Well, far from comatose, we do have examples of people like Hellen Keller, who managed to become a wonderful writer while being deaf-mute. — Manuel

Well Keller only lost both her sight and hearing after an illness at age two. So she had that much normal exposure to the world in terms of her social and biological development. And through a supportive family, she developed a reasonable system of sign language, such as miming putting on glasses to signify her father, or a tying up of her hair to signify her mother. As well as shakes of the head to mean yes and no, pushes and pulls to mean come or go. A "vocabulary" of about 60 signs to navigate her safe home world.

Then she had a carer who took her at six and taught her a laborious system of spelling out words through tapping out an alphabet on her fingers. From here, Keller – having had vital exposure to human speech in her first few years – learnt to talk herself. And talk of all the things she could now learn from now having added not just braille, but the ability to decode chalk writing on blackboards by touch, and spoken words from touching a person's moving lips.

But when she gave her public talks, many found her bookish and limited. Maxim Gorky, perhaps unkindly, called her affected and spoilt. Someone speaking of God's disapproval of revolution in a stilted and learnt way rather than with any worldly wisdom.

I know all this from researching these kinds of "parables" and what they reveal about the socially-constructed and language-scaffolded nature of the human mind. They illustrate exactly how language – as semiosis – plays a central role in structuring what we "phenomenologically experience".

Alexander Meshcheryakov wrote a book, Awakening to Life, about his own work teaching finger-spelling to people born deaf and blind and so really lacking any normal level of exposure to either the sensory world and the socio-linguistic world. They grew up in institutions where their experience was about limited to their internal spasms of hunger or cold, and the rough touch of the hands cleaning and feeding them. Years of training could get them to the level of dressing themselves, feeding themselves, using the toilet. But nothing much beyond as any grammatical structure must be connected to some matching semantic world of lived experience.

So consciousness is not an innate or singular property, but a learnt and developmental process. And in humans, we develop the set of neurobiological habits we would share with any large brained animal. Then we add a socially-constructed realm of language-scaffolded ideas and intellectual habits on top.

All this was already obvious to a Victorian neurologist like John Hughlings Jackson – the father of British neurology – who had already worked out that the brain is structured hierarchically and topographically. A structure that could model an organism's reality by both breaking it apart and putting it back together at the same time.

When asked about what made the human brain different from an animal's, he said it wasn't merely speech but the fact that speech was an ability to "propositionalise" or make meaningful claims. About anything and everything. "The unit of speech is a proposition," he declared. "We speak not only to tell other people what to think, but to tell ourselves what we think. Speech is part of thought."

Curious that so much that seemed clear enough to Victorian science then got forgotten and all muddled up again.

It's more so, what would a human be like, if they never developed senses….. — Manuel

Dunno. Maybe the autonomic system would still work, but the cognitive system wouldn’t for lack of direct sensory input, and the aestetic part wouldn’t work for lack of feelings about things of sense, so it looks like none of what is called a priori, like your “pure thought”, would be available. But hey….probably wouldn’t be dead.

I'd wonder if there's "something that it's like" to be that, from a phenomenological perspective, "pure thought", absent language. — Manuel

Again, don’t know, but given the otherwise fully equipped human, I’m convinced all thought is absent language.

…outside of language, we don't know what non-linguistic thought is. — Manuel

You mean outside the language we use to speculate on what non-linguistic thought is. I agree we don’t know what non-linguistic thought is, only because we don’t know what thought is regardless of its modifiers. Just as I’m convinced thought is absent language, so too am I convinced at least empirical thought is in the form of images which reflect the state of my knowledge. Even so, I haven't been able to pin down a describable form of pure thought, as it is called by the metaphysicians, a priori.

If mind is computational and computation is a physical process then it would seem to follow that the mental is really a function of the physical. — Janus

And I agree with that. I do think mental stuff is physical stuff. Just like gravity is physical stuff or anything else is physical stuff. I don't see a metaphysical difference between these things.

There is no mental vs. physical. If you want to talk about something analogous in modern terms, I think it makes sense to speak of the experiential and the non-experiential. And then the question becomes, how can non-experiential stuff lead to experiential stuff?

Difference is good―I don't think we want this place to become an echo chamber. I also agree with you on not wishing to create a substantive difference between the mental and physical, even though I think the distinction is useful in some of our thinking practices. — Janus

Absolutely.

It would be boring if we all agreed on everything. Keeps the discussions alive and interesting and it keeps one sharp too, forces one to think clearly about things one may overlook or has trouble explaining.

But when she gave her public talks, many found her bookish and limited. Maxim Gorky, perhaps unkindly, called her affected and spoilt. Someone speaking of God's disapproval of revolution in a stilted and learnt way rather than with any worldly wisdom.

I know all this from researching these kinds of "parables" and what they reveal about the socially-constructed and language-scaffolded nature of the human mind. They illustrate exactly how language – as semiosis – plays a central role in structuring what we "phenomenologically experience". — apokrisis

It is quite remarkable how much language is tied to thought. I haven't read Keller in a long time, so the critiques may be true to some extent.

But it's still a stunning, the human capacity to be able to speak at all absent eyes and ears. I suspect that people who are deaf-mute may be touching on thought (whatever it is) in a less complex way than we do, maybe getting closer to whatever thought may be absent language. But as you point out, it also impoverishes output.

They grew up in institutions where their experience was about limited to their internal spasms of hunger or cold, and the rough touch of the hands cleaning and feeding them. Years of training could get them to the level of dressing themselves, feeding themselves, using the toilet. But nothing much beyond as any grammatical structure must be connected to some matching semantic world of lived experience. — apokrisis

There seems to be a crucial development window in which children can develop "the language organ", which, if missed, renders language virtually impossible.

Incidentally this seems true of other human capacities. If a child gets no visual input by 4 or some age like that, they won't be able to see.

So consciousness is not an innate or singular property, but a learnt and developmental process. And in humans, we develop the set of neurobiological habits we would share with any large brained animal. Then we add a socially-constructed realm of language-scaffolded ideas and intellectual habits on top. — apokrisis

I don't see how it's not innate. That it requires learning, only means it needs stimulus, but it comes from inside the creature. The world doesn't "teach" us consciousness, it sharpens and refines what we already have.

"The unit of speech is a proposition," he declared. "We speak not only to tell other people what to think, but to tell ourselves what we think. Speech is part of thought." — apokrisis

Absolutely. And we can tell in ordinary life, when we ask someone "what are you thinking", we expect propositions, not the "blooming buzzing confusion" that is happening inside our heads all the time.

. Maybe the autonomic system would still work, but the cognitive system wouldn’t for lack of direct sensory input, and the aestetic part wouldn’t work for lack of feelings about things of sense, so it looks like none of what is called a priori, like your “pure thought”, would be available. But hey….probably wouldn’t be dead. — Mww

Being not dead is good. Unless you are an anti-natalist. Which if you are, well, good riddance. I suspect you may be right, there'd be almost nothing going on inside.

Again, don’t know, but given the otherwise fully equipped human, I’m convinced all thought is absent language. — Mww

I'm a big fan of the a priori. To problematize it as unscientific looks quite silly to me. You may be convinced, and I share the intuition, but I can't say what it is. Saying it's a priori is fine, but it leaves me uninformed. And when you begin to explain the a priori, you use language. So, it's a sticky issue.

Even so, I haven't been able to pin down a describable form of pure thought, as it is called by the metaphysicians, a priori. — Mww

I think that makes sense. And maybe we can say little more than this.

I don't see how it's not innate. That it requires learning, only means it needs stimulus, but it comes from inside the creature. The world doesn't "teach" us consciousness, it sharpens and refines what we already have. — Manuel

I’m talking about self-aware and introspective human consciousness as something beyond simple animal enactive awareness. How language scaffolds what we mean by that level of mind.

Without language, there is nothing reportable because there is no socialised habit of narration. An inner story of that kind is not being created.

I think I follow. True one needs other people to activate consciousness "beyond simple animal enactive awareness." But what other people do is stimulate, provoke, give something to bounce off, in our minds. The interaction comes from others, but consciousness is inside us.

I'm a big fan of the a priori. To problematize it as unscientific looks quite silly to me. — Manuel

Agreed; the idea has enough problems without being unscientific. It was never supposed to be scientific in the first place, only meant to catalog the objects of certain kinds of cognition as to their source. The ground for the possibility of these kinds of cognitions, and by association their respective objects, is given in every rational human, regardless of the terminology used to describe it.

Saying it's a priori is fine, but it leaves me uninformed. — Manuel

It does need to be taken in context. I would think you’d be informed enough, after it's been described, and what it’s supposed to do within that description. Doesn’t mean you gotta believe a word of it, but you’d be informed nonetheless.

And when you begin to explain the a priori, you use language. — Manuel

Yeah, but when you put out words to explain something with language, that something has already thought by you without it. When you bring in words that explain something to you, there is no sense in them until their relations are thought by you, and it’s the other guy that’s thought first and talked second.

Anyway…..put this to rest?

We've had a good row, and I see no significant issues remaining to clear up at the moment. So, I think we are good here M. :cool: