But this is not my forum. And I have no desire for it to be my forum. This thread is interesting because some folk here have such ratshit ideas; explaining why they are ratshit provides some amusement. Were this my forum, it would be much less entertaining. — Banno

To be clear, you are implying that traditional Christianity (viz., roman and orthodox catholicism) are ratshit.

We can stipulate whatever definitions we want. And provided we keep in mind that they are stipulations, that's fine.

But what I would do is set out for you examples of how the use of "sex" and "gender" differ. That's were your error sits.

To be clear, you are implying that traditional Christianity (viz., roman and orthodox catholicism) are ratshit. — Bob Ross

No. I've said that the arguments for your variant are ratshit.

CC: @Philosophim

Banno, your comments are just getting mean and are not helping further the discussion. I am continually making an effort to further our discussion by trying to get you to tell me what you think sex and gender are; and so far all you have done is give two examples without definitions and stated that giving a definition presupposes essence realism.

To be clear, I am not putting on a performative act: I will concede points if I am convinced.

Aristo-Thomism is the predominant view for roman catholicism; so at a minimum you are saying the latin, Dominican scholastics is ratshit. Nothing you have critiqued of mine really varies from standard Aristo-Thomism. Likewise, most of the broader points I am making are accepted by traditional Christianity (viz., orthodox and roman Catholicism).

Christianity, even for protestantism, is a version of essence realism, of the immorality of homosexuality, moral naturalism, etc.

What definitions are you using, Banno? Do you a definition of sex and gender that you have in mind when using those terms?

:fire:

You are actively playing in to the role of victim.

Definitions

 I'm saying that the concepts and arguments you use are not neutral philosophical tools, but are tools of power, formed by historical social conflict.
…
To me it's like saying "but what if racism is actually true?" Well, no: here is why we have racism [insert genealogical account here], and here is why the racists are making these arguments now. (I'm not saying you're a racist or resemble a racist).

To me this is just a red herring. I understand this is exactly what Foucault wants us to think; but it evades a discussion about the truth of the matter.

To take your example, imagine someone is a race realist. Would I be contending with their view by avoiding a discussion about what race realism means to them and why they believe it in exchange for a historical exposition of the genesis of why they (or the group of people who believe it) developed the theory?

I see it as having its place, but the more important aspect is to converse about the ideas—not why a person developed them.

With that said, I think we would have a more fruitful discussion if you responded to my points on natural law theory and provided what ethical realist theory you are operating under so we can compare.

I characterized your ideas as conservative, but not so that I can accuse you of things you haven't expressed: we only have to look at your words to see evidence of bigotry, as several others have pointed out independently.
…
I wonder if you can meet me half way and admit that the following comments might suggest otherwise?

What you believe bigotry is? I would say it is an obstinate attachment to an unreasonable belief; so the material aspect of the act cannot itself prove bigotry: you would have to demonstrate that I am holding onto a belief (1) stubbornly (2) despite having reasonable counter-evidence. E.g., a person who is a racist is not necessarily a bigot: little old grandma with her KKK robe and stubborn insistence on racism, as exemplified by her unwillingness to listen to anyone who tries to have a rational conversation with her, is a bigot. Bigots are people that hold onto a belief so steadfastly that they are close-minded to an extreme point of rejecting reasonable counter-evidence (or even being willing to engage with people in good faith on the topic).

 I guess because you characterize the vast majority of your view as the Thomist Aristotelianism that you share with MacIntyre. But I'm interested in the particular views you're expressing here, like your views on homosexuality and the extremely controversial---among Thomist Aristotelians and Catholics as much as among others---view that oral sex between a married man and woman is immoral

Catholicism teaches that oral sex, as opposed to oral foreplay, is immoral: that’s something that MacIntyre would have probably accepted as a Catholic. However, it was not infallible teaching (viz., extraordinary magisterial teaching or ordinary and universal magisterial teaching) as far as I know; so maybe he didn’t agree with it.

Catholicism’s basis for it being immoral is natural law theory and is heavily influenced by the Dominican, Latin tradition in the west; so I do think my view is basically the predominant metaphysics of Catholicism (although it is not taught as the official metaphysic—because, for good reason, they keep the metaphysical commitments of the faithful to purposefully vague ones). The reason it is immoral is because the sex is not ordered towards unified and procreative sex.

If you are asking about oral foreplay, that is technically not forbidden in Catholicism (I agree); so my natural law theory is a bit stronger.

Because from my point of view, pathologizing a way of life or sexual identity that causes no demonstrable harm is a form of prejudice

I understand where you are coming from, but this is because you are viewing ‘harm’ in a liberal way. I think two gay men that have consensual sex are harming themselves and each other.

Harm for liberalism is more like “goes against happiness”; for conservatism it is more like “goes against nature”. In more cryptic terminology, liberalism is about hedonic happiness; conservatism is about eudaimonic happiness.

This is why I was saying your original critique begged the question. You used all the concepts in liberal ways that I am going to reject. For example, for you it is not incoherent with the concept of love to support someone in their transitioning to the opposite sex; in conservative, traditional thought this is incoherent. To love something is to ‘will the good of it for its own sake’ and ‘the good’ is metaethically referring to the realization of the nature of that thing. So, I ask you: what do you mean by ‘love’? What do you mean by ‘harm’?

Your comments are not always helpful is what I am saying. Calling the most prominent opposition to your liberal views 'people with ratshit ideas' is not helpful (even if it is true).

Why are you refusing to define what you mean by 'sex' and 'gender'? Do you believe you already have and I missed it? I am trying to forward this conversation.

The methodological approach is to empirically investigate what is essential to a given thing, such that it would no longer be that thing without it, and that would be a part of its nature. E.g., you are no longer talking about a human, in nature, if you are talking about a being that doesn’t include rationality. This doesn’t mean every human has to be capable of exercising proper intellect; but what this is essential to the human nature. — Bob Ross

First off, teleology and essences are no more empirically observable than is efficient causality, which is zilch. So one does not empirically investigate them: they instead get investigated metaphysically.

Secondly, and more to the point: This quote from you would entail that a human infant is not human—not until it gains rationality to some meaningful extent. It would also entail the same for those with very severe mental retardation, or mental handicaps, or however you’d like it best expressed. Also those in a coma. And the list continues. All of which is … patently wrong.

The essence of a chair is something which can be sat on. — Bob Ross

A bench is not a chair. (both can be sat on) To not mention beds and tree trumps, etc. So this too is wrong.

It is about looking at the teleology in a thing. — Bob Ross

On this we can agree, but see my comments to @unenlightened in this post as they regard both faulty teleological reasoning and faulty applications of the word "natural".

Personally, I’d very, very greatly dislike having sex with another man. It would be as unnatural for me as it would be utterly unnatural for a non-bisexual homosexual male to in any way like having sex with a woman. But!: These two facts in no way make either homosexuality or heterosexuality unnatural relative to Nature itself. To jump from the first notion of "natural" for one's own constituency as persona to the notion of "natural" in the sense of Nature at large is to do far more erroneous reasoning then merely equivocate semantics and contexts. Nor does the aforementioned in any way make either homosexuality or heterosexuality intrinsically unethical—this irrespective of the mores of a society--this such as via relation to the Good per se, which ought to be pursued by all (or at least so some of us uphold). In contrast, it can be readily construed unethical, i.e. unaligned with the Good, to condemn a loving couple who has sex that leads to no harm but instead much psychological good for both—this either by accusing them or their sexual activity of being in any way degenerate or else by acting upon this condemnation. Jesus Christ sure as hell didn't--and he lived in a time of what by comparison were massive amounts of homosexual behavior in the societies that surrounded him.

How the so called "mind" of AI can interpret the property of chair-hood. I like it!

It's not AI; but these days, your conclusion is justified. It's "Arm", steam-bent oak, by Clark Bardsley Design, from Auckland, New Zealand.

Nice work, ain't it?

A chair on which one cannot sit. A certain approach to definitions and essences, displaced by a piece of nonsense. For those who can see it.

Nice work, ain't it? — Banno

Yup. Definitely so! Having worked a bit in Photoshop, you sometimes get those types of results, as you say. Cool art, though. In a way, it reminds me of Dadaism the the Surrealism which grew out of it. (I greatly like the best of both.)

Things such as schizophrenia are added and removed from the list of mental illnesses, and therefore such predication cannot be tautologous. For example, one of the newest mental illnesses in the DSM-5-TR is prolonged grief disorder. It was added in 2022. In 2021 it was not considered a mental illness. This is one sure reason why we know that, "X is a mental illness," is not a tautological ("non-substantive") claim. — Leontiskos

Yes, words change over time. As our understanding of mental health changes, so do the meanings of the relevant words. This does not mean that merely defining a word as it is used today is a substantive claim. It is definitional. Whereas, the claim "schizophrenia is not a mental illness" would be substantive. Accepting it would require a significant revision of our understanding of schizophrenia, and so to the meaning of the term.

Then feel free to provide your own definition. I was just taking a common one. My points will hold with any genuine definition of "bigotry." — Leontiskos

Amusing that you think you can know that. I will try to define only rhetorical bigotry, the relevant form here:

The ascription of negative qualities onto a population based on their group identity, which are not intrinsic to that group's membership criteria.

But this begs the question at hand, namely the question of whether it is bigotry. — Leontiskos

It is just historical reality that exactly these claims were leveled against homosexuals, that they were immoral and mentally ill. And which were used to justify repression, including forced institutionalization. Do you think those claims were merely the result of the inquiry of curious minds? Or were they both reflections of social prejudices and tools used to legitimatize repression?

First off, teleology and essences are no more empirically observable than is efficient causality, which is zilch. So one does not empirically investigate them: they instead get investigated metaphysically.

The investigation of the essences of things is empirical: we do not know of the nature of chairness a priori. Now, you are right that teleology itself is a matter of metaphysics; but the empirical world and metaphysics goes hand-in-hand.

Secondly, and more to the point: This quote from you would entail that a human infant is not human—not until it gains rationality to some meaningful extent. It would also entail the same for those with very severe mental retardation, or mental handicaps, or however you’d like it best expressed. Also those in a coma. And the list continues. All of which is … patently wrong.

It doesn’t entail any of that. I was careful to note that all humans in virtue of having a complete substantial human form are fully human in essence. Essence determines what a thing is—not how that essence is realized in existence.

So, for example, a cognitively disabled person still has rationality as an aspect of their nature because it is an aspect of their substantial form even though it was not realized in matter appropriately. This is the age old real metaphysical distinction between essence and esse.

A bench is not a chair. (both can be sat on)

This is a fair objection to raise: I was too loose with my characterization. Technically a chair is something which for one person to sit on and a bench is for multiple people to sit on. This is a real distinction, not merely nominal, between the natures of both.

To not mention beds and tree trumps, etc.

A bed is for lying down. A person that buys a bed to use as a chair is misusing a bed.

Personally, I’d very, very greatly dislike having sex with another man. It would be as unnatural for me as it would be utterly unnatural for a non-bisexual homosexual male to in any way like having sex with a woman. But!: These two facts in no way make either homosexuality or heterosexuality unnatural relative to Nature itself.

Correct, but I never argued this. It is unnatural because it misuses our natural organs and disorders the mind and body.

Nor does the aforementioned in any way make either homosexuality or heterosexuality intrinsically unethical—this irrespective of the mores of a society--this such as via relation to the Good per se, which ought to be pursued by all (or at least so some of us uphold). 

True, but natural law theory would entail that it is immoral.

 In contrast, it can be readily construed unethical, i.e. unaligned with the Good, to condemn a loving couple who has sex that leads to no harm but instead much psychological good for both—this either by accusing them or their sexual activity of being in any way degenerate or else by acting upon this condemnation.

Loving someone is not ‘willing the good of someone for its own sake whereby what is good for them is to be happy’: that’s a liberal and very modern view that ignores the reality of essences. Loving someone is ‘willing the good of someone for its own sake whereby what is good for them is to realize their nature’.

Nothing about two consenting, superficially (hedonistically) happy homosexuals having sex is loving, harmless, nor good for them; because it goes contrary to their nature. Again, notice the tension between libertarian, hedonic liberalism and communal, aristotelian conservatism—that’s what is really at play here.

Jesus Christ sure as hell didn't--and he lived in a time of what by comparison were massive amounts of homosexual behavior in the societies that surrounded him.

Jesus didn’t come to condemn: He came to save. This is no way suggests that Jesus condoned homosexuality and, in fact, the apostles were very clear about it being immoral. https://www.gotquestions.org/New-Testament-homosexuality.html

This is not a chair. Just because someone advertises it as a chair or calls it a chair does not make it a chair. It does not have the form of a chair. That's like me outlining the form of a human and then you send a picture of a cow because someone advertised the cow as a human.

That is not what bigotry refers to. It is an obstinate attachment to an unreasonable belief. — Bob Ross

Funny that you keep repeating this "obstinate belief", when even the toy definition you took it from says more than that:

obstinate or unreasonable attachment to a belief, opinion, or faction, in particular prejudice against a person or people on the basis of their membership of a particular group.

I would say that your insistence that trans is a mental illness, based only on your personal philosophizing, against the entirely of mainstream medical opinion, who I must presume is collectively vastly more qualified than you to make this judgement, is plenty obstinate.

By your logic, when transgenderism was considered, by definition, to be a mental illness called general dysphoria it would not have been bigoted for me to believe it. However, since they changed to definition to fit liberal agendas I am not somehow a bigot for using a different definition. — Bob Ross

Yes, generally we judge against the standards of the time. Holding racist views in the 19th century is not the same as holding them today. Living in a racist society, and inheriting these beliefs, is not the same as actively advocating for them.

And yes yes, it must have been the strong arm of The Liberal Agenda which bent the medical establishment to its will.

This is not a chair. — Bob Ross

You have to say that. You have to re-assert your arbitrarily chosen essence, your self- reinforcing monologue.

You do the same thing here:

That is not what bigotry refers to. — Bob Ross

points to the same problem.

Look up the definition of a word in the dictionary.

Then look up the definition of each of the words in that definition.

Iterate.

Given that there are a finite number of words in the dictionary, the process will eventually lead to repetition.

If one's goal were to understand a word, one might suppose that one must first understand the words in its definition. But this process is circular.

There must, therefore, be a way of understanding a word that is not given by providing its definition.

Now this seems quite obvious; and yet so many begin their discussion with "let's first define our terms". — Banno

Notice that the dictionary definition, as a description of use, is post hoc? The use precedes the definition.

The question to hand is "which is to be the master?"; and my answer is, the use is the master of the definition. — Banno

There will be amongst us those who hold that there is such a thing as the meaning of a word; and that any worthwhile theory of language must set out, preferably in an algorithmic fashion, how that meaning is to be determined.

There will be others, amongst whom I count myself, who think otherwise, and will go along with quine:

Success in communication is judged by smoothness of conversation, by frequent predictability of verbal and nonverbal reactions, and by coherence and plausibility of native testimony.

If there is a philosophically interesting topic here it may be to compare and contrast Quine's critique of pointing as the source of meaning, with Wittgenstein's. It will not easily be found in a defence of pointing. — Banno

Here's what can be done by way of answering your demand for a definition:

An example of a biological appraisal: This body has two X chromosomes. A biological fact, normatively neutral.

An example of a gendered appraisal: Having two X chromosomes counts as being a woman. A social fact, and normatively loaded. — Banno

Here's why it's relevant to the thread:

The failure of your essentialism is that it mistakes having two X chromosomes for taking on the feminine role. It tries to introduce the normative stuff at the level of biology. — Banno

Loving someone is ‘willing the good of someone for its own sake whereby what is good for them is to realize their nature’.

Nothing about two consenting, superficially (hedonistically) happy homosexuals having sex is loving, harmless, nor good for them; because it goes contrary to their nature. — Bob Ross

You rely on these notions of "nature" extensively. They are however meaningless devoid of an explanation of what "our true human nature" which awaits to be fulfilled in fact is. So please explain what in your opinion this ultimate nature of humanity whose fulfillment we ought to strive for is. This being quite pivotal to the subject matter at hand

As to politics, for my part I am neither liberal nor conservative, but a bit of both. I just don't like scapegoating by those who behave as though they themselves and their preferred faction(s) are angels incarnate who do no wrong.

Jesus didn’t come to condemn: He came to save. This is no way suggests that Jesus condoned homosexuality and, in fact, the apostles were very clear about it being immoral. https://www.gotquestions.org/New-Testament-homosexuality.html — Bob Ross

No apostle was Jesus. Period. Moreover, Christ man, Jesus condemned galore. It's he who stated that the camel (a beast of burden) will have an easier time than the fat rich guy when it comes to entering the kingdom of god (the needle's eye). It's he who gave the allegory of souls that deviate from god being placed into trash bins that get set on fire so as to become annihilated into oblivion. It's he who rode the white donkey into the marketplace to condemn those within. But no, he, Jesus, never once condemned homosexuality. And yes, this lack of condemnation by he upon which all of Christianity is pivoted on is not only indicative but immensely informative.

Now, you bring up a good point in this example that this perpetrator is not culpable themselves for the attack (e.g., perhaps they are hallucinating and relative to their perspective they are stopping something grave from happening [although it isn’t really happening that way]); and so they are innocent intuitively. I was challenging the idea that they are to be see as innocent; but we can also go the A route and note that this ‘innocent person’ is a threat to this victim (of no fault of their own) objectively; and so the victim is justified in directly intending to neutralize the threat—even if that has a side effect of killing them.

I do think that is a really good example you gave their that challenges my idea of innocence. — Bob Ross

Then let's build on it. Let's say the person-in-the-psychotic-rage-from-the-unforeseen-drug-interaction isn't trying to kill you, they don't have any weapons, but are merely trying to drag you into their idling van. You resist, of course, and stab them with a pocket-knife you have and it kills them. Is that murder?

Now let's say the person-in-the-psychotic-rage-from-the-unforeseen-drug-interaction isn't attacking you at all, but they are screaming death threats at you, and in your personal space, and a good Samaritan comes up behind the psychotic and puts them in a chokehold, but he does it wrong and the psychotic dies. We will never know what the psychotic truly intended to do. Is that murder?

This is in response to your new/edited OP: your gender theory is very much in line with how aristotle may have responded in his time period to more modern and flexible ideas of gender...however, his logic has been criticized on the basis of some of his "is" statements for their lack of acknowledgement that being is not a fixed state. For example, "he is a boy": if that boy gets their penis removed, wears a wig, and talks with a lisp, then many will no longer see them as such...what are they then?

Aristotle would probably agree with you that gender as a personality trait would violate his rigid ideas of...things...but what practical relevance does this have? What justifies totally invalidating transgenderism and homosexuality? It seems that it's not working....

A gravitational gender expression of gender is any expression that a healthy member of that gendersex would gravitate towards (e.g., males gravitating towards being providers and protectors); and a symbolic gender expression of gender is any expression which represents some idea legitimately connected to the gendersex-at-hand (e.g., the mars symbol representing maleness). — Bob Ross

But how can you justify this perception of health? Is health then supposed to be equivalent with "well, they tell me that im a male, so it's unhealthy to wear pink or read cosmo"? The gender stereotypes have changed overtime. That line of reasoning doesn't seem to make any sense, seems to be a symptom of an extremely kantian type of logic.

...your gender theory is very much in line with how aristotle may have responded in his time period to more modern and flexible ideas of gender... — ProtagoranSocratist

I'm not so sure. For instance, Martha Nussbaum's response to rigid Aristotelian essentialism would be critical, despite her drawing heavily on Aristotle herself. That cosmic teleology would be dropped. For Aristotle, teleology is immanent in nature itself. It's more Aquinas who would have it enforced by god. But we can do without either.

We're being sold a pup, an Aristotle crafted to suit religious ideology.

But why is schizophrenia a mental illness? Why would anyone link trans to mental illness if there were not some type of similarity between being trans and being schizophrenic (as in they are both a type of delusion)? — Harry Hindu

This is a basic misunderstanding, there is zero commonality between being trans and schizophrenic. Schizophrenia involves auditory hallucinations, disordered thinking, and delusions of persecution, and is devastating to the sufferer. Whereas, to be trans is to identify with a social role which is at variance with the one culturally linked with their biological sex. To argue that this is a delusion, you would have to argue that there is something so essential to the linkage between biological sex and gendered social role that to be at odds with it is a kind of insanity.

But if you had a family member that was anorexic and they were told that their condition means that they have a distorted view of their own body, why would they be more accepting of this fact than trans people are of their condition as a delusion? — Harry Hindu

Anorexia is devastating and very often fatal (~20% mortality rate), and family members are usually desperate for help. Framing the condition as an illness is to say that help is warranted, whereas denying this say the opposite, that the sufferer just needs to get over it or whatever. Unlike schizophrenics or anorexics, trans people don't generally conceive of themselves as mentally ill. This designation is imposed, which is pathologization.

I was assuming, and this just an assumption, that something happened to your wife for her to be completely through menopause at 25...that seems young to me. — Bob Ross

You misunderstand. Perhaps I was unclear. She was through menopause a long time ago because she is 73.

The methodological approach is to empirically investigate what is essential to a given thing, such that it would no longer be that thing without it, and that would be a part of its nature. E.g., you are no longer talking about a human, in nature, if you are talking about a being that doesn’t include rationality. This doesn’t mean every human has to be capable of exercising proper intellect; but what this is essential to the human nature. — Bob Ross

You make no sense, and you haven't answered the question. The criterion you claim is essential, the next sentence clearly says is not essential, and then again you claim it is essential. That's not rational. Are you human?

How do you investigate what is essential, what is accidental and what is a defect? What are the criteria? Why rationality and not an opposable thumb or the ability to love, or bipedalism?
And how do you decide what categories to investigate?

It is surely the essential nature of a homosexual that they are attracted to the same sex. This follows from the mere definition and requires no empirical investigation; likewise it is essential to a heterosexual that they are attracted to the opposite sex.

One might think that reproduction is essential to life, but as soon as one knows that most species have become extinct, that becomes untenable. One has to rethink.

In the case of a chair, it's essence is its human use, and its essence is not really empirically investigated, but again definitional. We call it a chair if we can sit on it - except that when one does the investigation, it becomes rather more confusing, because a bosun's chair doesn't look like a chair, a human cannot sit on a doll's-house chair, and sometimes we sit on stools, branches, benches, saddles, the ground, and so on. And this is empirical evidence that essences are highly opaque, to the point of being arbitrary, even in what seems to be the simplest of cases.

This is a basic misunderstanding, there is zero commonality between being trans and schizophrenic. Schizophrenia involves auditory hallucinations, disordered thinking, and delusions of persecution, and is devastating to the sufferer. Whereas, to be trans is to identify with a social role which is at variance with the one culturally linked with their biological sex. To argue that this is a delusion, you would have to argue that there is something so essential to the linkage between biological sex and gendered social role that to be at odds with it is a kind of insanity. — hypericin

There is. Gender isn't a role like an actor or actress in Hollywood where the role is fictional, segregated from reality. Gender is more of a social expectation of the sexes. Society is not saying, "you are a woman because you wear a dress". Society is saying that "you are already defined as a woman because of your biology, and because society also has a rule that exposing yourself is illegal, then we expect you to wear certain clothing to symbolize your sex under the clothing so that people of specific SEXUAL orientations can find mates that align with their SEXUAL preferences".

Anorexia is devastating and very often fatal (~20% mortality rate), and family members are usually desperate for help. Framing the condition as an illness is to say that help is warranted, whereas denying this say the opposite, that the sufferer just needs to get over it or whatever. Unlike schizophrenics or anorexics, trans people don't generally conceive of themselves as mentally ill. This designation is imposed, which is pathologization. — hypericin

Read the symptoms I provided from Cleveland Clinic again. One of the symptoms is not realizing you are mentally ill, which is why they have feelings of being exploited, a tendency to read threatening meanings into benign remarks or events, persistently holding grudges, and a readiness to respond and react to perceived slights. This is all because they are being told that what they believe is not true and the truth is not something they can cope with.

I agree with you that it is important to begin with an exposition of the fundamental concepts at play; but I would say that this is best exemplified by giving definitions and descriptions of the key concepts involved (like ‘sex’, ‘gender’, etc.). — Bob Ross

And that is specifically where we disagree in terms of meta-criteria. My thought in thinking about liberal/conservative was to note how there's not really a definition as much as these are attitudes we ascribe to others that are also somewhat dependent upon eachother: i.e. to be conservative is to be not-liberal, and vice versa. I wanted to start here because it seems like the fulcrum around which your initial argument rests (the two options for thinking about gender), and I don't think it's a conceptual division but a cultural one -- one of perspective and attitude rather than definitions and inferences.

If that's so I wouldn't put it that there is some kind of "liberal" theory of gender, for instance. There are possibilities for theorizing gender which rather than being defined by concept, definition, and description of the concepts can be understood more provisionally, but with greater accuracy, by listening to what people say about their gender.

This notion of gender is something that can create particular social expectations which are played out. That is, there is no liberal or conservative gender so much as gender is a performance within a culture which utilizes this spectrum for self-identification. But not all genders are liberal/conservative or even thinking in such terms at all. They are diverse and difficult to categorize in such manners.

And lastly I'd note where we began: There is something completely alien to your way of looking at sex and gender to me. It looks like an old idea preserved in moth balls for no purpose other than to claim that one has a conservative notion of what gender is as opposed to a liberal notion of gender. But I don't think what I've presented falls into this category you've denoted in your first paragraph where one must either think in terms of essences where there are two genders which must adhere to such-and-such rules regarding sex and relationships OR we are left with psychologizing.

Rather I think we can be empirical about gender and look towards the facts about how people behave. Hence my highlighting the Kinsey report, and noting how your criteria are not medical as much as religious.

As you say here:

Aristo-Thomism is the predominant view for roman catholicism; so at a minimum you are saying the latin, Dominican scholastics is ratshit. Nothing you have critiqued of mine really varies from standard Aristo-Thomism. Likewise, most of the broader points I am making are accepted by traditional Christianity (viz., orthodox and roman Catholicism).

Christianity, even for protestantism, is a version of essence realism, of the immorality of homosexuality, moral naturalism, etc. — Bob Ross

But, medically speaking, all of that is wrong. There is nothing wrong with having sex of the various kinds. There is no nature to which our soul must aspire towards which a Dominican scholastic was able to perceive. The opinions of priests are often mistaken when it comes to sexual health.

So, I mean, we can say it's a perspective, yes. But it's a perspective that relies upon false notions about what human beings are empirically speaking, and when it comes to the normative component that's something you'll just be appealing towards your sense of what seems right on the basis of some sort of shared cultural artifact like religious texts and interpretation.

Which is why I mentioned hedonism -- sure I can check the math, but if there is at least one other reasonable ethical stance towards this problem of ethics (the ethics of sex, gender, and boning) then we're lead right back to "Which ethic should we choose?"; the is/ought problem, Hume's fork, is more ignored in these old philosophies that believed the facts spoke for themselves about what is good, when in reality it was the philosophers interpreting the facts towards such-and-such norms (which means we are free to do the same).

One of the symptoms is not realizing you are mentally ill, — Harry Hindu

I bet there's a lot of people have that symptom.