The danger you and I both recognize comes not from the story Bitbol tells here, but from the further story which physicalists try to tell, in which heat is "really" or "actually" or "reduced to" its objectively measurable components. — J

Of course! Neither you or @Patterner are the kinds of reductive materialists that Bitbol (and Chalmers) have in their sights - but plenty are, and that is who he's addressing.

In Consciousness Explained, I described a method, heterophenomenology, which was explicitly designed to be 'the neutral path leading from objective physical science and its insistence on the third-person point of view, to a method of phenomenological description that can (in principle) do justice to the most private and ineffable subjective experiences, while never abandoning the methodological principles of science. — Daniel Dennett, The Fantasy of First-Person Science

That is the polar opposite of Bitbol's phenomenology and Chalmers' naturalistic dualism. So they're not (and I'm not) 'attacking straw man arguments' - physicalists really do say that. It's important to get clear on the fault lines between the tectonic plates, so to speak. Which, from what you're saying, I'm not sure that you're seeing. (Incidentally I'm drafting a Medium essay "Intro to Bitbol" which I hope might be useful as he has an enormous amount of material online.)

physicalists really do say that. — Wayfarer

They certainly do.

It's important to get clear on the fault lines between the tectonic plates, so to speak. Which, from what you're saying, I'm not sure that you're seeing. — Wayfarer

I think I see some of them, but always happy to learn more. Appreciate all the thought you've given this.

I agree that the feeling of warmth is an example of a conscious experience. We also agree, I suppose, that being conscious as such is a conscious experience -- sounds awkward, but how else could we put it? I certainly experience being conscious, and so do you. So I'm hypothesizing that, as with warmth, there's a compatible story to be told about the "outside" of our conscious experience. — J

Can you explain what you mean by "experience being conscious"? we come at consciousness from different directions. I'm happy to explore your idea, but not necessarily sure what it is.

Can you explain what you mean by "experience being conscious"? we come at consciousness from different directions. I'm happy to explore your idea, but not necessarily sure what it is. — Patterner

Fair enough. We'd have to start by agreeing on what can be an object of experience. As you know, many philosophers believe that con* can never be an object for itself, that it is properly a transcendental ego of some sort. To "experience consciousness," for these philosophers, would be like saying that the eye can see itself.

I don't find that persuasive, but let's say we agreed that it was a good description. In that case, we need a different term -- not "experience" or "be conscious of" or "be aware of" -- for what happens when con reflects on itself. Whatever term we decide to use, that's what I'd be referring to when I spoke about experiencing being conscious.

Or, we can allow, as I do, that self-con or the awareness of one's con is an experience on par with any other mental event. In that case, when I talk about the experience of being conscious, I mean the experience I have when I merely look at my looking (doing meditation is an excellent way to get there). It's separate from any content, whether perceptual or internal.

But I don't think we even need anything this esoteric to answer the question, "Do you experience con?" We can just reply, "Is experiencing con the same or different from being conscious?" If it's the same, then we all agree that we have that experience. If it's different, then we return to the Sartrean exegesis I began with. But in neither case is the phenomenon -- call it what you will, "experience" or not -- in doubt.

*consciousness. I'm tired of typing that word incorrectly!

As far as I can tell, consciousness (=experiencing being conscious) entails the set of sensory sensations, thoughts and feelings one has in the present, where "the present" is a short period of time, not an instant of time.

These are all intertwined. Sensations and feelings can induce thoughts, and thoughts can induce feelings. It is the feelings aspect that the hard part, of the "hard problem". Most aspects of consciousness seem amenable to programming in software. Feelings are not amenable to this. IMO, feelings are the one aspect of consciousness that is inconsistent with what we know about the physical world. That doesn't mean it's necessarily inconsistent with naturalism - it could just mean that there are aspects of the natural world that are not understood and may be inscrutable.

*consciousness. I'm tired of typing that word incorrectly! — J

:rofl:

Fair enough. We'd have to start by agreeing on what can be an object of experience. As you know, many philosophers believe that con* can never be an object for itself, that it is properly a transcendental ego of some sort. To "experience consciousness," for these philosophers, would be like saying that the eye can see itself.

I don't find that persuasive — J

I do agree with this, as it happens. I think everything is an object of experience. But I don't think the experience is an object that, itself, can be experienced. I don't think the problem is that an eye cannot see itself. I think the problem is that vision cannot see itself.

I think what is normally called human consciousness is the consciousness - the subjective experience - of being a human. We have mechanisms for mental abilities, and we experience them as, among other things, self-awareness. We are aware of our thoughts and feelings.

A bacterium experiences greater or lesser warmth, just as we do. But it doesn't think about it, or comment on it.



I very much agree regarding what you say about feelings. I agree with most of what you say. But I don't agree that "Most aspects of consciousness seem amenable to programming in software." I think only mental abilities can be programmed, like sensory input, responses to sensory input, storage of sensory input and responses, referencing the stored data... I don't think subjective experience of all that is programmable. we can program feedback loops, but we can't program those feedback loops being aware of themselves.