I just didn't write out 50,000 physical events. But now you can say which of them convert physical events to subjective experience. — Patterner

That's like asking which transistor state change is Tomb Raider. Subjective experience is not one neuron event (and 50k is way short).

My point was: 1) that most aspects of consciousness can be described algorithmically- this is what materialist philosophers of mind do.
...
2) on the other hand, feelings cannot be created via algorithm. — Relativist

It's a parallel process, but any parallel process can be accomplished via a Turing machine (presuming no weird reverse causality like you get with realist interpretations), so I disagree, the operation of any physical system at all (if it's just a physical system) can be driven algorithmically.
So your point 2 is one of opinion, something to which you are entitled until one starts asserting that the statement is necessarily true.

I am not aware of any physicalist hypothesis explaining qualia. — Patterner

I am also not aware of any non-physicalist hypothesis explaining qualia. Don't forget that.

I don't think 6-year olds have been tested in ways that we are currently talking about. — Patterner

The point of the 6-year old is that they have an intuitive feel about it, which is how the philosophers go about attempting a definition. You know what you want to designate as 'alive', and so you attempt to craft a definition that always meets that intuition. That's a nice example of a rationalized definition rather than a rational one.

I just didn't write out 50,000 physical events. But now you can say which of them convert physical events to subjective experience.
— Patterner
That's like asking which transistor state change is Tomb Raider. Subjective experience is not one neuron event (and 50k is way short). — noAxioms

"Which of them" doesn't necessarily mean "which one of them", and the thought that just one neuron event is our subjective experience of heat is preposterous. I think we agree on that, so let's move on. You said I couldn't find our subjective experience of heat in physical events because I glossed over many of them, and made assumptions about them. I assume that means you are familiar with how physical events produce subjective experience, when explained in more detail and without assumptions, so please map it out for me.

My point was: 1) that most aspects of consciousness can be described algorithmically- this is what materialist philosophers of mind do.
...
2) on the other hand, feelings cannot be created via algorithm.
— Relativist
It's a parallel process, but any parallel process can be accomplished via a Turing machine (presuming no weird reverse causality like you get with realist interpretations), so I disagree, the operation of any physical system at all (if it's just a physical system) can be driven algorithmically.
So your point 2 is one of opinion, something to which you are entitled until one starts asserting that the statement is necessarily true. — noAxioms

I am a physicalist, but I see no reason to believe feelings could be programmed into a turing machine, unless we treat feelings as illusions: a belief that the sensation is real, along with the behavioral reactions it induces. An alternative is that there is some aspect of the world that manifests exclusively as the feelings we experience. I'm open to other possibilities. Do you have something in mind?

If DNA was your identity, then identical twins would be the same person. That doesn't work. Consider a bacterium. When it splits, which is the original? That's where our notion of pragmatic identity fails and one must us a different one. It gets closer to the notion of rational identity. — noAxioms

Sorry for the late reply. Indeed, my point was that a person seems more than anything that can be described.

But in a sense, everything is more than what can be described by concept, isn't it?
Stephen Hawking once asked What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?. Regardless the question about the supposed 'agent' that 'breathed fire' into the equations, clearly all that exists can't be 'reduced' to concepts. I believe that concepts can 'map' (or perhaps even are) the structure of what exists. However, in the case of personal identity there is even more than just 'existence' IMO.

Pragmatic identity is simply a convenient way to describe things, a coarse-grained description that has a pragmatic value. However, in the case of persons, I believe that a person is real in a fundamental sense. It can be 'dissolved into' a more detailed description or anything else.

Of course, this is all speculative but things like 'qualias', subjective experiences, the experience of being an agent ('free will') and so on do suggest so.

Physics itself seem to have no notion of identity and is of no use is resolving such quandaries. — noAxioms

I'd agree with that. You and I seem to disagree on how 'complete' the description that current physical theories is. It might well be the case that in the future our 'current picture' of reality will be regarded as how we now see classical physics.

That seems not to be how evolution work, hence my skepticism on the discreetness of it all. — noAxioms

And you should be skeptic! I know I am proposing something sketchy here. But I do believe that the 'hard problem' etc point to something like that.

Well, you mix 'are' and 'behave' there like they mean the same thing. They don't. The former is metaphysics. The latter is not. Science tends to presume some metaphysics for clarity, but in the end it can quite get along without any of it. — noAxioms

Yeah, I used the words in a somewhat flippant way. In any case, my point was that proponents of epistemic interpretations of QM think that QM doesn't give a description. To people like Newton, Galileo and so on that would be somewhat absurd (and even Galileo suggested that science can 'disclose' less about the 'nature of reality' than his contemporaries thought).

Speaking of identity, it is kind of hard to follow Wafarer's identity given the somewhat regular change of avatar. @Banno (and 180) also does this with similar rate of regularity. You guys don't realize how much stances and personalities I associate with the avatar more than the name. It's like my wife coming home, same person I always knew, but after having swapped to a totally new unrecognizable body. My avatar has been unaltered since the PF days. — noAxioms

LOL, agreed.

"Which of them" doesn't necessarily mean "which one of them", and the thought that just one neuron event is our subjective experience of heat is preposterous. — Patterner

Good. Just checking. Earlier in this topic, somebody (not you) suggested almost exactly that, as if a computer could feel pain if it executed a 'feel pain' machine instruction. This was meant sarcastically, but meant to imply that physicalism would require that there is similarly one 'feel pain' synapse in a brain.

You said I couldn't find our subjective experience of heat in physical events because I glossed over many of them, and made assumptions about them.

Well, you can't find subjective experience of heat in physical events possibly because you don't understand what the physical events are doing. I don't claim to have this knowledge either. It's besides the point of illustrating that it cannot be done, which probably isn't going to be accomplished by not understanding what does go on.

I assume that means you are familiar with how physical events produce subjective experience

Again, no. Not the point.

I am a physicalist, but I see no reason to believe feelings could be programmed into a turing machine, unless we treat feelings as illusions: a belief that the sensation is real, along with the behavioral reactions it induces — Relativist

OK. Similarly, I do see reason to believe that. Our opinions differ. I'm OK with that. Can you demonstrate that feelings cannot be programmed into a Turing machine? I outlined a simple way to do it in my OP. Simple, but compute intensive, beyond our current capability, which is too bad. Doing so would likely not change anybody's stance. Such is the nature of subjective proofs. They only prove things to the subject.

An alternative is that there is some aspect of the world that manifests exclusively as the feelings we experience.

That aspect is a testable prediction. So test for it. Find out where some simple effect that cannot be physically caused. If there's no suggested test for that, then there's no real theory that supports your alternative.

Indeed, my point was that a person seems more than anything that can be described.

But in a sense, everything is more than what can be described by concept, isn't it? — boundless

My arm is more than what can be described, sure. I tried to say as much in my OP (not specifically mentioning arms).

Stephen Hawking once asked What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?

That's a question for the universe being mathematics, and not just being described by it. MWI suggests simply: "In a closed system, its wave function evolves according to the schrodinger equation". So if the universe IS actually a wave function, the breathing of fire refers to what's driving the evolution of that wave function, which is much like asking what created the universe.

Personally I don't see a need for a fire. That's realism's problem, and yes, MWI is a realist interpretation.

Regardless the question about the supposed 'agent' that 'breathed fire' into the equations, clearly all that exists can't be 'reduced' to concepts.

Depends on your definition of exists, but saying otherwise is essentially idealism. And most definitions of existence are pretty dang idealist. I really tried to hammer that home in some of my recent topics.

I may not be an idealist, but I've come to terms with 'existence' being an ideal, which is awfully dang close to being an idealist I guess. Personal identity is certainly an ideal, with no physical correspondence. It's a very useful ideal, but that's a relation, not any kind of objective thing.

Pragmatic identity is simply a convenient way to describe things, a coarse-grained description that has a pragmatic value. However, in the case of persons, I believe that a person is real in a fundamental sense. — boundless

OK. We differ on this point.

Of course, this is all speculative but things like 'qualias', subjective experiences, the experience of being an agent ('free will') and so on do suggest so.

I'm pretty sure that the subjective experience of a free agent vs the experience of a non-free agent (however you want to define that) is pretty much identical, and thus having free will is not something one can determine by introspection.

You and I seem to disagree on how 'complete' the description that current physical theories is. — boundless

I know that quantum mechanics does not tell you how to make a cherry pie. Does that make QM incomplete or does it just mean that you're leveraging the wrong tools to explain how to achieve the pie?
There are those that deny that pies are physical because they cannot describe them in terms of field equations. I consider that fallacious reasoning. Maybe the pies are not just particles, but any claim to that effect needs more justification that just personal incredulity.

In any case, my point was that proponents of epistemic interpretations of QM think that QM doesn't give a description.

Really? It does describe, but it describes what we know more than attempt to describe what is. In that sense, any such interpretation is far closer to the science of the situation than is a metaphysical interpretation.

To people like Newton, Galileo and so on that would be somewhat absurd (and even Galileo suggested that science can 'disclose' less about the 'nature of reality' than his contemporaries thought).

Not exactly sure what you're saying they find absurd. Yes, it has always been the nature of science that the more we understand, the less we realize we know about the actual nature of things. This is sort of a progression from the naive realism (of say classical physics) to the statement that reality is stranger than we can know.

You said I couldn't find our subjective experience of heat in physical events because I glossed over many of them, and made assumptions about them.
- Patterner

Well, you can't find subjective experience of heat in physical events possibly because you don't understand what the physical events are doing. I don't claim to have this knowledge either. It's besides the point of illustrating that it cannot be done, which probably isn't going to be accomplished by not understanding what does go on. — noAxioms

How does not understanding what the physical events are doing grant the knowledge that they are doing this thing that is unexplainable by what we do know about them? Which is not negligible, especially for those whose lives are spent learning and experimenting in these areas.

Can you demonstrate that feelings cannot be programmed into a Turing machine? I outlined a simple way to do it in my OP. — noAxioms

There's much I agree with in your op, but I don't see anything in it that suggests the qualia "redness" or "pain" could be created through computation.

A Turing machine can't create the experience of "redness". It could compute the conditions that give rise to it, and the aspects of the world that it represents. But if you have a solution, I'd be interested in hearing it.

I may not be an idealist, but I've come to terms with 'existence' being an ideal, which is awfully dang close to being an idealist I guess. — noAxioms

Keep coming! You're getting close!

Personally I don't see a need for a fire. That's realism's problem, and yes, MWI is a realist interpretation. — noAxioms

I believe that the 'fire' is an image of change. If the universe was merely a mathematical structure - as Tegmark's MUH (mathematical universe hypothesis) says - it would seem that the universe would be changeless. So either change is a 'persistent illusion' (as Einstein wrote about 'time' in a letter to the family of his deceased friend Michele Besso) or change is real. If change is real, something more than 'just math' is needed.

Ironically, if MUH was right, it is difficult for me to consider its ontology as 'physicalist'. After all, mathematical structures seem very remote to something I would call 'physical' (in a former post you disagreed...).
If, instead, there is something more than 'just math' we might ask ourselves what is it. Again, we agreed that common form of 'materialism' seem inadequate. So, again, if change is real, what is it?

Depends on your definition of exists, but saying otherwise is essentially idealism. And most definitions of existence are pretty dang idealist. I really tried to hammer that home in some of my recent topics. — noAxioms

Agreed something like MUH is essentially a sort of 'idealism', however more a variety in which concepts are what is fundamental. To me this kind of 'idealism' is defective because it can't, in my opinion, adequately explain change, consciousness and so on.
But I respect Tegmark for his clarity and honestly I think your position is similar. In his system there is no 'prime matter' that is left unexplained and 'somehow' follows mathematical laws. Simply reality is mathematical structures all the way down.

I may not be an idealist, but I've come to terms with 'existence' being an ideal, which is awfully dang close to being an idealist I guess. Personal identity is certainly an ideal, with no physical correspondence. It's a very useful ideal, but that's a relation, not any kind of objective thing. — noAxioms

I think you're pretty close to what I am saying. You can't 'pin down' the identity of a person but denying the reality of a person is also wrong. Of course, if one starts from the assumption that anything that is 'real' can be 'pinned down' personal identity becomes an useful fiction.
Nevertheless, I also believe that the 'person' of a human being is not independent from the 'physical'. Perhaps the closest we can say is that the 'person' is a mode of existence, which, I believe, is curiously similar to how the 'Aristotelian' metaphysical tradition understood the 'soul' to be (note that for them the 'soul' wasn't a 'substance' opposed to matter).

There are those that deny that pies are physical because they cannot describe them in terms of field equations. I consider that fallacious reasoning. Maybe the pies are not just particles, but any claim to that effect needs more justification that just personal incredulity. — noAxioms

I can grant that 'pies' are indeed useful fiction we impose on experience to make sense of it. Valid fictions that help us to 'navigate' in our experience that remain valid until one 'looks deeper'. This doesn't mean that 'everything is an illusion' but I'm open to the idea that the way we 'carve' the world into separate objects is, in fact, is more rooted in utility rather than 'truthfulness'. However, pies and human beings are vastly different kinds of 'entities'. I can accept the idea that pies might be one day completely described in terms of fundamental particles/fields but I'm not sure the same is true for human beings.

Really? It does describe, but it describes what we know more than attempt to describe what is. In that sense, any such interpretation is far closer to the science of the situation than is a metaphysical interpretation. — noAxioms

QBism for instance is pretty clear that wavefunctions are more like representations of the degree of beliefs an 'agent' (and QBists differ on what an 'agent' is) has about a given phenomenon. There is no need for them that there is an isomorphic relation between the mathematical structure of the theory and some properties of nature. Simply, QM is seen as an useful tool for calculating, predicting and so on.
QBists are quite explicit of this and, however, I believe that the same goes for all other epistemic views (even if admittedly the latter aren't as clear).

Newton and Galileo certainly believed that we could 'disclose' something real about the 'nature of things'. A famous passage of Galileo:

“Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe, which stands continually open to our gaze. But the book cannot be understood unless one first learns to comprehend the language and read the letters in which it is composed. It is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles and others geometric figures without which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it; without these, one wanders about in a dark labyrinth.” — Galileo Galilei, Il Saggiatore (1623), in Opere, vol. VI, p. 232.

IIRC, even Fenyman (who AFAIK endorsed a form of the Copenaghen interpretation) in a lecture (there is an online video I believe somewhere) stated that physics is not only predictive. He made the example of the impressive ability of the Mayans to predict the motion of celestial objects. However, he was clear that science doesn't give us only predictions but it really helps to understand more of nature and we do understand more about celestial objects than the ancients.

Epistemic interpreters are often skeptics who also point out that what is common to all physical theories is their predictive powers. They would say that Newtonian mechanics remains valid for its predictive powers and not for being a 'faithful description' of the world.
I somewhat agree with them about this but, at the same time, I also believe that science is a gradual process of understanding better nature. Knoledge gradually becomes less and less 'confused' so to speak and 'physical reality' becomes less and less 'veiled'. I don't believe we will be ever be able to 'completely unveil' reality (so on this I agree with the skeptics) but at the same time I do believe that intelligibility of nature is real.

How does not understanding what the physical events are doing grant the knowledge that they are doing this thing that is unexplainable by what we do know about them? — Patterner

I don't know, but it seems to be the dualists that are claiming this knowledge in the absence of understanding. I never made such a claim. Perhaps you took my double-negative as a single negative.

There's much I agree with in your op, but I don't see anything in it that suggests the qualia "redness" or "pain" could be created through computation. — Relativist

The relevant bit from the OP, which is a proposed empirical test for physicalism:

No understanding of human brain function exists or is likely ever to exist, even if say a full simulation of a human is achieved. Of course such a simulation, while not providing that full understanding, would at least falsify any dualistic model, at least to the person simulated, no matter his prior views. — noAxioms

No, the quote does not mention any specific qualia, but the simulated person would notice the sudden disappearance of them if they were not there.
Note my distinction between a demonstration that physicalism is the case, and actual understanding of how consciousness works.

A Turing machine can't create the experience of "redness". — Relativist

If physicalism is true, then the machine very much can. So your assertion amounts to a claim that physicalism is wrong, but apparently expressed as opinion, not as something falsified.

If the universe was merely a mathematical structure - as Tegmark's MUH (mathematical universe hypothesis) says - it would seem that the universe would be changeless. — boundless

Yes, it would be. That means that the universe is not containted by time, which is generally concluded by relativity regardless of MUH or some other sort of solution. That the state of the universe is different at different times does not contradict the universe being changeless. States of things change. The universe is not a state.
Well, under alternate interpretations, yea, it is a state, but those are in denial of concepts like spacetime. Such a universe would need to be externally driven by such a fire.

So either change is a 'persistent illusion' (as Einstein wrote about 'time' in a letter to the family of his deceased friend Michele Besso) or change is real.

Depends on how you define change. The state of a person changes over time. That's change, and not something that Einstein would considered to be an illusion.

Ironically, if MUH was right, it is difficult for me to consider its ontology as 'physicalist'. — boundless

Right. Math doesn't supervene on material or energy, and 'physical' has implications of material. Physicalism (but not materialism) still works in such a case, since it only suggests that nothing additional is needed.

MUH seems to have some big problems that need solving. Maybe they have been solved and I didn't read up on it. In particular, why does our particular mathematical structure appear so interesting? Most mathematical structures are not, and if they all exist equally, they you're probably part of one of the uninteresting ones, not the tiny fraction that is interesting. That's a tough problem, and one that Carroll has attempted to point out.

So, again, if change is real, what is it?

Change is a difference in state over time. How is that a problem with any interpretations of things? Change can also be over something other than time. e.g. The air pressure changes with altitude.

Agreed something like MUH is essentially a sort of 'idealism'

Then mathematics would not be fundamental, but would supervene on some entity thinking the mathematical thoughts.

I can grant that 'pies' are indeed useful fiction we impose on experience to make sense of it. — boundless

My quote there was not about if pies were fictions or had identity, but rather suggesting that pies cannot be explained in terms of say quantum fields. So by the same reasoning that some claim that humans cannot be purely physical, neither can pies or say Mars. I mean, where does the cherryness emerge if none of the particles are cherry?
No, it will never be done. It would be as pointless as trying to run a strip mine with tweezers. Wrong tool for the job.

IIRC, even Fenyman (who AFAIK endorsed a form of the Copenaghen interpretation) in a lecture (there is an online video I believe somewhere) stated that physics is not only predictive. He made the example of the impressive ability of the Mayans to predict the motion of celestial objects. However, he was clear that science doesn't give us only predictions but it really helps to understand more of nature and we do understand more about celestial objects than the ancients.

Put more simply, it isn't hard to predict that the sun will rise tomorrow morning, but science goes further and blames it on Earth spinning and not the sun moving around.

They would say that Newtonian mechanics remains valid for its predictive powers and not for being a 'faithful description' of the world.

Sure, which is why they still teach in in school despite it being wrong for more boundary cases.

I don't believe we will be ever be able to 'completely unveil' reality (so on this I agree with the skeptics) but at the same time I do believe that intelligibility of nature is real.

Right!

Keep coming! You're getting close! — Wayfarer

Except idealists put mind at the root of the supervention tower, and I put it near the other end. How can I be an idealist if I do that?

A Turing machine can't create the experience of "redness".
— Relativist
If physicalism is true, then the machine very much can. So your assertion amounts to a claim that physicalism is wrong, but apparently expressed as opinion, not as something falsified. — noAxioms

Good point, but it means your Turing machine question doesn't further the analysis.

A Turing machine could produce feelings if (and only if) the machine's initial state includes the capacity to exhibit feelings. Feelings can't be programmed into existence. So the issue remains: how can feelings be accounted for? I offered 2 possibilities: illusionism and some otherwise undetected aspect of reality.

You reference simulation in your op. This amounts to a zombie: one could simulate a human that appeared to behave like a human in all ways, but it would not experience feelings because the machine lacks the capacity for them. For example, the machine could detect the wavelengths of reflected light, and identify "red", and react just as we would. But that't not experiencing the quale as we do.

How does not understanding what the physical events are doing grant the knowledge that they are doing this thing that is unexplainable by what we do know about them?
— Patterner
I don't know, but it seems to be the dualists that are claiming this knowledge in the absence of understanding. I never made such a claim. Perhaps you took my double-negative as a single negative. — noAxioms

You said I couldn't find our subjective experience of heat in physical events because I glossed over many of them, and made assumptions about them. Does that not mean I can find our subjective experience of heat in physical events if I don't gloss over many of them, and make assumptions about them?

As for my dualism, I'm just trying to come up with a system that is internally consistent. There may be many other guesses that are internally consistent, and there may be no way to falsify or verify any, as is the case with physicalism. But I have a couple starting points.

1) If what we can detect cannot explain something, then we should consider the possibility that there is something we can't detect.

2) If consciousness coming into existence only when physical structures have some level of complexity, without it having been the goal, does not make sense, then maybe we should consider that it was there all along.

I may not be an idealist, but I've come to terms with 'existence' being an ideal, which is awfully dang close to being an idealist I guess. Personal identity is certainly an ideal, with no physical correspondence. It's a very useful ideal, but that's a relation, not any kind of objective thing. — noAxioms

Do you mean 'idea' when you write "ideal"? Do you mean that 'existence' is an idea or concept, but existence is not? If so, there is nothing idealist about that position.

A Turing machine could produce feelings if (and only if) the machine's initial state includes the capacity to exhibit feelings. — Relativist

It isn't the Turing machine that's going to have feelings, it will be the simulated person. I said as much in the OP. So its that simulated guy that has the capacity, not the Turing machine. Neither the Turning machine nor the people running it will know what it's like to be the thing simulated.

So the issue remains: how can feelings be accounted for?

Physics of course, which is how they're accounted for if physicalism is true.

You reference simulation in your op. This amounts to a zombie: one could simulate a human that appeared to behave like a human in all ways, but it would not experience feelings because the machine lacks the capacity for them.

Right. That only works if there's a distinction between a zombie and a regular human, and it only works if qualia are non-causal, which is a self-defeating suggestion. The whole zombie argument seems to argue only for epiphenomenalism, which is trivially falsified.

Remember, the simulated person is not programmed by anybody to do or say anything. The point is, he can't tell when the simulation took over from the real physical state that was used for the initial condition. I think you'd notice if your qualia suddenly vanished.

You said I couldn't find our subjective experience of heat in physical events because I glossed over many of them — Patterner

No, I concluded from your glossing over that you don't fully understand how it all works, which is fine because I don't know either. From this non-knowledge, I suggested that one is in a poor position to say how it cannot work.

Does that not mean I can find our subjective experience of heat in physical events if I don't gloss over many of them, and make assumptions about them?

If you fully understand how the brain physically works, and physicalism is true, or even if it isn't, then yes, you will find either subjective feeling of heat or the absence of it. If absence, they you'd find the parts that are supposed to be affected by these feelings but in the absence of the magic, are missing their cause. That's a prediction made by any dualist stance, and yet no scientist believes the suggestion enough to go look for it.
DesCartes put it in the pineal gland, which I thought was due to its inaccessibility, safe from falsification. Turns out he chose it (a gland of all things) because it's the only construct in the vicinity that there's but one of, and he felt there shouldn't be multiple receptor locations for this interaction.

1) If what we can detect cannot explain something, then we should consider the possibility that there is something we can't detect.

But we can detect it, else you wouldn't know about it. Something physical must detect it, else there could be no physical effect.

If consciousness coming into existence only when physical structures have some level of complexity, without it having been the goal, does not make sense, then maybe we should consider that it was there all along.

Better. It kind of has been the goal, since it makes one more fit, so I'd leave that part out. It doesn't eliminate my answer to your first point. Something needs to detect it, simple or not. Such detection I suspect would not be all that complicated, but that's me considering an idea with no theory behind it.

Do you mean idea when you write "ideal"? — Janus

I mean a mental construct, with no corresponding physical thing. I've done a whole topic for instance on identity (of beings, rocks, whatever) being such an ideal.

Do you mean that 'existence' is an idea or concept, but existence is not?

No, I'd have put it in quotes like that if I was talking about the word. I've done other topics on that as well, where i query what somebody means when they suggest mind independent existence of something, and it typically turns out to be quite mind dependent upon analysis.

1) If what we can detect cannot explain something, then we should consider the possibility that there is something we can't detect.
-Patterner

But we can detect it, else you wouldn't know about it. Something physical must detect it, else there could be no physical effect. — noAxioms

I don't know what you mean. Or maybe I didn't say it clearly. I'm saying we can detect the physical. That's what our sciences are all about. But if the physical can't explain consciousness - at this point, there is no theory. Because consciousness is not physical, meaning has no physical properties, so it can't be detected by our sciences, much less tested. So maybe something non-physical is at work.

If consciousness coming into existence only when physical structures have some level of complexity, without it having been the goal, does not make sense, then maybe we should consider that it was there all along.
-Patterner

Better. It kind of has been the goal, since it makes one more fit, so I'd leave that part out. — noAxioms

Physical processes with no element of consciousness evolve with the goal of achieving arrangements that produce consciousness?

I mean a mental construct, with no corresponding physical thing. I've done a whole topic for instance on identity (of beings, rocks, whatever) being such an ideal. — noAxioms

I don't understand what you mean. Isn't the identity of a rock simply whatever name or description I give it in order to identify it? Or else it is just the rock itself?

No, I'd have put it in quotes like that if I was talking about the word. I've done other topics on that as well, where i query what somebody means when they suggest mind independent existence of something, and it typically turns out to be quite mind dependent upon analysis. — noAxioms

It seems obvious that any name or description of anything, the identification of it, is mind-dependent, but does it follow that the thing itself is mind dependent? Perhaps 'identity' does not have to possess a single meaning but could be counted as applying to both name (or identifying description) and object, no?

So the issue remains: how can feelings be accounted for?
Physics of course, which is how they're accounted for if physicalism is true. — noAxioms

Are you referring to physics, as a scientific discipline?

It's possible that feelings depend on some aspect of physical reality that only manifests in sentient beings. Physicists would never be able to detect its existence.

It isn't the Turing machine that's going to have feelings, it will be the simulated person. I said as much in the OP. So its that simulated guy that has the capacity, not the Turing machine. Neither the Turning machine nor the people running it will know what it's like to be the thing simulated. — noAxioms

How could this be compatible with physicalism? There is nothing physical about the simulated person outside of the Turing machine.

Simulations reproduce the informational, but not the physical, aspects of a system. If you are right, this implies that the 'what it's like' is informational, not physical (which I happen to believe).

But even if that were true, this still doesn't mean the simulation has qualia. It might be that only a certain type of informational processing manifest qualia. Ours have it, but the simulation lacks it. Would that imply qualia are epiphenomenal? Not necessarily. With the way our brains process information, qualia do work. The simulation might process in a completely different way that doesn't require qualia. The only requirement in a simulation is the informational behavior is reproduced. How it is reproduced is up to the simulation's designer.

I think you'd notice if your qualia suddenly vanished. — noAxioms

The zombie isn't aware, in the subjective sense, so it wouldn't notice anything.

The universe is not a state. — noAxioms

Well if the 'state of the universe' changes, then the universe changes. However, I think you made a good point here.

Anyway, relativity strongly suggests that 'change' is an illusion due to our limited perspective. However, as I noted in another discussion I had with you I am not sure if I am prepared to accept that. If our experience is illusory even on this seemingly basic fact, then perhaps this basic deception would undermine any empirical investigation.

Then mathematics would not be fundamental, but would supervene on some entity thinking the mathematical thoughts. — noAxioms

'Idealism' is a broad category. On some interpretations, Plato held the Idea of the Good as the fundamental entity but it wasn't seen as a 'Mind'. Others would argue that the 'Good' was indeed a Mind.
Yet, Plato, under both interpretations is often regarded as an 'idealist'.

If we restrict the term 'Idealism' to describe the views of those who posit a Mind or a plurality of Minds as fundamental, then yes your view isn't idealistic. However, if you think that mathematical truths are fundamental you are quite close to that, in the sense that you would posit concepts ('intelligible forms') as fundamental realities.

Right. Math doesn't supervene on material or energy, and 'physical' has implications of material. Physicalism (but not materialism) still works in such a case, since it only suggests that nothing additional is needed. — noAxioms

Again, this is only valid if you think that 'mathematical truths' are physical. I guess that we have freedom to call views with the names we want to call them, provided that we do this in a consistent way.
To me mathematical truths are not 'physical' because, as I wrote earlier, I believe that they are not localized into space and time and are not identical to space-time.

MUH seems to have some big problems that need solving. Maybe they have been solved and I didn't read up on it. In particular, why does our particular mathematical structure appear so interesting? Most mathematical structures are not, and if they all exist equally, they you're probably part of one of the uninteresting ones, not the tiny fraction that is interesting. That's a tough problem, and one that Carroll has attempted to point out. — noAxioms

I'm not sure how this is a problem for MUH. I mean, if all mathematical structures exist, then both interesting and non-interesting one do.

I mean, where does the cherryness emerge if none of the particles are cherry? — noAxioms

I can envision that all properties of 'cherryness' can be explained via the (known) properties of the constituents of cherries. I'm not sure that there is a 'discrete jump' in complexity between particles/fields and cherry.
However, in the case of a human being, I'm not so sure that there isn't a 'discrete jump'. It doesn't seem possible for consciousness to emerge as 'cherryness' does. So, if there is indeed emergence, it is of a different kind of emergence than in the case of cherryness.

Put more simply, it isn't hard to predict that the sun will rise tomorrow morning, but science goes further and blames it on Earth spinning and not the sun moving around. — noAxioms

Yes, but a skeptic would concede to you that your model 'works better' than the ancient's. However, the skeptic would then point out that this doesn't necessarily mean that you have more knowledge of 'how things really are'.

The skeptic would use the example of the 'progress' from Newtonian mechanics (NM) and, say, Special Relativity (SR). Taken as two descriptions of physical reality, NM and SR are incompatible. We know that NM has been falsified. However, they are both valid in many contexts and NM can be impressively precise in its prediction. So, even if NM is an incorrect description of physical reality is good at making predictions. So, perhaps, the skeptic would argue, the same goes for all physical theories. Predictive power, alone, doesn't guarantee that a theory gives a good description of physical reality. You need something else than empirical confirmation. Given that science begins and ends in empirical observations, this means that, in order to justify that we do know more of 'physical reality as it is' you need extra-scientific reasons.
From a 'purely scientific' viewpoint, scientific theories are predictive models. Nothing more or less. And if we wanted to base our knowledge only on science we should 'suspend judgment' on everything that is different from predictions, measurements and so on. Scientific progress would only give us better predictions, applications etc, i.e. it would have only a pragmatic value rather than a noetic one.

I agree with that to a point. However, I do believe that, say, we can discuss about the intelligibility of nature and find out a reasonable position about it, i.e. 'metaphysics' has a place. If it didn't, then knowledge of 'physical reality' would be impossible.

P.S. I believe I'll be unable to respond further until at least next weekend.

Or maybe I didn't say it clearly. I'm saying we can detect the physical. — Patterner

Are you saying you can't detect the mental? That seems odd for somebody pushing it as a separate fundamental thing.

Because consciousness is not physical, meaning has no physical properties...

Of course it has physical properties. It is the cause of physical effects. If it couldn't do that, you would not be going on about it. It therefore very much can be detected by our science. How do you not see that?

without it having been the goal

Why would a natural process refuse to work if there was an external goal involved? That seems pretty unlikely for a natural process that shouldn't 'care' about such things. It's like saying gravity only works when you don't want it to.

Isn't the identity of a rock simply whatever name or description I give it in order to identify it? Or else it is just the rock itself? — Janus

Not talking about a token meant to represent the object. Yes, the object itself. OK, the topic I linked is more about there being no physical boundary for an object itself. I gave several examples of physical devices presuming to measure this, and every one of them was fictional.

The identity is more a question of: Is this rock the same one it was yesterday? What if I chip a bit off? Is it the same rock but smaller now, or is it two entirely new rocks? That's the kind of identity that is only a mental construct. We decide what convention works best and go with it. It being a convention makes it an ideal.

So people pragmatically consider themself to be the same person they were yesterday, but older, changed somewhat. That works great, but rationally it can be taken apart, suggesting once again the lack of physical basis. Derek Parfit did some nice work analyzing such things, and concluded that the physical lack of it doesn't matter.
I actually did a topic explicitly on that, but I think it went away with the old PF site.

It seems obvious that any name or description of anything, the identification of it, is mind-dependent, but does it follow that the thing itself is mind dependent? — Janus

I don't think it follows, but the convention typically chosen by anybody is a mind dependent one. There are very few definitions that are not. "Is part of the universe" is heavily mind dependent, especially because of 'the' in there, implying that our universe is special because it's the one we see. "Is part of a universe" is better, but leaves open what constitutes a universe and what doesn't. It's also very much a relational definition, not a particularly objective one. Anyway, the linked topic very much goes into that issue specifically.

So the issue remains: how can feelings be accounted for?
Physics of course, which is how they're accounted for if physicalism is true. — noAxioms
Are you referring to physics, as a scientific discipline? — Relativist

No. Referring to the actual natural laws and constants of this universe, and not to the study and/or knowledge of same.

It's possible that feelings depend on some aspect of physical reality that only manifests in sentient beings. Physicists would never be able to detect its existence.

Well, see my reply to Patterner just above.

It isn't the Turing machine that's going to have feelings, it will be the simulated person. I said as much in the OP. So its that simulated guy that has the capacity, not the Turing machine. Neither the Turning machine nor the people running it will know what it's like to be the thing simulated. — noAxioms
— hypericin

How could this be compatible with physicalism? There is nothing physical about the simulated person outside of the Turing machine.

It's running a simulation of a physical thing. That's what a simulation often does. My early career involved running simulations of physical chips because it was a lot cheaper to test the simulated chip and find bugs that way, as opposed to the considerable expense of creating actual prototype chips.
But a simulation of a radio wouldn't work if you didn't know where the music came from, and you were running the simulation in attempt to prove that this arrangement of electronics happens to play music despite nobody knowing exactly how it does that. So the simulation would fail, and the physicalists would think they're not simulating it accurately enough, and the dualists would say that the simulation did not simulate the broadcasted radio waves, which are asserted to have no physical effect.
Seems like both side are wrong in this example.

Simulations reproduce the informational, but not the physical, aspects of a system. — hypericin

I seen no distinction here. The sim of the chip simulates a physical chip, and thus it exhibits all the relevant physical properties. If it didn't, it would be an invalid simulation. The chip cannot tell if it's simulated or not.

If you are right, this implies that the 'what it's like' is informational, not physical (which I happen to believe).

'What it's like' is subjective, which arguably is and isn't informational since you cannot know what it's like to be a bat for example.

But even if that were true, this still doesn't mean the simulation has qualia.

I think the simulated guy would notice qualia abruptly shutting off. But yes, the machine running the simulation would not have qualia.

The simulation might process in a completely different way that doesn't require qualia.

Then it is simulating something else, not the physical workings of the system.

The only requirement in a simulation is the informational behavior is reproduced.

I think you're thinking of an imitation, not a simulation. An entity that attempts to pass the Turing test is an imitation person, not a simulated one. It knows dang well that it's the machine, but being an imitation, it's goal is not to tell you that. The simulated person, like the chip, cannot tell if its real or not.

Well if the 'state of the universe' changes, then the universe changes. — boundless

Sure, but referencing 'the state of the universe' implies that it has a state, and thus more or less is a state. My assertion of the universe not being a state is consistent with relativity theory, black holes, and all that goes with it. I'm inclined not to be one of those that rejects Einstein, but that isn't to say that other interpretations (that are inconsistent with all of the above) are wrong.

However, if you think that mathematical truths are fundamental you are quite close to that, in the sense that you would posit concepts ('intelligible forms') as fundamental realities.

Perhaps yes on the mathematical truths (arguably not since so many of them depend on unprovable axioms), but definitely not to any sort of concepts, all of which seem to supervene on something more basic.

Math doesn't supervene on material or energy, and 'physical' has implications of material.
— noAxioms

Again, this is only valid if you think that 'mathematical truths' are physical.

I just said that such truths are not physical, the opposite of your assertion here.

To me mathematical truths are not 'physical' because, as I wrote earlier, I believe that they are not localized into space and time and are not identical to space-time.

Agree. Perhaps you read my comment wrong above to think I suggested otherwise.

I'm not sure how this is a problem for MUH. I mean, if all mathematical structures exist, then both interesting and non-interesting one do. — boundless

But there's so many more of the latter, to the point that you are more likely than not to be part of one of them.
As Carroll put it:
"The issue is not that the existence of such observers is ruled out by data, but that the theories that predict them are cognitively unstable: they cannot simultaneously be true and justifiably believed."
-- https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.00850
MUH (raw at least) seems to be such a theory.

I can envision that all properties of 'cherryness' can be explained via the (known) properties of the constituents of cherries.

How would you respond to somebody who cannot envision such an explanation being possible, especially given the current lack of such an explanation?

Yes, but a skeptic would concede to you that your model 'works better' than the ancient's. However, the skeptic would then point out that this doesn't necessarily mean that you have more knowledge of 'how things really are'.

I would have said that the new model is closer, but sure, you'll never get all the way to ding an sich.

So, even if NM is an incorrect description of physical reality is good at making predictions.[/quote]Same can be said of SR. It demonstrably does not correspond to reality. But it was never an attempt to do so. GR is closer, but just like NM, breaks down at the boundary cases. Doesn't imply that we should teach neither NM nor GR in schools.

Or maybe I didn't say it clearly. I'm saying we can detect the physical.
— Patterner
Are you saying you can't detect the mental? That seems odd for somebody pushing it as a separate fundamental thing. — noAxioms

No, I'm not saying that. I'm saying we can detect the physical.

Because consciousness is not physical, meaning has no physical properties...
Of course it has physical properties. It is the cause of physical effects. If it couldn't do that, you would not be going on about it. It therefore very much can be detected by our science. How do you not see that? — noAxioms

Can you tell me what the physical properties of consciousness are? Are they like the physical properties of particles; things like mass, charge, or spin? Are they like the physical properties of objects; things like length, weight, or hardness? Are they like the physical properties of processes; things like speed, duration, or distance? Can we measure how much energy is required to taste sweetness or see red?

Because consciousness is not physical, meaning has no physical properties...

Of course it has physical properties. It is the cause of physical effects. — noAxioms

You seem to be assuming consciousness is a thing. Physicalism does not require that; it may be that consciousness is produced by the physical in a manner analogous to a movie is produced by the rapid projection of a series of still images. We can refer to the movie as if it is an object, but it actually is not. My hypothesis is that consciousness entails the rapid change from one static brain state to the next. This would be no more detectable than a movie: brain states can be detected, but not the subjective experience they create.

I seen no distinction here. The sim of the chip simulates a physical chip, and thus it exhibits all the relevant physical properties. If it didn't, it would be an invalid simulation. The chip cannot tell if it's simulated or not. — noAxioms

You are missing the distinction. The sim simulates a physical chip, simulating it's physical properties. But, it exhibits none of the physical properties of the chip: not the mass, not the current at any point, nothing. At best it can report values representing these physical quantities. Of course, any simulation simulates only a narrow subset of the physical properties deemed relevant.

If the simulation was aware, it suggests the awareness is a property of information/competition, not physics.