Premises:
[1] Epistemically, belief and thought are identical.
[2] Preexisting attachment to an idea motivates a rhetorical shift from “I think” to “I believe,” implying a degree of veracity the idea lacks.
[3] This implication produces unwarranted confidence.
[4] Insisting on an idea’s truth beyond the limits of its epistemic warrant is irrational.

Conclusion ∴ All belief is irrational. — Millard J Melnyk

By whatever definition of belief, truth, or knowledge you apply, it is generally recognized that a belief has to be justified in order to be valid or usable. Adequate justification, along with a recognition of uncertainty, addresses any questions about rationality.

[1] Epistemically, belief and thought are identical. — Millard J Melnyk

They are?

A believe is, one way or another, held to be true. But not all thoughts are held to be true. We can certainly entertain thoughts that are not true - that's were things like modality and error come from.

if your point is that we ought perhaps treat our beliefs with scepticism, that's not a bad view. But care needs to be taken - can you, for example, maintain scepticism as to the meaning of the words your post is written with, while you write it? Doin so would seem to undermine the very grounding of your scepticism.

Is your belief that you are now reading this sentence irrational?

All this by way of pointing to something a bit broader than just that your belief that "All belief is irrational" would thereby be irrational.

But further, we do construct social institutions, not by "I think..." so much as by "We will act in this way...". No individual can construct such a social institution by thinking it; but that is why they are social.

SO not seeing it.

I pretty much never go for argumentum ad populum. I generally assume that whatever is generally recognized in a world such as ours is must be incorrect.

I'm assuming you're thinking along lines of justified true belief. That pertains to knowledge. I'm not talking about knowledge, but the difference between thought and belief.

Per Copilot at https://copilot.microsoft.com/shares/1YnFudJCauyNC69pJSbJi#:~:text=At%20this%20point,the%20JTB%20framework.

-----------
Me:
At this point, is JTB still considered a robust definition of knowledge?

Copilot:
No—JTB (Justified True Belief) is no longer considered a robust or sufficient definition of knowledge. Philosophers widely agree that Gettier-style counterexamples expose fatal flaws in the JTB framework.
-------------

You're welcome to specify the epistemic differences between, "I believe it's raining," and, "I think it's raining."

If it's raining, you can justify both statements. The justification for one is exactly the same as for the other. Both statements have equal warrant. Epistemically identical.

Which just begs the question: then why "believe" rather than "think"?

In other words, what justifies/gives warrant to characterize "It's raining" as a belief as distinct from a thought?

You're welcome to explain that. I'll be all ears. I can't.

[4] Insisting on an idea’s truth beyond the limits of its epistemic warrant is irrational.

Conclusion ∴ All belief is irrational. — Millard J Melnyk

The conclusion doesn't follow: hasty generalization fallacy (at least).

Goodness, some logic.

Bet it doesn't help.

“Epistemically identical” and “identical” mean different things.

I didn’t say that belief and thought are identical, period.

I distinguish epistemics from epistemology. Epistemics is the practical analysis of how knowledge is produced, justified, and deployed. So, when considering thought vs. belief, there is no epistemic difference inherent between the two. Neither grants an idea more or less epistemic warrant. Epistemically, "I think it's raining" and "I believe its raining" are identical with respect to the accuracy, soundness, value, etc., of the idea that it's raining. The differences are rhetorical and epistemically unwarranted..

If it's raining, you can justify both “believe” and “think” versions. The justification for one is exactly the same as for the other. Both versions have equal and identical warrant. Epistemically identical.

Which just begs the question: then why "believe" rather than "think"?

In other words, what justifies/gives warrant to characterize "It's raining" as a belief as distinct from a thought?

The rest of your comment from “if your point is that we ought perhaps treat our beliefs with scepticism” and down is actually off-topic. Relevant, yes -- but I made no pretensions of getting into implications of what I said in the post. Happy to talk about them, though, once we get on the same page about what I in fact did say. My sole aim here is to stress test the argument as it stands before getting into its ramifications.

I admit that the title of the post was a bit of provocateuring as I worded it. What’s irrational is the shift from “think” to “believe”. No rational warrant to make the shift, which means no warrant, period. No value add – unless you think that creating an illusion adds value. “Believe” smuggles in illicit credibility. Granular gaslighting.

So, the rational content, meaning, and the epistemic warrant for, “I believe it’s raining,” and, “I think it’s raining,” are exactly the same. “Believe”, however, sneaks in credibility that isn’t rationally defensible, and so, it’s irrational. To the degree that a belief is semantically and epistemically as rational as a thought, there is no rational justification for holding it as a belief. If we’re thoroughly convinced of the idea, rather than say, “I think…” we say, “I know…” When we say, “I believe…” we’re admitting we don’t know it, but we want to impress more than, “I think…” will buy us. That “more” is the irrational bit. Add it to a thought, resulting in a belief, and that belief is definitionally characterized by the irrational bit.

So, I guess, strictly speaking, the title is right on as it is.

Maybe, but not just cuz you say so. Specify. Point out and explain the gaps and/or leaps.

[4] Insisting on an idea’s truth beyond the limits of its epistemic warrant is irrational. — Millard J Melnyk

I don't believe we have a clear enough understanding of the limits of "epistemic warrant" to use the idea as a given. Saying that is not a rejection of reason but a particular use of it.

The proposition that saying as much is itself a belief only leads to comparing beliefs.

And then you are back where you started.

I distinguish epistemics from epistemology. — Millard J Melnyk

And?

I don't "distinguish epistemics from epistemology", so you are wrong?

You want your cake and to eat it, by supposing that belief and thought are both the same and yet different.

A belief is usually considered to be an attitude towards a sentence such that the sentence is held to be true.

A thought is something else entirely.

The objection I presented is that we can think something without believing it. It follows that belief and thought are not identical.

I don't see that you addressed this objection.

And again, more broadly, your conclusion is itself a belief: that belief is irrational. It follows that your argument is irrelevant to your conclusion, since your conclusion is irrational.

Believing all belief is irrational, is irrational.

So there seems to be something irrational about your conclusion.

I wrote:

By whatever definition of belief, truth, or knowledge you apply, it is generally recognized that a belief has to be justified in order to be valid or usable. — T Clark

You responded:

I pretty much never go for argumentum ad populum. I generally assume that whatever is generally recognized in a world such as ours is must be incorrect. — Millard J Melnyk

Are you saying that a belief doesn’t have to be justified in order to be valid or useable? Or are you saying that a justified belief is not valid or usable?

I'm assuming you're thinking along lines of justified true belief. That pertains to knowledge. I'm not talking about knowledge, but the difference between thought and belief. — Millard J Melnyk

I didn’t say anything about justified true belief.

In other words, what justifies/gives warrant to characterize "It's raining" as a belief as distinct from a thought? — Millard J Melnyk

What difference does it make? The issue on the table, as I understand it, is whether or not all belief is irrational. As I indicated, adequately justified belief is not irrational.

By "epistemic warrant", I simply mean that what is asserted as true doesn't cantilever past a solid, rational (adequately thought through and connected to reality) basis for thinking it's true. When, "I think it's raining," isn't enough to do what you want to get done, given no additional reason or fact or evidence to justify making the statement seem stronger (more credible) than "I think" affords -- i.e., given that nothing warrants the additional credibility you want to convey -- the additional credibility is unwarranted, and so, irrational.

Does that help?

As to:

"The proposition that saying as much is itself a belief only leads to comparing beliefs."

I have no idea what you're saying there nor how it relates to what I said in the post. Please clarify.

Epistemically, belief and thought are identical. — Millard J Melnyk

I don't really understand what work "epistemically" is doing here. However it is true that "I think that p" and "I believe that p" both indicate that you assign the value "true" to p. Moore's paradox is a powerful argument in favour of that intuition. I'm not sure why you don't add that the same is true of "I know that p". However, these terms are not synonymous. This becomes clear when one considers "S thinks/believes/knows that p". If p is false, A does not know that p, but can be said (by someone else) to believe or think that p.
The significant difference between "I know.." and "I believe..." and "I think ..." is that although they are, if you like, cognitively identical, they indicate more and less confidence in the truth of p, with "think" at the low end of the scale suggesting considerable uncertainty whether p.

I

Preexisting attachment to an idea motivates a rhetorical shift from “I think” to “I believe,” implying a degree of veracity the idea lacks. — Millard J Melnyk

If there is a pre-existing irrational attachment to an idea, the shift may well take place, and the resulting belief will be irrational. But if there is not a pre-existing irrational attachment to an idea, the consequence will not follow. So 3) does not follow.

I think you're almost right, unless the believer applies induction: which is technically reasoned belief or evidence-based belief. "The sun will rise again tomorrow because it did today". Then, we are in the territory of "half psychosis", or partially imposed imagination. David Hume questioned induction's ability to prove, but often we have nothing else to go on beyond induction in the process of decision making, so we can't throw out all belief and faith.

This would be great news for those of us who want a truly human world. Big pill to swallow, though. — Millard J Melnyk

Seems like a belief in the good of humanity ;-)

How do you distinguish between generally received opinions from what has been justified by reason?

Efforts to make that distinction are a big part of why we talk about reason.

I think I agree with some other objections in the thread. I noticed aspects of my own objections in these.

Even granting that some beliefs and thoughts are epistemically identical, there still seems to be a crucial kind that hinders your argument from going through: "justified beliefs." I don't think these are identical to mere thinking. It seems like going from "I think" to "I believe" when that belief is justified would warrant some confidence. Given justification, the generalization is too quick.

Still, beliefs and thoughts don't seem identical to me epistemically. I may have beliefs even when they are not thoughts. I have many beliefs about the living status of all kinds of people, but this does not mean that I'm thinking that they are either dead or alive. "Having a belief" and "having a thought" are thus separate concepts.

We can also separate beliefs and thoughts in how they are justified. A belief may be supported by reasons (weighing evidence, coherence with other beliefs, etc.) that are not present in the same way when we merely think about the claim. For example, the belief “Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince was not written as satire” might be justified by testimony and by an independent weighing of the textual evidence. But merely thinking that same statement does not mean that this thought itself is drawing on that testimony or that weighing of the evidence. Often “I think” is just a way to say that one has a belief. The belief can be epistemically justified, but it does not necessarily follow that the thought is justified in the same way. They seem different.

Conclusion ∴ All belief is irrational. — Millard J Melnyk

Believing all belief is irrational, is irrational. — Banno

:snicker: Ninja'd.

The objection I presented is that we can think something without believing it. It follows that belief and thought are not identical. — Banno

I think it is fair to say that there are given contexts where they are used synonymously, yet even then we could perhaps extend this and say they are identical in the sense that light blue and dark blue are identical as being shades of blue. Meaning, both are ponderings.

Because the gap between “I think” and “I believe” seems to be hallucinatory. — Millard J Melnyk

In given contexts they are most certainly synonymous. "I believe I am breathing" is hardly the same as me saying "I think I am breathing". The first is an ironic statement and the second is a flight of fancy.

Beliving something and Thinking it are quite different in some contexts and practically identical in others. It is irrational to say Blue can mean Sad and that Red can mean Passion that all colours are synonymous with this or that emotion. This is kinda what you are doing with Think and Believe.

….when considering thought vs. belief, there is no epistemic difference inherent between the two. — Millard J Melnyk

Agreed, in principle, but from that, how does it not follow that all thought is irrational? It is unintelligible that all thought is irrational, for the thought that all thought is irrational is itself irrational, ad infinitum, therefore it must be the case, given the criterion of epistemic congruency, that not all belief is irrational. The caveat being….epistemic congruency just means neither thought nor belief is knowledge.

The key is the judgement which follows from the act of cognition, insofar as it is possible to think without judging the validity of the object thought about, while on the other hand, the object thought about must have been judged in order to then affirm or deny the validity of it.

To think, e.g., its raining, merely indicates a priori, that some of the manifold of conditions experience informs as necessary, must be observed, such that rain is possible. To believe it’s raining is to judge whether enough of those conditions are actually met in order to validate that an observation accords with experience. To know it is raining, then, indicates that all the conditions experience informs as necessary are met, from which it is invalid, re: self-contradictory, for the judgement to be that it is not raining.
————-

….why we talk about reason. — Paine

…..just as you say, with anthropology, psychology and that ridiculous OLP conspicuous in their absence when we do.

Premises:
[1] Epistemically, belief and thought are identical.
[2] Preexisting attachment to an idea motivates a rhetorical shift from “I think” to “I believe,” implying a degree of veracity the idea lacks.
[3] This implication produces unwarranted confidence.
[4] Insisting on an idea’s truth beyond the limits of its epistemic warrant is irrational. — Millard J Melnyk

This hinges on the fact that we both believe what and that we are thinking, and think only what we believe. Even if I think "the moon is made of green cheese" either I do so from a context of genuine empirical ignorance, or in the mode of intentional counter-factuality. In which case the second premise, that there is tendency to epistemic over-valuation - due to the epistemic coincidence of belief and thought itself - is unwarranted. Belief is not irrational so much as it is pre-rational. Or foundationally rational would be my construction.

The fact that you believe something fundamentally involves asserting an epistemic authority. However it is not unwarranted so much as it is committed to establishing warrant. Hence the basis of rationality.

Epistemically, belief and thought are identical. — Millard J Melnyk

A believe is, one way or another, held to be true. But not all thoughts are held to be true. We can certainly entertain thoughts that are not true - that's were things like modality and error come from. — Banno

I distinguish epistemics from epistemology. Epistemics is the practical analysis of how knowledge is produced, justified, and deployed. So, when considering thought vs. belief, there is no epistemic difference inherent between the two. Neither grants an idea more or less epistemic warrant. Epistemically, "I think it's raining" and "I believe its raining" are identical with respect to the accuracy, soundness, value, etc., of the idea that it's raining. The differences are rhetorical and epistemically unwarranted..

If it's raining, you can justify both “believe” and “think” versions. The justification for one is exactly the same as for the other. Both versions have equal and identical warrant. Epistemically identical.

Which just begs the question: then why "believe" rather than "think"? — Millard J Melnyk

Geez Louise, guys. This is making a mountain out of mole hill. Can, "I believe" and "I think" be synonymous. Sure it can. We often precede statements with "I believe" and "I think" to express a sense of skepticism about the truth value of what we are stating.

The other issue is that Millard seems to be conflating two senses of "think".
-Propositional “think that p” (e.g., “I think it’s raining”) → epistemically similar to believe that p.
-Generic or hypothetical thinking (e.g., “I’m thinking about unicorns” or “Imagine it’s raining”) → not epistemically committed.

You both are now talking past each other as one is talking about the first and the other is talking about the second.

When it comes to justifying our beliefs, we can do it one of two ways - empirically or logically. When we are able to justify some belief using both, instead of just one or the other, it becomes knowledge.

You want your cake and to eat it, by supposing that belief and thought are both the same and yet different. — Banno

Quote the statement where I said belief and thought are the same thing. You're hallucinating.

How do you distinguish between generally received opinions from what has been justified by reason? — Paine

Simple. You ask the person with the opinion what they did to justify it to themself. Most people did nothing.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

If you're interested in epistemology, you should read my paper above. Let me summarize to your basic point.

First, we assume you know something. But knowing something now doesn't necessarily mean it will be known again in the future. Lets use a deck of cards as an example.

We know that there are 4 jacks in a deck of 52 cards. From here we can conclude one type of inductive conclusion, probability. There's a 1/13 chance that when I draw a card, it will be a jack. If I decide to believe that any other card besides a jack will be drawn, I've done that through reason that its a 12/13 chance that it will be any card besides a jack.

Lets go one step down. I draw lots of cards and realize I can pull a jack from this deck of 52 cards. This is my knowledge. Since I know its been done one time, I believe it is possible to pull a jack again. So I pull from a deck of cards, and believe I'm going to pull a jack. Not because of probability, but because of possibility. What is known once could possibly happen again.

Next I have a randomizer on this deck of cards. I pull one card, put it back, then it randomizes again. Because I can envision the scenario in my mind with what I know, its plausible that the deck randomizer could randomize it so that a jack will never be the first card again. Its not irrational yet, but getting there.

Finally, we have an irrational belief. I pull a jack from a deck of cards, then put it back in the deck. I now believe that the jack I just put in the deck, is no longer in the deck. There's no reason behind such a belief, and this belief contradicts all reason that would point to the jack being in the deck. This is an irrational belief.

Glad to see someone understands "epistemically identical". :grin:

Even granting that some beliefs and thoughts are epistemically identical, there still seems to be a crucial kind that hinders your argument from going through: "justified beliefs." I don't think these are identical to mere thinking. It seems like going from "I think" to "I believe" when that belief is justified would warrant some confidence. Given justification, the generalization is too quick. — GazingGecko

"Justified belief" is an oxymoron. Take any idea. If the idea is justified to the point that a person would be in idiot to reject it, what part of the idea needs to be believed?

When you look out the window and it's raining, do you say, "I believe it's raining." ?? Where does belief enter into it? If you're lying in bed in a dark room and hear rain on the roof, do you say, "I believe it's raining." ?? Or would you more likely say, "I think it's raining." ?? Where does belief enter into that?

To the point that an idea has been rationally justified, there's nothing for belief to do. When we're attached to an idea whose justification leaves something to be desired, we use belief to cover the unjustified aspects so that we can have illicit confidence that they merit credence as much as the justified aspects do. That's not always a bad thing. We show each other this grace all the time when we say, "I believe you," or, "I believe in you" -- and that's a good thing. But it's no more rational than believing the tooth fairy left a quarter under my pillow.

I like topics like this because they tease out people's unexamined biases. Most people here reacted to "irrational" as a negative. It's different when it comes to ideas, though. Psychologically, "I believe in you," is worlds apart from, "I belief in democracy."

Conclusion ∴ All belief is irrational.
— Millard J Melnyk
Believing all belief is irrational, is irrational.
— Banno
:snicker: Ninja'd. — 180 Proof

:rofl:

Believing that believing all belief is irrational, is irrational, is irrational.

And that's to ignore the irrationality of confusing what I've said as a "belief". Where did I state or imply that I have a "belief" that belief is irrational?

Some people are so addicted to belief, they see them everywhere lol.

Hallucinatory.

The objection I presented is that we can think something without believing it. It follows that belief and thought are not identical.
— Banno

I think it is fair to say that there are given contexts where they are used synonymously, yet even then we could perhaps extend this and say they are identical in the sense that light blue and dark blue are identical as being shades of blue. Meaning, both are ponderings. — I like sushi

Neither you or Banno can tell the difference between "identical" and "epistemically identical", apparently.

Agreed, in principle, but from that, how does it not follow that all thought is irrational? — Mww

It does not follow just from that either that they're rational or irrational.

Sorry, having a hard time following you and relating it to what I've said. It's just not that complicated. The semantic content and the epistemic warrant for both versions, believe and think, are the same with respect to the the actual assertion. One is no more or less true than the other. Agreed?

So, there is a reason and a function for choosing "believe", and that reason is precisely to extend the "this is true" subtext always implied in an assertion beyond existing epistemic warrant (having done the work to establish that "this is true" isn't false.) Conjuring this illicit credibility is the function of "believe".

That's all I'm saying here.

This hinges on the fact that we both believe what and that we are thinking, and think only what we believe. — Pantagruel

No, not even a little bit. Personally, I don't deal in belief at all. "I think" and -- rarely -- "I know" are all I need, precisely because overextending epistemic warrant disgusts me. Have you read Harry Frankfurt's On Bullshit? Bullshit differs from lies by virtue of the fact that the bullshitter does absolutely nothing to establish warrant, because they couldn't care less about it. Warrant (connecting what we say to what's real) is irrelevant to them. All that matters is the effect they generate by what they assert. So, where I've mentioned overextending credibility beyond epistemic warrant, you can just substitute "bullshit" without any loss of meaning, lol.

So, then, "belief" fits only with ideas that are at least in part bullshit. No bullshit, no need for "believe" -- and in fact, people rarely use "belief" or "believe" when there's no bullshit involved. They say "think" or "know" or, far more often, just state the assertion. That's something I haven't even mentioned yet: it's a curious tick, epistemically, to interject ego into the mix. "It's raining," is about the rain. "I think it's raining," is about the speaker's relationship to the rain. "I believe," is even more egocentric.

The fact that you believe something fundamentally involves asserting an epistemic authority. However it is not unwarranted so much as it is committed to establishing warrant. Hence the basis of rationality. — Pantagruel

I agree and I think that's an astute observation. Yet one more reason that belief is irrational, because the interest in imposing epistemic authority (if it's merely asserted, it carries no authority) and the act of imposing it are thoroughly irrational. Warrant established on authority is patently irrational. "Smoke this brand, it's better for you," says the guy in the white lab coat and a stethoscope draped around his neck, LMAO!

You're, of course, welcome to theorize to your heart's content, just like I do. :blush:

That was an enjoyable little read, but it's not responsive to the post. Sure, there are different ways of looking at the same thing. I presented mine here for the purpose of evoking feedback on it, not on yours. Thanks though.

I can. You are using terms in one specific context and then saying this meaning they are identical in other contexts.

Premises:
[1] Epistemically, belief and thought are identical.
[2] Preexisting attachment to an idea motivates a rhetorical shift from “I think” to “I believe,” implying a degree of veracity the idea lacks.
[3] This implication produces unwarranted confidence.
[4] Insisting on an idea’s truth beyond the limits of its epistemic warrant is irrational. — Millard J Melnyk

1) This depends on how you are using the terms 'belief' and 'thought'. A belief can be a thought (I guess where it is not it woudl be referred to as somethign liek an 'Alief'), but a thought cannot be a belief.
2) Nothing is certain unless framed in an abstract framework. Having a degree of belief is perfectly rational (ie. believing a dice roll of 6 is more probable than not if I roll it 100 times).
3) No. It is called doubt and/or scepticism. These are kind of important. It is not unwarranted to state that a 100 dice rolls will almost certainly result in rolling a 6 (Entropy is evidence of highly improbable thigns being reclassified as 'impossible' for common purposes).
4) Insisting that belief and thought do not differ is to take an irrational stance. You have stepped beyond the limits of what such language is capable of by tagging colloquial language as if it is a mathematical truth.