Nice. This plays well into my dislike of "objective" and "subjective", a dichotomy I think causes far more problems than it solves. Part of the problem is that folk think in terms of objective and subjective objects, a nonsense that might be partially replaced by thinking in terms of objects and processes.

Is reading The Blue Book necessary for this?

Yes, but, importantly (though not in disagreement), not a physical process, or a conceptual process structured on the criteria for an object, but the process of the logic of a practice to judge (afterwards): what qualifies as understanding something; how we have a conversation about what is meaningful about what I said; or the difference between what we determine to be thought compared to just the voice inside your head, slogans, being polite, etc.

I mean… it’s not gonna hurt (it is a dense 70 pages though). I hope it would help and be easier to scan through the discussion for the posts labeled Section___ that dig into the text of every 3-5 pages, as the above is a summary of those 20 posts, though those are still only what caught my eye. If there is anything of particular interest, I can point to my notes and the section of text.

The motivation for an “answer” is a desire for “reliability, and solidity”. To picture “what I mean” (p.65) as “information” is to need it to be in the framework only of knowledge. Our personal experience is pictured as an internal object to be “the very basis of all that we say with any sense about [being a human]” (p. 48). He also says we are “tempted to say that these personal experiences are the material of which reality consists.” (p. 45) The skeptic really wants to be “inhabited” by the exceptional, in a way that “others can’t see”. Thus the creation of the object, that is a 'mind' or 'subject', is to make me inherently important and unique; as if within me would be “that which really lives”. — Antony Nickles

Looking through what your thread has focused upon, and what we have discussed as differences of method by different thinkers, I resist the idea that thoughts about "the object" come down merely to a psychological motivation.

I resist the idea that thoughts about "the object" come down merely to a psychological motivation. — Paine

Is this to say you think I’ve made a mistake in reading? or that you disagree with him? And, to try to say this again, I’m not arguing this is the only thing to be learned, but I wouldn’t say it is insignificant (“merely”). And I still don’t understand what a “psychological motivation” is meant to distinguish, and differentiate from what. I mean, does pointing out that they are logical errors as well (generalization, forced analogy, abstracting criteria, etc.) make it seem less… personal, individual… ethical? And not to mince words, but I take him to be investigating why we take a particular framework of how we think about objects and impose it on how to think about thought, meaning, and understanding. I just need a little more, or to understand what I’m supposed to justify/explain if that’s the case.

One starting place is to ask why W wants to separate psychology from thinking. The separation is a stumbling block to explanation.

I take your point that we often impose one set of meanings to replace others. That does not explain why W does not reduce one set of signs into another.

One starting place is to ask why W wants to separate psychology from thinking. — Paine

Well, without a further explanation of what “psychology” means, I’ll assume we are talking about the kind of thing the skeptic pictures as a “thought” in us (as an object), or when they imagine thinking as a mechanism in a “queer kind of medium” that would “explain the action of the mind” (p.6). I take the method here is to show how (and why) the skeptic pictures thinking this way by contrasting it with (and perhaps in this way “separating” it from) the logic and reasons of our ordinary ways of judging what is a thought and what is considered thinking (as I mention above). I would conjecture that other reasons for differentiating these two versions of thought would be to show that our ordinary criteria are more varied, substantial, and illuminating than we had considered (been blind to). But I’m interested to hear what you take thinking to consist of, and why psychology would be a part of it (or thought to be), one that needed to be separated, and for what reason.

that we often impose one set of meanings to replace others… does not explain why W does not reduce one set of signs into another. — Paine

I’m not sure what the “set of signs” are, that they would be different (irreducible). The things he has us say are the same. “I can’t feel your pain.” etc. He just shows there are multiples senses of such a phrase which apply different (types of) criteria—allowing us to see the demands of the skeptic. He does say we can “construct new notations, in order to break the spell of those which we are accustomed to” but that is just an exercise to highlight the distinctions we make or could make.

Part of the problem is that folk think in terms of objective and subjective objects, a nonsense that might be partially replaced by thinking in terms of objects and processes. — Banno

Yes. It's almost as if objective and subjective have become nouns. I always thought that the ellipsis in "objective" and "subjective" was "propositions". i.e, it was primarily about truth-conditions, where subjective propositions had, essentially, just one truth-condition - the assertion of the subject.

.... the process of the logic of a practice to judge (afterwards): what qualifies as understanding something; how we have a conversation about what is meaningful about what I said; or the difference between what we determine to be thought compared to just the voice inside your head, slogans, being polite, etc. — Antony Nickles

Quite so.

I resist the idea that thoughts about "the object" come down merely to a psychological motivation. — Paine

I'm not sure, but I think the object here is the meaning of a word. Given the understanding of meaning as intention that makes some sense, I think. The other interpretation is the the object, the meaning of a word, is a "mental object".

I resist the idea that thoughts about "the object" come down merely to a psychological motivation.
— Paine
Is this to say you think I’ve made a mistake in reading? or that you disagree with him? — Antony Nickles

I have to say, I think that W did not, for some reason, feel the need to draw a clear distinction. It may be that he had in mind the earlier (before Frege) idea that the laws of logic are the laws of thought.

I mean, does pointing out that they are logical errors as well (generalization, forced analogy, abstracting criteria, etc.) make it seem less… personal, individual… ethical? — Antony Nickles

Put it this way, Seeing these errors as logical makes them seem more appropriate for philosophy.

I take him to be investigating why we take a particular framework of how we think about objects and impose it on how to think about thought, meaning, and understanding. — Antony Nickles

Yes, But, from memory, what he offers us is things like an irresistible temptation. But this is not a temptation like the temptation offered by the bakery counter. That is, the temptation is not the temptation of pleasure. It's more like the temptation of taking the first offer for you car because you have better things to do than hang about selling it or putting on yesterday's clothes because that's what you have at hand.

One starting place is to ask why W wants to separate psychology from thinking. The separation is a stumbling block to explanation. — Paine

There is an issue here. I'll venture that what W is interested in is not how we actually think, but how we should think - logic justifies its conclusions, psychology merely reports them.

That does not explain why W does not reduce one set of signs into another. — Paine

Sorry, I'm not sure what you are getting at here.

I take the method here is to show how (and why) the skeptic pictures thinking this way by contrasting it with (and perhaps in this way “separating” it from) the logic and reasons of our ordinary ways of judging what is a thought and what is considered thinking (as I mention above). — Antony Nickles

the skeptic pictures thinking this way by contrasting it with (and perhaps in this way “separating” it from) the logic and reasons of our ordinary ways of judging what is a thought and what is considered thinking (as I mention above). — Antony Nickles

There is a similarity to be found there in at least some versions of scepticism. I mean that a sceptic might say - and I have heard sceptics saying - that the sceptical argument is applying more rigourous standards because he is doing philosophy and philosophy demands something better than the sloppy ways of ordinary thinking. W, on the other hand, wants to show that ordinary thought has, or can have, more depth and complexity to it than the sceptic recognizes.

But I’m interested to hear what you take thinking to consist of, and why psychology would be a part of it (or thought to be), one that needed to be separated, and for what reason. — Antony Nickles

Since, as you know, I'm a bit obsessed with this question, I'll also offer an answer. If I make a mistake fixing one of those old-fashioned petrol engines by fitting the wrong kind of spark plug or failing to adjust the timing (of the valves) properly, there are certain kinds of explanation within the scope of engineering, that could be offered - failure to realize what kind of spark plug the engine needs or failure to understand why the correct timing is important. That kind of explanation is quite different from the explanation that I made those mistakes because I had not slept properly or was arguing with the boss or seeking revenge on the owner for over-charging me for accountancy services.

But I’m interested to hear what you take thinking to consist of, and why psychology would be a part of it (or thought to be), one that needed to be separated, and for what reason. — Antony Nickles

I spoke of 'thinking' more generally than W would probably warrant. However, from the Tractatus to the PI, the distinction between science and whatever he is doing keeps being reestablished. That difference is often depicted as a limit to what can be explained but he seems hell bent to put it in other ways.

So, we have discussed previously where W looked at how the desire to be mysterious is recognized as a motive. But there is nothing like a move to make that an explanation for why it always happens. The latter would be an example of a reduction through psychology.

from the Tractatus to the PI, the distinction between science and whatever he is doing keeps being reestablished. That difference is often depicted as a limit to what can be explained but he seems hell bent to put it in other ways. — Paine

I agree the comparison with science is key. I don’t think the focus is on the distinction so much as that traditional philosophy wishes it had the same kind of outcomes as science, that matched its completeness, generalizability, predictability, consistency, etc. I take this as what he is talking about that our dissatisfaction with our ordinary criteria (p.59) makes us turn a “muddle” into something that would have an “answer” which is how and why the skeptic becomes “puzzled” (p.58). The restricted standard that the skeptic wants (as in the Tractatus) is what “limits” what they consider “rational” so they don’t recognize that although our ordinary criteria allow for us to get into muddles sometimes, there are also valid, intelligible ways to get out of it (just not ensured to ahead of time).

So, we have discussed previously where W looked at how the desire to be mysterious is recognized as a motive. But there is nothing like a move to make that an explanation for why it always happens. The latter would be an example of a reduction through psychology. — Paine

Sure, I don’t think it is an inherent trait or natural propensity, but it is one intelligible, possible reaction to our human condition of being separate. Another would be to imagine the only fault lies in language.

@Paine

Put it this way, seeing these errors as logical makes them seem more appropriate for philosophy. — Ludwig V

I’m interested to hear more. The skeptic’s argument at their word appears to fly in the face of common sense, but yet to make sense to philosophy. I would think we all agree that Witt is not just arguing back with common sense (“The table’s right there!”) and I would hope we could agree that he shows that philosophy has been wrongly restricting what counts as “logic”, and that there is a logic to our different ways of judging each thing. So what are we doing with “appropriate”?

Now I will grant that part of what he is saying is that the skeptic is just doing it wrong; that they are thinking poorly in imposing their standards and creating a picture to have those make sense. And there is an admonishment by examples to do better (philosophically) by realizing the validity of the everyday logic of each thing. I’m happy with that here.

I only worry that in characterizing something as “inappropriate” we fall into thinking we have to guard the gate of what we imagine is logical vs, say, “emotional” (that this is a false dichotomy) when part of what he is doing is trying to make us see we are unnecessarily limiting what is able to be rationally and intelligibly discussed. For example, to bring ethical discussion back from the wilderness that the Tractatus imagined (this is not an argument for emotions).

That is, the temptation is not the temptation of pleasure. It's more like the temptation of taking the first offer for you car because you have better things to do than hang about selling it or putting on yesterday's clothes because that's what you have at hand. — Ludwig V

I agree; he’s not talking about some innate propensity or urge. Witt interchangeably uses the word “inclined”, which I see in the sense that we are set up to think of things a certain way, take a certain position in regard to the other. Partly our next step seems reasonable in the framework forced onto a topic by the analogy of the object (but also queer thus needing philosophy to explain). Thus we see the other as impenetrable if we only approach them as an object of knowledge.

There is also a moral component that something we are inclined to do is not necessarily something we have to do and so perhaps should not do, as, when we reach the bedrock of authority, we can still choose to continue to teach, lead again, listen, discuss why, etc., rather than just bring the hammer of convention down.

But this leaves the place of conviction still on the table. I remembered I had come across this before (bellow), which I took up here, and I see it that when you are inclined or tempted, you are not as yet committed. You have the chance to reflect and realize you are being set up or deluded before you act. And an inclination is not a reason, nor a cause, but we are responsible for our convictions.

‘I cannot know what is going on in with [someone writhing in pain with evident cause]’ is above all a picture. It is the convincing expression of a conviction. It does not give the reasons for the conviction. They are not readily accessible. — Witt, PI (p.223)

So the real question is not what are we tempted by, but what are the reasons for our conviction. Why are they not easy to reach? Is that it takes a lot of the kind of work we’ve done here to see the interests we really have? To get past our self-delusions. Are they withheld?

I'll venture that what W is interested in is not how we actually think, but how we should think - logic justifies its conclusions, psychology merely reports them. — Ludwig V

I agree; for me his work is largely ethical in that sense (like an ethic, a form of conducting yourself). How to think better, deeper, closer, more detail, based on the facts, having a case or example, letting things be what they are, etc. And there is a particular logic that “justifies” conclusions; but of course that is not the only version of logic. And sometimes it’s a matter of showing someone examples of other logics that changes their mind.

I have learned many things new to me in your thread. I need to think and read about it more before trying to answer your points of argument.

Till then.

@Ludwig V


Thank you for this. My hope is that I have read the words themselves correctly first and then dug deeper and let it give us everything it can before I jumped to any conclusions or think I’ve got it figured it out ahead of all that, but I’ve maybe made it seem there is only one thing to take away when there is a lot everyone else sees and has rightly brought up not because it conflicts but because different parts catch our interest.

After I give @Ludwig V’ a chance to comment on my response to his latest, I’m going to repost all my commentary in one post, as, by renaming the discussion, no one can search the whole thing anymore to find the sections.

After I give Ludwig V’ a chance to comment on my response to his latest, — Antony Nickles

Thank you. I'm afraid I'll need to be brief.

So what are we doing with “appropriate”? — Antony Nickles

Yes. It was a lazy choice. I had in mind a certain uncertainty I have about the borderline between logic and psychology when it comes to philosophy. I freely admit that I am not clear about the issues here. though I hope I'm getting the measure of them.

Now I will grant that part of what he is saying is that the skeptic is just doing it wrong; that they are thinking poorly in imposing their standards and creating a picture to have those make sense. — Antony Nickles

It is one thing to decide that the sceptic is doing it wrong and then try to understand why they are making their mistakes. It is, perhaps, a different thing to wonder whether the sceptic may be right and then to try to work out whether that is so.

How to think better, deeper, closer, more detail, based on the facts, having a case or example, letting things be what they are, etc. — Antony Nickles

That is certainly what W is pursuing - and he has much to teach us.