Okay, so what I'm about to say is partially a re-statement of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. But I'm saying it for a reason.

I'm just trying to find out if there's anything in the phenomenological literature about my third point.

1. A phenomenological space is all possible variations of an experiential quality, e.g. color, duration, size, and so on.
2. Two phenomenological spaces are orthogonal iff variations in one do not affect the other, e.g. shape is orthogonal to color because we can change a blue sphere into a red one without changing its shape, or change a sphere into a cube without changing its color.
3. If a phenomenon cannot have two qualities at the same time and in the same place, then those two qualities occupy one space (this is why different colors, besides being "qualitatively distinct", nevertheless occupy one phenomenological space; they're mutually exclusive at-point).

Now, I'm aware that the idea of different phenomenal fields or axes of differentiation or whatever are mentioned in Husserl/MP. Husserl talks about manifolds of appearance, Merleau-Ponty talks about dimensions/fields of variation; I know this isn’t a brand-new thought.

My question is: is there anything answering to my point 3?

More precisely:

- Has anyone explicitly used mutual exclusivity at a point as a criterion for when two qualities belong to the same phenomenal space?
- I.e. something like: “red and green are two positions in one and the same space because they cannot co-occur at the same place and time without introducing variation in some orthogonal dimension (e.g. temporal succession, spatial division, etc.)”?

I’m not asking about color spaces in perceptual psychology or analytic “quality space” talk in general (Shoemaker, etc.) so much as whether phenomenologists have made this move: using co-instantiation constraints (“cannot be F and G here-now”) to carve up phenomenal spaces.

If you know of:

- passages in Husserl or Merleau-Ponty that come close to this,
- later phenomenological work that does something like this explicitly,
- or even cross-over work that connects Husserl/MP with quality-space models in this way,

I’d really appreciate references (specific texts/sections if possible).