Faith translates into Russian as "VERA."
And it's a very broad concept. It encompasses both a female name and the feeling and concept of a vast number of Russian philosophers and writers who have attempted to understand this word. There's no consensus on this. As a native speaker of Slavic languages, I think you're probably familiar with all of this.

I myself use this word to describe my sense of aspiration toward the transcendental, which is impossible to comprehend, know, or justify. — Astorre

It's an interesting discrepancy: Etymologically, Latin "fides" means 'trust', but Slavic "vera" (related to Latin "verus") means 'truth'.

It can indicate that adult converts are supposed to take something as truth what would/should otherwise be a matter of trust. They are expected to take something for granted, as true, despite the lack of trustworthiness.

Inspired by Kierkegaard's ideas — Astorre

What primary or secondary Kierkegaard sources do you base your argument upon? So far I've only seen you quote Wittgenstein as if his words were simple truth. I would suggest reading Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments where he speaks to the idea that all teaching/learning is aided by temporal occasions (including preaching), and that the teacher should therefore understand himself as providing such an occasion:

From a Socratic perspective, every temporal point of departure is eo ipso contingent, something vanishing, an occasion; the teacher is no more significant, and if he presents himself or his teachings in any other way, then he gives nothing... — Kierkegaard, Philosophical Crumbs, tr. M. G. Piety

This is why what I've already said is much more Kierkegaardian than the odd way that Kierkegaard is sometimes interpreted by seculars:

But is the problem preaching, or is it a particular kind of preaching? — Leontiskos

Kierkegaard wishes to stand athwart the Enlightenment rationalism notion of self-authority, preferring instead a Socratic approach that does not wield authority through the instrument of reason. Myron Penner's chapter/article is quite good in this regard: "Kierkegaard’s Critique of Secular Reason."

Kierkegaard wishes to stand athwart the Enlightenment rationalism notion of self-authority, preferring instead a Socratic approach that does not wield authority through the instrument of reason. — Leontiskos

The Philosophical Fragments juxtaposes the Socratic idea of self-knowledge to learning the truth in some other way. That is an exact description of his argument in the text.

Some bridge is needed to get that text to mean what you describe.

Good people can do bad things, and good people can become bad people. People aren't born evil and bad people can return to goodness. None of this suggests being born into sin. In fact, none of what I say makes reference to God or religion, but just asserts you are the creator of your moral standing.

Where i will push toward religion is to say you are always of infinite moral worth, but that is aligned with humanism as well.

It's complex and varied, but rarely as central as it is to Christianity, largely because most of the effort is spent on halacha, or the understanding of the law that governs the day to day — Hanover

Thus, as far as I could tell from the cited articles, there is no mention of the life (or any kind of existence) of a separate soul after death, until the resurrection of the entire body. You must understand that I am unfamiliar with this religion and am literally starting from scratch.

The cited texts mention the soul, but they refer to it as something that lives in and alongside the body, emphasizing the soul's formation only during life (as in the example of the rabbi's answer that one should live longer to fulfill more commandments). It is also mentioned that you will be resurrected as the same person you died. Therefore, any formation outside of life is impossible.

Did I understand correctly?

It's an interesting discrepancy: Etymologically, Latin "fides" means 'trust', but Slavic "vera" (related to Latin "verus") means 'truth'. — baker

I agree, this is truly interesting. Indeed, in Latin, veritas means truth. It turns out that, as a Slav, I understand both the word and the act itself in a very Western way. I'll definitely look into this, thank you. I wonder how this happened; perhaps it has something to do with the different understandings of the Roman and Constantinople churches? A very astute observation.

Thus, as far as I could tell from the cited articles, there is no mention of the life (or any kind of existence) of a separate soul after death, until the resurrection of the entire body. — Astorre

No, that's not the Jewish position.The position on it has changed over time, but that's not been the position for probably 1500 + years. https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/immortality-belief-in-a-bodiless-existence/

There are also different traditions within Judaism on the issue. It's like asking what do Christians think about X. It might depend upon whether I want to know what 1st Century Catholics thought or what modern day Presbyterians think.

Hasidic traditions delve deeper into the mystical and have more developed views of the soul than Litvak legally focused traditions. For example, the Chabad Hasids believe this : https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/3194/jewish/What-Is-a-Soul-Neshamah.htm

The animal soul/spiritual soul is the focus of the Tanya, a religious writings specific to that group.

Much of this has to do with Jewish history as much as theology. Biblical Judaism was temple based, with sacrifices on the alter, priestly classes, and what you read in the text. Rabbincal Judaism as it emerged since 70 common era (the destruction of the second temple where the temple mound currently is in Jerusalem) is very different, and with migrations to different parts of Europe, interaction with other cultures, it's changed over time. In fact, the past 100 years has seen major changes with WW2, mass migrations to the US and Israel, the growth and significance of Yeshiva (seminary) focus, political influence, secularized and liberal strands develoing , etc. I mean a Reform Jew might not even admit to a meaningfully real god and might sound atheist. There's just lots of ground to cover.

If you're trying to arrive at what we'd call the traditional Orthodox Yeshiva oriented tradition (black hats and beards, but not the long sideburns), then I can give you that position, but I'd need to look it up to be sure I got the nuance correct.

Maimonides wrote that to try and explain the World to Come to a person in a body is like describing color to a person who is blind from birth. Likewise, when Rabbi Harold Kushner was once asked if he believed in the survival of the soul, he replied: “Yes, as a matter of faith, but I do not grasp what it means to be only a soul. For when I think of Harold I think of the voice that you are hearing and the person that I see in the mirror. I am not sure who Harold is without this body.”

it looks unambiguous

it looks ambiguous — Astorre

Rabbi Kushner is a Conservative (capital C) rabbi, not an Orthodox one, making his views more liberal and less mystical. It's like asking what the Christian view on homosexuality is and listening to an Anglican and then a Southern Baptist. It'd be inconsistent.

If you want like a very specific halachik position on something to do with the soul that a rosh Yeshiva would endorse, i can give you that, but expect significant variation if compared to Conservative Judaism, a 19th century development.

And, particularly within more liberalized traditions, they permit variance of thought among leadership and congregants, with Reform considering inclusiveness of beliefs (even very open to mixed marriages and Christian congregants) a central tenant.

The reason I suggest to you the Litvak view is that they're convinced they represent true historical auththentic immutable Judaism. Of course, many think otherwise.

- Have you offered anything more than an appeal to your own authority? I can't see that there is anything more, but perhaps I am missing something.

I was surprised by the depiction of what is said to be "Socratic" in your account of the Penner article. I will try to read it and maybe respond.

If I do try to reply, it would be good to know if you have studied Philosophical Fragments as a whole or only portions as references to other arguments.

I was surprised by the depiction of what is said to be "Socratic" in your account of the Penner article. — Paine

Well that sentence about "standing athwart" was meant to apply to Kierkegaard generally, but I think Fragments is a case in point. The very quote I gave from Fragments is supportive of the idea (i.e. the Socratic teacher is the teacher who sees himself as a vanishing occasion, and such a teacher does not wield authority through the instrument of reason).

If I do try to reply, it would be good to know if you have studied Philosophical Fragments as a whole or only portions as references to other arguments. — Paine

I am working through it at the moment, and so have not finished it yet. I was taking my cue from the Penner article I cited, but his point is also being borne out in the text.

Here is a relevant excerpt from Piety's introduction:

The motto from Shakespeare at the start of the book, ‘Better well hanged than ill wed’, can be read as ‘I’d rather be hung on the cross than bed down with fast talkers selling flashy “truth” in a handful of proposition’. A ‘Propositio’ follows the preface, but it is not a ‘proposition to be defended’. It reveals the writer’s lack of self-certainty and direction: ‘The question [that motivates the book] is asked in ignorance by one who does not even know what can have led him to ask it.’ But this book is not a stumbling accident, so the author’s pose as a bungler may be only a pose. Underselling himself shows up brash, self-important writers who know exactly what they’re saying — who trumpet Truth and Themselves for all comers. — Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs, Piety, xvii-xviii

He goes on to talk about Climacus in light of the early Archimedes and Diogenes images. All of this is in line with the characterization I've offered.

I want to say that Penner's point is salutary:

One stubborn perception among philosophers is that there is little of value in the explicitly Christian character of Søren Kierkegaard’s thinking. Those embarrassed by a Kierkegaardian view of Christian faith can be divided roughly into two camps: those who interpret him along irrationalist-existentialist lines as an emotivist or subjectivist, and those who see him as a sort of literary ironist whose goal is to defer endlessly the advancement of any positive philosophical position. The key to both readings of Kierkegaard depends upon viewing him as more a child of Enlightenment than its critic, as one who accepts the basic philosophical account of reason and faith in modernity and remains within it. More to the point, these readings tend to view him through the lens of secular modernity as a kind of hyper- or ultra-modernist, rather than as someone who offers a penetrating analysis of, and corrective to, the basic assumptions of modern secular philosophical culture. In this case, Kierkegaard, with all his talk of subjectivity as truth, inwardness, and passion, the objective uncertainty and absolute paradox of faith, and the teleological suspension of the ethical, along with his emphasis on indirect communication and the use of pseudonyms, is understood merely to perpetuate the modern dualisms between secular and sacred, public and private, object and subject, reason and faith—only as having opted out of the first half of each disjunction in favor of the second. Kierkegaard’s views on faith are seen as giving either too much or too little to secular modernity, and, in any case, Kierkegaard is dubbed a noncognitivist, irrationalist antiphilosopher.

Against this position, I argue that it is precisely the failure to grasp Kierkegaard’s dialectical opposition to secular modernity that results in a distortion of, and failure to appreciate, the overtly Christian character of Kierkegaard’s thought and its resources for Christian theology. Kierkegaard’s critique of reason is at the same time, and even more importantly, a critique of secular modernity. To do full justice to Kierkegaard’s critique of reason, we must also see it as a critique of modernity’s secularity. — Myron Penner, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Secular Reason, 372-3

I find the readings that Penner opposes very strange, but they are nevertheless very common. They seem to do violence to Kierkegaard's texts and life-setting, and to ignore his affinity with a figure like J. G. Hamann (who is also often mistaken as an irrationalist by secular minds). Such readings go hand in hand with the OP of this thread, which takes them for granted even without offering any evidence for the idea that they come from Kierkegaard.

Faith translates into Russian as "VERA." — Astorre

It's an interesting discrepancy: Etymologically, Latin "fides" means 'trust', but Slavic "vera" (related to Latin "verus") means 'truth'. — baker

This looks to be a false etymology. The Latin fides and the Slavic vera are both translations of the Greek pistis, and vera primarily means faith, not true. The two words do share a common ancestor (were-o), but vera is not derived from verus, and were-o does not exclude faith/trustworthiness.

One stubborn perception among philosophers is that there is little of value in the explicitly Christian character of Søren Kierkegaard’s thinking. — Myron Penner, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Secular Reason, 372-3

If one accepts that such a Christian character is the most important question throughout all of his work, Penner playing off one camp against another looks like a made-up problem.

I will have to think about how Penner's use of "secular" relates to what Kierkegaard has said in his words in other works.

Kierkegaard does see Christianity and Worldliness as essentially different. But he does recognize a "well intentioned worldliness. It is too much for me to type in but I refer you to pages 69 to 73 of this preview of Works of Love, starting with: "Even the one who is not inclined to praise God or Christianity..."

In all the books I have read of Kierkegaard, Socrates is a wise observer of the world but is forever a resident of Dante's lobby of worthy pagans. The preview I linked to above does not include page 406 so I will type it in:

Only a wretched and worldly conception of the dialectic of power holds that it is greater and greater in proportion to its ability to compel and to make dependent. No, Socrates had a sounder understanding; he knew that the art of power lies precisely in making another free. But in the relationship between individuals this can never be done, even though it needs to be emphasized again and again that this is the highest; only omnipotence can succeed in this. Therefore if a human being had the slightest independent existence over against God (with regard to materia [substance]) then God could not make him free. Creation out of nothing is once again the Omnipotent One's expression for being able to make [a being] independent. He to whom I owe absolutely everything, although he still absolutely controls everything, has in fact made me independent. If in creating man God himself lost a little of his power, then precisely what he could not do would be to make a human independent. — JP 111251

Kierkegaard does oppose the modernity of many of his contemporaries. I disagree with Penner's implication that Kierkegaard shares Penner's view of the Enlightenment. Kierkegaard draws from ancient and modern psychologies. They both encounter the same limit regarding the life of the single individual. Kierkegaard composes his own psychology when he distinguishes the anxiety of the pagan from anxiety as the consequence of sin. The first kind is demonstrated in his consideration of genius and fate beginning with:

Within Christianity, the anxiety of paganism in relation to sin is found wherever spirit is indeed present but is not essentially posited as spirit. The phenomenon appears most clearly in a genius. Immediately considered, the genius is predominately subjectivity. At that point, he is not yet posited as spirit, for as such he can be posited only by spirit. — The Concept of Anxiety, IV, 368, translated by Reidar Thomte

The Anxiety of Sin involves the demonic which finds expression in ancient and modern presentations. For example:

If one wants to clarify in a different way how the demonic is the sudden, the question of how the demonic can best be presented may be considered from a purely esthetic point of view. If a Mephistopheles is to be presented, he might well be furnished with speech if he is to be used as a force in the dramatic action rather than to be grasped in his essence. But in that case Mephistopheles himself is not really represented but reduced to an evil, witty, intriguing mind. This is a vaporization, whereas a legend has already represented him correctly. It relates to the devil for 3,000 years sat and speculated on how to destroy to destroy man--finally he did discover it. Here the emphasis upon the 3,000 years, and the idea that this brings forth is precisely that of the brooding, inclosing reserve of the demonic. If one were to vaporize Mephistopheles in the way suggested above, another form of representation might be chosen. In this case, it will appear that Mephistopheles is essentially mime. The most terrible word that sound from the abyss of evil would not be able to produce an effect like that of the suddenness of the leap that lies within the confines of the mimical. Even though the word were terrible, even though it were a Shakespeare, Byron, or a Shelley who breaks the silence, the word always retains its redeeming power, because all the despair and all the horror of evil expressed in a word are not as terrible as silence. Without being the sudden as such, the mimical may express the sudden. In this respect the ballet master, Bournonville, deserves great credit for his representation of Mephistopheles. The horror that seizes one upon seeing Mephistopheles leap in through the window and remain stationary in the position of the leap! — ibid. IV, 397

I am getting blisters on my fingers, to quote John Lennon.

Where i will push toward religion is to say you are always of infinite moral worth — Hanover

Then why isn't everyone born into the Jewish religion?

And why do the Jews outkill them by a magnitude of 65 to 100?

One stubborn perception among philosophers is that there is little of value in the explicitly Christian character of Søren Kierkegaard’s thinking. — Myron Penner, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Secular Reason, 372-3

If one accepts that such a Christian character is the most important question throughout all of his work, Penner playing off one camp against another looks like a made-up problem. — Paine

It looks as though you are relying on the inference <If Penner holds that it is false that there is little of value in the explicitly Christian character of Kierkegaard's thinking, then Penner must hold that the Christian character is the most important question throughout all of Kierkegaard's work>. I think we can agree that this inference you are relying upon is fallacious, can't we? "X is not of little value" does not imply "X is the most important thing."

I will have to think about how Penner's use of "secular" relates to what Kierkegaard has said in his words in other works. — Paine

I want to make sure this conversation is properly contextualized. You might have to tell me what you are objecting to, because I might be misunderstanding. made me think that you are objecting to the idea that, "Kierkegaard wishes to stand athwart the Enlightenment rationalism notion of self-authority, preferring instead a Socratic approach that does not wield authority through the instrument of reason." Instead you want to propose, "The Philosophical Fragments juxtaposes the Socratic idea of self-knowledge to learning the truth in some other way."

That is the state of the matter as I understand it, and don't want to lose track of that thread just as soon as it has been enunciated. Now again, I have not said that the central theme of Fragments is Kierkegaard's "wish", but I do think that theme is a substantial part of Fragments. So we can certainly talk about what is happening in Fragments. Nevertheless, the point of as it relates to this thread is to situate Kierkegaard's approach to preaching within his Socratic approach to teaching, which would seem to undermine the too-simple dualisms that the OP is relying upon.

Kierkegaard does see Christianity and Worldliness as essentially different. But he does recognize a "well intentioned worldliness. It is too much for me to type in but I refer you to pages 69 to 73 of this preview of Works of Love, starting with: "Even the one who is not inclined to praise God or Christianity..." — Paine

I tried to find it, but the website said, "Pages 23 to 197 are not shown in this preview."

I have been trying to find an alternative copy to read your excerpt. There is one available from archive.org, but the document is protected and cannot be OCRed, so I'm not sure where that quote would reside inside of it. Maybe you know?

Preaching faith means either not having it or betraying it. — Astorre

This dilemma expresses the difficulty, or impossibility, of making a close approach to the divine.

According to Kierkegaard, the only true preacher is the one who lives faith in silence. — Astorre

Why does Kierkegaard write "...the only 'true preacher,' instead of 'the only truly faithful person' is the one who lives faith in silence."? With the insertion of "preacher," the sentence sets up as self-contradictory, given the dilemma quoted at top.

I conclude that talking about faith means abandoning it. As soon as you try to convey faith, you rationalize it, and therefore betray its nature. — Astorre

Human nature cannot abide total irrationality. No part of cognition, faithful or otherwise, can be of use if devoid of reason. Of course humans rationalize faith in transcendence. How else could they have any understanding of it?

As for internal monologues concerning the divine, the same absolute human demand for semblance of reason applies. How does it matter if Kierkegaard ruminates on God in total privacy? Is it not true that as soon you try thinking about faith, you rationalize it, and therefore betray its nature?

What about maintaining an open mind? Couple this with the concession God will not be understood, or even known beyond perplexing glimpses, and you have a procedure for accepting visitations from the divine with an open mind.

Listen to the fool in motley as soon as listen to the wise man, for the divine is a horrid beast of miracles as with Moses aglow in the dark for days after his descent from Mt. Sinai, and witness also Job and his poxy boils in payment for iron faith in the almighty.

I think we can agree that this inference you are relying upon is fallacious, can't we? "X is not of little value" does not imply "X is the most important thing." — Leontiskos

My statement was a reaction to hearing that there were those for whom "there is little of value in the explicitly Christian character of Søren Kierkegaard’s thinking." Perhaps I was over broad in my response, but I wanted to signal that such a view is very far from own. I don't have the problem Penner is addressing.

It is true that I question:

Kierkegaard wishes to stand athwart the Enlightenment rationalism notion of self-authority, preferring instead a Socratic approach that does not wield authority through the instrument of reason. — Leontiskos

But it is not an argument against it as a thesis because Penner is pushing back against a problem I don't have. Considering how Kierkegaard may be teaching in a Socratic fashion does not subtract from the role of Socrates as the most worthy pagan in K's works. I will have to ponder how that relates to Penner's view but don't present it as an argument in itself. That is why I am trying to approach the question of the Enlightenment beyond the context of Philosophical Fragments.

Now, Kierkegaard has many different forms of address as evidenced by the different pseudonyms. The psychological considerations in The Concept of Anxiety are very far from the straight up preaching in Works of Love. Note that the latter is published under his own name.

I will take a look at your link to find the passages I referred to.

I, too, find the OP lacking because it does not specify the text being read. There is no way to know if it has the problem Penner objects to or not.

There is one available from archive.org, but the document is protected and cannot be OCRed, so I'm not sure where that quote would reside inside of it. Maybe you know? — Leontiskos

The passage starts on page 57 and goes to page 61.

The beginning is really the preceding paragraph saying: "Love for the neighbor has the perfections of eternity--. Kierkegaard uses this formula to begin many different topics in the book.

The beginning of the section II C at page 51 gives the context of the passage within the larger argument.

- Great, thanks. I will have a look. :up:

The passage starts on page 57 and goes to page 61. — Paine

It’s a wonderful excerpt, deeply relevant to our own time. Kierkegaard points out the way that Christianity has raised the eyes of man, but also notes that the equalities to which the worldly are devoted are much different from Christian equality.

To secure an equal place in the world with other men, to make temporal conditions as similar as possible for all men, those are certainly things that worldliness considers of extreme importance. But even in this respect, what we may venture to call the well-intentioned worldly effort never completely understands Christianity. The well-intentioned worldliness holds itself piously—if one wishes to call it that—convinced that there must be one temporal condition, one earthly difference—which one may find by the help of calculations and surveys, or in any other preferred manner—where there is equality. If this condition were to become the only one for all men, then equality would be brought about. But partly, this cannot be done, and partly, this common equality of all arising from having the same temporal differences, is not at all Christian equality; worldly equality, even if it were possible, is not Christian equality. And to bring about a perfect worldly equality is an impossibility. — Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 59-60

Now I’m not exactly sure how this relates to the thread, although I agree that Kierkegaard admits a kind of “well-intentioned worldliness.” I don’t think I’ve said anything to the contrary.

My statement was a reaction to hearing that there were those for whom "there is little of value in the explicitly Christian character of Søren Kierkegaard’s thinking." Perhaps I was over broad in my response, but I wanted to signal that such a view is very far from own. I don't have the problem Penner is addressing. — Paine

Okay, understood.

I, too, find the OP lacking because it does not specify the text being read. There is no way to know if it has the problem Penner objects to or not. — Paine

Right. This is what I see claiming: “The preacher thinks the truth of faith can be taught, but according to Kierkegaard this is impossible. Therefore there is something wrong with preaching.” My response is to say that, according to Kierkegaard, in the proper and fullest sense, truth can never be taught except by God, and this includes faith. For Kierkegaard, the human teacher is modeled on Socrates, and because he does not have the capacity to impart knowledge in the way that God can impart knowledge, he is only a teacher—or in this case a preacher—to a limited extent. Thus if we situate the preaching of faith within Kierkegaard’s larger understanding of teaching, there is nothing sui generis about faith’s “unteachableness,” and the problem of the OP is dissolved.

According to Penner the error derives from an irrationalist/existentialist reading of Kierkegaard, which thinkers such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Caleb Miller indulge. For example, he quotes Miller claiming that Kierkegaard is “Chief among those who have defended the view that reason undermines faith, and that Christian faith should spurn reason.” Penner argues that Kierkegaard’s critique of reason is a critique of a very specific form of reason, namely the secular reason of modern philosophy:

The concept of “secular” used here has in mind the Kierkegaardian contrast between Christianity and “the world,” which parallels several other contrasts made in Kierkegaard’s texts, such as that between the eternal and the temporal, the infinite and the finite, transcendence and immanence, and the religious and the aesthetic. For example, Anti-Climacus, in The Sickness unto Death, describes “the secular mentality” in terms of mortgaging oneself to “the world” and later correlates secularity with finitude, culture, and civic justice. In this case, secular indicates a this-worldly, immanental sphere of mundane, material reality and relations, in contrast to an immaterial, transcendent sphere of spiritual reality and relations. Secularity, in this sense, involves a lack of openness to extrahuman transcendence rather than denoting the mere denigration of religion. To speak of modern philosophy’s view of reason as secular, then, is to say that its rational norms will be those that are governed by the terms of immanence—such as universal access, objectivity, neutrality—so that human reason may dissolve every paradox, unify each difference, and (potentially) provide an overarching explanation whose intelligibility and justification depend exclusively on factors within its immanental purview.

Thus the Kierkegaardian charge is not that modern philosophy is explicitly atheistic or that it denies religious transcendence or God-talk altogether. Some of Kierkegaard’s favorite targets, such as Descartes, Kant, and Hegel, attempt to rescue Christian theology rather than deny or destroy it, and Kierkegaard regularly assumes that the edifice he refers to as “modern speculation” understands itself to be explicitly “Christian.” Therein is precisely Kierkegaard’s trouble with modern philosophy—that modern philosophy unwittingly produces a pseudo-Christianity— and the Kierkegaardian critique of reason and modern philosophy will be incoherent if one does not recognize his fundamentally religious diagnosis of modernity. — Penner, 380-1

What emerges here is the possibility of a critique of preaching that is nevertheless not a critique of every kind of preaching. It is precisely the preaching or teaching of the pseudo-Christianity, produced by the rationalistic modus operandi of modern philosophy, that Kierkegaard finds fault with. It does not follow from this that a father cannot teach his children about the faith, and of course this was in no way Kierkegaard’s intention.

And of course Kierkegaard’s point is not that there can be no such thing as a well-intentioned worldliness, but even in your excerpt from Works of Love Kierkegaard is distinguishing that worldliness from authentic Christianity—in that case distinguishing worldly equality from Christian equality. The parallel is salutary insofar as we could imagine the same worldly man programmatically devising a way to bring about equality, and also programmatically devising a way to preach such that his sermon’s “moment in time has decisive significance so that the hearer could not for a moment forget it” (Fragments). In both cases what is being rejected as falling short of Christianity is secular or worldly reason.

There are plenty of examples where Kierkegaard expresses dissatisfaction with fellow Christians. It is fair to say that his opposition to Hegel, for instance, is an objection to an expression of modernity. But a fair amount of that objection is based upon "rational" grounds as much as upon religious ones.

When discussing the psychological, Kierkegaard uses "modern" ideas of development. He argues that they become inadequate after a certain level of explanation.

Penner is basing his interpretation on this differential:

Some of Kierkegaard’s favorite targets, such as Descartes, Kant, and Hegel, attempt to rescue Christian theology rather than deny or destroy it, and Kierkegaard regularly assumes that the edifice he refers to as “modern speculation” understands itself to be explicitly “Christian.” — Penner, 380-1

That makes it sound like Kierkegaard was fooled by various apologetic speech. It seems fair to me to ask for evidence of that in Kierkegaard's actual writings rather than rely upon Penner's inference.

If we are going to speak of the Enlightenment, should that not also include the issue of rights as discussed by Rousseau, Hobbes, Locke, etcetera? The more "Christian" life Kierkegaard is calling for does not cancel the "individual" depicted in those places.

That makes it sound like Kierkegaard was fooled by various apologetic speech. — Paine

I'm not sure what you mean by that.

If we are going to speak of the Enlightenment, should that not also include the issue of rights as discussed by Rousseau, Hobbes, Locke, etcetera? — Paine

I don't think rights are a function of the Enlightenment. For example, Aristotelian approaches to justice involve rights (which are the correlative of duties), and this surely precedes the Enlightenment.

I'm actually not really sure where this is going, or what your theses are.

I heard Penner to be saying that Kierkegaard was not imagining that his rivals were outside the Christian community. So, if he did understand that they were outside, he would have responded differently. I will avoid such a bank shot and just look for what Kierkegaard has said about worldliness.

I don't think rights are a function of the Enlightenment. For example, Aristotelian approaches to justice involve rights (which are the correlative of duties), and they surely precede the Enlightenment. — Leontiskos

What one does see in the writings of the Enlightenment is an attempt to separate the "Natural" from what has been imposed upon it, whether through human or divine authority. I am not sure that would have even been an idea for Aristotle.

Kierkegaard claims that views of "nature" have been changed because of "Christianity." Such a view both affirms and questions the separations drawn in the City of God by Augustine.