How would you answer your own question? — Leontiskos

That they would be "good ants" if I judge them according to my framework, and that this does not require that they have any understanding of said framework. Similarly, people can be rational without understanding the normative framework used to judge them as such.

I would say that members of the rational community (i.e. everyone) do understand rational norms, but they do not subscribe nor need to subscribe to them. — Leontiskos

I would agree, in principle. A norm, insofar as it is a euphemism for some explicit rational condition, understanding is that by which that condition is given its object. That I understand perfectly well the explicit condition, e.g., respect as a certain, albeit merely cultural, norm, it does not follow I must always without exception, hold the door for a lady.

It went down hill from soon after the opening post, a result of the contributions of those who could not abide what that post said.

That they would be "good ants" if I judge them according to my framework, and that this does not require that they have any understanding of said framework. Similarly, people can be rational without understanding the normative framework used to judge them as such. — goremand

Well we agree that ants protect their queen, do we not? And we agree that ants are not rational, and therefore do not engage in rational norm-following, do we not?

Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite."... — Aquinas, ST I-II.1.2.c - Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?

Well we agree that ants protect their queen, do we not? And we agree that ants are not rational, and therefore do not engage in rational norm-following, do we not? — Leontiskos

My point is that it's easy to "reverse-engineer" a normative framework just by observing how some entity tends to act (humans, ants, clouds, whatever), and claiming that this is how they "should" act. But this does nothing to justify the the framework, i.e. justify the claim that "this is how things should be".

And just as this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite."... — Aquinas, ST I-II.1.2.c - Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?

Isn't the "rational appetite" just another type of "natural appetite"? Certainly most people are inclined to be rational.

My point is that it's easy to "reverse-engineer" a normative framework just by observing how some entity tends to act (humans, ants, clouds, whatever) — goremand

And my point is that it is absurd to claim that ants are engaged in rational norm-following, so this is a massive strawman you are wielding.

Isn't the "rational appetite" just another type of "natural appetite"? Certainly most people are inclined to be rational. — goremand

In the context of that quote, acting for an end via the will is much different than acting for an end via mere instinct. This is why, for example, animals do not have any developed language.

And my point is that it is absurd to claim that ants are engaged in rational norm-following, so this is a massive strawman you are wielding. — Leontiskos

It makes no sense to make this about "rational norm-following" (which I assume means following a set of norms because it is rational to do so) when discussing rational norms themselves. Reason can't compel you to be reasonable, that's circular.

In the context of that quote, acting for an end via the will is much different than acting for an end via mere instinct. This is why, for example, animals do not have any developed language. — Leontiskos

I don't really see why it is much different. I believe human beings are rational by "mere instinct".

What has any of this to do with the topic of this thread - an account of the distinction between having a philosophy and doing philosophy?

Can someone relate it back to the theme?

It makes no sense to make this about "rational norm-following" — goremand

I simply do not think that non-rational norm following is coherent. So to talk about norm-following is to talk about rational norm-following. Because they are not rational, the ants are not following a norm. End of story.

I don't really see why it is much different. I believe human beings are rational by "mere instinct". — goremand

Even if humans are naturally rational, it remains true that a rational decision is different from an instinctual reaction.

What has any of this to do with the topic of this thread - an account of the distinction between having a philosophy and doing philosophy?

Can someone relate it back to the theme? — Banno

To my understanding, Leontiskos objected that you can't "do philosophy" without already "having a philosophy", and so to him this distinction doesn't really make sense. Then he made the more specific claim that rational norms are a condition for "doing philosophy", and I took issue with that. I'm sorry if our discussion is a weed in this beautiful garden of a thread.

I simply do not think that non-rational norm following is coherent. — Leontiskos

I take this to mean you stipulatively define norm-following as necessarily rational. Leaving aside how I think it's pretty common to apply norms to animals, machines etc. that clearly aren't rational, given that rationality is a set of norms, haven't you now made being rational a necessary condition for becoming rational?

To me, if you transition from from defying rational norms into following them, you've transitioned from irrationality to rationality. But that transition obviously can't be compelled by the rational norms themselves, so under your definition it appears simply impossible, because you don't allow that one can be rational for irrational reasons.

I take this to mean you stipulatively define norm-following as necessarily rational. — goremand

I think norm-following requires rationality. No stipulation required.

Leaving aside how I think it's pretty common to apply norms to animals, machines etc. that clearly aren't rational, — goremand

How so? How is it at all common? We could say, "The blender is abiding by the norm of blending up fruit. He hasn't deviated from that norm yet." But that is metaphorical language. We don't actually think the blender is abiding by norms.

given that rationality is a set of norms, haven't you now made being rational a necessary condition for becoming rational? — goremand

You would have to spell that argument out in more detail.

To me, if you transition from from defying rational norms into following them, you've transitioned from irrationality to rationality. But that transition obviously can't be compelled by the rational norms themselves, so under your definition it appears simply impossible, because you don't allow that one can be rational for irrational reasons. — goremand

First, do plants, animals, and machines "defy (rational) norms"? I don't see that they do, or can.

Let me try to sketch your argument. I'm still not quite sure what you are saying.

1. If someone transitions from defying rational norms to following them, then they have transitioned from irrationality to rationality.
2. Some people do transition from defying rational norms to following them.
3. Therefore, some people do transition from irrationality to rationality.
4. But that transition can't be compelled by the rational norms themselves.
5. Leontiskos does not allow that one can be rational for irrational reasons.
6. Therefore, under Leontiskos' definition the transition would be impossible.

(4) and (5) are especially opaque to me.

I'm sorry if our discussion is a weed in this beautiful garden of a thread. — goremand

:wink:

We could say, "The blender is abiding by the norm of blending up fruit. He hasn't deviated from that norm yet." But that is metaphorical language. We don't actually think the blender is abiding by norms. — Leontiskos

More likely we would express it like "a blender should be able to purée fruit", in particular we might be quite disappointed if a blender failed to do so. I don't think this is a metaphor at all, I think we have expectations about how machines should behave.

First, do plants, animals, and machines "defy (rational) norms"? I don't see that they do, or can. — Leontiskos

It think that depends on our willingness to ascribe beliefs to non-humans, I am open to reasonably intelligent animals and maybe computers behaving irrationally. Plants not so much, I guess you could even say that plants are always rational, but only in the same sense in which they never lose at football.

You would have to spell that argument out in more detail. — Leontiskos

My idea of "norm-following" is conforming to a set of norms. Your idea seems to be the same, but with the added requirement that you have to be rational.

Let us say we want to figure out whether or not an entity is rational. Since being rational means following rational norms, we have to first establish whether the entity is capable of norm-following. According to you, that depends on whether or not the entity is rational, which is what we're trying to figure out in the first place. So we could never know whether the entity is rational or not.

(4) and (5) are especially opaque to me. — Leontiskos

Maybe I overinterpreted what you wrote, it took "rational norm-following" to mean "rationally justified norm-following". So I took you to be saying that adopting a set of norms requires rational justification, which doesn't makes sense if rational justification itself depends upon a set of norms.

More likely we would express it like "a blender should be able to purée fruit", in particular we might be quite disappointed if a blender failed to do so. I don't think this is a metaphor at all, I think we have expectations about how machines should behave. — goremand

So you think we should put it on the blender that it has failed to follow a "norm"?

It think that depends on our willingness to ascribe beliefs to non-humans, I am open to reasonably intelligent animals and maybe computers behaving irrationally. Plants not so much, I guess you could even say that plants are always rational, but only in the same sense in which they never lose at football. — goremand

Whereas I would not say any of that.

My idea of "norm-following" is conforming to a set of norms. Your idea seems to be the same, but with the added requirement that you have to be rational. — goremand

Well, you have to be able to "attend" to the norm in a non-metaphorical way, and for that you need rationality. We can say that the blender "attends" to the purée-norm, but this is just whimsical or metaphorical speech. The blender is not attending to anything. It is just being forced to move in certain ways.

Since being rational means following rational norms — goremand

That's your strange definition, not mine. So the circularity seems to be coming from your own definitions.

Maybe I overinterpreted what you wrote — goremand

Then please re-write the argument I provided, correcting any mistakes I made. I want to see your actual argument.

So you think we should put it on the blender that it has failed to follow a "norm"? — Leontiskos

Yes, and the consequences for the blender will probably be quite harsh.

Well, you have to be able to "attend" to the norm in a non-metaphorical way, and for that you need rationality. We can say that the blender "attends" to the purée-norm, but this is just whimsical or metaphorical speech. — Leontiskos

Then how is it that you agreed with what I wrote here:

The way I see it, we can judge whether an act is moral/rational/whatever simply by checking it against the appropriate framework, but strictly speaking there is no need for the agent of the act to be aware of that framework. — goremand

So the agent doesn't have to be aware of the framework, but they need to capacity to "attend" to it? What does that mean?

That's your strange definition, not mine. So the circularity seems to be coming from your own definitions. — Leontiskos

I'm really surprised to see you object to this ("being rational means following rational norms"), I thought this was at the core of what you wanted to say. Originally you made an analogy to with moral norms, do you also have problem with "being moral means following moral norms"? What is the actual relationship between rationality and the associated norms, if not this? Can you follow rational norms without being rational, or vice versa?

I've asked what your argument is, and I've even tried to represent it:

1. If someone transitions from defying rational norms to following them, then they have transitioned from irrationality to rationality.
2. Some people do transition from defying rational norms to following them.
3. Therefore, some people do transition from irrationality to rationality.
4. But that transition can't be compelled by the rational norms themselves.
5. Leontiskos does not allow that one can be rational for irrational reasons.
6. Therefore, under Leontiskos' definition the transition would be impossible. — Leontiskos

Again:

Then please re-write the argument I provided, correcting any mistakes I made. I want to see your actual argument. — Leontiskos

If you are unwilling to state your position clearly and without ambiguity, then I see no reason to continue.

---

Edit:

I'm really surprised to see you object to this ("being rational means following rational norms"), I thought this was at the core of what you wanted to say. — goremand

I've said that one who follows norms is rational (i.e. If X is following a norm, then X is rational). I'm not sure how you managed to get a definition of rationality out of that. But again, you have to set out your argument clearly if I am to know what you are saying.

I've asked what your argument is, and I've even tried to represent it: — Leontiskos

I'm sorry for not making this clear: I'm withdrawing my argument, because I lost faith in my interpretation of your view. Any argument I make is necessarily against what I take to be your view, there is no point if I don't have some degree of confidence in my grasp of your position.

What I would like you to attend to are the questions I asked about the your view on the relationship between rationality and rational norms, because it's something I'm confused about right now.

If you are unwilling to state your position clearly and without ambiguity, then I see no reason to continue. — Leontiskos

Understandable, but I maintain that I am absolutely not unwilling. Anyway, you're not under any obligation to keep this up, if you're just bored or annoyed with this talk that's a perfectly legitimate reason to bow out.

I'm sorry for not making this clear: I'm withdrawing my argument, because I lost faith in my interpretation of your view. Any argument I make is necessarily against what I take to be your view, there is no point if I don't have some degree of confidence in my grasp of your position.

What I would like you to attend to are the questions I asked about the your view on the relationship between rationality and rational norms, because it's something I'm confused about right now. — goremand

Okay, well let me expand on my edit:

• Leontiskos: If you are acting in accordance with a norm then you must have an understanding of that norm at some level. If you have no understanding of a norm then you cannot act in accordance with it.
• Goremand: Ants act according to norms without understanding.
• Leontiskos: Ants do not act according to norms, given that they have no rationality (and therefore no understanding).
• Goremand: You must be committed to the claim that being rational means following rational norms.
• Leontiskos: Why?

We can go back in the conversation:

I have read the OP, but I can't promise I've absorbed it completely. What stood out to me is that you allow for acts to be judged as moral (or as you say now, rational) even if moral judgement doesn't feature in the decision of the act, which I think is true. The way I see it, we can judge whether an act is moral/rational/whatever simply by checking it against the appropriate framework, but strictly speaking there is no need for the agent of the act to be aware of that framework. — goremand

And:

Why can't I act in accordance with rational norms without understanding those norms? — goremand

This is apparently coming from the notion of susceptibility:

A moral act is an act that involves a moral judgment, or an act that is susceptible to moral judgment.

...

Admittedly, there is a difference between an act that involves a moral judgment and an act that is susceptible to moral judgment, especially on non-Aristotelian theories. This difference should be largely irrelevant, although I will tease out some of the implications as we go.⁴ — Leontiskos

What this all turns on is volition and negligence:

More precisely, the concept of susceptibility helps highlight the central moral notions of volition and negligence. — Leontiskos

Negligence is the idea that someone can be accountable to a norm that they are not currently following. Note that humans can be negligent and ants cannot, and this is because ants do not act self-consciously according to norms.

I've recently read an interesting paper by Susan Haack called Formal Philosophy? A Plea for Pluralism, published in 2005. Haack is one of our most pre-eminent philosophers of logic. I doubt there's another living philosopher who knows more about formalisms than she does. So her reflections on the "two ways of doing philosophy" are worth pondering. (She sees more than two.)

Let me call out, in particular, the list of questions with which she closes her essay. Following Peirce, who at one point offered "a small specimen of philosophical questions which press for industrious and solid investigation," she gives her own list:

Whether the grounds of validity of the laws of logic are to be found in language, in conceptual structures, in the nature of representation, in the world, or where?

Whether Peirce’s idea of necessary reasoning as essentially diagrammatic is defensible, or Russell’s distinction of logical and grammatical form?

How Aristotle’s dictum [“to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true”] could best be generalized to arrive at a satisfactory definition of truth? How, if this will require propositional quantifiers, these can be interpreted without using “true”?

Whether a unified interpretation of quantifiers is possible, and if so in what terms?

Whether the semantic paradoxes are a sign of deep incoherence in the ordinary truth-concept, or a trivial verbal trick? Whether these paradoxes must be avoided by recourse to an artificial language in which they cannot be expressed, or resolved by probing the ordinary, informal concept of truth?

Whether Tarski’s definition really advances our understanding of truth beyond Ramsey’s simple formula, and if so, how?

How we are to understand the relation between the neurophysiological realization of a belief and its content?

How belief-contents are best represented? How they should be individuated?

How degrees of belief affect degrees of justification?

How to articulate the desirable kind of interlocking or consilience that gives some congeries of evidence greater strength than any of their components?

How to asses the weight of shared evidence when there is disagreement within a group, or when members give shared reasons different degrees of credence?

What the proper relation is between belief and the will?

What the mechanisms are of self-deception and of wishful and fearful thinking?

How to understand “real,” as applied to particulars? to kinds? to laws? to the world? Whether “real” has the same meaning as applied to social as to natural kinds and laws?

How to distinguish the cosmological role of historical singularities and of laws? How to understand the evolution of laws?

How works of imaginative literature can convey truths they do not state?

Whether vagueness is always undesirable, or sometimes benign or even useful? How the precision sought by a logician differs from that sought by a novelist or poet? — Haack, in [i]Putting Philosophy to Work[/i], 238

Plenty to work on here, no matter which style of philosophy you favor!

Thanks for pointing to Hack's essay. The brief historical account of recent formal logic was particularly amusing in its account of Davidson's program, fuzzy logic and relevant logic, as were her comments on gender - Notable that the two most interesting logicians around at present are women.

I've never been keen on "foundherentism", an ugly name. But there is much to be said for the core idea that something must be taken as granted, while the overall structure of our beliefs ought be coherent. I'm also not too keen on "hypothetico-deductive method". The missing piece in Hack's account seems to m to be that our reasoning is public, that experimental evidence is shared, and so embedded in our common understanding. But I can agree with her that neither Old Deferentialism nor New Cynicism, nor indeed some synthesis of the two, gives a sufficient account of science or rationality considered more generally.

Nor do I go along with her rejection of statistical approaches, which appears to be based on treating probabilities of propositions being true, rather then of their being believable. Though of course if the aim is truth, then Bayesian thinking will not help.

Now I've not read Hack closely, so I may be quite mistaken here. There is it appears some agreement between the pluralism Hack advocates and the piecemeal approach suggested in my OP.

It's a good list. We might start a thread on each, and have endless fun...

Glad you got something from Haack's essay. To start at the end (of your post), I think Haack's pluralism is very much in harmony with your OP's considerations, so I hoped you and others who followed the thread would find it interesting.

I liked Evidence and Inquiry very much, and have reread it a couple of times. Yeah, "foundherentism" is an unfortunate coinage. But as you say, something like it is surely right. And when we get into the details, we find some ingenious answers to issues that come up both for the Deferentialists and the Cynics. Her discussions about how to rescue foundherentism from the objection that it is a blurred version of plain old coherentism are really sharp.

As for her list of topics . . . We rarely see a straightforward list of problems that a very good philosopher thinks are the most interesting to explore. That's part of why I wanted to share hers. As you say, any one of them would start a TPF ball rolling. The one I find most unexpected as a philosophical issue is "What the mechanisms are of self-deception and of wishful and fearful thinking?" If anyone, reading this, happens to know where Haack might have written on this topic, I'd like to know.

The one I find most unexpected as a philosophical issue is "What the mechanisms are of self-deception and of wishful and fearful thinking?" If anyone, reading this, happens to know where Haack might have written on this topic, I'd like to know. — J

I don’t know if Haack wrote about it to any significant extent (it wasn’t present in what I’ve so far read of her writings), but the issue of self-deception is a very complex and problematic topic in philosophy. For example, one form of self-deception occurs when one lies to oneself and maybe others (e.g., “I didn’t do it”) while being momentarily aware that this is a lie (e.g., knowing full well that one did do it) only to at a future juncture come to believe this very lie as being a full-blown truth. I’d label the issue as one regarding the philosophy of mind. The SEP has a dedicated entry to the issue of self-deception here.

I intuitively believe the issues of wishful and fearful thinking can become easily resolvable philosophically once the issue of self-deception becomes satisfactorily accounted for.

We are in the main made aware that we are lying to ourselves by the discrepancy between what we say is the case and what others say is the case. The private language argument at play again. And my point that reasoning is fundamentally public.

, it is unexpected for me because it seems to be more an issue for psychology than philosophy.

Or am I missing something here... philosophically, self-deception is inadvisable, but psychologically, it might be the appropriate approach.

In truth, your account is somewhat overly simplistic for me, but, that said, by and large I agree. In real world cases, the successful self-deceived will sometimes form a confirmation bias whereby they attempt via all means possible to justify the (believed) truth of what in fact is a self-deception. I take this to go hand in hand with the human ego’s often valued impetus to be right rather than undergo the suffering of being wrong. A kind of self-preservation of one’s identity as righteous, and the comfort (or else, satisfaction and peace of mind) that accompanies it. And, in cases such as this, the self-deception can well persist despite the surrounding community expressing otherwise via all sorts of evidence. (Don’t know how common this is, but I’ve encountered this in the course of my life.) Still, again, by and by, I’m in general agreement with you: if we're honest with ourselves ... then what you say follows.

I don’t know if Haack wrote about it to any significant extent (it wasn’t present in what I’ve so far read of her writings), but the issue of self-deception is a very complex and problematic topic in philosophy. For example, one form of self-deception occurs when one lies to oneself and maybe others (e.g., “I didn’t do it”) while being momentarily aware that this is a lie (e.g., knowing full well that one did do it) only to at a future juncture come to believe this very lie as being a full-blown truth. I’d label the issue as one regarding the philosophy of mind. The SEP has a dedicated entry to the issue of self-deception here. — javra

In the epistemological context she is concerned with, self-deception represents the mirror opposite of the act of knowledge, in much the same way that falsity represents the mirror opposite of truth. So it is broader than a lie of the practical reason. The idea is that there are cases where one can be self-deceived even within their speculative reason, and that this will shed light on truth and knowledge (by shedding light on falsity).

This tracks a more classical approach where the intellect is naturally oriented to truth, and the primary difficulties lie in intellectual impediments (such as self-deception).

and that this will shed light on truth and knowledge (by shedding light on falsity). — Leontiskos

As a song by "The Doors" has it: "you know the day (in this context, light and thereby truth) destroys the night (falsity), night (falsity) divides the day (truth) ..." Poetic but substantial enough to me, this when it comes to the ontology of truth and falsity.

"you know the day destroys the night, night divides the day" — javra

Yes, or the Wood Brothers' song "Keep me around":

Try asking the Dark where the Light comes from — Wood Brothers, Keep me around

Inquiries into falsity can shed light on truth, but they always fall short because falsity is something less than truth. The Darkness does not comprehend the Light. If Augustine is right then falsity is a sort of absence or privation. The Parmenidean paradox regarding falsity is also relevant here.

↪J, it is unexpected for me because it seems to be more an issue for psychology than philosophy. — Banno

Yes, that was why I was surprised too, but the SEP article that @javra pointed us to is revealing. It seems there have been plenty of attempts to formalize the family of "self-deception" terms in ways that are tractable philosophically. I like this one: "self-deceivers don’t believe p; they believe that they believe that p, and this false second-order belief—'I think that I believe that p'—underlies and underwrites their sincere avowal that p as well as their ability to entertain p as true." For extra credit: How might a psychologist prove or disprove this hypothesis? :smile:

It's always more complicated, yep.

I'd more or less go along with Davidson here, as a default position. Se the paragraph in his bio on problems of irrationality. The second-order belief idea is immune to empirical analysis. But our minds can be "weakly partitioned". One might believe p and believe ~p while never believing (p & ~p). That would be demonstrable: and that's a part of why setting stuff out explicitly and sharing with others is so useful.

A more difficult question might be whether such inconsistent beliefs are maladaptive.

...your account is somewhat overly simplistic for me — javra

Sure. There's plenty more going on, including no small amount of self-deception. But not with you and I of course, only with them. And is it maladaptive? For that, we have @Jamal as arbiter.

There's plenty more going on, including no small amount of self-deception. But not with you and I of course, only with them. — Banno

Seems like you're trying to insinuate something here.

Of course everyone, me and you included, is engaged in self-deceptions. That’s not the issue. For instance, philosophically speaking, it just as false to believe that “I am” as it is false to believe that “I am not”—though each falsity occurs from a different vantage. (This being, for example, basic Buddhist teachings 101.) Point being, issue is not if we are engaged in any self-deceptions (we’d be perfected being devoid of these, and all humans are imperfect) but, rather, what to do about it. One either prefers truth over falsity and so values the cathartic sting of bubbles getting burst whenever they so do or, else, one doesn’t, preferring instead the eternal preservation of falsehoods. In some ways it’s akin to becoming an alcoholic: it’s only when one loses all concern of becoming an alcoholic while drinking that one runs the risk of so becoming. Long story short, we all engage in doublethink, just that some of us dislike it while others do like it, with only the latter claiming that they are perfectly devoid of it.