From the perspective of Enlightenment philosophy in general, and Kantian metaphysics in particular, transcendental thinking is thinking (the synthesis of conceptions by means of the reproductive imagination) in which the conceptions are a priori (not only having nothing to do with this or that experience, but having nothing to do with any experience whatsoever).

A priori. Not of this or that experience, not of any experience whatsoever, but always for any possible experience whatsoever.

Transcendental whatever, is just the condition by which that whatever comes about. Transcendental cognitions are a priori; transcendental judgements, transcendental ideas, transcendental knowledge and so on.

All reason is transcendental, but not all transcendental is reason.

Understanding does not originate any transcendental conceptions, but uses them to construct mathematics, which is a system of synthetic a priori judgements.

Nutshell….

If by appearance you mean some kind of a picture or moving pictures (images) etc, then that's out of question. The representation only comes about when your sensible intuitions + understanding + affections of senses work together. In other words, you need a schema of imagination. — Sirius

We see a visual field that has within it objects. For me the question for Kant is whether we see the actual objects or merely mental representations of the objects. It's like the debate between direct and indirect realism. The former say that we see the actual objects and the latter say we see representations of the objects, but that the representations present us with aspects of the objects. However, the aspects are relational in that they only show us the results of the objects' affects on our bodies, and show us nothing of how the objects are in themselves.

How did Enlightenment thinkers explain apriori knowledge? Like from God?

….Copernicus removed us from the centre of things and Kant does precisely the opposite. — Janus

Yeah, that is ironic, hence ill-warranted “revolution”. That and the notion of treating metaphysics as a science. Still, both manifest as paradigm shifts in their respective disciplines.

….every thought inevitably produces its opposite. — Janus

That’s just logic, right? Principle of Complementarity? So two aspects of thought, yes, but the subject was two aspects of the world. Not sure complementarity works there.

Yeah, that is ironic, hence ill-warranted “revolution”. — Mww

I thought that might be what you had in mind.

That’s just logic, right? Principle of Complementarity? So two aspects of thought, yes, but the subject was two aspects of the world. Not sure complementarity works there. — Mww

I can't remember from my long ago readings of Kant and his commentators, whether he ever explicitly states that, despite the fact that we think of the world dualistically as "for us" and "in itself", the world is really one (non-dual).

The puzzle for me is what it could really mean to say the world is empirically real and yet transcendentally ideal. I always thought it would be more accurate to say it is empirically ideal and transcendentally real―in that what it is for us is always mixed up with our ideas, whereas what it is in itself has nothing to do with our ideas.

Hardly from god. Kant’s motto, circa 1784: sapere aude.

From the nature of human intelligence.

Speculative metaphysics means you gotta stop somewhere in formulating tenets supporting your theory. Infinite regress on one hand, inevitable contradiction on the other, in going too far.

The puzzle for me is what it could really mean to say the world is empirically real and yet transcendentally ideal. — Janus

Technically, it is things in the world that are empirically real. The world is a general conception representing the totality of those empirically real things, but is not itself empirically real. Hence an a priori conception representing an object in general, or, an ideal originating in reason.

Kant defines “object” to accord with perception and phenomena, from which it is deductible that “world” is not an object, hence cannot be empirically real. I’m find that for you if you’re interested.

Hardly from god. Kant’s motto, circa 1784: sapere aude.

From the nature of human intelligence.

Speculative metaphysics means you gotta stop somewhere in formulating tenets supporting your theory. Infinite regress on one hand, inevitable contradiction on the other, in going too far. — Mww

I don't think sapere aude conflicts with identifying logic as God. Most rationalists did see God as foundational and indispensable, and accepting apriori knowledge is a rationalist attitude. Locke wouldn't have accepted it. So how would Kant have answered Locke's view? I'm curious. :smile:

Yes, I know what you mean. The world is a collection of things and nothing over and above that―so I was speaking somewhat sloppily. The point remains in relation to objects (things) considered variously by Kant as "for us" and "in themselves". If things are actually something in themselves then it follows that they are real in themselves. If they are for us mixed up with, mediated by, our ideas, then they are ideal for us. I'm just playfully flipping the script in a way that for me at least makes sense.

The same formulation is used in B, now with the role of categories having been established — Paine

No. I haven't ignored anything. It simply looks like you haven't been reading my posts carefully. I do believe Kant's refutation of idealism (ROI) is INCONSISTENT with his project of transcendental idealism. So merely pointing to contrasting views expressed elsewhere in edition A or B does nothing unless you can show us a different plausible reading of ROI, which you haven't

I prefer Pluhar's translation & I will tell you what I think about the passage you just quoted, beginning from the 2nd edition as it's the most relevant, showing Kant 's failure to remain consistent

Now, it is true that all our presentations are by the understanding referred to some object; and since appearances are nothing but presentations, the understanding refers them to a something as the object of sensible intuition. But this something is in so far only the transcendental object — CPR, A250,B305

In this passage Kant appears to tells us the transcendental object is itself an appearance & presentation (focus on the italicized part). You can pick 2 options here.

Either this transcendental isn't the object Kant talks about in his ROI, in which case you won't have a clear contradiction, but the passage won't refute my interpretation, whereby Kant claims noumenal objects exist

Or you can claim this transcendental object is exactly the object Kant talks about in his ROI, but then you will arrive at a clear contradiction since in his ROI he explicitly states this object CANNOT be a presentation.

I quote again

I am conscious of my existence as determined in time. All time determination presuppose something permanent in perception. But this permanent something cannot be something within me, precisely because my existence can be determined in time only by this permanent something.Therefore perception of this permanent something is possible only through
a thing outside me and not through mere presentation of a thing outside me. Hence determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of actual things that I perceive outside me. — CPR,B276

Going back to the part you quoted.

This, however, signifies only a something = x of which we do not know-nor (by our understanding's current arrangement) can in principle! ever know-anything whatsoever. — A250,B305

This remaining passage of A250,B305 isn't problematic in any regards in so far as positing the existence of a noumenal object is concerned. Why ? Because not knowing anything about X does not imply you can't say it exists. Why ? Because existence for Kant has no analytic or synthetic relationship to an object. It niether belongs to its essential concept nor can it ever add to its concept.

Some people unfortunately don't have this in mind when they read this passage & thus end up claiming if we don't know anything about x, we surely can't know if it exists since that is also a conceptual claim regarding x. In complete contradiction to Kant.

Further in the same section, Kant makes a distinction that is missing your account: — Paine

It's not missing. I told you I'm aware of the contradictions. The passage you quoted (A253,B308) doesn't save you from anything. It merely presents a dilemma. Either the transcendental object is not related to noumena & in which case, it says nothing about the object posited in ROI (not presentation, appearance, phenomenon) or Kant is wrong in claiming the transcendental object does not belong to the noumenal realm. Which is it ? Pick your horn or show us a third way.

Yes. Kant's CPR is inconsistent & I'm not the first one to point this out. So go & face ROI.

The most prominent relation Kant had with Locke’s philosophy, as far as I know, is the notion of innate knowledge, which Kant rejected. As far as empirical realism is concerned, Kant maintains that for Locke’s version, and Hume’s as well, space and time must be properties of things, whereas…as we all know…Kant restricts space and time to our own internal faculty of intuition. For an infinitely divisible yet immaterial thing to be a property, is absurd, for Kant.
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If things are actually something in themselves then it follows that they are real in themselves. — Janus

Another technicality. For a thing to be something in itself is just to be a thing in itself, and while it is necessary to say such a thing exists, it is not necessary to say it is real. To do so is to contradict the category, insofar as reality is the conjunction of a thing with perception and we never perceive things-in-themselves. From which follows it must be that the thing of the thing in itself, is that which is in conjunction with perception, and the thing is real to us.

The main point is that things must be real, insofar as they appear to the senses, but things-in-themselves, insofar as they are as they are in-themselves they do not appear to our senses, so the major criteria for being real, is absent.

But if your way makes sense to you, far be it from me to intrude. You know…like I just did.

The most prominent relation Kant had with Locke’s philosophy, as far as I know, is the notion of innate knowledge, which Kant rejected. — Mww

Locke rejected innate knowledge. Kant accepts that we have knowledge a priori. My question was: how would Kant defend a priori knowledge to Locke?

As far as empirical realism is concerned, Kant maintains that for Locke’s version, and Hume’s as well, space and time must be properties of things, whereas…as we all know…Kant restricts space and time to our own internal faculty of intuition. For an infinitely divisible yet immaterial thing to be a property, is absurd, for Kant. — Mww

Hume was accepting Newton's version of things. The success of Newtonian physics would have been a basis for Hume's acceptance. I think Kant's whole project may have been more phenomenological than we sometimes imagine. So transcendental thinking is just there. We experience it. We can't follow it down to its roots, so we just leave that issue to the side. So there wouldn't have been a clear inner/outer distinction. Kant was a phenomenologist. That's my theory.

My question was: how would Kant defend a priori knowledge to Locke? — frank

Hmmmm, I’m not sure he could. I doubt Locke had any inkling, nor entertained the possibility, of knowledge given from man himself. Empiricists in general attributed knowledge to experience alone. Impressions and whatnot. But ol’ Johnny was pretty smart, so Kant might have enabled him to see the transcendental light.

But ol’ Johnny was pretty smart, so Kant might have enabled him to see the transcendental light. — Mww

I doubt it. :razz:

Another technicality. For a thing to be something in itself is just to be a thing in itself, and while it is necessary to say such a thing exists, it is not necessary to say it is real. — Mww

To say something exists necessarily involves saying it is real, as far as i can tell. I mean, you might say that the category <real> subsumes the category <exists> so that there are real things such as universals, numbers, identities, laws of nature and so on which are real, but do not exist, but I can't make sense of the idea that something could exist and yet not be real (in the ontological sense―something might exist and yet be fake, for instance).

To do so is to contradict the category, insofar as reality is the conjunction of a thing with perception and we never perceive things-in-themselves. From which follows it must be that the thing of the thing in itself, is that which is in conjunction with perception, and the thing is real to us. — Mww

You are stipulating a tendentious definition of real―a definition which is not in accordance with common usage. If the thing of the thing in itself is real as perceived, and it necessarily exists else we could not perceive it, how could it make sense to say it is not real in itself?

The main point is that things must be real, insofar as they appear to the senses, but things-in-themselves, insofar as they are as they are in-themselves they do not appear to our senses, so the major criteria for being real, is absent. — Mww

So, here is the same mistake. The major criteria for things being real, according to common usage, is that they exist, not that they be perceived (although the latter, if hallucinations be not counted as perceptions, is another criterion).

I know you don't like OLP, but it does have a point, which is that if we are free to use terms however idiosyncratically we like, then that pretty much enables us to say whatever we like without the risk of being wrong. There is no absolute fact of the matter as to the meaning of the terms we use in philosophy, so most common usage is the only guide we have.

Fair enough. It seems so to me.

Fair enough.

My point even annoys me. I just can't get out of it, in my own thinking.

to be totally honest, a lot of Kant's terminology just seems like unintelligible jibberish to me since having read more of it in the discussion, but that doesn't mean that it is, were dealing with systems here...he was likely verifiably wrong about a lot of things, but the guy did write i think over 20,000 pages of philosophy...

Again, this is not my understanding of what a priori means. As I wrote previously, I see it as knowledge we have as part of our human nature. It’s built into us. — T Clark

Many people believe that “knowledge results from biological and neurological Darwinian evolution”, as do I. In this context, the term “a priori” has a particular meaning.

However, if we are talking about Kant, this is not what Kant meant by “a priori”. In this different context, the term “a priori” as used by Kant has a different meaning

You are stipulating a tendentious definition of real…. — Janus

Yeah, I’ll own that. All that is real are the schemata of “reality”, just as are all things the schemata of “world”. Postmodern/current philosophy does nothing for me, so there’s no positive reason to update myself from such….tendeneity? Is that a word? If it wasn’t, it is now.

That which exists but is not perceived is only understood as having to be real, via inference. That which is perceived necessarily exists and is known to be real, via experience.

The necessary existence of the thing-in-itself, and the perceived thing of the thing-in-itself, is simply a matter of the time of the one relative to an observer and the time of the other relative to the same observer. At this time it is a thing existing in-itself, at that time it is a thing existing as perceived and represented in him.
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The major criteria for things being real, according to common usage, is that they exist…. — Janus

I understand that, and agree. To be real is to exist. But that’s not the contentious issue, that being, what is it to exist and be real, however idealistically contentious that may be?

That thing is red, just asks…what thing is red? A thing exists and is real, just asks…what thing exists and is real?

Hardly anyone asks what is it to exist and be real, but certain philosophers do, and seriously inquisitive regular folks might.

Simplest, most parsimonious, and altogether non-contradictory response, as far as we humans are concerned, is….a thing that exists and is real is that thing effecting the senses. That which doesn’t meet the criteria of effecting the senses can only be said to a possible thing, some thing conceived in thought, the reality of which is not addressed by the mere thought of its possibility.

BOOM!!!! Done deal, can’t argue that one bit without being stupid.
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On OLP:

When doing philosophy as a subjective personality, or even philosophizing with respect to a given thesis objectively…are we allowed to use terminology any way we like?

As you say, there is no absolute fact of the matter as to the meaning of the terms we use in philosophy, generally, for which common usage would then be a proper guide, but there is, or can be, facts of the matter relative to terms used in particular philosophies. And if a guy deviates from such facts of the textual matter, e.g., “….by this I mean to say…”, or, “….in this is to be understood….”, he falsifies the very thesis he presents, and if he is a position to be teaching it, that deviation teaches sheer nonsense.

But I get your point. Phenomenon, say, means this for this guy, it means that for that guy. Whether they are using the term wrong depends on the source they acquire it from. No term in its use could possibly be wrong if he invents the term for a purpose, but it could be very wrong if he uses it in some sort of opposition to the source, not himself, he learned it from. He would have to prove the original was wrong, in order for his use not to be.

I picked phenomenon because some folks like to call Kant a phenomenologist, which of course he would never call himself, which makes explicit he was not. And he wouldn't call himself that because he already stated for the record what he thought of himself as being, and that wasn’t it. Whoever says that considers himself at liberty to say whatever he likes merely because he thinks it the case. One might say, here, OLP was his guide.

Hey now. It worked for me, and I’m richer, smarter and immeasurably better looking.

However, if we are talking about Kant, this is not what Kant meant by “a priori”. In this different context, the term “a priori” as used by Kant has a different meaning — RussellA

In case you’re interested, here’s a link to an article by Lorenz—“Kant's Doctrine Of The A Priori In The Light Of Contemporary Biology.”

https://archive.org/details/KantsDoctrineOfTheAPrioriInTheLightOfContemporaryBiologyKonradLorenz

But ya know…realm of noumena. Understanding. Same as the transcendental object. Both concepts thought transcendentally. — Mww

Both may be thought "transcendentally" but are not identical. The point of my looking at the precise way Kant expresses the transcendental object was to question the statement made that the A and B editions were fundamentally different in this regard.

In both places, the transcendental object is not an appearance but a part of establishing 'objective validity' for representations. It is not called the noumenon because it is part of our process of understanding what is given through intuition of the senses. In making the point, Kant is constantly comparing it to an intuition that we do not have but can think as possible. So, the "object in general" is recognized as:

Hence to this extent the categories extend further than sensible intuition, since they think objects in general without seeing to the particular manner (of sensibility) in which they might be given. But they do not thereby determine a greater sphere of objects, since one cannot assume that such objects can be given without presupposing that another kind of intuition than the sensible kind is possible, which, however, we are by no means justified in doing. — ibid. A254/B309

Not being able to determine a "greater sphere of objects" undermines saying:

From this quote, it's clear the ground of our representations, all of phenomena, can't be an object of phenomena. It must be an object in the realm of noumena & it must exist in order for empirical realism to be true. — Sirius

The existence of noumena has not been asserted or denied anywhere in the work. To call it a realm is to ignore:

The concept of a noumenon is therefore merely a boundary concept, in order to limit the pretension of sensibility, and therefore only of negative use. But it is nevertheless not invented arbitrarily, but is rather connected with the limitation of sensibility, yet without being able to posit anything positive outside of the domain of the latter. — ibid. A255/B311

I am not aware of any place in the Critique where Kant argued differently from this.

Both may be thought "transcendentally" but are not identical. — Paine

Of course they are not identical, never said they were, and never should have been thought to imply they were. That they have common source can be described as both belonging to the realm…or faculty, or domain or some such…..of understanding. No big deal.

Your exposé of the transcendental object, while quite good, has nothing to do with what I said.

I did not mean to provide an opposing argument, only to clarify that I was not trying to avoid the "transcendental" in your comment.

We’re good.

I can understand why the idea of metaphysics confuses you because it involves what lies beyond 'physics' ideas of physics evolve alongside developments in science, including the transition from Newtonian thinking to that of quantum physics.

It involves a mixture of philosophy speculation and maths. The question may be about where the pathways of human understanding come in, with the concepts of physics being more than decorative aspects of the field of physics.

Hey now. It worked for me, and I’m richer, smarter and immeasurably better looking. — Mww

Top tier evidence. Thank you.

what lies beyond 'physics' — Jack Cummins

An inquiry into – speculation about – 'what (the synoptic results of) physics means for understanding existence' ...

Physics is a basis for understanding the laws of the physical world. The nature and purpose of 'existence' is more complex. There may be meaning, or no meaning, depending on how a person's construction of 'reality- But, as far as I see it metaphysics involves the issues of 'beyond' the physical, whether the physical comes down to laws of nature or substantive aspects of the 'truths' underlying the nature of 'reality'.

Physics is a basis for understanding the laws of the physical world. The nature and purpose of 'existence' is more complex. — Jack Cummins

:up: