a man gives the white king a paper crown, leaving the use of the piece unaltered, but telling me that the crown has a meaning to him in the game, which he can't express by rules. I say: "as long as it doesn't alter the use of the piece, it hasn't what I call a meaning". — p. 65

This is an argument. But it depends on a restricting the interpretation of both "use" and "meaning" to what is laid down and permitted by the rules. Other kinds of significance are excluded. Perhaps the paper crown distracts opponents, for example.

Think of the law of identity, "a = a", and of how we sometimes try hard to get hold of its sense, to visualize it, by looking at an object and repeating to ourselves such a sentence as "This tree is the same thing as this tree". The gestures and images by which I apparently give this sentence sense are very similar to those which I use in the case of "Only this is really seen".

I love this. I've never been able to work out what "a=a" means. Nor does it help me to tell me that this is a "limiting case" of identity. What does that mean. It may be necessary in logic, but I don't think it helps at all in philosophy.

Note the "us" and "We" being used here.
— Paine
This is a good distinction to point out. — Antony Nickles

Now Witt does slip in and out of the sense of “we” as: the philosophers investigating these issues, and “we” for: everyone, — Antony Nickles

It is interesting, though, that this use is often intended to identify some ground common to all human beings. (Hume and Berkeley do the same thing with their appeals to universal agreement. It is odd, though, that their philosophical opponents clearly do not belong to that agreement; so, who are they? We, now, can see that what they meant by "we" was "people like us". Not a particularly convincing reference group to establish what they are supposed to establish.) (I use "we" and "us" quite freely myself, because it seems to work.

But “the meaning of a phrase for us is characterized by the use we make of it.” .... which is “use” as a noun, .... , and the ..... sense of “use”, as a verb, where I would employ (use) words, like tools to make what I want**.) — Antony Nickles

Yes. I make a similar distinction, which may map on to yours. Mine has use in an "objective" sense as meaning something like the role of a sign as defined by the system in which it exists as against what I do with it. (The difference can be seen in the wonderful way that language allows us to misuse it, to stretch it, bend it, turn it round.)

The sign (the sentence) gets its significance from the system of signs, from the language to which it belongs. Roughly: understanding a sentence means understanding a language. — ibid. page 9

Wittgenstein frequently refers to language as a calculus. I have a feeling that his paradigms here come from formal logic - propositional and predicate calculus.

One sometimes hears that such a phrase as "This is here", when while I say it I point to a part of my visual field, has a kind of primitive meaning to me, although it can't impart information to anybody else. — p.65

.. and, of course, if your paradigm of pointing is what a sign-post does, there is no way that you can point to a part of your visual field - or even the whole of it. So "pointing" here has been moved into another language game or practice. And we know what is meant, don't we?

what do we really, freely, want? (what is my "real need"?) (PI #108) -- a discussion for later I think.) — Antony Nickles

I think this is why W's talk of practices and ways of life needs to be more articulated before it becomes more than a gesture - a promise.

Shared interests and desires that give rise to reasons are the raw material of sense-making, — Joshs

Yes. But identifying what those are. There seem to be precious few of them. It's a bit like the concept of "ius gentium" that the Roman lawyers invented - the idea that any human society needs certain laws in order to function at all. (I'm not saying that's false - just that it is very difficult to cash out.)

The 'human condition' is the only game in town but is difficult to locate. As Wittgenstein has said elsewhere, he does not want to make that easier for anyone. — Paine

That's another good concept for focusing what W seems to be getting at.

I think that's a misunderstanding. The requirement that the solipsist's claim cannot be understood by anyone else follows from the solipsist's doctrine. The solipsist misunderstands their own doctrine if they do not understand that it is logically impossible for anyone else to understand it. IMO. — Ludwig V

The bit I quoted leaves out where the solipsist just moments before was attempting to speak meaningfully of his condition. It is the conflict of motives that seems to make W impatient rather than him judging all who explain themselves a certain way to be deliberately obscure.

The use of "occult" is pejorative. In view of the consistency with which Wittgenstein employs the term, a replacement would have to name what is thinking that "signs co-exist with their objects."

By pointing out when W speaks of "us" versus "them" in the above quotes, I did not mean to say he is always doing that. On the contrary, he explicitly draws such a line in the sand only in specific places over specific practices. The constant appeal to common sense and ordinary language gives the background of how perplexity appears. When W draws the line in the sand, it is over the method of philosophy. The scrum is happening on a shared field of discourse.

I read through the OP from the beginning last night and see that I have challenged your view of "the skeptic" many times. I will stop arguing in that vein. I will only point out that the opposition regarding the use of signs in this book's discussion of the real versus the empirical is applied to Augustine just as heartily in the Philosophical Investigations.

Showing examples of other senses (usages) for a phrase than the skeptic claims, is not in order to be right, but to make a point by basically saying, “see?” to show the conditions which would allow the skeptic's phrase to do what they want (to give it the necessary context, expectations, implications, logic, etc.)
— Antony Nickles
Yes. That's relieving the cramp. Though we need to think of someone suffering from cramp who doesn't want to be released from it. The cramp is our diagnosis. But movement can become restricted because it is never used. Perhaps that's better. — Ludwig V

This gets to the question of the relation between feeling-affect-desire and the ‘intellectual’ for Wittgenstein. There are a wide variety of interpretations to choose from among Wittgenstein scholars. My preference is to claim that the desire to stay on the path of illusion is not knowingly to do so. Desire only makes sense the way that true and false makes sense , within a form of life that gives both a desire and the criterion of truth their intelligibility. If what can be intelligibly desired takes place within a form of life that rests on a grammatical illusion, it is not as though desire first recognizes the illusion and then decides to ignore this knowledge. Rather , the desire can’t make it intelligible in the first place. It is not a s though desire knows the illusion as illusion and then decides to stay with the illusion, as though desire has a choice.

The philosophical problem is not a moral failing or an act of bad faith where the skeptic willfully chooses illusion over truth. Instead, the deep-seated desire for certainty or for a complete explanation is captured by a misleading grammatical picture.

a replacement would have to name what is thinking that "signs co-exist with their objects." — Paine

I think you are missing Wittgenstein's point. Of course signs co-exist with their objects. The image of the man with a shovel is ahead of the roadworks and the man with the shovel is at the roadworks. The board and arrow pointing straight ahead are deliberately place well before you get to your destination. There's nothing occult going on there.

If the meaning of the sign (roughly, that which is of importance about the sign) is an image built up in our minds when we see or hear the sign, then first let us adopt the method we just described of replacing this mental image by seeing some sort of outward object, e.g. a painted or modelled image. Then why should the written sign plus this painted image be alive if the written sign alone was dead? — BB, page 9

That's quite different, isn't it? It "inserts" ("posits", if you want to be polite) an object between the sign and what it is a sign of. Wittgenstein's point is that the posited/inserted object doesn't do anything.

The classic arguments are these:-

From whence it seems probable to me, that the simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts; beyond which the mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any discoveries, when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of those ideas. — Locke, Essay, II, 23, xxix

One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the nature of things is the current opinion that everything includes within itself the cause of its properties; or that there is in each object an inward essence which is the source whence its discernible qualities flow, and whereon they depend. Some have pretended to account for appearances by occult qualities, but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical causes, to wit, the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities, of insensible particles; — Berkeley, Principles, 102

that the desire to stay on the path of illusion is not knowingly to do so. — Joshs

That's true. Though we can cling on to ideas because we want them to be true and/or can't bear the truth.

It is not as though desire knows the illusion as illusion and then decides to stay with the illusion, as though desire has a choice. — Joshs

Well, yes. To know the illusion for what it is is already to be cured.

I keep hammering on about this because it seems to me that Wittgenstein under-rates the difficulty and complexity of the task, and I worry that he does not seem to allow me to come to realize that what I thought was an illusion, isn't. Or, to put it another way, he doesn't seem to recognize the give and take that you can sometimes find in philosophical argument, where both sides have allowed their own view to be at stake in the argument. Not always, of course.

There are, however, some awkward phenomena. Akrasia (weakness of will) is one, and another is the phenomenon of protesting too much - where vehement denial of a truth betrays the denier's uneasy awareness the they are wrong.

Of course signs co-exist with their objects. — Ludwig V

That works for highway signs but does not explain why Wittgenstein calls it a mistake (without qualification) when reflecting upon learning language and the experience of meaning.

There are, however, some awkward phenomena. Akrasia (weakness of will) is one, and another is the phenomenon of protesting too much - where vehement denial of a truth betrays the denier's uneasy awareness the they are wrong. — Ludwig V

Psychologist George Kelly defined hostility as “the continued effort to extort validational evidence in favor of a type of social prediction which has already proved itself a failure.” Put simply, in hostility, events turn out differently than one had expected, and instead of revising one’s thinking, one tries to ‘force a round peg into a square hole.’