While res extensa and res cogitans as such may have run their respective courses, don’t we still argue a form of intrinsic metaphysical dualism to this day? Even dropping out the notion of substance still leaves two ideas categorically different from, but necessarily related to, each other.

But I’m an unrepentant dualist in this more-modern-than-me age, so what do I know. — Mww

I wouldn't deny that we think in dualist terms - maybe mistakenly, maybe ingrained as a kind of "folk psychology" (incidentally I hate that term, it makes it sound as if folk psychology is not useful or primitive, whereas it's the way we experience the world) - but I do deny it as a metaphysical distinction.

You may want to say "property dualist" - and that's fine. I can see the appeal. But then I also see the appeal of a multi-faceted monist, which is to say, dozens of types of properties - electricity, magnetism, liquidity, plasma, etc. - all would be different properties of the same stuff.

Either is fine, and here the domain is very tricky and up to choice.

I wouldn't deny that we think in dualist terms (…) but I do deny it as a metaphysical distinction. — Manuel

Interesting. Are you saying thinking in dualist terms is not a metaphysical operation? Can’t be investigated or talked about from a metaphysical point of view?

Guess I’m not sure what you mean.

I use the words "metaphysics" and "epistemology" as narrowly as I can. For metaphysics I mean the world. For epistemology I mean aspects of knowledge.

In this respect I don't think there are "substantial" distinctions between mind and matter, or anything else. No more so than seeing and hearing are metaphysical different.

In some respects, it's harder to think of a bigger difference between seeing something and hearing something. But we would not say these are metaphysical distinctions, these are differences in how we interpret the world. It's the same world but interpreted in vastly different ways.

So, dualism would be a distinction in how we organize the way we think about the world.

….dualism would be a distinction in how we organize the way we think about the world. — Manuel

Nice.
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Rather more broadly than you, apparently….
For metaphysics I mean the study of the use of reason in determining the possibility, principles, and extent of human knowledge a priori.
For epistemology I mean the study of the possibility, content and method, for human knowledge a posteriori.

For the world I mean the totality of possible experience, which reduces to the study of material things, which is the empirical science of ontology. Other arbitrary non-empirical use of the concept, re: the world of ideas; the world of fine art, etc, merely represents the sum of a certain class of objects as general content, the investigation of which may not rise to the power of science proper.

Always fun bouncing stuff off you.

Likewise, dude. I learn a lot.

Cool.

So which of the trails and tribulations of human-kind shall we rectify next?

It may be more than merely a mental construction, but it is at least a mental construction, or we would have no way to perceive or model it. I presume you know Russell's quote on this topic, and he was not an idealist. But what he says is factual as far as I can see. — Manuel

If the brain is more than merely a mental construction then it is a mind-independent existent. If it is not more than a mental construction then it is not a mind-independent existent. Our perceptions of the brain ( not our own, obviously, because we do not perceive our own brains) could be said to be mental constructions, but it would depend on what is meant by "mental construction". We are not aware of how our perceptions are pre-cognitively constructed. The predominant neuroscientific view seems to be that our perceptions arise as the kind of "tip"―the part we can be conscious of―of the "iceberg" of neuronal process. When we refer to something as mental, is it not usually a reference to things we can be aware of? If so, 'mental construction' as opposed to 'brain process' or 'brain model' might seem inapt.

Who ascribes these functions? We do. What does a brain do? It produces consciousness, but it does many things which are unrelated to consciousness which are equally important. Why privilege consciousness over many of the other things brains do? — Manuel

I'm certainly not privileging consciousness over the unconscious brain functions. In fact what I say about the term "mental construction" is precisely based on my disavowal of any such privileging. The point is that if the brain is doing things we cannot be mentally aware of, then that would seem to indicate that it is a mind-independent functional organ or structure.

It is true that we, on the basis of neuroscientific study, ascribe the functions, but it doesn't seem to follow that those functions are not real independently of our ascriptions. In fact the obverse seems more plausible.

You have mentioned structures several times. I can understand epistemic structural realism in physics, but above that, say in biology and so on, I don't quite follow what you are saying.

At least you are framing something which can be discussed that materialism means mind independent structure and that idealism denies that. That's a big improvement over usual conversations on these topics. — Manuel

What about ontic structural realism? It's true that we rely on our perceptions to reveal structures to us, so we know them only as they appear to us. This does seem to leave the question as to what they might be absent our perception of them. That question cannot be answered with certainty, but then what questions can? To my way of thinking it is more plausible to think that our perceptions reveal things about what we perceive, but that there remain aspects which we are incapable of perceiving. So, I don't see it as black and white―I don't see it as being the case that we can know nothing about things in themselves.

At minimum, 'idealism' implies (A) that brains are 'not mind-independent' and (B) that (a priori) 'minds are substances' rather than what brains do.

At minimum, 'idealism' implies (A) that brains are 'not mind-independent' and (B) that (a priori) 'minds are substances' rather than what brains do. — 180 Proof

Yep, I think this is exactly right.

You can pick - there's no limit. Well, maybe not moral philosophy, I find that stuff a bit dull for the most part.

but it would depend on what is meant by "mental construction". We are not aware of how our perceptions are pre-cognitively constructed. The predominant neuroscientific view seems to be that our perceptions arise as the kind of "tip"―the part we can be conscious of―of the "iceberg" of neuronal process. When we refer to something as mental, is it not usually a reference to things we can be aware of? If so, 'mental construction' as opposed to 'brain process' or 'brain model' might seem inapt. — Janus

Yeah, it gets tricky. On the one hand, there's something there independent of us. I think most would agree save for vanishingly few idealists (again I know only of one - Collier). On the other hand, if I say what remains is brain or a nervous system, then I am smuggling in what I am trying to show exists absent me.

We can, without going too speculative reasonably imagine that some intelligent alien species may carve out a different kind of organs (or parts of organs) and call that a brain.

As for the definition of mental- that's very hard. I think what you say is how it's used. I'd add unconscious processes to this, but this would make me idiosyncratic.

The point is that if the brain is doing things we cannot be mentally aware of, then that would seem to indicate that it is a mind-independent functional organ or structure.

It is true that we, on the basis of neuroscientific study, ascribe the functions, but it doesn't seem to follow that those functions are not real independently of our ascriptions. In fact the obverse seems more plausible. — Janus

Yes. We may be talking at cross purposes here. And maybe as you suggested we'd have to settle on what a "construction" means. I take it as, whatever the mind does when it interprets sense data.

Something exists absent us but calling it a "brain" assumes that what we are carving out is a "natural kind", that is the way nature carves itself absent us. This seems to happen in physics, in biology the different framing of other creatures arises, I think.

What about ontic structural realism? It's true that we rely on our perceptions to reveal structures to us, so we know them only as they appear to us. This does seem to leave the question as to what they might be absent our perception of them. That question cannot be answered with certainty, but then what questions can? To my way of thinking it is more plausible to think that our perceptions reveal things about what we perceive, but that there remain aspects which we are incapable of perceiving. So, I don't see it as black and white―I don't see it as being the case that we can know nothing about things in themselves. — Janus

I prefer epistemic structural realism - that applies to physics. Does it apply to chemistry or biology? I'm more skeptical here. If limited to physics, then I think we have no substantial issues to clear up.

A very short geneaology of idealism from an essay on Buddhism:

The term "Idealism" came into vogue roughly during the time of Kant (though it was used earlier by others, such as Leibniz) to label one of two trends that had emerged in reaction to Cartesian philosophy. Descartes had argued that there were two basic yet separate substances in the universe: Extension (the material world of things in space) and Thought (the world of mind and ideas). Subsequently opposing camps took one or the other substance as their metaphysical foundation, treating it as the primary substance while reducing the remaining substance to derivative status. Materialists argued that only matter was ultimately real, so that thought and consciousness derived from physical entities (chemistry, brain states, etc.). Idealists countered that the mind and its ideas were ultimately real, and that the physical world derived from mind (e.g., the mind of God, Berkeley's esse est percipi, or from ideal prototypes, etc.).

Materialists gravitated toward mechanical, physical explanations for why and how things existed, while Idealists tended to look for purposes - moral as well as rational - to explain existence. Idealism meant "idea-ism," frequently in the sense Plato's notion of "ideas" (eidos) was understood at the time, namely ideal types that transcended the physical, sensory world and provided the form (eidos) that gave matter meaning and purpose. As materialism, buttressed by advances in materialistic science, gained wider acceptance, those inclined toward spiritual and theological aims turned increasingly toward idealism as a countermeasure. Before long there were many types of materialism and idealism.

Idealism, in its broadest sense, came to encompass everything that was not materialism, which included so many different types of positions that the term lost any hope of univocality. Most forms of theistic and theological thought were, by this definition, types of idealism, even if they accepted matter as real, since they also asserted something as more real than matter, either as the creator of matter (in monotheism) or as the reality behind matter (in pantheism). Extreme empiricists who only accepted their own experience and sensations as real were also idealists. Thus the term "idealism" united monotheists, pantheists and atheists. At one extreme were various forms of metaphysical idealism which posited a mind (or minds) as the only ultimate reality. The physical world was either an unreal illusion or not as real as the mind that created it. To avoid solipsism (which is a subjectivized version of metaphysical idealism) metaphysical idealists posited an overarching mind that envisions and creates the universe.

A more limited type of idealism is epistemological idealism, which argues that since knowledge of the world only exists in the mental realm, we cannot know actual physical objects as they truly are, but only as they appear in our mental representations of them. Epistemological idealists could be ontological materialists, accepting that matter exists substantially; they could even accept that mental states derived at least in part from material processes. What they denied was that matter could be known in itself directly, without the mediation of mental representations. Though unknowable in itself, matter's existence and properties could be known through inference based on certain consistencies in the way material things are represented in perception.

Transcendental idealism contends that not only matter but also the self remains transcendental in an act of cognition. Kant and Husserl, who were both transcendental idealists, defined "transcendental" as "that which constitutes experience but is not itself given in experience." An example would be the eye, which is the condition for seeing even though the eye does not see itself. By applying vision and drawing inferences from it, one can come to know the role eyes play in seeing, even though one never sees one's own eyes. Similarly, things in themselves and the transcendental self could be known if the proper methods were applied for uncovering the conditions that constitute experience, even though such conditions do not themselves appear in experience. Even here, where epistemological issues are at the forefront, it is actually ontological concerns, viz. the ontological status of self and objects, that is really at stake. Western philosophy rarely escapes that ontological tilt. Those who accepted that both the self and its objects were unknowable except through reason, and that such reason(s) was their cause and purpose for existing - thus epistemologically and ontologically grounding everything in the mind and its ideas - were labeled Absolute Idealists (e.g., Schelling, Hegel, Bradley), since only such ideas are absolute while all else is relative to them.

With the exception of some epistemological idealists, what unites all the positions enumerated above, including the materialists, is that these positions are ontological. They are concerned with the ontological status of the objects of sense and thought, as well as the ontological nature of the self who knows. Mainstream Western philosophy since Plato and Aristotle has treated ontology and metaphysics as the ultimate philosophic pursuit, with epistemology's role being little more than to provide access and justification for one's ontological pursuits and commitments. Since many of what are decried as philosophy's excesses - such as skepticism, solipsism, sophistry - could be and were accused of deriving from overactive epistemological questioning, epistemology has often been held suspect, and in some theological formulations, considered entirely dispensable in favor of faith. Ontology is primary, and epistemology is either secondary or expendable. — Dan Lusthaus, What Is and Isn't Yogācāra

I'm nearest to epistemological idealism, although transcendental idealism also appeals to me. But I take Lusthaus' point that Western philosophy on the whole has had an ontological tilt, concerned with the nature of what ultimately exists, although I don't think that can be said of existentialism or phenomenology.

§ 553. The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea, then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality liberated to its notion, if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. The subjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity.

There is a sense of a real evolution here of both the meaning and the nature of the subjective and the objective. I think this might be summed up as "The evolution of understanding of the concept of the thing is at the same time the evolution of the thing which is a concept for understanding." From a subjective perspective. But, equally, it would seem that understanding is itself a property of those things which are understood.

….settle on what a "construction" means. — Manuel

It may, but not necessarily, mean….construction is thought; to construct is to think.

I take it as, whatever the mind does when it interprets sense data. — Manuel

I’m bouncing yet again:
The representation of sense data is phenomenon; the interpretation of sense data as phenomena, is understanding.

To think is to construct thoughts by the synthesis of conceptions. To synthesize is to imagine the relation of representations. To imagine is to hold an image. To hold an image is to spontaneously generate schemata subsumed under a general conception.

Spontaneous generation, then, is that function for which speculation fails, further attempts must defeat all antecedent speculations, and speculation with respect to spontaneous generation fails, simply because the logic justifying it, is immediately susceptible to irremediable self-contradiction. Which satisfies the notion that mere construction of thought, while complete in itself, is never enough to obtain a systemic end.
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You know how we treat “world” as the collection of all possible real things? Why not treat “mind” as the collection of all possible human mental operational constituency? If we do that in the same non-contradictory fashion as we treat “world”, all possible human mental constituency is not a limitation to interpreting sense data, in the same fashion as “world” is not a limitation to any particular which is a member of its collection. World and mind are general conceptions without operational functions belonging specifically to them.

There is no interpretive function in any of the senses, they being physiological apparatuses having only transitional modus operandi; thus, with respect to the intellect, there is only the instillation of a presence, an occassion for which the human actual interpretive mental constituency awakens towards its systemic function with respect to a given cause. If there is no interpretive function in the senses, no determinations as data or information are at all possible from them, which makes the notion of “sense data” empty, from which follows it cannot be sense data that the mental system interprets.
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It is just a fact legislating the human intellect, that we can logically explain what we’ve never seen, from which we can infer the possibility of what we’ve never seen, but we can never obtain any knowledge of what we’ve never seen.

It is “….beneath the dignity of philosophy….”, that the enormity of empirical knowledge resident in the current iteration of the human being in general, is sufficient reason to neglect how he came by it.

Nobody considers the notion that if the resident knowledge is all there ever was, he cannot explain to himself how it is he learned anything at all, for it would be impossible for him to differentiate that by which he learns, from that by which he simply remembers it on the one hand….
(re: Hume’s “constant conjunction”……)

….and on the other, how he can learn by instructing himself.
(Hume’s dilemma inevitable from mere constant conjunction, re: the impossibility for a priori cognitions in the form of, e.g., pure mathematics, or, the transcendental conception of freedom and its objects given from pure practical reason)

Why is that a human seldom allows himself to acknowledge that rote instruction regarding what he knows, and purely subjective deductive inferences regarding what he knows, is possible only from that singular mental functionality capable of both simultaneously?

Not only is idealism possible as a doctrine, there is an established argument for its necessity as a condition of human intelligence. It only remains to be defined in such a way as to limit its domain within that intelligence, and whence done successfully enough, comes entitlement to overlook the question-begging that comes along with the intellectual condition itself.

Ironically enough, the same applies to materialism, but we don’t care about that, insofar as there’s no legitimate need to confuse ourselves twice, so we grant the material world and concentrate on what to do with it.

the interpretation of sense data as phenomena, is understanding. — Mww

That could be technically correct. My goal is more general, and it would be to say that to construct something (whether it is a phenomenon or through understanding) is to bring into being something which did not exist as (now) thought (representation, image, object, etc.).

The sticky point for others (not anyone in particular) is that they'd say objects exist absent us. I agree that something exists absent us and before us and will continue after we die. But what we call it and how we categorize that is the issue. I think physics does manage to pierce into the mind-independent structure of things.

Which satisfies the notion that mere construction of thought, while complete in itself, is never enough to obtain a systemic end. — Mww

If I follow, I agree. Sounds to me like you are speaking about something like the unconditioned, which fair enough, is granted. But I may be misinterpreting.

You know how we treat “world” as the collection of all possible real things? Why not treat “mind” as the collection of all possible human mental operational constituency? If we do that in the same non-contradictory fashion as we treat “world”, all possible human mental constituency is not a limitation to interpreting sense data, in the same fashion as “world” is not a limitation to any particular which is a member of its collection. World and mind are general conceptions without operational functions belonging specifically to them. — Mww

Possible real things? What about numbers? Those are quite pesky.

The world, as I understand it, is what there is. Yet the most reliable evidence we have for it comes through mathematical formulations which, don't seem to have worldly existence. Or maybe as Tegmark says, the world is mathematical.

To get a better idea of what you are proposing, if you could give an example of something that's not a "personal mental operational constituency", maybe I could better follow. For example, you can say, everything we think of is mental, but X is not, because X is part of the world. Otherwise, I don't quite follow.

If there is no interpretive function in the senses, no determinations as data or information are at all possible from them, which makes the notion of “sense data” empty, from which follows it cannot be sense data that the mental system interprets. — Mww

Not the senses, what we construct from the senses. Our organ's structure sense-data, we then attempt to comprehend what is given to us through our native faculties.

Why is that a human seldom allows himself to acknowledge that rote instruction regarding what he knows, and purely subjective deductive inferences regarding what he knows, is possible only from that singular mental functionality capable of both simultaneously? — Mww

That's an interesting path to follow. Strictly speaking, I think we grow (innate) knowledge, not learn, which implies getting something which you never had in any way prior. But we could get side-tracked here.

Ironically enough, the same applies to materialism, but we don’t care about that, insofar as there’s no legitimate need to confuse ourselves twice, so we grant the material world and concentrate on what to do with it. — Mww

Actually, my main concern here is to attempt to clear up the misleading thinking that says, "matter can't think in principle", which is an assertion not based on evidence.

Then there are those who say that ideas are these crazy things that need to be reduced or explained away in some future science.

Once that's cleared up, I don't know what the debate is even about. It seems to be a preference of words.

to construct something (whether it is a phenomenon or through understanding) is to bring into being something which did not exist as (now) thought (representation, image, object, etc.). — Manuel

I’d agree with that regarding phenomena; these are something constructed that did not exist as (now) thought. But understanding just is the faculty of thought, so anything understanding does exists as (now) thought. The difference is, the synthesis intuition uses in the construction of phenomena, re: matter and form, is very different from the synthesis understanding uses in the construction of thought, re: the schemata of relevant categories, or, conceptions.

But what we call it and how we categorize that is the issue. — Manuel

My thinking as well. Which gets us to the brain thing: there is no doubt regarding the real existence of that object between the ears, but that object is only a brain because one of us, at one time or another, said so. From which follows necessarily, while that thing may always be, and be right where it is, it isn’t a brain from that alone. Same for the ears the brain is between. Actually…..same for the very notion of “between”.
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Sounds to me like you are speaking about something like the unconditioned…. — Manuel

We were talking about sense data, so I meant the systemic end to be empirical knowledge. That’s all sense data is ever going to give us, and that only iff it is in conjunction with something not that. The unconditioned, which is certainly an end in itself, must be considered transcendental, insofar as no phenomenon representing a sensible object is possible, hence can be conceived through reason alone.
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Possible real things? What about numbers? — Manuel

Crap on a cracker. Fair point; I should have said naturally occuring real things. Numbers are real things iff we inscribe them on Nature, and by that condition alone is their sensible appearance possible. Numbers we think are not real in that sense, which limits them to being valid conceptions of relative quantity, empirically represented by the thing we give to Nature…….oh, wait.

Like, what you meant by construction of something that didn’t exist? That much is true, in numbers we construct something that didn’t exist, but in this case I think what didn’t exist must still be thought before it does. Otherwise, how would we know what to put out there as an object? And how would we explain how there are can be so many representations of the same quantity without involving contradictions? And the killer….how is it that mathematics is always synthetic cognition referencing a myriad of distinct operations, but a number is always analytic, or that conception which is called primitive, in referencing only a singular quantity?
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….give an example of something that's not a "mental operational constituency"…. — Manuel

At the risk of argumentum ad verecundiam, and from a human point of view alone, mental operational constituency is sensibility and logic in general, and those reduced to representation, thought, judgement, cognition and reason. Thus, things-in-themselves on one end, and experience on the other, stand as not mental operational constituency. Neither of those enter mental operations, the former being that which gives the operational referent its beginning, the latter that which gives its termination.
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the misleading thinking that says, "matter can't think in principle", which is an assertion not based on evidence. — Manuel

Know what? If we follow that out to an extreme, the brain, being matter, must think, in principle, for it disguises itself in manifestations of a thinking subject.

Like I said…no need to confuse ourselves twice. Once, like this, is plenty.

The difference is, the synthesis intuition uses in the construction of phenomena, re: matter and form, is very different from the synthesis understanding uses in the construction of thought, re: the schemata of relevant categories, or, conceptions. — Mww

That's probably true when seen from a more micro-scale. But I'd suspect that both acts are creative - in the broadest sense of the term. They create something - phenomenon through matter and form and understanding - applying categories (etc.) - which did not exist as we now acquire them, prior to interaction. These things, while being quite different in specifics, create something from very poor sense data, photons and other particles.

My thinking as well. Which gets us to the brain thing: there is no doubt regarding the real existence of that object between the ears, but that object is only a brain because one of us, at one time or another, said so. From which follows necessarily, while that thing may always be, and be right where it is, it isn’t a brain from that alone. — Mww

That's how I see it. More than anything, I don't take brains to be "real distinctions" in nature, it's what we happen to categorize as relevant to the mental processes of certain animals. This does NOT deny something exists, just that they aren't carved up in nature in this way.

how is it that mathematics is always synthetic cognition referencing a myriad of distinct operations, but a number is always analytic, or that conception which is called primitive, in referencing only a singular quantity? — Mww

All good questions and borrowing Hume's words (from a different problem) - "this difficulty is too hard for my understanding." I have no idea how to proceed with numbers or math.

Thus, things-in-themselves on one end, and experience on the other, stand as not mental operational constituency — Mww

I almost get that. What do you mean by "experience" here? I make no distinction between experience and consciousness.

Know what? If we follow that out to an extreme, the brain, being matter, must think, in principle, for it disguises itself in manifestations of a thinking subject.

Like I said…no need to confuse ourselves twice. Once, like this, is plenty. — Mww

Yup. But the issue keeps arising. All I say is matter is much, much stranger than what we once thought....

What do you mean by "experience" here? I make no distinction between experience and consciousness. — Manuel

There’s dozens of definitions for experience, but I personally favor the one that says experience is knowledge of objects through perception. For consciousness, I go with the definition that says consciousness is the quality of the state of being conscious. It is clear the former is of much narrower pertinence than the latter, for one is certainly conscious of his thoughts as well as his perceptions.

Besides, there is reason to suppose consciousness has its own representation, but experience does not. Consciousness is represented by that to which it belongs, the “I” or the transcendental ego, while experience on the other hand, nonetheless a statement concerning the condition of a subject, it is so only from the sum of his perceptions, having no concern with the subject’s condition relative to his moral disposition or his aesthetic feelings in general.

Consciousness entirely defines the subject in which it is found; experience merely records the limits of a subject’s reality.

If we state we are conscious of our experiences we run little risk of ambiguity or illusion. If we maintain that we experience our consciousness, we are in pains to say how without involving both.
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You make no distinction, because you don’t think making one solves anything? Do you, in not making a distinction, revert to treating them equally?

Maybe it’s that when speaking of one there's no need for speaking of the other?

Thoughts?

There’s dozens of definitions for experience, but I personally favor the one that says experience is knowledge of objects through perception — Mww

That's fine. But what do you in a hypothetical scenario in which the traditional five senses aren't working, say a coma, but there's reason to believe there is still consciousness?

Consciousness is represented by that to which it belongs, the “I” or the transcendental ego, while experience on the other hand, nonetheless a statement concerning the condition of a subject, it is so only from the sum of his perceptions, having no concern with the subject’s condition relative to his moral disposition or his aesthetic feelings in general. — Mww

I use experience as synonymous with "consciousness" because this word has been used in so many ways and brings about different prejudices that I want a neutral term.

As for the "I" that accompanies consciousness. That one is tricky. Using only myself as an example (pun intended or not) I'd say a lot of the time there is an I, for which the conscious experience happens.

But there are rare times, daydreaming or random thoughts in which and "I" is not present. Of course, as soon as you verbalize it gets reintroduced. But I'm not 100% settled on the claim that an "I" accompanies all our consciousness all the time in every possible conscious variation or circumstance, even if it applies, say, in 95% of the cases.

Don't have a big horse in that fight either way.

Thoughts? — Mww

I mostly though that Galen Strawson's use of the word - introduced in Mental Reality - was very useful. No more than that.

On the other hand, if I say what remains is brain or a nervous system, then I am smuggling in what I am trying to show exists absent me.

We can, without going too speculative reasonably imagine that some intelligent alien species may carve out a different kind of organs (or parts of organs) and call that a brain.

As for the definition of mental- that's very hard. I think what you say is how it's used. I'd add unconscious processes to this, but this would make me idiosyncratic. — Manuel

I wouldn't say that what remains independently of human perception is merely the brain, but is the manifold of sensitive body, nervous system and brain plus the environment which acts up it, such as to produce perception amongst many other things.

I am not understanding what you are wanting to say with your 'alien' example. I think neurophysiology clearly shows us what reasonably counts as brain and what does not.

I guess we'll have to disagree on what would be the most reasonable scope of the term 'mental'. The idea that some process could be mental and yet be impossible for us to be aware of in vivo, so to speak, just doesn't seem tenable. On the other hand I think it is fair to say that we cannot be directly aware of any neural process in its neurality, so to speak.

Something exists absent us but calling it a "brain" assumes that what we are carving out is a "natural kind", that is the way nature carves itself absent us. This seems to happen in physics, in biology the different framing of other creatures arises, I think. — Manuel

I think science shows us that there are functional organic systems in nature, and I would say the brain is clearly one of them. I mean it is the one without which we wouldn't be having this conversation or experiencing anything at all.

I'm not sure what you mean by "the different framing of other creatures". Other multicellular organisms have sense organs, organs of sight, hearing, touching, tasting and smelling just as do, even though their organs may not be configured in just the same ways as ours. We also know that other animals visually detect the same structures in the environment as we do―it is evidenced by their behavior.

I am not understanding what you are wanting to say with your 'alien' example. I think neurophysiology clearly shows us what reasonably counts as brain and what does not. — Janus

You may have loosed what counts as brain when you say:

"the manifold of sensitive body, nervous system and brain plus the environment which acts up it."

The nervous system is then a component of a system of which the brain is a part of.

My alien example is simple, but the particulars are hard to imagine (since we are human beings, not Martians).

Suppose Martians existed and that they have more sophisticated or refined sensory and intellectual capacities. The way they conceptualize the world is different from ours. For them, what we call a "brain", is misleading slicing of what we take to be the organ responsible for thought.

On this view, one could suppose that for them a brain may be a human head, that is to say, not only the organ "brain", but also the eyes, the ears and so on, which, without these additions a brain would not be able to work properly. So they could carve out organs in a different manner- maybe radically so, I can only point to examples I can imagine, not one's I cannot.

I guess we'll have to disagree on what would be the most reasonable scope of the term 'mental'. The idea that some process could be mental and yet be impossible for us to be aware of in vivo, so to speak, just doesn't seem tenable. — Janus

What about language use? We literally do not know what we are specifically going to say prior to saying it (or typing it.) Clearly we have a vague meaning, which we can express through propositions, sometimes expressing what we wanted to say, sometimes we just get approximations.

The point is that certain unconscious processes - willing, judging, spontaneity, creativity - are things that come out of us without us being consciousness of them until they happen. And I think that without these processes, we wouldn't have consciousness as we understand the word.

Other multicellular organisms have sense organs, organs of sight, hearing, touching, tasting and smelling just as do, even though their organs may not be configured in just the same ways as ours. We also know that other animals visually detect the same structures in the environment as we do―it is evidenced by their behavior. — Janus

Yeah we have been stuck on this point before if I recall correctly. I am skeptical that they do. Not that they necessarily experience things COMPLETELY differently from us in all respects, but in some respects they do. Dogs with olfaction have access to a world we barely imagine. Mantis shrimp have 16 color receptive cones which renders the experience they have of the world very different from what we see.

There may be overlap. But I fear excessive anthropomorphizing may be limiting what we can say here.