through analysis of the universe. — Relativist

Yes I think that methodological criterion is important. That stops ghosts and angels falling under the definition, as although these are claimed to have causal connections with us, they are not usually claimed to exist by virtue of an analysis of the universe, although I suppose that's arguable. By analysis of the universe I presume you mean by means of the scientific method predominantly.

The "natural" is anything that exists that is causally connected to the actual physical world through laws of nature. — Relativist

Is the 'laws of nature' bit essential to naturalism? Is naturalism committed to the idea that laws of nature are what causes the world to be as it is, and behave in the way it does?

Is the 'laws of nature' bit essential to naturalism? — bert1

It's essential to the naturalistic metaphysics I know and defend, but one could instead depend on Humean regularities (each causal action is unique). IMO, (non-Platonic) laws make the most sense.

By analysis of the universe I presume you mean by means of the scientific method predominantly. — bert1

Most of our knowledge of the universe comes from science, but there are potential additional sources of knowledge- such as knowledge derived from conceptual analysis. So it's best to leave this open.

This might need tidying up a bit. You might have left a big hole there for other things to sneak in. — Punshhh

What hole do you have in mind?

I would define natural as everything except what is made up in peoples heads. Putting the emphasis on the human mind, the only place where artificial things are created.

That's tricky. Our knowledge of the world is in our heads, and that is (in a sense) made up - even though it corresponds to reality.

I see no good reason to think anything unnatural exists. This is not an expression of certainty - I'm open to having this theory challenged and defeated. But the mere possibility it is false is not a defeater. — Relativist

I'm not really seeing how this runs against anything else said though - anything discovered would ne 'natural'. If there is some 'non-physical' reality of some kind, or some sort of film between us and reality that necessarily negates the objectivity of what we see, that is also natural.
So, your point is taken, but I think claiming its on 'naturalistic' grounds is a bit sus.

Our knowledge of the world is in our heads, and that is (in a sense) made up - even though it corresponds to reality. — Relativist

These sorts of thoughts are why I've given the above response. Curious...

'. I'm not really seeing how this runs against anything else said though - anything discovered would ne 'natural'. If there is some 'non-physical' reality of some kind, or some sort of film between us and reality that necessarily negates the objectivity of what we see, that is also natural. — AmadeusD

The notion of something "between us and reality" is self-contradictory. Perhaps you mean "between us and the rest of reality". My problem here is that you seem to be posing a mere possibility. I grant naturalism (as I've defined it) is possibly false, but mere possibility doesn't undercut believing naturalism to be true, in the provisional sense I have in mind.

The very best scientific theories are possibly false, but that mere possibility is not a good reason to believe it false.

Going in reverse, because its easier: Yeah, I agree. Have said so. Our best info is the best way to reason. When we don't have good info, I entertain all comers.

I agree, something 'between us and reality' is fraught, unless one takes simulation seriously and defines reality in a super-restrictive and awkward way. But my view is that in any case we might end up finding out is 'true', that is natural. There can't really be non-natural reality which I assume is hte contradiction you note. I didn't mean to put that forward. I agree with essentially all you say.

The comment was to illustrate that one can accept naturalism, and still reject strict materialism i guess. Doesn't seem like we disagree.

You assert the mind is not an object, and therefore "not in the frame". And yet, it is a fact that I exist, I am an observer, a subject, and I engage in mental activities. "The mind" is conceptually that aspect of myself that engages in mental activities. Reconcile this. — Relativist

It's not difficult! Everything around me now - a partial catalogue is monitor, powerbook, keyboard, iphone, speakers, desk, bookshelf, books, windows - every single one of those is an objective existent. The mind - neither mine, nor yours, nor anyone else's should they be in this room - is not an objective existent. It is that to which these objects of the sense appear. So it is categorically, or ontologically, of a different order to existent things. You won't notice this, because naturalism methodically brackets out the role of the mind, even though the mind is foundational to all of existence as we know it. Armstrong, for instance, wishes to treat mind as another among the objects of physics and chemistry - he says this, it's no 'straw man argument' - and then complains, why does the mind deserve special treatment? Why, if physics and chemistry have such enormous purchase in the objective domain, should the mind be exempted from these powerful methods that science has developed? And the answer is: it is not an object. So the methods of science, which are so powerful in so many respects, has no purchase here.

And the thing is, you acknowledge this. You've said in many places, yes, physicalism can't account for the nature of mind. As if this is kind of a last wrinkle that might have to be ironed out, a final puzzling anomaly that will "one day" be solved. But no - it's an intractable problem, because it's not an objective question.

If you could grasp this point, about 99% of what separates our views would be evident.

What hole do you have in mind?

Universes not causally connected, could include infinite universes entirely different to ours. But which is somehow constrained by human thought. If not a gap, a leaky sieve.

and anything not causally connected (such as alternate universes) that is inferred to exist, to have existed, or that will exist, through analysis of the universe.

That's tricky. Our knowledge of the world is in our heads, and that is (in a sense) made up - even though it corresponds to reality.

Yes, but we know it includes artificial things, so we will need to separate these out in some way. This is what philosophy is for presumably.
Do we know there are not artificial things outside the human mind? Well I think only where there are minds able to create them.

Universes not causally connected, could include infinite universes entirely different to ours. But which is somehow constrained by human thought. If not a gap, a leaky sieve. — Punshhh

I covered that by referencing "anything inferred to exist by analysis of the universe", which means via accepted theory.

I intentionally leave out mere possibilities. My definition is intended to identify what we can justifiably believe. This also applies to:

Do we know there are not artificial things outside the human mind? — Punshhh

I covered that by referencing "anything inferred to exist by analysis of the universe", which means via accepted theory.

I understand your parameters and approach to this question, which I agree with. However, what we don’t know looms large to me. And yet you are sort of restricting what is natural to what has been deemed to be so by human thought. While we have no metric by which to measure how much of our world we know about and therefore, the extent of our ignorance.

I intentionally leave out mere possibilities. My definition is intended to identify what we can justifiably believe. This also applies to:

Do we know there are not artificial things outside the human mind?

Well we have one example of a mind existing. Something which is naturally emergent in biological life. So it seems reasonable to allow the possibility of other minds, creating other artificial things. Including highly advanced technologies. Which might for example have technology to control physical material, energy etc.
I say this because it seems reasonable to consider that human technology will be able to do such things in the future.

what we don’t know looms large to me. And yet you are sort of restricting what is natural to what has been deemed to be so by human thought. While we have no metric by which to measure how much of our world we know about and therefore, the extent of our ignorance. — Punshhh

It seems reasonable to believe there's a great deal we don't know. But what use can be made of this fact? Does it lead anywhere?

Well we have one example of a mind existing. Something which is naturally emergent in biological life. So it seems reasonable to allow the possibility of other minds, creating other artificial things. Including highly advanced technologies. Which might for example have technology to control physical material, energy etc.
I say this because it seems reasonable to consider that human technology will be able to do such things in the future — Punshhh

Regarding other "minds", IMO we can justifiably believe they exist in other humans, and in a diminished sense- in other animals.

But sure, it's fine to speculate about what we might create. Speculation can lead to discovery and invention. I also do not insist that empirical evidence is necessary to believe that something exists. Example: we can justifiably infer that there is life elsewhere in the universe.

It seems reasonable to believe there's a great deal we don't know. But what use can be made of this fact? Does it lead anywhere?

Epistemic humility.
For me it helps to contextualise the things I do know, by realising how partial it is. Also it helps to remain open minded.

Regarding other "minds", IMO we can justifiably believe they exist in other humans, and in a diminished sense- in other animals.

Yes, but I was treating all minds on Earth as one group. I was asking about minds elsewhere.
It goes like this, there are minds with technology on earth which emerged naturally. Presumably there are other planets with minds with technology. Due to temporal variation in the development of planets and minds, there are likely to be minds far more advanced, in terms of technology (not to mention what’s going on in those other possible universes) than us. If minds are where artificial things come from (as in the example of humans), there could be highly advanced artificial things around. How do we know there aren’t artificial worlds, spacetime bubbles, universes out there? How do we know our world (known universe) isn’t artificial?

Mind (consciousness) is not a "separate, non-physical entity" — Gnomon
It would be a different kind of 'physical'. It had to have evolved, with life, for once there was no life and consciousness on Earth, and now there is. — PoeticUniverse

I agree :
# First, Mind (consciousness, thoughts, feelings) is not an entity, but a process.
# Secondly, Mind (power to create imaginary ideas) is not physical, but meta-physical*1. By that I mean : Physics refers to the things we perceive with the eye of the body. Meta-physics refers to the things we conceive with the eye of the mind.
# Thirdly, the "cognitive leap" became apparent in eon-long-lifeless-mindless evolution when signs of learned-social-human-culture emerged from a background of evolved-genetic-animal-instinct : jazz hands :cheer: .
# Fourthly, the Agency*2 we call Mind is always associated with complex living organisms : animated matter, not inanimate rocks. But what is the complexifying & animating force, vital principle, elan vital? What input transforms raw matter, into living bodies, thinking beings, and intentional agents?
# Fifthly, Mind has never been found separate from a physical organism of some kind. I can imagine a disembodied soul (ghost), but for me, it's obviously not real, but ideal. So, obviously, to be a causal & interactive agent in the real world, Mind must be embodied, and a physical manifestation of Mind is Culture.
# Sixthly, Mind is the active processing of meaningful Information*3. And Action in the real world is always associated with some form of Energy. the currency of Mind is Information : EnFormAction.
# Seventhly, we can only discuss mental processes in philosophical or poetic metaphors*4.
# Eighthly, After decades of searching the Cosmos, scientists have never found verifiable signs of life or mind (culture), apart from a single rocky planet, on the cusp of an ordinary galaxy, among two trillion star constellations. Matter & Energy seem to be everywhere, so why is Mind so rare? What is the secret sauce . . .? I have a philosophical hypothesis, and it is mentioned in this post. :nerd:



*1. Metaphysics uses rational, philosophical inquiry to understand reality, while mysticism is based on direct, subjective, and intuitive experiences of reality.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=difference+between+metaphysics+and+mysticism

*2. mind is the capacity for agency—the ability to act, make choices, and exert control over one's actions and life circumstances.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=%22mind%22+is+agency

*3. Information is Physical and Metaphysical :
To explain the “active” element of Information, Peat says “I suggest that Information is the final element in a triad—information is that which gives form to energy”.
https://bothandblog8.enformationism.info/page29.html

*4. What Is Mind?

What is called Mind?
The flow of your thoughts!
The internal dialogue
When we do not talk.

We think and think,
shaping our words
to speak, the process
of thinking is Mind.

The platform in which
the thoughts move
like people move
in a railway station.

Mind is where words
move in whirls before,
it finally make it to
the conversations.

Controlling Mind
is then controlling
your thinking.
Mind is thoughts.

Narayanan Kutty Pozhath

So, in other words, "the mind" is mind-dependent. :roll:

# First, Mind (consciousness, thoughts, feelings) is not an entity, but a process.
# Secondly, Mind (power to create imaginary ideas) is not physical — Gnomon

"Non-physical power/process"? More fatuous nonsense. :lol:

And the thing is, you acknowledge this. You've said in many places, yes, physicalism can't account for the nature of mind. — Wayfarer

You can't justify your view on the sole basis that physicalism is false*.

The mind - neither mine, nor yours, nor anyone else's should they be in this room - is not an objective existent. — Wayfarer

However I am an objective existent. I engage in mental activities; I experience qualia. As I suggested, and you did not dispute: "the mind" is conceptually that aspect of myself that engages in mental activities. You have not reconciled the fact that I am an objective existent with your claim that "the mind" is not.

it is categorically, or ontologically, of a different order to existent things. — Wayfarer

This is vague. Describe these various ontological categories.
_____________
*I have never claimed everything will one day be solved.

What I've acknowledged is that physicalism, narrowly defined, does not account for qualia very well. But the most modest leap from this is an extended physicalism that adds some aspect of reality not otherwise detectable that accounts for the explanatory gap.

It goes like this, there are minds with technology on earth which emerged naturally. Presumably there are other planets with minds with technology. Due to temporal variation in the development of planets and minds, there are likely to be minds far more advanced, in terms of technology (not to mention what’s going on in those other possible universes) than us. If minds are where artificial things come from (as in the example of humans), there could be highly advanced artificial things around. How do we know there aren’t artificial worlds, spacetime bubbles, universes out there? How do we know our world (known universe) isn’t artificial?
2h — Punshhh

One can justifiably believe there are non-earthly minds elsewhere in the universe, based on naturalism being true - which implies abiogenesis occurred: this implies the probability of minds coming into existence has a probability> 0. The universe is vast, and old, so it is reasonable to believe it's occurred multiple times. One or more may have created artificial worlds. Of course, it's possible, and it's a viable science fiction theme. But...there's no reason to think this is the case- there's no evidence of it, and it's not entailed by accepted theory.

Such speculations can sometimes lead to important investigations that uncover new facts. I'm not at all suggesting that we should treat speculations as necessarily false. They are, and should remain, possibilities.

I engage in mental activities; I experience qualia. — Relativist

The mind - neither mine, nor yours, nor anyone else's should they be in this room - is not an objective existent.
— Wayfarer
However I am an objective existent. I engage in mental activities; I experience qualia. As I suggested, and you did not dispute: "the mind" is conceptually that aspect of myself that engages in mental activities. You have not reconciled the fact that I am an objective existent with your claim that "the mind" is not.

it is categorically, or ontologically, of a different order to existent things.
— Wayfarer
This is vague. Describe these various ontological categories. — Relativist

You’re eliding two very senses of “I” without noticing it.

Yes — as a human organism, you are an objective existent. Your body, your brain, your behaviour are all perfectly legitimate objects of third-person description. No one disputes that.

But the “I” that is the subject of experience — the subject to whom qualia appear, the one that is doing the thinking right now — is not itself an object within the field of objects. It is the condition for there being a field of objects at all. You never encounter this “I” as a thing in the world in the way you encounter tables, neurons, or even brain scans. It is always on the experiencing side of the relation.

So when you say:

"I am an objective existent. I engage in mental activities; I experience qualia."

you are illicitly fusing:

The organism that can be studied objectively, and

The subjectivity in virtue of which anything is experienced at all.

Those are not the same ontological role. The first is an object in experience; the second is what makes experience possible in the first place.

That is what I mean by saying that the mind (or the subject) is “of a different ontological order.” It is more basic than the objective/subjective split itself.

If you insist on treating the subject as just another object, you erase the very distinction that makes the word “experience” intelligible. But, as I already predicted, this is something you won't notice or acknowledge. It is the blind spot of physicalism.

in other words, "the mind" is mind-dependent. — 180 Proof

The subjective reality of existence is ineliminable. Cogito ergo sum.

The subject reality of existence is ine[lim]inable. — Wayfarer

Only for subjects.

Cogito ergo sum.

Neither proves nor explains anything. And given that there aren't rational grounds to "doubt everything", The Cogito only makes explicit (its) presupposed (non-subjective, non-mental) existence.

Also, you missed this, Wayf ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/1026327

The only thing I'm opposing, is the application of scientific method to philosophical problems.
— Wayfarer
"Problems" such as? — 180 Proof

Questions of meaning, purpose, value, aesthetics. The scientific method is undoubtedly successful in respect of understanding objective processes and relations. No question at all. That is the context within which physicalism is meaningful and effective. I don't dispute that it is, but physicalism is the attempt to apply the same mindset to philosophy. I've said before that physicalism is really no different to 'metaphysical naturalism' - the attempt to ground metaphysical arguments on naturalistic assumptions.

When we identify something, we identify a gestalt, not an assembly of simples. This is a basic fact of cognition.

A gestalt has properties that no list of constituent parts captures: unity, salience, meaning, intentional relevance.
— Wayfarer

And this is just a certain level of explanation in the realm of psychology, where these concepts may have some utility whether on a formal or informal basis, or fundamentally inaccurate/accurate. But that doesn't invalidate the possibility or validity of explanations from the view of neurons as units of information-processing. — Apustimelogist

Not so. Charles Pinter's book is cognitive science, not psychology. When you say it's psychology, it shifts the whole meaning. But his argument is that when you appeal to atomic structures. neurons, brains, or other elemental entities, your thinking is always operating in terms of gestalts, which are perceived meaningful wholes that exist inside the world of lived meanings. Take the time to look through the chapter abstracts. Pinter's book is thoroughly scientifically informed but not reductionist.

It seems that I am actually advocating for the complete opposite of what you think I am - usign the full range of conceptual tools and explanations to alk about things. — Apustimelogist

Using the full range, but generally deferring to the reductionist, 'bottom-up' ontology, wherein the material substrate is the causal explanation for the higher-level features of experience. This comes across all the time in your posts.

I appreciate that you take a lot of time to respond to my objections and I read your posts as being earnest and sincere. But can I ask — have you ever dipped into philosophy of science at all? I’m thinking of people like Kuhn or Polanyi. The reason I ask is that a lot of what I’m advocating here about cognition and objectivity comes from that tradition, where the idea of a completely neutral objective science is challenged on scientific and philosophical grounds. It might clarify where I’m coming from, even if you end up disagreeing. It may not only be 'Colorless green ideas sleeping furiously' ;-)

... physicalism [naturalism] is the attempt to apply the same mindset to philosophy. — Wayfarer

This is caricature. Paradigms like physicalism are not applied "to philosophy" but interpretively / methodologically to experience, science, historiography, law, pedagogy, religion, etc.

This is caricature. Paradigms like physicalism are not applied "to philosophy" but interpretively / methodologically to experience, science, historiography, law, pedagogy, religion, etc. — 180 Proof

:up: Exactly! There is a certain (willful?) blindness afflicting those who want to reduce and understand the world in terms of "isms". The so-called "natural attitude" just consists in the refusal to submit one's thinking, experience and understanding to any dogma, and the "interpretive/ methodological" application "to science, historiography, law, pedagogy religion, etc." is simply the extension of that free-mindedness to the human disciplines.

Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. — Edward Feser

The idea of a perfect geometrical figure can be understood to be simply an abstraction away from the inevitable imperfections in any geometrical physical construction.

Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally. — Lloyd Gerson, Platonism v Naturalism

All we have to think about is what we perceive and possible explanations for what is perceived (I include here bodily sensation, proprioception, interoception, fantasy, dreams. memories, thoughts themselves and anything else we can become aware of.

I see no reason why the conscious experience of anything, even of a thought itself, could not be a neural process which we do not consciously experience as such. That it may not appear to as such cannot constitute a convincing refutation of that possibility―it would be an argument from incredulity. Of course it is also possible that "something else" might be going on.

The problem is that we have no way of gaining purchase on what that 'something else" might be. We are all free to choose what to believe about that, or else abstain from coming down on one side or the other. The latter is my own preference, even though my intuitive feeling is that something else is going on. I abstain from forming specific views based on that intuitive feeling because any and every view of it I can imagine, or have ever heard of, seems underdetermined.

abstraction away from the inevitable imperfections in any physical geometrical construction.

The so-called "natural attitude" just consists in the refusal to submit one's thinking, experience and understanding to any dogma, and the "interpretive/ methodological" application "to science, historiography, law, pedagogy religion, etc." is simply the extension of that free-mindedness to the human disciplines. — Janus

:fire: Well said!

Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it.
— Edward Feser

The idea of a perfect geometrical figure can be understood to be simply an abstraction away from the inevitable imperfections in any geometrical physical construction. — Janus

That is the John Stuart Mill argument, standard empiricism, 'all knowledge comes from experience'. Against that, is the fact that rational thought is the capacity to grasp 'a triangle is a plane bounded by three interesecting straight lines'. A non-rational animal, a dog or a chimp, can be conditioned to respond to a triangular shape, but it will never grasp the idea of a triangle

I see no reason why... — Janus

Whenever you say that, you are comparing ideas, considering arguments, making a case in your mind. Of course that entails brain activity, but to try and explain it in terms of brain activity is another matter entirely.

Secondly, the thrust of Aristotle's argument is this: that material configurations, neural states, circuits, and the like, are always particular and specific, whereas ideas are by their nature general (universal in his lexicon.) We understand what a geometric form is in general, such that we can recognise it whereever it is encountered, or even merely considered. So it can't be identified with a particular configuration of matter, a neural configuration, circuit or switch. (That is Gerson's gloss on Aristotle's argument.)

The so-called "natural attitude" just consists in the refusal to submit one's thinking, experience and understanding to any dogma, and the "interpretive/ methodological" application "to science, historiography, law, pedagogy religion, etc." is simply the extension of that free-mindedness to the human disciplines. — Janus

Not so. The 'natural attitude' is a specific reference to Husserl's criticism of naturalism. 'Husserl’s insight is that we live our lives in what he terms a “captivation-in-an-acceptedness;” that is to say, we live our lives in an unquestioning sort of way by being wholly taken up in the unbroken belief-performance of our customary life in the world. We take for granted our bodies, the culture, gravity, our everyday language, logic and a myriad other facets of our existence' (IEP). We take the reality of the world at face value - really it's not that different from naive, or even scientific, realism.

Besides, your own entries are shot through with plenty of dogma, first and foremost that science is the only court of appeal for normative judgement in any matters whatever. Anything you deem cannot be adjuticated scientifically, you declare 'indeterminable', because you can't see any other criteria, including logical criteria, by which it could be decided. So if an argument is advanced that doesn't fit within this procrustean bed - why, then, it must be dogma!

But his argument is that when you appeal to atomic structures. neurons, brains, or other elemental entities, your thinking is always operating in terms of gestalts — Wayfarer

But there's nothing stopping someone from modelling why thinking may or may not be like that in terms of computational models that may model brain architecture. The only thing in cognitive sciences that is in principle not amenable to the kind of explanation a physicalist might like is experience / "qualia".

This comes across all the time in your posts. — Wayfarer

I just can't really comprehend the idea that events at larger scales of reality are not scaffolded upon events at smaller scales.

Kuhn — Wayfarer

I fully agree with Kuhn's analysis though I think it is permissible to talk about realism in a sense considerably weaker than the kind of realism it is implied Kuhn is often arguing against (though obviously he may not agree that weaker forms of realism should be considered realism).

Physics shouldn’t bother with consciousness; metaphysics shouldn’t bother with time dilation. — Mww

But I don't think metaphysics can bother with qualia either. There is no way of articulating about redness and no possible explanation or description you can give from anyone's perspective, physical, metaphysical, whatever

But I don't think metaphysics can bother with qualia either. — Apustimelogist

Indeed. A bridge too far. For me to undergo any mental state, is just the state of me.