The strange magic of evolutionary theory is that it creates a sense of purpose, of intent, that does not depend on any conscious activity. Whether, and how far, that coincides with un- or sub-conscious activity, I couldn't say. — Ludwig V

What evolutionary theory provides in relation to intent, in my opinion, is a better understanding of how intent underlies all living beings, and how conscious intention is just one specific manifestation of that more general purpose (intention) which underlies all life.

But I don't think that it makes philosophical sense to say that an unconscious purpose is just like a conscious purpose, but unconscious. It needs a bit more explaining than that. — Ludwig V

Sure, a bit more explaining would be useful, but it's really not difficult to understand through the use of a few examples. It is very common for the more specific to be a type of the more general. So for example, the human being is a type of animal. Likewise, walking is a type of activity. In the same way, we can understand that consciously willed acts demonstrate a specific type of intentionality. In reference to the examples now, walking is a consciously willed act which is a specific type of intentional activity, whereas growing is a type of intentional activity which is far more general. And, the human being is a type of animal which we know has a far more developed capacity for consciously willed acts, in a very specific way, in comparison to the more general intentionality of other animals.

I don't think it is necessarily wrong to develop variant uses of ordinary concepts for philosophical purposes. But it would be a mistake to think that philosophy can just sail off on its own, losing contact with the ordinary world and ordinary language. Ordinary language, because it is the first language we learn, is the inescapable bedrock of everything else. — Ludwig V

This is exactly what I disagree with, seeing things in the opposite way as this. I believe that philosophy forms the bedrock usage, and ordinary language sails off, losing contact with the philosophical roots. This can be understood historically. Ancient philosophy established the conventional meaning of many common words in modern society. Those with ruling power, the Church for example, historically enforced rules of language usage and this created a class distinction between the illiterate and the literate. The Church took its rules of language use very seriously, as is evidenced by The Inquisition. Eventually though, the human will for freedom of speech and expression overcame this, allowing language to fly off in all sorts of different directions. However, it's not difficult to see how strict enforcement of basic grammar is the only way to provide a foundation for higher education.

Why can't our individual worlds all share in the public world? — Ludwig V

This is a good question, commonly asked because "the public world" is often taken for granted. Because of that presumption, what is taken for granted, the answer is most often not well understood.

The answer itself, is that we do not have acceptable ontological principles required to support the reality of a united, shared, "public world". We must start with the individual mind as the most immediate, and this often leads to some form of idealism. However, we do have very good reason to accept the minds of others, as well as the medium between us, which separates my mind from your mind.

The problem though, is with the assumption of unity, required to create "the public world". Yours and my minds are separate, allowing us each to have private thoughts, so there is necessarily a medium which separates us. But these are terms of separation, not terms of unity. So until we can show that the medium which appears to separates you and I, in actuality unites you and I, we do not have the ontological principles required to support the reality of a united, shared, "public world".

This is the ancient problem of the One and the Many. Our inclination is to take "the One" for granted, as the united whole, the universe. But empirical evidence demonstrates to us that "the Many" is what is real.

That doesn't mean there are no rules. It just means that the rules can be misused and misinterpreted. Some of these misinterpretations become new, or extended, uses. Others are ignored or suppressed because they are not accepted (taken up) by the ultimate arbiters of correct and incorrect - the community of users. — Ludwig V

The nature of "ordinary language" is that the users are free to decide which rules to follow, or whether even to follow any rules. This freedom leaves any rules as ineffective, effectively not "rules". Imagine if the speed limit signs on the highways were just there to inform people what speed someone, somewhere, thought people might like to drive at, but had no power of enforcement, allowing that people would drive whatever speed they wanted anyway. We couldn't call these signs "the rules", because "the rules" implies principles which people are obliged to follow.

But we need to link back to ordinary language (or experience) or world, or philosophy becomes a pointless exercise. — Ludwig V

This is very ambiguous. These words "language", "experience", and "world" have very different meaning. And, the scope of all three together is very wide. However, the three together do not cover everything, so that implies that we could still do meaningful philosophy without referring to any one of the three. The philosophy might refer to "mind", or "concepts", "objects", and many other similar things, making it very meaningful without reference to the things you mentioned.

Life's quite bleak from the evolutionary point of view. — Ludwig V

I suppose some might find it a kind of comfort -- the idea that we can't help doing what our biology (or unconscious, if you prefer) insists on. But this is so manifestly untrue that I've never really understood the appeal.

"the rules" implies principles which people are obliged to follow. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't quite see this. By "obliged," do you mean "forced"? Not many sets of rules come with their own enforcement. Or, if it's merely a matter of "Either follow them or face the consequences," then this applies equally well to ordinary language, which exacts stern consequences for the non-followers. In this, they're no different from road signs.

Or, if it's merely a matter of "Either follow them or face the consequences," then this applies equally well to ordinary language, which exacts stern consequences for the non-followers. — J

I don't see that there are any "stern consequences" in the case of ordinary language. It's just like in my example of the speed signs, where there is no stern consequences for driving fast. People use language any way they please, and unless they go beyond the boundaries of hate speech, or something like that, there are no stern consequences at all for stepping outside the norm. In fact, many even get rewarded as trendsetters or "influencers".

Why can't our individual worlds all share in the public world? — Ludwig V

I'm reminded of a powerful quote I read in novelist John Fowles ('The Magus') excursion into philosophy, The Aristos. I read that book in my 20's and have never looked at it since, but it contains a compendium of quotes from Heraclitus, one of which was:

There is but one world common for those who are awake, but when men are asleep, each turns away into a world of his own — Heraclitus

Interpretation: Awake = awake to the Logos, the shared reality, the unity-in-difference of nature.
Sleeping = enclosed in private illusion, a subjective world made of projections and habits.

It is a classical 'axial age' declaration that might easily have been found in the Upaniṣads or the early Buddhist texts.

But is is nothing like 'scientific objectivity', even though that is arguably descended from it. It is more thorough-going, pertaining to the entire life of the individual, not simply to the exercise of rational powers in respect of a specific scientific question.

So the reason our individual worlds do not automatically converge on the public world is that our ordinary state is one of confinement within a narrow, self-referential viewpoint (described in phenomenology as the egological or natural state). Awakening, for Heraclitus, means breaking out of that confinement and aligning oneself with the deeper order that is common to all (although in his case, that consisted of severe asceticism and seclusion from society.)

In the case of the signs, I was imagining dying in a crash because of not following the speed rules. In the case of language, someone who didn't follow the rules of their language would likely be ostracized or oppressed -- at least it they did it a lot. Anyway, the severity of the consequences isn't the point. Rather, it's that there is no automatic enforcement of these rules. Compare, for instance, using a passport. There are rules and you have to follow them or else you can't use a passport. No one is ever in a position of being told, "Fine, don't present a valid passport, you'll be sorry." They're simply prohibited from playing the passport game.

In the case of the signs, I was imagining dying in a crash because of not following the speed rules. — J

The probability of that is extremely low. The vast majority of people speeding would have no consequences. And even if not speeding, one could still die in a crash. So that is really not relevant.

. In the case of language, someone who didn't follow the rules of their language would likely be ostracized or oppressed -- at least it they did it a lot. — J

But people do it all the time, and some, instead of being ostracized, become trendsetters and influencers.

Anyway, the severity of the consequences isn't the point. Rather, it's that there is no automatic enforcement of these rules. — J

No, the point is that there is not any rules which we must follow, and no real punishment if we do not follow the rules which are there.

Compare, for instance, using a passport. There are rules and you have to follow them or else you can't use a passport. No one is ever in a position of being told, "Fine, don't present a valid passport, you'll be sorry." They're simply prohibited from playing the passport game. — J

Right, in the case of language, you can still use it freely without following rules. By the passport analogy, you can still play the game, even without the passport.

whereas growing is a type of intentional activity which is far more general. — Metaphysician Undercover

"intentional" in some sense, I suppose. I would prefer "purposive". It's a process of developing a functional mechanism and the process is set up by DNA (roughly) and includes control mechanisms. But it's very different from purposive activities at a conscious, everyday level. Our growth processes are not controlled by the conscious being that is being created. That would be impossible.

the idea that we can't help doing what our biology (or unconscious, if you prefer) insists on. — J

Yes and no. We can't help eating and drinking in a sense, but there is a huge super-structure of activity at the conscious level. The basic biology is realized - catered for - in many very different ways, depending on the environment, cultural and physical. (It's very hard, to impossible to separate the biology from it's superstructure.)

I believe that philosophy forms the bedrock usage, and ordinary language sails off, losing contact with the philosophical roots. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see how that's possible. We don't learn philosophy on its own. We have to learn ordinary language first. The same applies to very many, if not all, specialized languages. To put it another way, we expect everybody to speak ordinary language, because that's what we all use all day. Could a child learn physics first and ordinary language afterwards? I think not.
I think there's a specialized use of "foundation" here, which is part of the way that we think theoretically. So there are questions about the foundations of mathematics or logic that are quite different wha similar question mean in the context of house-building or institution-founding.
My point here is that "foundation" sometimes means "beginnings" and sometimes means something that one can only really understand when one has already understood what is "built" on the foundation.

However, we do have very good reason to accept the minds of others, as well as the medium between us, which separates my mind from your mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

If there is a medium that separates us, it also, at the same time, unites us. It's just a change in perspective. London and Edinburgh are separated by a bit more than 300 miles. At the same time, they are joined by those miles.

We couldn't call these signs "the rules", because "the rules" implies principles which people are obliged to follow. — Metaphysician Undercover

I guess you mean by "obliged" that there are penalties if inflicted on you if you do not follow them. If you kick the ball when you are off-side, the referee will impose a penalty. But sometimes, there are just consequences when you do not follow them. If you break the rules of chess in a formal game, there will be a penalty. If you break the rules in an informal game, there are no penalties, except the consequence that you are not playing chess. Your opponent may or may not be pleased by your action, and that reaction could be regarded as a penalty.
But you have a point. There are no formal rules in ordinary language. The so-called rules of language are, perhaps more like habits. I do agree that they are certainly not particularly like conventions, in the sense that there is no agreement to use words in particular ways and we follow them without being able to articulate them.
But it is useful to think of language as a set of rules - grammar. This is a process of articulation and codification after the event. One use is to teach the language to new users who already speak a language. It is a hard road, and is usually supplemented by the informal learning that children rely on. Another is that it allows us to develop the idea of logic and so to improve our thinking and calculating ability.

Or, if it's merely a matter of "Either follow them or face the consequences," then this applies equally well to ordinary language, which exacts stern consequences for the non-followers. — J

Yes. If I say "Julius Caesar is a prime number", the penalty is that I haven't said anything. But sometimes, when people break the rules, we find an interpretation that makes sense. "Trieste is no Vienna" is, strictly speaking, meaningless, but in fact we can make sense of it. Sometimes, a look can speak volumes, though normally you can't say anything by looking.

If I say "Julius Caesar is a prime number", the penalty is that I haven't said anything. — Ludwig V

Or, as I suggested to @Metaphysician Undercover, if you continue to say such things you may well be institutionalized.

We can't help eating and drinking in a sense, but there is a huge super-structure of activity at the conscious level. — Ludwig V

Sure. The evolutionary thesis isn't usually applied to the stuff that's biologically obligatory, like breathing or digesting. There, it's just taken for granted that we have no choice, as organisms. It becomes inadequate when applied to most of the rest of our behavior. Our status as Homo sapiens gives us certain drives, certain tendencies to behave, but they rarely -- or so I hope -- determine my behavior unthinkingly. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were making what I regard as polemical points, in opposition to the rationalizing tendency of the philosophy that was current. I find it difficult to think they really believed it, about themselves.

Or, as I suggested to Metaphysician Undercover, if you continue to say such things you may well be institutionalized. — J

Yes, of course that's true. I intended to high-light the point that "penalties" might or might not overlap with consequences and that although they might be different in some respects, they are also the same, or likely to have the same effect on the relevant behaviour - to discourage it.

The evolutionary thesis isn't usually applied to the stuff that's biologically obligatory, like breathing or digesting. — J

Yes. Actually, it occurs to me that the biologically obligatory activities are in a somewhat different category from the evolutionary purposes. The former serve the interests of the individual. Evolution serves the interest of the species.

Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were making what I regard as polemical points, in opposition to the rationalizing tendency of the philosophy that was current. I find it difficult to think they really believed it, about themselves. — J

I've always thought there is a big rhetorical element in much of what they say. But I've never heard anyone else suggest it. It makes sense to me.

"intentional" in some sense, I suppose. I would prefer "purposive". It's a process of developing a functional mechanism and the process is set up by DNA (roughly) and includes control mechanisms. But it's very different from purposive activities at a conscious, everyday level. Our growth processes are not controlled by the conscious being that is being created. That would be impossible. — Ludwig V

I look at this perspective as very problematic. "Purpose" is usually defined by "intention", and "intention" is defined by "a goal", or "aim". This implies that "intention" is the broader term because some goals or aims may actually be without real purpose, but acting purposefully always implies a goal. It appears like you want to make "purposive" the broader term, and have two types of purposiveness, one of which does not involve intention. But this makes that second type of purposiveness unintelligible.

You propose a type of purposiveness which is not set toward any goal or aim. It's just a "functional mechanism", a "control mechanism", which does what it does, without any further goal, or aim.

But this is completely contrary to what evolutionary theory demonstrates to us. Evolutionary theory shows us that these mechanisms do have a goal or aim. Some have survival of the organism as their aim, and some have reproduction as their aim. Therefore it is contrary to evolutionary theory to remove intention from these mechanisms. They clearly act with a goal, or aim, and therefore are intentional.

Furthermore, your proposal is contrary to the spirit of evolutionary theory, which strives to show how the various parts and activities of the different living beings are all connected at a fundamental level. But you propose a division of separation between "purposiveness" at the conscious level, and "purposiveness" at the level of the DNA. And this drives a wedge of unintelligibility between these two, within an individual living being. So within myself, for example, I have purposiveness within my DNA, and also a completely separate and unrelated purposiveness within my conscious activities. How is that reasonable in any sense, to drive such a wedge and produce a dualism of purposiveness within an individual being? This is why I say that this proposed division of purposiveness would leave one type as unintelligible. Unless one is understood as an extension, or subtype of the other, then the one is left as aimless and unintelligible.

I don't see how that's possible. We don't learn philosophy on its own. We have to learn ordinary language first. — Ludwig V

I don't see why this is difficult for you. You do understand that there is a separation between the act of teaching and the act of learning, do you not? When people learn to talk, they learn by copying, they do not learn by definition. However, those who teach do so on principle. So the teaching may be based in philosophy, while the learning is not. The children do not necessarily "learn philosophy" even if philosophy is the reason for the specifics of what is being taught. That is why philosophy is prior, it guides the teaching, while the learning is based in the activities of the free will. What is learned is "ordinary language", what is taught is principled speaking (philosophy). Therefore ordinary language is based in a foundation of philosophy as the guiding principles, what you call rules, even though the learner may refuse the rules.

If there is a medium that separates us, it also, at the same time, unites us. It's just a change in perspective. London and Edinburgh are separated by a bit more than 300 miles. At the same time, they are joined by those miles. — Ludwig V

I explained to you the principles of separation. You are claiming that the principles of separation also serve as unification. That is what I insisted, is unjustified. Obviously, "300 miles" refers to a spatial separation between two distinct and separate places. Please explain how you conceive of "300 miles" as a union between these two.

But it is useful to think of language as a set of rules - grammar. — Ludwig V

This may be useful for some purposes. But in philosophy when we want to understand the true nature of something, what is conventional for other purposes might mislead the philosopher. That is what I think is happening here. This idea, which is useful for some other purposes, is misleading you in your philosophy.

Or, as I suggested to Metaphysician Undercover, if you continue to say such things you may well be institutionalized. — J

I don't think you're getting the point J. Most likely, you could keep on saying this, and never get "institutionalized". And, people very often get institutionalized for other things. Therefore there is no necessary relationship between saying things like that, and the punishment you propose. There really is no "stern consequences" for common misuse of language.