Well if you look at the paper they are primarily drawing from Aristotle's zoological works, and the Metaphysics is more subsidiary:

In part 1 of this study, these questions are addressed via an examination of aspects of Aristotle’s zoological works, specifically his use of the logical terms genos (genus) and eidos (species) in those works, and his brief discussion (in the Metaphysics) of the male-female difference in relation to species definition. — From Aristotle to Contemporary Biological Classification: What Kind of Category is Sex?

But the thesis of the paper is salutary. Sex is a cross-species or meta-species classification. It is something that subdivides species of animals, and therefore requires a level of abstraction and generality beyond zoological studies considered according to species. In a philosophical and theological sense sex has always been somewhat elusive in that way. This elusiveness of sex is therefore in some manner a metaphysical issue, given that it requires a reconceptualization of the whole in light of some common aspect. Even current day disputes between different schools of feminism could be cashed out in terms of this elusiveness, where "TERFs" will tend to emphasize sex as being more than a kind of accidental division subordinate to the animal species.

(This is incidentally why is mistaken when he views metaphysics as merely a matter of "height," as if it were a hermetically sealed compartment at a certain "altitude" of thought. That is a very common misunderstanding.)

That paper is narrowly focused on a particular set of issues. The Metaphysics draws sharp differences between the ease with which we can observe kinds as a grouping in a system of classification and what might be an understanding how those species came into being. The many discussions concerning the "actual" in relation to the "potential;" are problems that cut across all enquiries of the nature of beings. The methods of analysis in the biological works are attempts to apply the ideas of causality developed in the Metaphysics to figure how particular beings come into being.

If you search the site, you will see the issue has consumed much digital ink.

i think you and Leon are missing the point, i was just demonstrating that Metaphysics influenced taxonomy without asking anyone to read the book, i honstly don't even know what the paper is about...but it mentions aristotle's metaphysics in regards to zoology, i regret using that as an example...

Absolute presuppositions are not verifiable. This does not mean that we should like to verify them but are not able to; it means that the idea of verification is an idea which does not apply to them.... — R.G. Collingwood - An Essay on Metaphysics

This is an interesting idea. I have so many questions. But it seems better to read the book and then ask questions. It's 200 pages, so that will take time. It's a pity, but perhaps there will be an opportunity on another occasion. I have downloaded the book.

As I noted, this is a first take. I don't like it much. Definitely needs work. Beyond what's on the list, just general good writing rules also apply. — T Clark

I don't disagree with you, though I would vastly prefer - "explained" instead of "defined" in the first point. If one offers definitions, there is a serious risk one will never get any further. "Definitions first" is a recipe for stalling. "Definitions last" would be a lot more realistic. If that approach was good enough for Socrates, it is good enough for me.
But the biggest issue is about clarity. The analytic tradition sets a lot of store by it. I'm never quite sure what they mean. The standard of clarify in that tradition is logical analysis. But that is a poor model for many topics and requires a good deal of input on the part of most readers - in that they have to learn logic first, which presumably can only be clearly introduced and explained in ordinary language. I don't know what other traditions say about this, but one would think that they would be inclined to sign up, with a different idea of what clarify is.

It would help to bear in mind the question for which an answer is sought. — Mww

Oh yes, certainly. That's why I said that the question defines its answer (normally). What counts as an answer depends on the question. Different kinds of answer for different kinds of question.

no contradiction in treating metaphysics scientifically, that is, in accordance with basic principles as grounds for its speculative maneuvers. — Mww

OK. I understand why one might include logic and mathematics as sciences; they do have some basic principles. They are different from the principles of physics &c. That is the result of the kind of questions that they ask, so it is not a problem.
But what are the basic principles of metaphysics? Maybe one could venture that they are the principles of logic applied to certain concepts that are used in almost every context. One might get assent to the proposition, but then comes the question why no progress is made.
Perhaps we should not be asking that, but asking what counts as progress. That might reveal a good deal about the nature of the enquiry.
Here's what really puzzles me. Metaphysics is said to be about the world - de re. Why, then, is it not an empirical science like physics, etc.

Mathematics is sufficient proof, in that for what reason proposes from itself metaphysically, experience proves with apodeictic certainty naturally. — Mww

What's the phrase - "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics"? It's a good point. Someone is sure to ask whether there are questions for which a mathematical answer is not appropriate and if so, why?

i was just demonstrating that Metaphysics influenced taxonomy without asking anyone to read the book, i honstly don't even know what the paper is about...but it mentions aristotle's metaphysics in regards to zoology, i regret using that as an example... — ProtagoranSocratist

I would suggest that the point is that the Aristotelian approach was developed to apply universally, but it seems reasonable to suppose that Aristotle got the model from his biological work. Certainly, it has turned out to be a lot more useful in biology than in physics. Against that idea is the fact that Plato developed the idea of "forms" or "ideas" in the context of mathematics, and Aristotle must have been influenced by that.

Sex is a cross-species or meta-species classification. It is something that subdivides species of animals, and therefore requires a level of abstraction and generality beyond zoological studies considered according to species. In a philosophical and theological sense sex has always been somewhat elusive in that way. — Leontiskos

I'm a bit surprised that you don't mention the distinction between sex and gender in this connection. It is, perhaps, only a beginning to addressing the complications you refer to. But it is at least a start.

This is incidentally why ↪Ludwig V is mistaken when he views metaphysics as merely a matter of "height," as if it were a hermetically sealed compartment at a certain "altitude" of thought. That is a very common misunderstanding.) — Leontiskos

I did recognize that I was pushing a metaphor. But I did so in order to bring it into question.

Metaphysics is not some hermetically sealed compartment that is distinct from all other compartments of thinking. It is more a kind of valence or mode or abstraction that occurs in thinking. — Leontiskos

I'm not sure I would put it in just that way, but I don't disagree with you. It seems to me that the difficulty of characterising it shows that metaphysics is not a discipline or subject like any other. That's why, in my book, presenting actual metaphysical discussions is the best way of introducing it to people.