"Ought" and "Is" Are Not Two Types of Propositions

panwei

Traditional political philosophy often grounds its normative foundations in transcendent moral laws or abstract social contracts. However, the "must" argued for in this theory is not based on moral judgment or orientation, but rather on the efficacy requirement that a fundamental purpose imposes on action. It is an instrumental "must"—an internal, factual necessity based on the causal relationship between ends and means. It is analogous to saying, "If you want to stay alive, you must breathe." Its compelling force originates from the factual existence of the purpose "wanting to stay alive" and the fact that "breathing" is a necessary condition for achieving that purpose. I am not claiming that the "fundamental purpose" is a "good" or "bad" value orientation in a moral sense, nor am I asserting that we oughtto comply with this purpose; rather, I am stating that it is a factually given setting at the level of biological mechanism.
Nevertheless, the conclusions derived in this theory coincide with many of the "moral obligations" we intuitively endorse; indeed, the parts that do not coincide appear, in my view, even more reasonable. Does this not suggest that the compelling force of the "moral obligation" we have always felt may precisely originate from this kind of "functional norm" encoded in our biological nature? For instance, we have an intuitionthat killing is wrong because our minds can vaguely discern that the act of arbitrarily infringing upon life would be fundamentally detrimental to our adaptation to the environment and survival. Perhaps the moral system of human society is itself an adaptive tool formed under evolutionary pressures to promote group survival and reproduction. In other words, morality is a cultural apparatus that "serves the fundamental purpose."
Therefore, the claim of this theory is more radical than "describing a coincidence": it asserts that the unique authority of moral obligation stems precisely from this instrumental necessity deeply embedded in the logic of action. When we say, "A ought to do X," the compelling force behind it does not come from some mysterious transcendent law, but from a fact—for any agent of action possessing a specific fundamental purpose, doing X is a logical requirement dictated by that fundamental purpose. This "must" is not an approximation of morality; it is the very foundation of morality. The reason we feel the irresistible binding force of "ought" is that our rationality intuits this factual connection between the action and the fundamental purpose. The authority of moral language is merely the projection and expression of this factual connection within human psychology and culture. In other words, the essence of "ought" is the recognized"must" that serves the fundamental purpose.
Hume pointed out that it is impossible to validly derive an "ought" (a value or normative proposition) from an "is" (a series of propositions of fact that contain no value judgments). There is a logical chasm between them; any such derivation necessarily implies an unstated normative premise. However, this theory posits that the "ought" in the traditional sense is, in its essence, a specific type of "is."

The above is an explanation I made after completing the institutional argument to respond to Hume's dilemma.Translations provided by deepseek.

Astorre

↪panwei

I like the functionalist approach. I also share your idea about the origins of "ought." Essentially, this isn't a new idea—just a new perspective on an old instinct. Modern man, even without a background in philosophy, already lives within this paradigm. He intuitively thinks in terms of cause and effect:

"Don't mess with the electrical panel—it'll kill you."

There's no morality here—there's necessity.

But I have a question for you. Your approach works brilliantly in the context of the formation of society, when any deviation could cost the system its very existence. However, what happens when society becomes overdeveloped?

A hundred years ago, people could afford much less. The risks were higher, the connection between action and consequences more direct. For example, openly declaring one's sexual orientation meant jeopardizing everything: reputation, safety, even one's very existence. Why? Because society then had a clearer sense of its own boundaries, its own supporting structures. Even a single violation was perceived as a crack in the foundation.

Over time, society has strengthened. It has become so resilient that it no longer fears individual deviations. The right to personal choice has become a cult, sometimes to the point of absurdity.

Today, teenagers online hurl words at each other that would once have landed them in court or jail—and they do it playfully.

As a result, the sense of boundaries—that very sense of what is necessary—has become dulled. The individual no longer faces direct punishment for deviant behavior. The functional regulator you wrote about dissolves in excess freedom.

We have Ouroboros, a morality that devours itself.
A system created for survival has succeeded so much that it is now destroying its own foundations.

And here's my question for you:
How do you see this consequence within the framework of your approach?
Can a functional morality explain—or restrain—the self-destruction of a system that has become too successful?

Banno

↪panwei

When you go shopping, you take a list of the things that you want. When you receive a receipt at the check out, you will get a list of the very same things. The two lists may be the same, but their purpose is very different. One is what you wanted, the other is what you got.

That's the difference between ought and is. The receipt from the checkout is what is the case, the shopping list is what ought be the case.

The difference is in the intent one takes to each. One guides your actions, the other describes them.

And that's pretty much why you can't get an ought from an is; at some point you have to change from what you see about you to how you want things to be - to change your attitude. And that's not a issue of deduction.

So in your essay, if the conclusion is an "ought", there has to be a point at which that ought is introduced. And that seems to be "the compelling force". So even if "doing X is a logical requirement dictated by that fundamental purpose" then isn't that fundamental purpose is hte source of the "ought"?

And if so, it's not an "is".

sime

In Decision Theory, States and Actions are generally treated as logically orthogonal concepts; an 'is' refers to the current state of an agent, and an 'ought' refers to the possible action that has the highest predicted utility in relation to the agent's 'is'. This treatment allows causal knowledge of the world to be separated from the agent's subjective preferences.

Paradoxically, this can imply that the psychological distinction between states versus action utilities is less clear, considering the fact that agents don't generally have the luxury of having perfect epsistemic knowledge of their worlds prior to taking an action (e.g. as required to solve the Bellman Equation).

Also, an action is only as good as the state that it leads to - rewards are related to (state,action) pairs, so utility values can be thought of as equivalence classes of states quotiented with respect to action utilities. This is practically important, since agents don't generally have the memory capacity to store perfect world knowledge even if it were available. Agents tend to visit and focus their learning on the state->action->(reward,state) chains that correspond to highest reward, and then learn compressed representations of these visited states in terms of a small number of features that efficiently predict utility. E.g Chess Engines estimate the utility of a board position by representing the board in terms of a managebly small number of spatial relations between pieces, especially in relation to the Kings. So the representational distinction between states and action reward values in the mind of an agent is muddied.

bert1

at some point you have to change from what you see about you to how you want things to be — Banno

I agree with you, but haven't you previously resisted a reduction of what ought to be the case to what one wants to be the case?

Banno

haven't you previously resisted a reduction of what ought to be the case to what one wants to be the case? — bert1

On the grounds that "ought" has a social aspect, yes. Small steps. Not what I want but what we want.

Hanover

It's an interesting question (although not really asked) whether a perfect god entails that ought and is be the same.

bert1

↪Banno

Oh, fair enough. In that case I agree with you.

Perhaps the moral system of human society is itself an adaptive tool formed under evolutionary pressures to promote group survival and reproduction. In other words, morality is a cultural apparatus that "serves the fundamental purpose." — panwei

Your OP is a well-stated version of an evolutionary explanation for morality. As such, it's open to the usual objections, which I think are correct.

First, let's assume that we really could come up with the ideal "natural" or "socially adaptive" or "evolutionarily coded" description of how humans may best flourish. Conceivably, you could take this description and apply it to the species in general, saying "For the species to flourish, this is what must happen." But a species is not a moral agent; it doesn't know about terms like "ought" or "should." But individuals do, and at the individual level, the same old problem arises: Why should I, an individual, care about the flourishing of the species? For that matter, I may not care much about my own flourishing -- and if I don't, what is the argument that I ought to? What makes it right for me to do so? You need some previous moral premises (involving an ethical preference for life over death, happiness over pain) in order to make that work. Now of course, as a matter of fact, most of us do prefer happiness to pain, but not because it's ethically right to do so. It just feels better -- and that's only a moral reason if you can make the argument that feeling better is the right thing to pursue, ethically.

Second, it seems all too clear that what's been selected by evolution for human behavior isn't a reliable guide to morality anyway. You refer to "a factually given setting at the level of biological mechanism." Well, just to pick one such setting, heterosexual men are hardwired to find nubile young women/girls sexually desirable. There are obvious advantages to being able to begin reproduction as early as possible, and a 13-year-old girl will likely be strong and healthy too, suggesting healthy offspring. But most cultures now regard such a program as immoral. Why? What is the reasoning that would show us -- rightly -- that childbearing at such a young age is an immoral hardship to impose on a girl? To make such an argument, you have to weight different "natural" features of our species, and make an ethical decision about which ones to take as guides. In short, "ought" and "should" must again be introduced; there is no "specific type of 'is'" that can help us.

bert1

↪Hanover

It is, and the answer, I think, is 'yes' if we include the assumption of omnipotence in the concept of perfection. It still only follows that what is is what ought to be from God's point of view. It remains possible for God to be at odds with the values of Earthly (or Andromedan) communities, and from their point of view, for God to be an evil git, who ought not to will what he wills. But I'm a moral (inter-)subjectivist. And indeed this is off topic.

Joshs

For instance, we have an intuitionthat killing is wrong because our minds can vaguely discern that the act of arbitrarily infringing upon life would be fundamentally detrimental to our adaptation to the environment and survival. Perhaps the moral system of human society is itself an adaptive tool formed under evolutionary pressures to promote group survival and reproduction. In other words, morality is a cultural apparatus that "serves the fundamental purpose." — panwei

This seems like a long and convoluted way to explain something that can be better explained in a much more direct way. We believe killing is wrong because we care about others. We care about others because we see them as like ourselves, which allows us to relate to them, learn from them, expand the boundaries of our sense of self. It’s not a question of what we can ‘get out of them’ for some narrowly conceived selfish purpose, but that they become a part of our own sense of self. The self is enriched and expanded to include others rather than simply treat them as objects for solipsistic purposes. Yes, we could argue that this furthers the survival of the species, but this is still looking at the notion of survival too narrowly and statically. What is being enhanced isnt the mere static survival of an object-a human, but the becoming and expansion of the self. Social bonds, friendship , love and cooperation dont just do the bidding of some prior “fundamental purpose” called evolutionary survival; they are its extension and redefinition. They are not just a means to some prior end. They are their own ends., their own fundamental purpose.

Joshs

↪Banno

That's the difference between ought and is. The receipt from the checkout is what is the case, the shopping list is what ought be the case. — Banno

It’s difficult for me to absorb the sense of this Humean distinction. My brain is clogged with too many sedimented layers of philosophy which have explicitly dismantled the entire framework on which the is-ought distinction is built. My thoughts bounce from enactivists like Evan Thompson and Francisco Varela to hermeneuticists like Dilthey and Gadamer, from poststructuralists like Deleuze and Foucault to phenomenologists like Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-ponty, from Wittgenstein, Putnam and Rorty, to Joseph Rouse and Karen Barad.

Joshs

↪Astorre

I also share your idea about the origins of "ought." Essentially, this isn't a new idea—just a new perspective on an old instinct — Astorre

You’re right, the is-ought divide is not a new idea. So why not let some fresh air into the room by focusing on newer philosophies ( there are many of them) which dismantle the basis for the is-ought distinction?

We care about others because we see them as like ourselves, which allows us to relate to them, learn from them, expand the boundaries of our sense of self. — Joshs

I agree with the thrust of your post, and I personally share the sentiment quoted above. But . . . suppose I don't? Suppose I don't see others as like myself, and am not interested in relating to them or expanding my sense of self. Are you arguing that I ought to? If not, what does this have to do with ethics and morality, with doing the right thing or pursuing the good or however one cares to phrase it?

GazingGecko

Does this not suggest that the compelling force of the "moral obligation" we have always felt may precisely originate from this kind of "functional norm" encoded in our biological nature? — panwei

I'm skeptical of this. It might be the case that donating to a sperm-bank would serve our biological nature's ends. That seems at least initially plausible. Yet, I don't think we intuit a compelling force that this is "good," or that it would be "good" for our tribe or kin to donate sperm, so it's not clear this is what is going on when we concern ourselves with morality.

It is an instrumental "must"—an internal, factual necessity based on the causal relationship between ends and means. It is analogous to saying, "If you want to stay alive, you must breathe." Its compelling force originates from the factual existence of the purpose "wanting to stay alive" and the fact that "breathing" is a necessary condition for achieving that purpose. — panwei

I'm not sure of this, but your instrumental theory might turn out to be either: (a) trivial prediction; (b) imports normative "ought" again.

It becomes (a), if you are merely stating that "given desire X, you are likely to be motivated to Y because it efficiently achieves X." There is no compelling force, it is a descriptive claim without any normative content. It is incomplete if it is to serve in our moral deliberation.

Or it does (b) by adding the premise "you ought to take the efficient means to your ends." Then there is normative force, but I'm not sure how that fits into your picture since it appears like the gap is back.

Or have I misunderstood you?

sime

Are 'oughts' inferences, and are 'ises' reducible to 'oughts'?

In ordinary language, "ought" is also used to signify predictive confidence, as in "it ought to rain"; so "oughts" aren't necessarily used in relation to utility maximisation. Furthermore, we understand what an agent is trying to achieve in terms of our theory of the agent's mind, which is partly based on our observations of their past behaviour. So an inference of what an agent 'ought' to do on the basis of what 'is' can perhaps be understood as an application of Humean induction. And our description of what 'is' tends to invoke teleological concepts, e.g. if we describe a ball as being a snooker ball it is because we believe that it ought to behave in the normal way that we expect of snooker balls from past experience.

So if descriptions of what is the case are necessarily inferential, and if our understanding of moral obligations are in terms of our theory of minds which in turn are inferred from behavioral observations, then perhaps there is an argument for saying that only oughts exist, even if we are never sure which ones.

Count Timothy von Icarus

Hume's division isn't logical, it's metaphysical and epistemic. If one rejects Hume's psychology, which Hume himself seems to acknowledge cannot be justified given his epistemology, one has no reason to accept the division.

Just consider the assumption that there are facts about values.

So:

X is better than Y (X is more worthy of choice than Y) is true (a fact).

It does not follow that this fact can never imply "choose X over Y." To be truly "more worthy of choice" or "better," or "more desirable," is simply to be what ought to be chosen. The only reason this is obfuscated is because much modern ethics has this bizarre fixation on "ought" as only applying to a sui generis sort of "moral obligation." Yet even after centuries of this, we still don't use the word "ought" in this way. "You ought to try the chicken," or "she likes you, you ought to ask here out," do not imply "you are morally obligated to eat this chicken," or "you are morally obligated to ask our friend out on a date."

I suppose, if we face objections here we can allow that it is an axiom of practical reason that: "it is true that one ought to choose the better over the worse, the more choiceworthy over the less, etc."

So:

1. It is true that we ought to choose the better over the worse.
2. X is better than Y.
C. Thus, we ought to choose Y.

Is fine, and so it follows that if there are facts (is statements) about values we should have no problem following these into conclusions about what we "ought" to do. If people insist that 1 must be included in all arguments involving "values" I would counter that this seems unnecessary given what "better" or "good" mean, but it hardly seems too problematic to include it since it is obviously true.

The point of the division is more that Hume's psychology precludes ever knowing such facts, although it also precludes knowing virtually any facts at all, which we might suppose just indicates that it is a grievously deficient theory of knowledge.

Count Timothy von Icarus

↪sime

Good point, that's another common usage of "ought." And given Hume's epistemic commitments, I do wonder if there can ever be anything other than these sorts of "ought" claims outside claims about "relations of ideas," which are themselves grounded in sense perceptions from which we can only ever derive predictive oughts (which arguably can never be justified according to his epistemology and psychology).

Leontiskos

The only reason this is obfuscated is because much modern ethics has this bizarre fixation on "ought" as only applying to a sui generis sort of "moral obligation." Yet even after centuries of this, we still don't use the word "ought" in this way. "You ought to try the chicken," or "she likes you, you ought to ask here out," do not imply "you are morally obligated to eat this chicken," or "you are morally obligated to ask our friend out on a date." — Count Timothy von Icarus

:up:

I suppose, if we face objections here we can allow that it is an axiom of practical reason that: "it is true that one ought to choose the better over the worse, the more choiceworthy over the less, etc." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Aquinas:

Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek after." Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided. — Aquinas, ST I-11.94.2 - What are the precepts of natural law?

The nub is whether predicates like "good" and "better" are truth-apt or can be "factual." What you've rightly pointed out is that, regardless of what one says when they are in their "philosophy mode," in everyday life we take it for granted that such predicates are truth-apt.

1. It is true that we ought to choose the better over the worse.
2. X is better than Y.
C. Thus, we ought to choose Y. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I know we've been here before, but I have to point out that this could only be true if "better than" is defined as "should be chosen" or "is worthy [?] of choice," in which case the alleged argument becomes a tautology ("We ought to choose what we ought to choose"). But if "is better than" is given an independent interpretation from "should be chosen," then the argument merely shows that the "ought" premise in needed in order to get to the "ought" conclusion. How do you justify the first premise? Why is it morally obligatory to choose the better over the worse? -- that question needs to be answered without reference, overt or covert, to what is worthy of choice; otherwise it just goes in circles.

Yet even after centuries of this, we still don't use the word "ought" in this way. "You ought to try the chicken," or "she likes you, you ought to ask here out," do not imply "you are morally obligated to eat this chicken," or "you are morally obligated to ask our friend out on a date." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of course they don't. That's why they aren't moral injunctions. Whereas "You ought to help the poor" is. Is there a reason why "ought" can't have both moral and non-moral uses? Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that "we still don't use the word 'ought' exclusively in this way"? For why should we? -- surely the deontological ethicists weren't recommending that.

ProtagoranSocratist

Perhaps the moral system of human society is itself an adaptive tool formed under evolutionary pressures to promote group survival and reproduction. — panwei

I'd argue this as well; you'll notice that standards tend to shift rather than stay permanent, "we killed them and it is justified because..." and various other examples.

"Ought" and "must" aren't the only illusory types words people to use, there's also the use of can/can't beyond possible/impossible, and the dreaded "should".

Joshs

I agree with the thrust of your post, and I personally share the sentiment quoted above. But . . . suppose I don't? Suppose I don't see others as like myself, and am not interested in relating to them or expanding my sense of self. Are you arguing that I ought to? If not, what does this have to do with ethics and morality, with doing the right thing or pursuing the good or however one cares to phrase it — J

What I’m arguing is that ‘sense of self’ has nothing to do with the physical boundary that divides the outer layer of my skin from other persons. It has precisely to do with relatability and assimilability. I can be divided within my own ‘self’ just a much as I can be united with another person, depending on the relative success at achieving this integration. My personal desires and interests don’t come before this striving for self-integration; it is intrinsic to the very nature of desire. This ought is not a choice, it is the condition of possibility of intelligible experience.

Leontiskos

I know we've been here before — J

Yes, and you still haven't addressed the problems with your view. "X should be chosen because X is worthy (or worthwhile)," is simply not a tautology. Your claim that it is a tautology requires equivocation and a redefinition of "worth."

It should be easy enough to see this by simply noting that an argument over whether something has worth is not the same as an argument over whether some course of action should be taken. For instance, "The coffee should be chosen because the coffee should be chosen," is not the same as, "The coffee should be chosen because it tastes delicious," and yet 'tastes delicious' is itself here understood as a relevant form of worth.

Joshs

"X should be chosen because X is worthy (or worthwhile)," is simply not a tautology. Your claim that it is a tautology requires equivocation and a redefinition of "worth."

It should be easy enough to see this by simply noting that an argument over whether something has worth is not the same as an argument over whether some course of action should be taken. For instance, "The coffee should be chosen because the coffee should be chosen," is not the same as, "The coffee should be chosen because it tastes delicious," and yet 'tastes delicious' is itself here understood as a relevant form of worth. — Leontiskos

The way I’m reading ‘x should be chosen’ is that it implies a preference. The choice being recommended is preferable to the alternatives on some basis, and thus more worthy to be chosen than the alternatives on that same basis. One isn't making a blanket implication of the worth of the recommended choice, only that it is worthier than the alternatives on some basis. It’s hard to imagine a circumstance in which the utterance ‘the coffee should be chosen because the coffee should be chosen’ would be useful, except as a way of answering objections with ‘because I said so’, which isnt a denial that I deem the coffee preferable to (more worthy than) alternatives, but simply says ‘the reasons for my preference are none of your business and just do what I say’.

This ought is not a choice — Joshs

Well, OK. So if I were to say to someone, "You ought to ____ [filling in your description of what you call the intrinsic striving for self-expression]," that would be pointless, since they're doing it anyway?

Leontiskos

Traditional political philosophy often grounds its normative foundations in transcendent moral laws or abstract social contracts. However, the "must" argued for in this theory is not based on moral judgment or orientation, but rather on the efficacy requirement that a fundamental purpose imposes on action. It is an instrumental "must"—an internal, factual necessity based on the causal relationship between ends and means. It is analogous to saying, "If you want to stay alive, you must breathe." Its compelling force originates from the factual existence of the purpose "wanting to stay alive" and the fact that "breathing" is a necessary condition for achieving that purpose. I am not claiming that the "fundamental purpose" is a "good" or "bad" value orientation in a moral sense, nor am I asserting that we oughtto comply with this purpose; rather, I am stating that it is a factually given setting at the level of biological mechanism. — panwei

Good. You are describing teleological reasoning.

When we say, "A ought to do X," the compelling force behind it does not come from some mysterious transcendent law, but from a fact—for any agent of action possessing a specific fundamental purpose, doing X is a logical requirement dictated by that fundamental purpose. — panwei

Right, but the opponent of teleological reasoning will claim that they have no reason to adopt the fundamental purpose/telos that you identify. They will say, "I agree that I ought to eat food if my purpose is survival, but I don't grant that my purpose need be survival. I could choose to die instead of survive if I want."

The reason we feel the irresistible binding force of "ought" is that our rationality intuits this factual connection between the action and the fundamental purpose. — panwei

Yes, very good. :up:

Hume pointed out that it is impossible to validly derive an "ought" (a value or normative proposition) from an "is" (a series of propositions of fact that contain no value judgments). There is a logical chasm between them; any such derivation necessarily implies an unstated normative premise. However, this theory posits that the "ought" in the traditional sense is, in its essence, a specific type of "is." — panwei

Your point has been given in all sorts of different ways over the years. One of them would simply say, "I have such-and-such a purpose/telos/end, therefore I ought to undertake the means to that end," is a straightforward derivation of 'ought' from 'is'.

AmadeusD

that fundamental purpose is hte source of the "ought"? — Banno

Yessir.

T Clark

A very good OP.

However, the "must" argued for in this theory is not based on moral judgment or orientation, but rather on the efficacy requirement that a fundamental purpose imposes on action. It is an instrumental "must"—an internal, factual necessity based on the causal relationship between ends and means. — panwei

I was going to argue with this. As I see it, all political judgment is underlaid buy a value judgment about what the responsibility of a society is to its members. As I read further down, I see that you’ve addressed that issue pretty well.

Perhaps the moral system of human society is itself an adaptive tool formed under evolutionary pressures to promote group survival and reproduction. In other words, morality is a cultural apparatus that "serves the fundamental purpose." — panwei

This is how I see things too, although it always pays to be skeptical about attributing specific purposes to evolution. The way I say it is that people like each other and we like to be around each other. We find value in other human beings, especially those close to us. Under ideal conditions, these values guide us in how we behave when we’re trying to live together. The ultimate foundation of morality comes from within us, it isn’t imposed from outside.

The authority of moral language is merely the projection and expression of this factual connection within human psychology and culture. In other words, the essence of "ought" is the recognized"must" that serves the fundamental purpose. — panwei

I have a somewhat different take on this. I split what we call morality into two parts 1) that voice inside us that guides our actions—our conscience 2) The voice of authority from outside that works to control disruptive behavior and maintain the stability of society. Sometimes these two factors reinforce each other, sometimes not.

There is a logical chasm between them; any such derivation necessarily implies an unstated normative premise. — panwei

Yes, this makes sense to me.

Joshs

↪J

This ought is not a choice
— Joshs

Well, OK. So if I were to say to someone, "You ought to ____ [filling in your description of what you call the intrinsic striving for self-expression]," that would be pointless, since they're doing it anyway? — J

They’re doing some ought, but it may not match your ought. Your ought may be taken as an invitation to view the situation from a different vantage. In psychological theory, the separating of is and ought translates into the difference between the person as a static object and the motives which push or pull them into behaving.
The ought is this ‘spark plug’ which is presumed to be needed to drive action. Psychological approaches like enactivism assume that we always already find ourselves thrown into action, so the ‘ought’ of motive doesn’t have to posited as a separate mechanism from the ‘is’ of being in the world. The issue isn’t how we get ourselves started but how we cope with the way we find ourselves thrown into situations , that is, the direction of motive.

The enactivists also argue that the social linguistic community is inseparably intertwined with the very notion of self; intersubjective factors already have an effect on our perception and understanding of the world and ourselves, even in the immediacy of our instrumental copings with the environment.

T Clark

Perhaps the moral system of human society is itself an adaptive tool formed under evolutionary pressures to promote group survival and reproduction. In other words, morality is a cultural apparatus that "serves the fundamental purpose."
— panwei

This is how I see things too, although it always pays to be skeptical about attributing specific purposes to evolution. — T Clark

Another thought. I think maybe this emphasis on biology and evolution underplays the importance of culture and learning on our personal moral judgments.

Again, a really good OP.

Leontiskos

The way I’m reading ‘x should be chosen’ is that it implies a preference. The choice being recommended is preferable to the alternatives on some basis, and thus more worthy to be chosen than the alternatives on that same basis. One isn't making a blanket implication of the worth of the recommended choice, only that it is worthier than the alternatives on some basis. — Joshs

One of the reasons I wouldn't phrase things in quite the same way that @Count Timothy von Icarus does is because I think the relativistic model is sub-optimal. To put it concisely, I would rather talk about "good" or "worth" rather than "better" (and of course 'better' denotes a relation).

What this means is that if something is "more worthy" or "more valuable" than something else, then it does have intrinsic worth. So when I say, "Better than the alternatives," there must be some fixed rational aspect according to which it is better. In the coffee example that fixed rational aspect was taste, and this cashes out in the fact that one does not only desire something that tastes better than the alternatives, but one also desires something that tastes good.

This dance between 'good' and 'better' is always operative in the realm of practical reason (including morality). Each entails the other, and so your point is fine as far as it goes. Nevertheless, for Aquinas and Aristotle the good has a priority over the better, and this is because the precept, "Seek the better," already presupposes the precept, "Seek the good." This is presumably why Aquinas talks about good-seeking as the first principle of practical reason, rather than better-seeking.

It’s hard to imagine a circumstance in ‘the coffee should be chosen because the coffee should be chosen’ would be useful, except as a way of answering objections with ‘because I said so’. — Joshs

Yes, and that's much the point. Worth-based reasons are not tautologous in the way that @J likes to claim they are; they are not tautologous in the way that will-based reasons are. @J incorrectly claims that, "I chose the coffee because it has worth," is the same as, "I chose the coffee because I chose the coffee." When we appeal to worth of any kind we have moved beyond tautological, will-based "because I said so."

"Ought" and "Is" Are Not Two Types of Propositions

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