I don't really understand what work "epistemically" is doing here. — Ludwig V

It's doing there in an attempt to distinguish the assertion from the statement of relationship to the assertion (which failed miserably as can be seen in the comments.) "I think it's raining," and, "I believe it's raining," are semantically identical with respect to the rain, i.e., the assertion each makes is identical. All that differs, as you point out, is the speaker's level of credence in the assertion.

I'm not sure why you don't add that the same is true of "I know that p". — Ludwig V

LMAO! You can see from the discussion how problematic it is to get minds to open to the possibility that "I believe" is not all it's cracked up to be. Do you think taking on "I know" would be easier? You're right, it's exactly the same situation for both, although when someone says, "I believe" and "I think" we take them at their word. When they say "I know" a boatload of new soldiers of skepticism suddenly get activated. :lol:

Once it's clear that belief properly applies only to assertions that are part bullshit (see https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/1022560), then knowledge becomes easy-peasy: assertions which we believe (because you never know -- how much epistemic work is "enough"?) have been completely justified. To my mind, "knowledge" is a useless category, because either it remains open to revision -- in which case, what are the merits and advantages of calling it knowledge as opposed to theory or provisional conclusion or guess? -- or dubbing it "knowledge" prematurely closes the question, which accounts for the obscene levels of resistance to new ideas and angles always mounted by the "knowers" in every age and every situation.

The significant difference between "I know.." and "I believe..." and "I think ..." is that although they are, if you like, cognitively identical, they indicate more and less confidence in the truth of p, with "think" at the low end of the scale suggesting considerable uncertainty whether p. — Ludwig V

If in fact we use "believe" for assertions that involve bullshit, then "believe" is at the low end of the scale. "I think P" is honest and invites discussion. "I believe P" has a markedly different effect, immediately raising the question what the person did or did not do, (likely the latter, because jumping that gap is what "believe" does,) to determine the extra that "believe" implies over "think".

But the most persuasive form is to drop all reference to self completely.

You can see this in practice: "P." is actually more credible, all things being equal, than "I believe P."

"Fire! Get the hell out!" compared to "I believe there's a fire! I believe you should get the hell out!"

Which is more likely to prompt action?

Naked assertion without reference to self is actually more convincing than "I know". Psychologically, the reference to self itself raises questions that naked assertion doesn't. What's more, it shifts the cognitive focus away from the whole (supposedly) point: "It's raining" motivates hearers to check out the actuality to see if the assertion is true empirically. "I think" and "I believe" and "I know" shifts attention to the speaker's relationship with the empirical reality. The effect is to dissuade (to some degree) empirical investigation by deflecting attention onto the speaker.

Yet one more reason that belief is irrational, because the interest in imposing epistemic authority (if it's merely asserted, it carries no authority) and the act of imposing it are thoroughly irrational. — Millard J Melnyk

Just because it is "not yet rational" doesn't mean that it is the opposite of rational. This is a classic fallacy of the excluded middle. Rationality and irrationality can be on a spectrum, not sides of a coin.

That was an enjoyable little read, but it's not responsive to the post. Sure, there are different ways of looking at the same thing. I presented mine here for the purpose of evoking feedback on it, not on yours. — Millard J Melnyk

Perfectly fair! Let me address your post then.

[1] Epistemically, belief and thought are identical. — Millard J Melnyk

This conflicts with most understandings of thoughts. A thought is an inner conscious experience. So for example if I'm thinking of a tomato, then I'm thinking of a tomato. Is that a belief? No. A belief is a claim that what we are thinking about is real beyond the thought itself. So if I thought about a tomato and said, "I believe this tomato I'm thinking about exists somewhere in the world," I'm nothing that what I'm thinking about is real beyond my thoughts. Prior to proving that it is true, it is a belief.

[2] Preexisting attachment to an idea motivates a rhetorical shift from “I think” to “I believe,” implying a degree of veracity the idea lacks. — Millard J Melnyk

I do want to clarify what an "I think" context is from an "I believe" context. Correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems you're assuming that "I think there might be a tomato that exists in the world that I'm visualizing in my head," is different from, "I believe there is a tomato that exists in the world what I'm visualizing in my head."

If this is case, "I think" in your case isn't a statement of certainty, but a statement of consideration or exploration. You don't believe its the case, you think it could be. This is called "plausibility". There's nothing innate in your thoughts that confirms or denies that the thing you are thinking about can be found in the real world.

You are implying that if someone thinks on a plausibility for long enough, it becomes a belief statement of possibility or certainty. I would say that's not necessarily the case. Plenty of "I think"s simply stay that way. But correct me if I have the wrong base understanding of what you're trying to say here.

[3] This implication produces unwarranted confidence. — Millard J Melnyk

If one changes from "I think" to "I believe" through the repetition of one's thoughts, then that is most certainly unwarranted confidence. But you have to demonstrate that this always happens, and I'm not sure you have here.

[4] Insisting on an idea’s truth beyond the limits of its epistemic warrant is irrational. — Millard J Melnyk

Correct, and I think few would disagree with you.

Conclusion ∴ All belief is irrational. — Millard J Melnyk

Unfortunately I'm not seeing how this conclusion follows the premises. All you've noted is one type of belief, or a belief that insists on an idea's truth beyond the limits of its epistemic warrant. The point in my initial reply was to show you there are different types of beliefs. Probability, possibility, plausibility, and irrational. The first three if believed based on one's epistemic circumstances, can be rational. Only if one disregards the epistemic circumstances that allow the other three beliefs to be cogent, can one come to an irrational belief.

If "justified belief" is an oxymoron then I suppose that we are relying on different concepts that we both call "belief".

With belief I roughly mean an attitude with a direction-of-fit towards the world with the content that something is the case or not. On this view, "It is raining" can be a belief without one claiming "I believe it is raining" explicitly. This usage seems closer to (or at least a kind of) what you call an "idea." Thus, to me, there is nothing contradictory in saying a belief is justified, akin to how you say an idea is justified.

I think I have a better picture of what you’re arguing now. I think you take "belief" to be an add-on to expressions of ideas to signal credence to oneself or others without any added epistemic warrant being involved. You seemingly derive this concept of "belief" from how the phrase "I believe" is used to convince oneself and others that there is more warrant than there really is and that this thus is irrational.

Your addition of "I believe in you" is interesting. It tells me that you take the relevant concept to be what I would consider "non-doxastic," being similar to having "faith."

Is this in the right direction of what you had in mind with your argument?

Just because it is "not yet rational" doesn't mean that it is the opposite of rational. This is a classic fallacy of the excluded middle. Rationality and irrationality can be on a spectrum, not sides of a coin. — Pantagruel

Well, bad call. No "middle" excluded by me, although I won't argue it's not true of your interpretation of what I've said. I can't account for or answer to your interpretation. Speaking in binaries for simplicity's sake does not imply thinking in binaries. It's seems you want to find fault if at all possible? Have you considered your own motivations for that?

Take "belief is irrational" like saying, "Todd's gone nuts!" It doesn't mean there's absolutely no sanity left in Todd, does it? But nuts enough that it's significant and has to be dealt with. Like that.

I think your confusion lies in failing to keep the two parts of such statements distinct.

"I ____ that P" is a two-part assertion. (think/believe/know in the blank, makes no real difference.)

Part 1: P is the assertion proper, and it is identical in "think P", "believe P", and "know P". Epistemically identical in all cases.

Part 2: The "I ____" part, referring to the speaker's relationship/attitude to the assertion, which as far as the truth value of the assertion is neither here or there.

Since there is no difference in P in any case, there is no reason justified by assessing P epistemically to choose "think" or "believe" or "know". The choice has nothing to do with P or its validity or truth value. P (epistemically) and the speaker's relationship/attitude to P both lie on spectra. The choice made to adopt one or another relationship/attitude does not. It's a discrete, mutually exclusive choice.

In predominate usage, "I believe" is chosen for assertions for which the epistemic analysis of the assertion does not give it sufficient warrant. It's a frank admission that epistemic warrant is weak. "Believe" bridges the gap. When warrant is strong, "The sun is really bright and hot today," we simply don't prefix an assertion with "I believe..."

I don't argue that there isn't plenty of sloppy use of language and that lots of times "think" and "believe" get used interchangeably. "Know" is quite different, though. However, I try not to make sense out of things based on sloppy examples.

Does that help?

This conflicts with most understandings of thoughts. — Philosophim

What you have in mind does, but it's not what I said.

"I ____ that P" is a two-part assertion. (think/believe/know in the blank, makes no real difference.) E.g., "I believe it's raining." P = "it's raining".

Part 1: P is the assertion proper, and it is identical in "think P", "believe P", and "know P". Epistemically identical in all cases.

Part 2: The "I ____" part, referring to the speaker's relationship/attitude to the assertion, which as far as the truth value of the assertion is neither here or there.

Since there is no difference in P in any case, there is no reason (justified by assessing P epistemically) to choose "think" or "believe" or "know". The choice has nothing to do with P or its validity or truth value.

You are implying that if someone thinks on a plausibility for long enough, it becomes a belief statement of possibility or certainty. I would say that's not necessarily the case. Plenty of "I think"s simply stay that way. But correct me if I have the wrong base understanding of what you're trying to say here. — Philosophim

Actually, no -- which would be clear with a simpler example. Yours with "might be" and "visualizing in my head" and "plausibility" is unnecessarily complicated. Let's stick to "I _____ that P", it's all we need.

I said/implied nothing about thinking "on a plausibility for long enough, it becomes a belief statement". Our use of think, believe, and know are terminology choices we make. I'm ignoring sloppy usage and deceptive usage and assuming the the choice reflects the speaker's own honest assessment of their relationship/attitude to the assertion.

Let me know how these clarifications alter your feedback.

…..believe and think, are the same with respect to the the actual assertion. — Millard J Melnyk

Therein lay some difference in our philosophies: an assertion is a statement predicated on language, but the OP is concerned with the relative quality of thought and belief, its irrationality, which are determined by the logical validity of the cognitions of which they are the content, and with which language has nothing to do.

While I agree assertions of thought or belief, in and of themselves, hold the same epistemic value, demonstrated by their interchangeable language use….however indiscriminate that may be…..without serious loss of mutual understanding, it remains they are very far from being interchangeable in the system in which they are the constructs necessarily presupposed in any language use.

One is no more or less true than the other. Agreed? — Millard J Melnyk

Agreed, assertions expressing them aside, thought has no more truth value than belief, but only because there is no truth value in either one. Truth resides exclusively in the conformity of the thought or belief with experience on the one hand, or another antecedent thought or belief that has itself already conformed to experience, on the other. Conformity with respect to experience is empirical proof, legislated by the principle of induction, re: contingently true only insofar as we know; conformity with respect to antecedent thought/belief is logical proof, legislated by the LNC, re: necessarily true insofar as its negation is impossible. Empirical proof is called knowledge, logical proof is called apodeitic certainty.
—————-

It's just not that complicated. — Millard J Melnyk

Or…it’s overly simplified?

Either way, it’s your thread; I’m just a visitor.

"I ____ that P" is a two-part assertion. (think/believe/know in the blank, makes no real difference.) E.g., "I believe it's raining." P = "it's raining".

Part 1: P is the assertion proper, and it is identical in "think P", "believe P", and "know P". Epistemically identical in all cases. — Millard J Melnyk

Ok, I'm in agreement with you that in certain contexts, "I think" can mean the same thing as "I believe". But does it always? No. Many time "I think" can also mean "I'm considering". And considering is not a synonym of 'belief'.

If you're going to use a word that can have more than one meaning depending on context, but you're only interested in the context in which that meaning is a synonym of another word, just use that other word. Otherwise people are going to bring up the different contexts of the word you're using, and the argument will likely get into an argument over definitions instead of where you want to explore.

Part 1: P is the assertion proper, and it is identical in "think P", "believe P", and "know P". Epistemically identical in all cases. — Millard J Melnyk

Again, I think in a particular context these words could be synonyms, or have certain parts that they share. But 'know' is never the same as 'believe' unless you're using slang. Knowledge as a definition is a descriptor of whether a belief has a backing behind it that fits some reasonable standard beyond the base assertion. Another way to view it is, "If a belief can be irrational, than there is the possible contrast of a belief being rational."

Since there is no difference in P in any case, there is no reason (justified by assessing P epistemically) to choose "think" or "believe" or "know". — Millard J Melnyk

Unfortunately this just picks a very limited context and makes them all synonyms. So all you've really done is use one concept, not three. But it is the case that these words can represent different concepts in different contexts. Therefore you can's use the word as if it is a synonym in all contexts.

Actually, no -- which would be clear with a simpler example. Yours with "might be" and "visualizing in my head" and "plausibility" is unnecessarily complicated. Let's stick to "I _____ that P", it's all we need. — Millard J Melnyk

There's a difference between 'unnecessary complication" and "identifying real differences". I mean, we can call everything that's has green on it a tree right? "Fir tree", "bush" and "grass" are not unnecessary complications, they are observations of important differences in most contexts.

I said/implied nothing about thinking "on a plausibility for long enough, it becomes a belief statement". — Millard J Melnyk

So then, and please correct me again if I'm wrong, you're using belief and think as synonyms.

Take "belief is irrational" like saying, "Todd's gone nuts!" It doesn't mean there's absolutely no sanity left in Todd, does it? But nuts enough that it's significant and has to be dealt with. Like that. — Millard J Melnyk

Exactly. It is a matter of degree. Hence by definition no longer binary. We have moved now onto a scale which lies between two extremes.

Believing that believing all belief is irrational, is irrational, is irrational. — Millard J Melnyk

What this shows is that the thread, and your attempted explanation, is hopelessly muddled.

Cheers.

Shall I dip my toe in the murk? Hmmm...........no.....

If "justified belief" is an oxymoron then I suppose that we are relying on different concepts that we both call "belief". — GazingGecko

Probably.

Again, what you mean by belief isn't relevant to the post. The syllogism can't be evaluated on the basis of your definition, because it doesn't use that definition.

I think you take "belief" to be an add-on to expressions of ideas to signal credence to oneself or others without any added epistemic warrant being involved. — GazingGecko

Getting there! :D

As I've mentioned now in several places:

"I ____ that P" is a two-part assertion. (think/believe/know in the blank, makes no real difference.) E.g., "I believe it's raining." P = "it's raining".

Part 1: P is the assertion proper, and it is identical in "think P", "believe P", and "know P". Epistemically identical in all cases. Maybe the problem is how I tried to

Part 2: The "I ____" part, referring to the speaker's relationship/attitude to the assertion, which as far as the truth value of the assertion is neither here or there.

Since there is no difference in P in any case, there is no reason (justified by assessing P epistemically) to choose "think" or "believe" or "know". The choice has nothing to do with P or its validity or truth value.

So, not sure what you mean by "add-on", but I think the above makes clear the structure of what I'm talking about. "I think/believe/know that P" involves a discrete choice about how to characterize the speaker's relationship/attitude to the assertion P, not a difference in P itself. When a person chooses "believe", it's because neither "think" nor "know" fit the bill, and they're not satisfied with simply stating "P".

Given the above, I'm pretty sure that "doxastic" and similar considerations apply only to Part 2, the asserter's "doxastic stance" toward the assertion.

Wise move.

Ok, I'm in agreement with you that in certain contexts, "I think" can mean the same thing as "I believe". — Philosophim

Well, no, we're not in agreement, because I haven't said and don't agree that think can mean the same thing as believe.

So then, and please correct me again if I'm wrong, you're using belief and think as synonyms. — Philosophim

Nope. I'm not sure I can make it clearer. Last try: I'll restate it with a bunch more possibilities:

"I ____ that P" is a two-part assertion. (think/believe/know/consider/speculate/conjecture/theorize/hypothesize in the blank, makes no real difference.) E.g., "I believe it's raining." P = "it's raining".

Part 1: P is the assertion proper, and it is identical in "think P", "believe P", "know P", or "WHATEVER P". Epistemically identical in all cases. Maybe the problem is how I tried to

Part 2: The "I ____" part, referring to the speaker's relationship/attitude to the assertion, which as far as the truth value of the assertion is neither here or there.

Since there is no difference in P in any case, there is no reason (justified by assessing P epistemically) to choose "think" or "believe" or "know" or "WHATEVER" -- which are not synonyms. The choice has nothing to do with P or its validity or truth value, which is identical in every case.

Well, no, we're not in agreement, because I haven't said and don't agree that think can mean the same thing as believe. — Millard J Melnyk

I apologize then, I'm clearly not getting it.

Part 1: P is the assertion proper, and it is identical in "think P", "believe P", "know P", or "WHATEVER P". Epistemically identical in all cases. — Millard J Melnyk

Can you explain how these are epistemically identical in all cases? The point I was getting at earlier is that you seem to want to use one concept with words that often have different meanings in different contexts. It would be much clearer if you voiced what that specific concept was without the introduction of different words.

You also use P as a noun earlier with "Its raining". So is "Its raining" epistemically equivalent whether I believe, think, or know about it? Or is it the believe, think, or know which is epistemically equivalent?

Part 2: The "I ____" part, referring to the speaker's relationship/attitude to the assertion, which as far as the truth value of the assertion is neither here or there. — Millard J Melnyk

Ok, this is contextual to oneself. But couldn't a person have a different intention? So I'm sure one person when they say 'believe' could mean 'assert'. In another context they could mean, "Consider". And in another context they could personally believe their belief is 'knowledge'. But these are all different concepts, whether their opinion of the concept in application to P is true or not.

The choice has nothing to do with P or its validity or truth value, which is identical in every case. — Millard J Melnyk

Are you just trying to say that "What is true is true regardless of what we believe/think/know about it?"

I agree if I understand your position correctly as being deflationary. I would simply put it by saying that an interrogated subject isn't in the epistemically exalted position to distinguish his 'beliefs' from what he 'knows' about the world.

To find out what somebody believes, don't ask them for a self report of the form "I believe that X is true with n% confidence", but rather, ask them what they know about the world, because what a person is prepared to assert about the world is a more accurate measure of what their actual "beliefs" are, and can be expected to be at odds with what they say about themselves when introspecting unreliably.

The next question should concern the extent to which beliefs exist internally within a person in the sense of a mental state, versus externally of the person as behavioural hypotheses that society projects onto the person. (Since we have no reason to assume that people understand themselves).