There's no such time. Time came into existence along with the universe; the Big Bang is not an event in time but a boundary of time. — Banno

Maybe. There's a theory that we're in a black hole, which is inside a bigger universe. Instead of one Big Bang, there are Big Bounces that spawn universes. So our universe is in a bigger one, and our's is spawning more universes, which we detect as black holes.

The philosophical import being that we really don't know.

In GR time begins at the singularity and the question of a time before the singularity is without a sense.

Outside of GR, anything goes, so again the idea of a time outside the universe is undefined.

Either way, such speculation is a waste of time.

In GR time begins at the singularity and the question of a time before the singularity is without a sense. — Banno

That's not true. The GR math doesn't say anything about a singularity. The idea of a singularity is just a product extrapolation.

So the black hole cosmology theory isn't outside GR.

@SophistiCat. is that correct?

Either way, such speculation is a waste of time. — Banno

Speculative physicists don't seem to think so.

So the black hole cosmology theory isn't outside GR. — frank

Yeah it is - it's an extension of GR to another universe.

I'll leave you to it. :roll:

I think you meant "Wow. I read the article you posted, and that's an amazing possibility. Thanks for sharing."

You're welcome.

a platonic number or form (e.g., the perfect circle, devoid of which there is no pi, devoid of which there is no QM) will all "stand out" to us. Whereas consciousness (via which we apprehend objects of awareness such as the....universal of a perfect circle) does not. Were existence to be synonymous to actuality, as per what you've said of Peirce's interpretation, this discrepancy would not be accounted for. — javra

Here, I want to come back to the reality of intelligibles. Scientific principles, mathematical relations, and the natural numbers are not dependent on any individual mind, yet they can only be grasped by a mind. That is the sense in which I hold they are real (in the noumenal or intelligible sense) but not existent (in the phenomenal, spatiotemporal sense. This is nearer to the pre-Kantian sense of 'noumenal', which Kant adapted, and changed, for his own purposes.)

This isn’t meant as a full metaphysical system, but as an heuristic:

* existent = that which appears in space, time, and causal relations; what can be encountered as a phenomenon

* real = that which has objective validity or logical necessity, but is not a physical particular

This is very close to Peirce’s schema: laws, generalities, and mathematical structures are real even though they do not exist as phenomena of Secondness. On those grounds, I don’t think “reality” can be collapsed into “existence” without erasing the ontological standing of intelligibles altogether.

Furthermore language depends on such abstractions. Whenever we use the terms ‘same as’, ‘equal to’, ‘different from’, ‘less than’, and so on, we’re making use of our capacity for rational abstraction, without the requirement of being aware of doing so. This capacity is anticipated by a discussion in Plato’s Phaedo called ‘The Argument from Equality’. In it, Socrates argues that in order to judge the equal length of two like objects — two sticks, say, or two rocks — we must already have ‘the idea of equals’ present in our minds, otherwise we wouldn’t know how to go about comparing them; we must already have ‘the idea of equals’. And this idea must be innate, he says. It can’t be acquired by mere experience, but must have been present at birth.

I don’t know if it’s necessary for us to accept the implied belief in the ‘incarnation of the soul’ to make sense of the claim: the fact that it’s innate is what is at issue. It is the innate capacity which provides us the ability to make such judgements, which we as rational creatures do effortlessly. It is just this kind of innate capabiiity which empiricism tends to deprecate (subject of Steve Pinker's book The Blank Slate).

On a larger scale, the same kind of capacities of abstraction are brought to bear on formulating the mathematical bases of theoretical physics. Science sees the Universe through such mathematical hypotheses, which provide the indispensable framework for making judgements (in accordance with the oft-quoted Galilean expression that ‘the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics’).

Thus intellectual abstractions, the grasp of abstract relations and qualities, are quite literally the ligatures of reason — they are what binds rational conceptions together to form coherent ideas.

You did ask me once what I meant by that expression.

There's no such time. Time came into existence along with the universe; the Big Bang is not an event in time but a boundary of time. — Banno

Huh. Interesting. I was not focally aware of that. There's no semi-equivalent (I get it's not a matter of simple terminology or verbatim but a truly transcendental concept altogether—somewhat)? There's no hypothetical future where humans have mastered time travel (and beyond?) that any matter currently in existence can be somehow "placed" or otherwise "end up" at such a point? Why is that? (It's honestly fascinating to ponder, is all)

This sort of speculative physics makes for poor threads. — Banno

Perhaps. That said, I don't need to remind anyone here that all generally-accepted theories as well as most if not all scientific facts began as mere speculation. I fail to see an intrinsic evil in the practice per se, though I can see how it can be a bit disfavored and come off as irrelevant.

Either way, I appreciate the newfound knowledge. :smile:

Time came into existence along with the universe — Banno

Schopenhauer says time began with the first eye opening.

Yes, I think we're all in accord that the culprit here is the word "reality," no surprise. "Stuff we can know as humans" and "all the stuff that can be known" are fine with me instead, as long as the two aren't supposed to mean the same thing.

These guys are idealists masquerading as physicalists. They just want to shut down the debate and confine the physical material to their idealism. If they were true physicalists they would have brought the Many Worlds Theory to the table by now, but they haven’t.

The simplest answer to the OP is we don’t know what else there is. There might be all sorts of weird and wonderful stuff, that we can’t see. We just can’t see it.

This can then be elaborated by saying we know that there is a lot we don’t know about the world we find ourselves in. So we know that we don’t know things about things that we can see. Therefore we are not in a position to say, or know anything about what we can’t see. So we can’t say what else isn’t there, just like we can’t give a full account of what we know is there.

Just keeping things philosophical. — javra

Perhaps you are right. Quantum physics always seem to shroud everything in a fog, anyway.

That's not what I said, is it? — javra

I may well have misunderstood you.

You and I are selves, and selves do stand out ... this to the consciousness embedded in each which, as consciousness, does not. One does not see "consciousness" in the mirror but only one's own physiological self. — javra

I find myself floundering here. There is a regrettable tendency to think of anyone's self - including one's own - as if it were an object of some sort. If it is, it is remarkably elusive for something that is omni-present in one's life and experience. What's worse, is that one tends to find oneself positing more than one - a physiological self, as opposed to various others; none of these can possibly be one's true self - whatever that means. In addition, while I can supply some sort of (metaphorical) meaning to "stand out" as a description of what existent objects do, I can't grasp a meaning clear enough to be sure that I'm making the right sense of what you are saying. I am confused by the fact that if something "stands out" in my experience, I find that it does so against a background, which also exists.

I might question whether the word was ever "perfectly useful," but other than that, you've said it well. — J

Perhaps. "perfectly" was really a rhetorical flourish, meant to underline that there are uses of "real" and of "reality" that are not problematic in the way that this peculiar, specifically philosophical, use, is.

We could, for instance, create "Peirce-marks" to indicate when the word is being used as Peirce defined it. — J

Well, yes, "P-real" could become a (real) word. There would be a swarm of other, similar, words. It would be interesting to see which of them would survive for, say, ten years. Definitions can only work if there is a consensus about how the term is to be used. But there is no such consensus in philosophy about "exists", so there is no sound basis for evaluating any definition. I'm also deeply suspicious of any definition that sets out to define a single word. (Dictionaries nowadays recognize the relationships of a given word to others.)

Curious if you disagree with this: In commonsense language, then, Superman, the comic-book character, exists (in our culture) but is not real. — javra

I think that's right. But it's perhaps worth adding that he is a real comic-book character, just not a real person. As a cautious generalization, I would say that the problem with "real" is that things are often real under one description and unreal under another. "Exists" seems to be binary (unless you are Meinong).

This sort of speculative physics makes for poor threads. — Banno

I agree with you. But see below.

Speculative physicists don't seem to think so (sc. that speculation is a waste of time).. — frank

That may be because they are working in a context that gives some traction to discussion and argument. On the other hand, it may be that that kind of response is not really appropriate. The speculation may be fun or exciting or something. Truth is, perhaps, only relevant when the speculation gets tied down into a
critical framework. It may or may not be true that Kekule came up with the carbon ring after he had a dream, which then gave him the idea of the benzene ring, which sent him into the laboratory. But it illustrates the point. No-one is concluding that dreams are a reliable source of scientific hypotheses.
The transition may involve a high casualty rate and a good deal of fruitless discussion. Is it worth it? I don't know.

There's no hypothetical future where humans have mastered time travel (and beyond?) that any matter currently in existence can be somehow "placed" or otherwise "end up" at such a point? Why is that? (It's honestly fascinating to ponder, is all) — Outlander

I can see your point. But I think it is important to recognize that the fascination is not the same thing as truth. If you don't, you'll find yourself believing in dragons and world conspiracies. "What if.." can be great fun. But it doesn't always play into truth and falsity. (Who cares that Superman is impossible? We all understand the context and can enjoy the stories, but let's not get carried away into political philosophy.)

That is the sense in which I hold they (sc. abstract objects) are real (in the noumenal or intelligible sense) but not existent (in the phenomenal, spatiotemporal sense. — Wayfarer

Well, they are not phenomenal or spatiotemporal objects. But why does that mean they don't exist? Or, why do you restrict existence to such objects?

This capacity (sc. to grasp abstract objects) is anticipated by a discussion in Plato’s Phaedo called ‘The Argument from Equality’. In it, Socrates argues that in order to judge the equal length of two like objects — two sticks, say, or two rocks — we must already have ‘the idea of equals’ present in our minds, otherwise we wouldn’t know how to go about comparing them; we must already have ‘the idea of equals’. And this idea must be innate, he says. It can’t be acquired by mere experience, but must have been present at birth. — Wayfarer

Yes, but Plato is wrong to think that the idea of equality must be innate. We learn how to measure things and so when things are the same length or weight - and even when there are two sticks or rocks. True, we are born with the capacity to learn, but that's not the same thing.

The simplest answer to the OP is we don’t know what else there is. There might be all sorts of weird and wonderful stuff, that we can’t see. We just can’t see it.
This can then be elaborated by saying we know that there is a lot we don’t know about the world we find ourselves in. So we know that we don’t know things about things that we can see. Therefore we are not in a position to say, or know anything about what we can’t see. So we can’t say what else isn’t there, just like we can’t give a full account of what we know is there. — Punshhh

Yes. That seems straightforward and right to me. It also seems to me that the difficulties arise only when we insist on trying to drag "reality" and "existence" and a metaphorical use of "beyond" into it.

That is the sense in which I hold they (sc. abstract objects) are real (in the noumenal or intelligible sense) but not existent (in the phenomenal, spatiotemporal sense.
— Wayfarer

Well, they are not phenomenal or spatiotemporal objects. But why does that mean they don't exist? — Ludwig V

If I ask you to point to the number 7, what would you actually point to? At most, you could indicate a token—a mark on paper, a glyph on a screen, or the word “seven.” But the number itself is not any of these tokens. We both understand “7” because we can perform the intellectual act of counting and grasping numerical relations. The token is a symbol, not the referent, which is a numerical value.

This is why I say that numbers, logical principles, and laws of nature are intelligible rather than phenomenal. They are not given in sensation the way tables, colours, or sounds are. You don’t encounter the number 7 in space and time; you grasp it by a capacity of the intellect. That makes them real, but not existent in the empirical sense.

Of course, we say colloquially that the number 7 exists, and I wouldn't take issue with that. But this is a philosophical distinction and in this context such distinctions are significant.

I'm not making arbitrary distinctions - I’m distinguishing two modes of existence. Phenomenal things exist as objects of sense. Intelligible things are real insofar as they can be grasped by a rational intellect, but they are not phenomena, in the way that sense objects are.

This distinction between phenomenal and intelligible objects isn’t something I’ve invented; it’s a well-established feature of the classical philosophical tradition. From Plato and Aristotle through the medievals and into early modern rationalism, the difference between what is apprehended by the senses and what is apprehended by the intellect was taken to be fundamental. It’s only with the rise of empiricism and the narrowing of “existence” to what can be observed or measured that this distinction began to fade from view.

I’m simply trying to keep both modes of understanding in play, because collapsing everything into the empirical domain obscures the reality of the intelligible structures we rely on in logic, mathematics, and science itself. And it is actually germane to the subject under discussion.

The set of true sentences is never complete, if that helps. — Banno

If the set is not complete, then you imply that there are more true sentences which are not in the set. So, do you mean by this, that "the set of true sentences" does not refer to all the true sentences?

Because what 'is' for us is all there is for us. Anything beyond is not anything. (again, Kantian noumenon).

Because what 'is' for us is all there is for us. Anything beyond is not anything. (again, Kantian noumenon). — I like sushi

But tomorrow isn't here yet.

Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow,
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day,
To the last syllable of recorded time;
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.

there are uses of "real" and of "reality" that are not problematic in the way that this peculiar, specifically philosophical, use, is. — Ludwig V

Maybe. Even in ordinary conversation, it can get vague really quickly. I guess I'd agree that we know how to use "real" in the context of "Simone de Beauvoir was real" vs. "Santa Claus is not real".

"P-real" could become a (real) word. There would be a swarm of other, similar, words. It would be interesting to see which of them would survive for, say, ten years. — Ludwig V

Yes, it would! Have there been other philosophical definitions which had to compete for survival against competitors using the same term? I feel there must have been, but I can't think of one at the moment. Maybe "logic"?

I'm also deeply suspicious of any definition that sets out to define a single word. — Ludwig V

In philosophy, yes, since we lack a reliable means to go and check whether we've got it right. Binomial nomenclature, in contrast, seems a noble and successful task.

Because what 'is' for us is all there is for us. Anything beyond is not anything. — I like sushi

I'm not being stubborn, but I just don't see how it follows. If you said, "Anything beyond is not anything for us," I'd see your point. But why would you assert that "for us" encompasses all there is?

These guys are idealists masquerading as physicalists. — Punshhh

Who are "these guys"?

I'm not being stubborn, but I just don't see how it follows. If you said, "Anything beyond is not anything for us," I'd see your point. But why would you assert that "for us" encompasses all there is? — J

Have you read Kant? If you have then refer to what he says about negative and positive noumenon.

Nothing more to say (you can search this very site to find examples of myself and others pointing out this difficult obviousness).

Who are "these guys"?

I wouldn’t want to name names as I feel cheeky enough saying what I said.

There is a point though, only an idealist, of some kind, would restrict what is to what can be said, or known by a person. Surely by contrast, a physicalist of some kind would allow any of an infinite number of other possibilities and the fact that we cannot observe them directly doesn’t preclude their existence.

OK, I see what you're saying. Yes, a physicalist would probably agree there are things that humans can't know, but fortunately you don't have to be a physicalist to reach that conclusion!

The idealism question is a little harder. A hardcore Wittgensteinian/Davidsonian position on what we can talk about meaningfully isn't idealist, by my definition. That position raises doubts about going beyond human experience on what I'd call methodological grounds, rather than a skepticism based on some interpretation of Kantian idealism, say.

If the reality we experience is the only thing that we have experienced, how do we know that there isn’t anything beyond our reality? — an-salad

Anything we are aware of is part of our reality. It cannot be otherwise.

:100: :up: :up:

There is a point though, only an idealist [immaterislist], of some kind, would restrict what is to what can be said, or known by a person. Surely by contrast, a physicalist [materialist] of some kind would allow any of an infinite number of other possibilities and the fact that we cannot observe them directly doesn’t preclude their existence. — Punshhh

:up: :up:

So which one are you?

What's south of the South Pole?

Your replies read like a word game. But the OP is asking about what is, are you confining what is to what can be known by the use of words?

If the reality we experience is the only thing that we have experienced, how do we know that there isn’t anything beyond our reality? — an-salad

We can't "know" there's more (in the strict sense of "knowlwdge"). But we innately have a sense that there is a world beyond ourselves, and this constitutes a rational basis. Given that we have this belief, it is rational to maintain it unless it is defeated by other facts and valid reasoning. The mere fact that it is possibly false is not a defeater.

↪180 Proof So which one are you? — Punshhh

Physicalist (philosophical naturalist).

The token is a symbol, not the referent, which is a numerical value. — Wayfarer

Just a small point. What I "actually" point to is a mark on wall or paper. That mark is a token of the type "7". It is a sign or symbol for the number, which is an abstract object. We often refer to tokens as numbers, but I agree that they are not.

This is why I say that numbers, logical principles, and laws of nature are intelligible rather than phenomenal. They are not given in sensation the way tables, colours, or sounds are. You don’t encounter the number 7 in space and time; you grasp it by a capacity of the intellect. That makes them real, but not existent in the empirical sense. — Wayfarer

I'm surprised you are bothered about the empirical sense of "existent". I'm not, at least if you think that sense is "to be is to be perceived". The issue is whether inferences from what we perceive to things that are not (directly) perceived are allowed.

I’m distinguishing two modes of existence. Phenomenal things exist as objects of sense. Intelligible things are real insofar as they can be grasped by a rational intellect, but they are not phenomena, in the way that sense objects are. — Wayfarer

Well, that's true. But it doesn't follow from the fact that intelligible objects are not phenomena that they do not exist.

From Plato and Aristotle through the medievals and into early modern rationalism, the difference between what is apprehended by the senses and what is apprehended by the intellect was taken to be fundamental. — Wayfarer

Perhaps so. But even Berkeley, for all his rhetoric, had to concede exceptions. The existence of his own self, other people, and God were all inferred from his perceptions (ideas). Physics and other sciences have no trouble with that - so far as I know. Microscopes, telescopes, dials and meters of all sorts.
I think that our language here leads us in to unnecessary difficulties. At first sight, it seems that "what we perceive" and "what is apprehended by the intellect" are two distinct sets of objects. But perception and intellect do not work separately, in distinct silos. They are both involved in everything. Perception involves understanding and understanding involves perception. It's not an accident that "I see" or "I hear you" can mean "I understand".

I’m distinguishing two modes of existence. Phenomenal things exist as objects of sense. Intelligible things are real insofar as they can be grasped by a rational intellect, but they are not phenomena, in the way that sense objects are. — Wayfarer

The awkward thing here is that there is a gap between phenomenal things like sights and sounds, smells and tastes, etc. on one hand and intelligible things like circles and squares and numbers and functions. Ordinary life relies mostly on objects that involve both perception and understanding.
But there are lots of different kinds of object. Do we really need a "mode of existence" for each kind? I don't see that as necessary, though I'm not dogmatic about it.

I guess I'd agree that we know how to use "real" in the context of "Simone de Beauvoir was real" vs. "Santa Claus is not real". — J

Santa Claus and Pegasus &c. are a bit atypical. Standard cases are quite clear. Forged money is not real money, but exists; it is real in that it is a copy of real money. A model car is not a real car, but it exists because it is a real model of a car. A fisherman's fly is not a real fly, but it is exists because it is real bait. An actor is not a real policeman, but exists because they are a real person.
The last of these illustrates the peculiarities of fictional characters. Santa Clause is not just not a real person; he exists as a fictional or mythical character, which is to say that he does not exist.

Have there been other philosophical definitions which had to compete for survival against competitors using the same term? — J

I had the impression that philosophy was a war of all against all all of the time - in a collegial way, of course.

Binomial nomenclature, in contrast, seems a noble and successful task. — J

What is binomial nomenclature?

the fact that we cannot observe them directly doesn’t preclude their existence. — Punshhh

Of course not. We can observe them indirectly.

how do we know that there isn’t anything beyond our reality? — an-salad

We know that there are things we don't know about, because we have questions we cannot answer. We also know that there are things we don't know about because we know that we know things that people in the past didn't know.
Of course none of those things are beyond our reality. Or at least, if they are, they will become part of our reality as soon as we know about them.
Does that help?

Just a small point. What I "actually" point to is a mark on wall or paper. — Ludwig V

And not a valid one. The mark is a symbol. What it represents is a mathematical value, not an object.

If the reality we experience is the only thing that we have experienced, how do we know that there isn’t anything beyond our reality? — an-salad

Who is "we"?
If you're referring to "mankind" and assuming it's somehow unified and uniform, then you're clearly wrong.

Secondly, there's no need to get all exotic and extraterrestrial. Let's rephrase your question to, "If the reality Tom experiences is the only thing that Tom has experienced, how does Tom know that there isn’t anything beyond Tom's reality?"
How about the internal states of Dick and Harry? Are they a reality for Tom? Does Tom care about the about the internal states of Dick and Harry? Does Tom even acknowledge the possibility that the internal states of Dick and Harry might be other than what Tom supposes?

And not a valid one. The mark is a symbol. What it represents is a mathematical value, not an object. — Wayfarer

Yes. You are right. My main point, though, was the structure of type and token that enables to say that it is the same symbol in many places and many occasions. Or at least, I thought that was what you meant.

Your replies read like a word game. — Punshhh

Let's be clear: I'm pointing out that the OP isa a word game.

And "No".