I agree with you. But see below. — Ludwig V

We can be more specific. We can't assess physical theories without doing the maths.

And there is no maths here.

What is binomial nomenclature? — Ludwig V

The system, begun by Linnaeus, of identifying creatures by genus and species, e.g., Homo sapiens. I offered it as an example of a single, useful definition that can save everyone a lot of trouble. It has to be agreed to, of course.

We can be more specific. We can't assess physical theories without doing the maths.
And there is no maths here. — Banno

Quite so. That gives us some ground to treat the speculative physics that we hear so much about as somewhat different from this game. The speculations are at least candidates for the status of a hypothesis.
But it's not a free-standing game like noughts and crosses or tic-tac-toe. It's an extension of the language-game that's played in everyday language, and it is a puzzle game, not a competition between the players. Solving the puzzle is what it is all about. The solution is to understand the extension and see not only that it can't be played but why it can't be played. (Or, just possibly, to see whether there is a way that it might be playable.)

The system, begun by Linnaeus, of identifying creatures by genus and species, e.g., Homo sapiens. I offered it as an example of a single, useful definition that can save everyone a lot of trouble. It has to be agreed to, of course. — J

Of course. I should have understood. However, definitions like that are contextualized in a specialized field where the definition is a stipulation rather than a codification of an existing practice. Another advantage in the context of zoology is that it is possible to nominate a specimen as a reference, to supplement the words and help make decisions about borderline cases. So they are not like the philosophical attempts to define words that already have a use.

Yes, yet through all that, my initial comments stand. Reality is what there is, hence to posit something "beyond reality" is to posit more of what there is, and "beyond reality" is a grammatical error. And what I experience is not the very same as what is real, what we know is not the very same as what I experience.

My main point, though, was the structure of type and token that enables to say that it is the same symbol in many places and many occasions. Or at least, I thought that was what you meant. — Ludwig V

It is indeed a part of what I meant! But the additional point is that what is denoted by the symbol is an intellectual act, not a phenomenal existent. And I say that is a real, vital, and largely neglected distinction.

definitions like that are contextualized in a specialized field where the definition is a stipulation rather than a codification of an existing practice. — Ludwig V

Yes. As you say, very few philosophical terms could undergo such an evolution. It's for that reason, as I've said so often on TPF, that I'd like to see philosophers avoid terms like "reality" whenever possible. Or else put it in Peirce-marks or Kant-marks or Carnap-marks etc. if that's what you mean. :smile:

what is denoted by the symbol is an intellectual act, not a phenomenal existent. And I say that is a real, vital, and largely neglected distinction. — Wayfarer

If I may . . . This is right, and perhaps not so neglected if we see the connection with the many discussions we've had about the status of propositions. The whole point of trying to separate out something called a proposition is to preserve that very distinction. Sentences denote propositions (when they have the appropriate form), not objects or even individual thoughts. Nor are propositions objects in the world, though they may be about objects in the world. At least, that's the standard account. See Rodl though . . .

Reality is what there is, hence to posit something "beyond reality" is to posit more of what there is, and "beyond reality" is a grammatical error. — Banno

Well I think it's implicit that we're talking about known reality.

The way I look at it is this: I think hypotheses that we are living in the matrix or whatever are vulnerable to occam's razor. They have no better explanatory power than the hypothesis that I am a Homo sapiens on earth 2025, but posit additional entities.

And I think it's also important to stay within this explantory / hypothesis space. Because sometimes people make the claim that everything around us being a dream is somehow simpler than believing in a gigantic universe. But scale, and physicality, are not complexity. Or you sometimes get allusions to a an idea of a universe being "easier"; both of these claims are baseless and/or irrelevant at this time.

The whole point of trying to separate out something called a proposition is to preserve that very distinction. Sentences denote propositions (when they have the appropriate form), not objects or even individual thoughts. Nor are propositions objects in the world, though they may be about objects in the world. At least, that's the standard account. — J

:up: And this ties back to Wittgenstein's statement that the world is all that is the case. He was referring to the insight that the world does not seem to be made of a set of objects, but of objects doing things. That gives us the notion that the world is a set of true propositions.

Well I think it's implicit that we're talking about known reality. — Mijin

Yes, there are things we don't know. That is, there are true statements of which we do not have any knowledge. The person that realism should bother most is @Wayfarer, but he has convinced himself that he can have both antirealism and unknown truths.

unknown truths. — Banno

Name one.

Interesting how this connects to the previous considerations about "reality." Like "reality," the term "the world" is capable of being used in many ways. Wittgenstein's insight is valuable whether or not we want to use "the world" the way he uses it. His point is that, apart from objects, there are states of affairs, facts, construals, propositions, ways of thinking and speaking -- and when we ask "What is the case?" it is those items we're asking about, not the objects.

ADDED But propositions are made true by whether the arrangements of objects (crudely) are that way. We need the objects to help make a Wittgensteinian world.

This is right, and perhaps not so neglected if we see the connection with the many discussions we've had about the status of propositions. The whole point of trying to separate out something called a proposition is to preserve that very distinction — J

Which I am seeking to leverage to make a point about metaphysics…a point which I still don’t think is being acknowledged.

so you know everything there is to know. Ok. Here we go again.

Actually if you'd bothered reading anything I've said in this particular thread, you would see i've said nothing of the kind (although I've never said anything of the sort in any other thread, either). As the discussion had turned into a general one on metaphysics, I was trying to make the distinction between phenomenal and intelligible objects, but no avail.

:roll:

:smirk:

Let's be clear: I'm pointing out that the OP isa a word game.

No more than your replies are a word game.

And "No".

The game seems to be, let’s insist there isn’t anything else (other than our reality), because we don’t have the vocabulary to do it’s ising justice. Meanwhile smuggling in the acknowledgement that there probably is something else (as a nod to the idea that you can’t prove a negative).

I was trying to make the distinction between phenomenal and intelligible objects, but no avail.

He’s doing a neat trick whereby the phenomenal has to become intelligible (therefore an intelligible object) before it can be acknowledged.

Physicalist (philosophical naturalist).

So it’s Multiverses all the way down then?

Actually if you'd bothered reading anything I've said in this particular thread, you would see I've said nothing of the kind — Wayfarer

I see your "bothered to read" and raise you Fitch's paradox of knowability.

So yes, you did say something of that kind.

Anti-realism says: every truth must be knowable.
But you also say: there are truths we don’t and maybe can’t know.
Fitch shows you can’t have both.
If there are unknown truths, then not every truth is knowable, which just is the denial of anti-realism.

Please refer to what I said in this thread. As I interpreted this discussion as being about metaphysics I responded accordingly here and here. These are not recapitulations of the ‘mind-created world’ OP, although I believe they’re compatible with it.

Not seeing how that helps you. Have another look at Fitch.

Reality is what there is, hence to posit something "beyond reality" is to posit more of what there is, and "beyond reality" is a grammatical error. And what I experience is not the very same as what is real, what we know is not the very same as what I experience. — Banno

In a way, I'm fine with the first sentence. My problem is that we seem to hunger for a way of metaphorically pulling everything together under one heading. I just did exactly that with "everything". and that itself reveals the fundamental issue. In normal contexts, the scope of everything is set by the context (and sometimes we talk about "domains" in this context. But here, I'm attempting to use "everything" without a limiting context. We do the same with "reality", "existence", "being", "world", "universe" and "cosmos". The catch is that we can't let go of the expectation that the scope will be limited, and so we undermine our own attempt by positing something that is outside the scope of how we are using the term - a possibility that we set out to exclude.

Your second sentence is very tempting. It turns on the fact that these terms are not synonymous, but are conceptually linked and inter-related. But we don't have a clear grasp of those links and inter-relationship, so that we get lost in them. This second sentence is tempting, but if one asks what "the very same" means (and particularly wonder what the difference is between "same" and "very same"), the meaning suddenly becomes elusive. (I'm skating over the issue how "experience" and "knowledge" relate to the terms in the first sentence, because our idealist tendencies seem to me to explain that.)

But the additional point is that what is denoted by the symbol is an intellectual act, not a phenomenal existent. And I say that is a real, vital, and largely neglected distinction. — Wayfarer

Does the following explain why you think the distinction is so important?

Thus intellectual abstractions, the grasp of abstract relations and qualities, are quite literally the ligatures of reason — they are what binds rational conceptions together to form coherent ideas. — Wayfarer

I don't want to elide the distinction you are trying to make - though I confess I don't fully understand it. I can attribute meaning to the idea of "phenomenal objects" and to the idea of "intelligible objects". But it does seem to me very important not to let go of the idea that we often understand the things that we perceive and often perceive the things we understand. I think I may be arguing for a third class of objects, which can both be perceived and understood. I hope that makes some sense.

As you say, very few philosophical terms could undergo such an evolution. It's for that reason, as I've said so often on TPF, that I'd like to see philosophers avoid terms like "reality" whenever possible. Or else put it in Peirce-marks or Kant-marks or Carnap-marks etc. if that's what you mean. — J

I sympathize and try not to use those terms unnecessarily. But they are so deeply embedded in philosophy, that it seems impossible to not use them - and I can't resist joining in the discussion.

This is right, and perhaps not so neglected if we see the connection with the many discussions we've had about the status of propositions. The whole point of trying to separate out something called a proposition is to preserve that very distinction. Sentences denote propositions (when they have the appropriate form), not objects or even individual thoughts. Nor are propositions objects in the world, though they may be about objects in the world. — J

There's another term I would like to avoid.

Well I think it's implicit that we're talking about known reality. — Mijin

The trouble is that by referring to "known reality" you open up the possibility of unknown reality. Any limit that you try to set, immediately creates the idea that there is something beyond or in addition to that limit. Wittgenstein tries valiantly to get round that problem in the Tractatus, but ends up with a compromise - "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." - which sits oddly beside "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world."

Interesting how this connects to the previous considerations about "reality." Like "reality," the term "the world" is capable of being used in many ways. Wittgenstein's insight is valuable whether or not we want to use "the world" the way he uses it. His point is that, apart from objects, there are states of affairs, facts, construals, propositions, ways of thinking and speaking -- and when we ask "What is the case?" it is those items we're asking about, not the objects. — J

Oh, surely, what he says is stronger than that. "The world is all that is the case." and "The world is the totality of facts, not things." Of course, this is related to the Fregean insistence that words only have meaning in the context of sentences and Wittgenstein's belief that sentences work in virtue of the similarity (identity?) of their structure with the structure of the world.

The game seems to be, let’s insist there isn’t anything else (other than our reality), because we don’t have the vocabulary to do it’s ising justice. Meanwhile smuggling in the acknowledgement that there probably is something else (as a nod to the idea that you can’t prove a negative). — Punshhh

Yes, we give with one hand and take back with the other. Berkeley is a spectacular example. He says nothing can exist unperceived and that he does not deny the existence of "any one thing" that common sense believes in. (He reconciles the two by pointing out that God always perceives everything.)

He’s doing a neat trick whereby the phenomenal has to become intelligible (therefore an intelligible object) before it can be acknowledged. — Punshhh

Yes, that's the price you pay for positing phenomenal and intelligible objects as distinct kinds of objects. The obvious solution is to insist that perception and intelligence deal with the same objects at least sometimes.

Anti-realism says: every truth must be knowable.
But you also say: there are truths we don’t and maybe can’t know.
Fitch shows you can’t have both.
If there are unknown truths, then not every truth is knowable, which just is the denial of anti-realism. — Banno

On a quick look-up, SEP explains the paradox thus:-

The ally of the view that all truths are knowable (by somebody at some time) is forced absurdly to admit that every truth is known (by somebody at some time).

I'm not impressed. It seems to follow that at any given time, there can be unknown truths. That these truths may be known at some other time is not particularly interesting.

On a quick look-up, SEP explains the paradox thus:-
The ally of the view that all truths are knowable (by somebody at some time) is forced absurdly to admit that every truth is known (by somebody at some time).
I'm not impressed. It seems to follow that at any given time, there can be unknown truths. That these truths may be known at some other time is not particularly interesting. — Ludwig V

Fitch's paradox only demonstrates the obvious, that every truth must be known. Since "truth" refers to a relation between propositions and reality, and only intelligent minds can produce this relation through the application of meaning, and the process of knowing, it is very obvious that all truths must be known.

So, what Fitch does, is take a clearly false premise, that there may be a truth which is unknown, and shows how one might produce an absurd conclusion from that false premise. That's common practise in philosophy, it's a way of demonstrating the falsity of the premise, to those who do not grasp the obvious.

The issue with the possibility of truths which we as human beings do not know, involves the assumption of a higher, divine intelligence, like God. If we understand that the human mind is deficient in its capacity to know, and we assume the possibility of an actually existing higher mind with a greater capacity to understand and know, then we accept the possibility of truths which are not known by any human mind, but are known by the higher mind.

Oh, surely, what he says is stronger than that. "The world is all that is the case." and "The world is the totality of facts, not things. — Ludwig V

I agree, it's open to several interpretations. Consider the first dictum. Is it definitional? That is, should we read it as "'The world' is 'all that is the case'"? Or is it descriptive: "The world is all that is the case"? i.e., there is nothing beyond the world. I favor the first reading, because I find it more provocative.

The same bifurcation of interpretation can be applied to the second dictum.

"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." - which sits oddly beside "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world." — Ludwig V

This one also seems to fit with the "definitional" interpretation, where it doesn't appear so odd. The limits of my world are not the limits of the world. I may know that there are more facts, more "things that are the case," without being able to find them or speak about them. A great deal hinges on the question, "What does a limit do?" Does it prevent knowledge that there is more, or only knowledge about whatever that "more" is?

But [terms like 'reality'] are so deeply embedded in philosophy, that it seems impossible to not use them - and I can't resist joining in the discussion. — Ludwig V

Yes. My proposal for reform is quixotic. But at least we can be more conscious of how we use them -- and maybe use them a bit less often.

There's another term I would like to avoid. — Ludwig V

Which one? "Proposition"?

Anti-realism says: every truth must be knowable.
But you also say: there are truths we don’t and maybe can’t know.
Fitch shows you can’t have both.
If there are unknown truths, then not every truth is knowable, which just is the denial of anti-realism. — Banno

"True" is a judgement. Judgements are only made by intelligent minds in the process called "knowing". Therefore all truths are known.

Interesting how this connects to the previous considerations about "reality." Like "reality," the term "the world" is capable of being used in many ways. Wittgenstein's insight is valuable whether or not we want to use "the world" the way he uses it. His point is that, apart from objects, there are states of affairs, facts, construals, propositions, ways of thinking and speaking -- and when we ask "What is the case?" it is those items we're asking about, not the objects.

ADDED But propositions are made true by whether the arrangements of objects (crudely) are that way. We need the objects to help make a Wittgensteinian world. — J

I agree. As you say, the idea is that the world is made of events and states.

So it’s Multiverses all the way down then? — Punshhh

Nope, afaik the quantum vacuum is the ground state of nature.

…..all truths are known. — Metaphysician Undercover

I certainly agree with that, but I’d re-state your premises justifying it.

OK, care to make that re-statement for me? Just so I can understand your perspective on this.