Hi Anonymous,

I am not nearly as familiar with the thinkers you cited as I am with Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, & Sartre. I find it very, very hard to lump all of the existentialists into one particular camp because they disagree on many, many points.


But yes, I think it's fair to say that all of them think that philosophy has left out what I think you'd call the actual lived, human experience of the world. Instead, philosophy has traditionally emphasized highly theoretical or abstract interpretations of what human experience is like. If I had to pick one dominant theme in existentialism, it would probably be that one.


They also, I think, have a tendency to emphasize the negative sides of the human experience. Negative emotions like dread, anxiety, despair, etc. And phenomena that are traditionally conceived of as negative, especially the concept of death and human finitude as well as the idea of "the nothing" and nihilism in general.


Most of my academic studies were focused on Martin Heidegger. Undoubtedly the Heidegger of the early period, when he wrote Being & Time, is extremely considered with what he considered to be actual human experience, or what he called being-in-the-world.


He also certainly rejected scientism and egoism. Science, after all, only studies beings or entities. It never studies being itself, which is the task of philosophy as ontology as Heidegger sees it. And Heidegger's chapter devoted to the "who" of being-in-the-world with its conception of "das man" is a direct argument against the concept that we are isolated, egoistic selves primarily rather than social beings that are thrust into a world of other people, or other Dasein.


Heidegger would also agree with your last point that are choices, in terms of over-arching life project - the things that we most care about - being a mother, being an artist, being a factory worker, being a good friend - are somewhat arbitrary.


It's harder to say what Heidegger thinks about authenticity. To my knowledge he never explicitly argues, at least in Being & Time, that the authentic life is *better* than the inauthentic life. But he certainly seems to imply it with just the word choice alone.


Does Marcel have anything to say about being authentic? I would imagine he does as it's a pretty common existentialist theme.


Love existentialism. Always very happy to discuss!

I am not nearly as familiar with the thinkers you cited as I am with Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, & Sartre. I find it very, very hard to lump all of the existentialists into one particular camp because they disagree on many, many points. — Brian

I did generalize in regards to the 3 I mentioned in my OP (I'm most familiar with Gabriel Marcel). I can't think of any points on which the 3 disagree, however. I think it's more the case that each of the 3 I mentioned pursues his own existentialist philosophy in a slightly different way.

Sartre and Marcel knew each other and each responded to and mentioned the other by name in their writings (most notably in Sartre's Existentialism is a Humanism and Marcel's Existence and Human Freedom).

They also, I think, have a tendency to emphasize the negative sides of the human experience. Negative emotions like dread, anxiety, despair, etc. And phenomena that are traditionally conceived of as negative, especially the concept of death and human finitude as well as the idea of "the nothing" and nihilism in general. — Brian

One of the criticisms that Marcel made of Sartre's views was his negativism. Marcel was of the opinion that Sartre made judgments he didn't have to (we are condemned to be free). It's interesting that Marcel was raised in a non-religious home and was an agnostic, but his writings explored the themes of fidelity, faith, hope and charity. A Christian Catholic writer (Francois Muriac) wrote to him and pointed out that those themes required the existence of God. Marcel agreed and converted to Catholicism.

Another point of contention between Marcel and Sartre was that Marcel was all about openness, and he pointed out that Sartre was not open to some ideas and concepts (God, seeing the positive aspects of freedom).

Marcel did also have some positive things to say about Sartre's writing, and there were points upon which they agreed.

Does Marcel have anything to say about being authentic? I would imagine he does as it's a pretty common existentialist theme. — Brian

I don't know that Marcel used the term, "authentic", but I've read several of his plays, and his characters display authenticity. Marcel approaches the topic from the viewpoint of materialism. He suggests that the modern world is one in which people are often treated like mechanical objects, instead of beings who are experiencing the world. He explored the themes of openness and availability, and I'd argue that those require authenticity.

What I like most is the idea that I can live whatever type of life I want, that I'm free to pursue (or not pursue) whatever system of philosophy I like. Of course, the flip-side is to acknowledge that I'm totally responsible for my choices. I can't blame anyone else for the choices I make or the consequences that follow.

I'm intrigued by the concept of "transcendence" as employed by Marcel, as well.

What I like most is the idea that I can live whatever type of life I want, that I'm free to pursue (or not pursue) whatever system of philosophy I like. Of course, the flip-side is to acknowledge that I'm totally responsible for my choices. I can't blame anyone else for the choices I make or the consequences that follow. — anonymous66

This I am afraid flies in the face of everyday experience. We do make choices but so does everyone else and we are constrained by the choices we make. The best we can do is to try to make movement in the direction of our choices. Outcomes are always unknown.

What exactly flies in the face of everyday experiences?

What I like most is the idea that I can live whatever type of life I want, — anonymous66

This. There are limitations and constraints.

So, you're saying we're not actually free, because other people have choices, as well? What other constraints? You mention outcomes.

What I am getting out of existentialism.

What? I AM getting out of existentialism.

We all face all types of constraints in our lives. Living a life is much like navigating ocean waters. We do our best and learn from experience.

Are you saying, that when existentialists say, "we're free" (or condemned to be free), our response should be, "no, we're not.... there are limitations and constraints."?

It depends on how one thinks of free.

I can make Choices (in which direction), which are constrained, and I have Will to attempt to effect those choices. The results are never known until after they occur. It's all about learning to be a skilled seafar.

What kinds of things should people in general not even attempt, because of these constraints and limitations?

Going through a brick wall. Stealing a wallet. Flying off a building. A choice can be made to try with unpredictable consequences. It is like the ship in the Perfect Storm when confronted by the huge wave.

I did mention consequences.

Yes, it is just we are not free to live the life we choose. We can only try.

But, then why bring up extreme negative cases like stealing wallets, or trying to fly off buildings?
Using your reasoning, isn't it also the case that one can only "try to buy groceries"?

You asked for types of constraints. So I used some dinner examples. I could have said trying to barbeque without a fire. There are multitude of constraints both internal and external. All you need to do is observe your choices and how they are constrained. Maybe driving against a red light?

I'm not sure why anyone would want to if they were rational enough to consider the consequences... but, (and these are types of negative choices that Sartre liked to talk about), one is free to drive against a red light.

One person Sartre describes is the Cliff Walker. This man walks down a narrow pass on top of a tall, steep cliff. The man isn’t afraid of falling off, he has sure footing, nor of the wind blowing him sideways and to his death (it is a calm breezy day). He is more afraid that he will be overcome by an insatiable desire to throw himself from this height. This type of fear isn’t as forward facing as it would be if he was afraid of tripping to his death. He doesn’t trust himself enough.

One of my defining lessons learned from Sartre was the Condemnation to Freedom. The cliff walker suffers with this condemnation of freedom when he looks at the fall before him. He knows that he has the freedom to jump for no other reason than to jump. That freedom terrifies him. He has no real control over his identity when these fears take him over. There’s no truth to his being when he considers his freedom to desire to jump to the abyss. — blogger

But, the context of my post is that we're all free to pursue the lives we like. Someone who owns a business and is making a lot of money, for example, is free to walk away from his business and huge house, forsake the life of luxury and hitchhike to South America with the intent to live out his life helping the poor. The people in his life may not like it, the public is bound to criticize him, and he may not actually survive the trip.. but he is free to pursue that lifestyle.

And someone who has been living with the conviction that some system of thought has all the answers, is free to start questioning that system, and/or take seriously the criticisms of that system.

What I like most is the idea that I can live whatever type of life I want, that I'm free to pursue (or not pursue) whatever system of philosophy I like. Of course, the flip-side is to acknowledge that I'm totally responsible for my choices. I can't blame anyone else for the choices I make or the consequences that follow. — anonymous66

To me this is the essence. This is true adulthood or spiritual maturity. That (to me) is why atheism is central. If I have a God, then my justification and dignity lies outside me. I am a child or a slave. I'm neither free nor responsible. To be fair, theologians try to squeeze adulthood back into the system with free will. But this is only the freedom to rebel against rightful authority. It is certainly not freedom to become one's own rightful authority. For what it's worth, this essence of existentialism is significantly older than existentialism proper. It's a subversive fragment in/of Hegel, for instance.

As far as responsibility goes, we are responsible to an (ideally) freely chosen (by us) vision of "duty." It's not exactly duty when we have a say in our notion of right and wrong, beautiful and ugly. "My" ideal existentialist takes responsibility by not thinking very highly of excuses.

A last point is that I view existentialism as an ideal to strive toward. Are we truly and totally radically free? Or do we strive to live as if we are free? Do we move toward political and ideological systems that "stoke" this fragile sense of freedom? In short, this Freedom is (perhaps) something a or even THE noble lie through which we attain some dignity. "Treat me as if I'm free and adult and I'll do the same for you." The alternative is the endless attempt to embed the individual in forces beyond his or her control, to humiliate the nail that sticks out, arrogant enough to be a king without subjects and priest without a external god (or a priest of Freedom with only one real customer).

That's a good point. Outcomes are unknown. But we can more or less choose our movements toward these outcomes, uncertain of the success of these movements. Beyond the attainment of our goals (always tricky), there is the fundamental way we view ourselves. Do we have a "right" to be here, even if we don't have a God-given reason? Do we experience ourselves as puppets? As sinners in the hands of some angry stand-in for God (a god-object that might be an abstract principle that has us wringing our hands like naughty children)?

Do we have a "right" to be here, even if we don't have a God-given reason? Do we experience ourselves as puppets? As sinners in the hands of some angry stand-in for God (a god-object that might be an abstract principle that has us wringing our hands like naughty children)? — 0af

Have you ever read any of the Christian Existentialists?

Not much. A little Kierkegaard. I do the find the idea of a "leap of faith" believable. For instance, I think atheism involves a leap of faith. Sartre writes of a basic choice that structures personality. In my view, there's something like a basic choice on the God issue. Arguments can be made on both sides, so either side can find reasons after the fact of this basic choice. But I should point out that there are evangelical atheists who are in some sense quasi-theists merely replacing God with an authoritative abstraction. For instance, the evangelical atheist might want to "cure" the world of religious illusions. Spreading this cure or dispelling this illusion becomes a "holy" one-size-fits-all mission. I mention this to emphasize that the
"real" distinction might that between the personal ("pure" atheism) and the trans-personal (religion in both traditional and abstract terms.)

Anon, did you ever delve into Berdyaev?

Only very superficially. He's on my list of people to read.

I probably already said this, but The Meaning of the Creative Act is a good place to start, if you can make it through the more esoteric elements. Divine and the Human is also good for later work, and more explicitly existentially Christian in scope.

I find Kirkegaard hard to handle. He seems so extreme. In many ways, I'm looking for a role model, and I don't find his lifestyle to be appealing. Kirkegaard saw himself as being a modern Socrates with a divine mission. He wanted to shake things up, to get a reaction, and sarcasm and irony were his main tools. He may have lived the life he wanted, but it was short and stressful.

Did Berdyaev write about how the creative act is sometimes not so idyllic as it's usually portrayed? I believe Shestov pointed out that artists and authors could sometimes feel frustrated with their creations and the creative act.

I'm listening to this today. It's from Berdyaev's The Destiny of Man: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IjczKNt-kmQ

I like the way he thinks. I just ordered The Meaning of the Creative Act.

K was never a live option for me either. Sartre I've studied pretty closely. At his best, he is the thing itself. I've never felt seduced by righteous political poses, though, so I just tolerate these in Sartre. Being and Nothingness can be bloated and tedious, perhaps because the amphetamines give him verbal diarrhea. Even so, it's full of killer passages. Hegel's Phenomenology is the same way though. I'm reading Sartre's The Words (autobiography) and it's pretty great. Similarly Hegel's Philosophy of History is more enjoyable than the Phen. In theory, the tech-jargon more difficult books are more "serious," but there's a passage of Hegel's famous preface in Dissemination (another tedious or too-patient book at times) that demolishes this illusion pretty well. The difficult/serious passages depend upon the more accessible as a foundation. This is sort of a digression, but it ties into your "role model" thing:

I think that's the essence of what we do when we read the most exciting philosophy. We are constructing ourselves , figuring out who we shall become. I like Sartre & Hegel and others for become aware of and describing this process. Man is a essencelessness sniffing out essence. Sartre at his best takes his coffee black. Man is a futile passion. Life is absurd. There's a divine laughter around these grim propositions. Man's passion is paradoxically satisfied in making peace with the impossibility of its satisfaction otherwise. That life is absurd only enhances the stature of the protagonist at first stumbling and eventually standing serene within its fog and noise. A nothingness that recognizes itself as such loses its hurried awkwardness. In my view, we search through various father figures. Absurdity and/or alienation is the hollowness or the emptiness of all of them. The wise-man-supposed-to-know is a carrot on a stick, a chased projection. Carrot chasers seduce and intimidate one another with hints that they are at least almost enlightened. But everything must remain impersonal and distant. It's impious to speak from the nothingness at one's own center. Even absurdity and freedom must (for some) be mediated by the famous sages, as if the nullity of the famous sages wasn't almost the essence of absurdity. Similarly, the "masters of suspicion" are treated with reverence as authorities, and the gods slap their knees. (A figure of speech, these gods.)