Heidegger redefined metaphysics, or rather replaced the old metaphysics with what he thought was a better use of the word. I think he saw it as rehabilitation.

He said old metaphysics studied Being as if it's a thing, which became identified with God. In his metaphysics, Being is studied through phenomenology, or from the nature of experience. We always find ourselves in a world, and in fact, me and world are inextricably bound (logically speaking). Expanding on that thought is what Heidegger thought of as metaphysics.

For him, this was tied to a eschatological vision. Eschatology is traditionally a part of Abrahamic religions that deals with a final judgment and a profound change in the universe. But this kind of vision outgrew Christianity and took up residence in continental philosophy, starting with Hegel and continuing on through Nietzsche and Heidegger, who thought the great final transformation of humanity would come from the rise of Germans to world power, manifesting their potential to live in authenticity. He also believed all Jews would have to die in order for this grand vision to be realized. That's why you'll find in the book @Mikie referenced a nod to the 'inner greatness of National Socialism.' That book is partly famous because it contains Heidegger's attempt to cover up his attachment to the Nazis.

All of this is a long rabbit hole away from what an anglophone philosopher would mean by metaphysics, which is usually just the nature of reality.

Heideggar himself seems to be a pretty pivotal figure in modern philosophy. I'll definitely consider "introduction to metaphysics" as a companion to aristotle's work, because i'm currently determined to read as much about ancient philosophy as I can. — ProtagoranSocratist

Sounds good. It’s actually not a long read, and isn’t as difficult as Being and Time. The last section is especially clear (“the restriction of being”). I think pairing this with Aristotle can be helpful, but isn’t completely necessary in my view.

Still, one can’t go wrong reading more Aristotle.

And yeah I don't really care that Heideggar fell for Nazi ideology and promoted it a little bit as a professor, what matters to me more is the actual content that someone wrote, not their political identity. — ProtagoranSocratist

I don’t care either.

P.S., don’t listen to what anyone tells you about what Heidegger meant or who offers simple explanations. Most are so radically wrong it’s cringe-inducing. Just read it.

Heidegger, who thought the great final transformation of humanity would come from the rise of Germans to world power, manifesting their potential to live in authenticity. He also believed all Jews would have to die in order for this grand vision to be realized. That's why you'll find in the book Mikie referenced a nod to the 'inner greatness of National Socialism.' That book is partly famous because it contains Heidegger's attempt to cover up his attachment to the Nazis. — frank

:up: :up:

The infinite & indivisible substance of Spinoza is a bare substratum, which can never be actual in of itself, since it lacks determination altogether. — Sirius

Obviously you've not studied Spinoza's work.

An undetermined being violates the [Parmenides] unity of being & intellect...

So what? Hume dispenses with this "axiom" (more recently Q. Meillassoux's anti-correlationism).

... the ground of metaphysics

Explain how and why "metaphysics" requires a "ground".

Kant [ .... ] he was far more intelligent than Spinoza.

:roll:

Perhaps try understanding someone before misrepresenting their position. Seems you lost understanding at "fiction." Whatever rhetoric you project into my brief statement about MY THOUGHTS, which I already clarified, just goes to show how much of a munchkin you're being. Reduce Nietzsche? I'm pretty sure I told you he's many faceted

Nietzsche has many facets — DifferentiatingEgg

, is it any wonder a person often only finds in something the bs they put into it in the first place?

So what? Hume dispenses with this "axiom" (more recently Q. Meillassoux's anti-correlationism). — 180 Proof

My guy, Hume dispenses with metaphysics as well. Don't you know he denied the intelligibility & usefulness of substances & accidents altogether ?

It's gross incompetence on your behalf to conflate Kant's correlationism with the correlationism of Permeinides. Kant does allow you to posit entities that are beyond intelligibility, UNLIKE Permeinides. Check his refutation of idealism, which gives key support to the 2 world interpretation - a part of CPR severely disliked by Schopenhauer.

As for Meillassoux. Don't get me started on that. His works stand refuted. All I need to do is reach for my shelf. Hyperreal Speculative metaphysics was a fad, nothing more. Great for hoo haa & parties.

Obviously you've not studied Spinoza's work. — 180 Proof

Obviously, 360 proof. It just so happens that my objection to Spinoza is exactly the same one offered by another dumb guy by the name of Hegel, who also failed to STUDY Spinoza. :lol: , we poor peasants can only arrive at misunderstandings of Spinoza. Enlighten us Shīfū.

Jamal and I have disagreed about this in the past. This thread provides good evidence that you need to put your money down on specific definitions or you’ll never be able to discuss beyond just the surface of metaphysics. If we come back in a month and have the same discussion, the same arguments will just get recycled over and over without ever having a resolution. If you want to go deeper, you have to commit. — T Clark

@Clarendon yesterday produced a very good post in another thread which covers the issue of definitions in metaphysics:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/1026833

Highly recommendended. He or she puts it much better than I ever did.

Aside from that, I thought you and I had reached a compromise agreement some time ago, which is that you don't begin a philosophical discussion with the definition of the concept you centrally want to discuss, but it can help, for the sake of argument, to define any supporting concepts.

:eyes:

... the ground of metaphysics
— Sirius

Explain how and why "metaphysics" requires a "ground". — 180 Proof

Put up or shut up, son.

which is that you don't begin a philosophical discussion with the definition of the concept you centrally want to discuss, but it can help, for the sake of argument, to define any supporting concepts. — Jamal

I don’t remember that at all. It doesn’t sound like something I would agree with.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/802351

Although I did say...

I happen not to agree with this either, because we can usually set aside or ignore any concerns about the definition of these dependencies, relying on shared meaning. — Jamal

Explain how and why "metaphysics" requires a "ground". — 180 Proof

Oh boy, 360 proof, the ground of metaphysics I'm referring to is the principle of intelligibility. It has many different names. The principle of unity & sufficient reason. Does that ring a bell?

Your question, "WHY we need IT ? :joke: " presupposes it !!! Had you read Schopenhauer, which I did many moons ago, you would know this.

If you want to question everything, then don't stop in the middle & fashion naturalist castles in air (Spinoza's metaphysics). Half-assed skepticism is intellectually dishonest.

the ground of metaphysics I'm referring to is the principle of intelligibility. It has many different names. — Sirius

Ascetic Socratism, decadence, self-hate, life-denying...

Kant does allow you to posit entities that are beyond intelligibility…. — Sirius

Gotta be careful here. Is to posit an entity to think it?

Kant allows the understanding to think whatever it wants, but these thoughts are mere conceptions, for understanding is primarily the faculty of conceptual representation. And if understanding can think a conception, to then deem the concept unintelligible is contradictory.

Entities, then, might better be considered as the possible representation of that which is subsumed under the conception. In the case of those conceptions that are intelligible insofar as understanding thinks them, re: noumena, but objects the conceptions of which are not, it is the understanding itself in which resides the intelligibility quality, not the object.

The proof: there is no such thing as a noumenal entity, for the human intelligence, which is to say Kant does not allow positing entities beyond intelligibility. To posit that which understanding cannot think, is impossible.

This is not to say noumenal objects are impossible; only that they are not within the human capacity to think, therefrom to cognize, which just is to posit, at all.

“…he will not even be able to justify the possibility of such a pure assertion, without taking
account of the empirical use of the understanding, and thereby fully renouncing the pure and sense-free judgment. Thus the concept of pure, merely intelligible objects is entirely devoid of all principles of its application, since one cannot think up any way in which they could be given…”
(A260/B315)

You know…..just sayin’.

It's useless to tell us whether this or that is unverifiable until you tell us your criteria for verification. — Sirius

A statement has been verified if the statement is discovered to be true.

It has been asked “what is metaphysics?”. One characteristic of metaphysical questions is that they are never verified to be true. For example, does anyone know the true answer to the metaphysical question “why is there something rather than nothing” or “do we have free will” or "what is the nature of reality”. In fact, if a statement can be verified, such that the speed of light is 299,792,458 m/s, then by definition it cannot be a metaphysical statement.

Not only that, you will also have to justify it. — Sirius

It is sufficient justification that metaphysical statements are not verifiable by pointing out that no metaphysical statement has been verified to be true.

Of course, if language is a tool, then it cannot be the subject matter of any science which aims to discover truths. This was known to Aristotle. — Sirius

Science is always concerned about the tools it uses. A faulty tool will give faulty answers. For example, when studying cells, the microscopes being used are constantly being tested for optical quality, resolution, etc.

But the [neo-] positivists you are echoing actually disputed this. They regarded language as unveiling the structure of the world & mind. — Sirius

Truth cannot be found within language. Truth transcends language. It is not the case that “Paris is in France is true” but rather “Paris is in France” is true IFF Paris is in France.

The neo-positivists (aka logical positivists, logical empiricists) followed the verification principle, in that a statement can only be meaningful if either empirically verifiable or a tautology.

As regards the world, a statement such as “Paris is in France” can be empirically verified, and therefore is meaningful, but as regards the mind, a statement such as “this painting is beautiful” cannot be empirically verified, and is therefore meaningless.

For the neo-positivists, language was very limited in its ability to unveil the structure of the world and mind, as not only was it forced to reject any statement that could not be empirically verified but also was forced to reject all poetic, metaphorical and emotive language.

Then you lose your reason for denying the possibility of non sensible or sensible intuition as an infallible source of knowledge. I recommend you to check the Critique of Pure Reason. — Sirius

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason discusses a priori pure intuitions of time and space and a priori pure concepts of the Categories. This is knowledge, but not innate knowledge that precedes our sensibilities. This is knowledge that derives from the very sensibilities that it needs to make sense of, ie, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism.

This is why I wrote “All our knowledge comes from sensory experience”.

Kant did not propose that we have knowledge prior to our sensibilities, which we then apply to our sensibilities. Kant proposed in Transcendental Idealism that a priori knowledge is that knowledge derived from our sensibilities that is necessary to make sense of these very same sensibilities.

I don't want to derail this thread but I will respond to your objection. The fact of the matter is CPR has a 1st & 2nd edition. Almost all Kantian scholars agree the two editions appear to have contradictory claims & the majority do think the contradictions are real & ireconcilable

This is why I mentioned Kant's refutation of idealism, which he added to his 2nd edition of CPR. Here is where he makes strange claims in regards to noumena

I am conscious of my existence as determined in time. All time determination presupposes something permanent in perception. But this permanent something cannot be something within me, precisely because my existence can be determined in time only by this permanent something.Therefore perception of this permanent something is possible only through a thing outside me and not through mere presentation of a thing outside me — CPR, B276, translation of Pluhar (the best)

From this quote, it's clear the ground of our representations, all of phenomena, can't be an object of phenomena. It must be an object in the realm of noumena & it must exist in order for empirical realism to be true.

Thus the concept of pure, merely intelligible objects is entirely devoid of all principles of its application, since one cannot think up any way in which they could be given…”
(A260/B315) — Mww

The quote you provided doesn't refute my claim since I'm not saying Kant claims we have non sensible intuition of intelligible objects & thus we can posit them. Rather, I say Kant allows us to posit unintelligible objects for which we have no DIRECT sensible (the only kind for Kant) intuition in his refutation of idealism.

So, in other words, you're just making shit up like "the ground of metaphysics".. That's Reddit bs, son.

So, in other words, you're just making shit up like "the ground of metaphysics".. That's Reddit bs, son. — 180 Proof

Unc trying to ragebait me. :lol: , it won't work. I'm too playful to get butthurt.

No. Whether metaphysics is possible or not & under what conditions, all of that involves studying the ground of metaphysics.

It's not a coincidence that the principle of intelligibility is looked upon at the beginning of the inquiry. It deals with the question whether the structure of Intellect & Being has any link & what kind. If it fails, all fails.

This is a perennial question & I'm stupefied to see you so lost in understanding its importance

Ascetic Socratism, decadence, self-hate, life-denying.. — DifferentiatingEgg

Guilty as charged. Where's my punishment for corrupting the youth ?

I say Kant allows us to posit unintelligible objects for which we have no DIRECT sensible (the only kind for Kant) intuition….. — Sirius

….and I’m saying to posit unintelligible objects, is itself unintelligible. We don’t care about the intuition we don’t have; we only care about setting limits on understanding, in order to prevent having to ask why we don’t, or, what would happen if we did.

:up: :up:

It is obviously, clearly, not unintelligible to posit unintelligible objects. Its just pointless. It would be unintelligible (and its obviously, because this isn't possible - which is essentially what the term claims) to posit a specific unintelligible object. That is not what's being done in those sorts of theories.

When people say "that's meta" in daily usage, they're usually talking about something in a philosophical sense...like the general characteristics, or the bigger narrative behind something. If that's what metaphysics are in philosophy, then metaphysics is a rendundant term. — ProtagoranSocratist

To me, metaphysics means more of a methodology of revealing about the world i.e. the universe. It adopts a critical reflection on the basis of the questions how and why on all the objects in the universe exist, change and behave as they do, and aims to arrive to the analytical and logical conclusions on the questions.

This is why I mentioned Kant's refutation of idealism, which he added to his 2nd edition of CPR. Here is where he makes strange claims in regards to noumena

I am conscious of my existence as determined in time. All time determination presupposes something permanent in perception. But this permanent something cannot be something within me, precisely because my existence can be determined in time only by this permanent something.Therefore perception of this permanent something is possible only through a thing outside me and not through mere presentation of a thing outside me
— CPR, B276, translation of Pluhar (the best)

From this quote, it's clear the ground of our representations, all of phenomena, can't be an object of phenomena. It must be an object in the realm of noumena & it must exist in order for empirical realism to be true. — Sirius

Notice that he starts with "I am conscious of my existence as determined in time." That is phenomenology. He's pointing out that he experiences himself as being in motion through time. If he's in motion, it has to be relative to something stationary. If all he is resides within this thing traveling through time, then there must be something other than himself that is a stationary object.

So when you go to form conclusions from this, keep in mind the nature of the argument. It's phenomenology and its logical (if A is moving, there must be a not-A that's stationary.) There is no transcendental vantage point from which to verify it. It's in the category of "I reckon."

It is obviously, clearly, not unintelligible to posit unintelligible objects. — AmadeusD

Ok. If it isn’t unintelligible, indicating it is intelligible, what would it look like….what conditions would have to be met….to go ahead and do it? How would you intelligibly posit unintelligible objects?

Seriously. I mean….I can’t so would like to be informed as to why that is.

A specific unintelligible object makes explicit the possibility of a multiplicity of them. If one is unintelligible to posit, and if there is a multiplicity of them, then they all are, insofar as whichever unintelligible object it is, that is posited, is undeteminable. If they all are unintelligible merely bcause one of them specifically is, then none of them can be posited, which is just the same as there is no positing of unintelligible objects.

Stupid f’ing language games.

‘Preciate it. I got two of ‘em, a rarity I must say.

the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space.

So how can something be a "first principal"? Do you agree with google or not? — ProtagoranSocratist

There are the concepts and objects that we know by reflecting, intuiting and thinking about them, rather than by physical observations, for instance all the examples listed above. The methodology and subject for dealing with these concepts are Metaphysics.